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Introduction 
 
As a teenager, I had a profound interest in the role of the United States (U.S.) in 
international affairs. My curiosity derived from my close proximity to Washington, D.C. and 
the daily international news coverage broadcast from that location. Local news stations 
continuously covered the visits of foreign dignitaries and the role of their U.S. counterparts. 
Unsurprisingly, media outlets frequently put a positive spin on U.S. political-military activity 
abroad, depicting the United States as an international leader, role model and global assistant. 
For the most part, I naively believed in the benevolence of my country at this time. 
However, the U.S. military deployment to the Saudi Arabia following Iraq’s annexation of 
Kuwait in 1990 challenged aforementioned preconceptions at a significant juncture in my life. 
I was about to graduate high school and had been contemplating joining the armed forces as a 
means of escaping my hometown. I was skeptical of U.S. motivations and goals vis-à-vis Iraq, 
as I had witnessed an oscillation in the quality of U.S. relations with Iraq’s leader Saddam 
Hussein during the previous decade. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan, and acting Vice 
President George H.W. Bush, had aided and befriended Hussein during his near decade-long 
war with Iran—a campaign initiated by Hussein. Nevertheless, when Iraq annexed Kuwait in 
1990, George H.W. Bush was acting President, and he depicted Saddam as a rogue leader and 
a threat to international peace and stability. This seemingly sudden and complete reversal of 
nearly a decade of support made me question U.S. government motives. 
In response to Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait, the United States, Britain and France, among 
other countries, rapidly mobilized political and military assets to restore the status quo in the 
Middle East. During this time, the media persistently reported and conjectured about the 
possibility of war. Meanwhile, critics surmised that oil interest was the single motivating 
factor driving U.S. policy in the Middle East. Even the uneducated inhabitants of rural 
Virginia where I lived were objective enough to recognize the addiction the United States has 
to petroleum was most likely prompting the U.S. to demonize Hussein. With this in mind, it 
was unsurprising when the Persian Gulf War was launched in the spring of 1991, under the 
banner of liberating Kuwait, against Saddam Hussein. 
During the war, the media provided around-the-clock news coverage throughout the two-
month campaign. I did my utmost to stay informed about what was happening, but U.S. news 
coverage tended to put a positive slant on their coverage. For instance, I do not recall a great 
deal of information being provided about the effects the war was having on civilians in Iraq. 
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Instead, attention was concentrated on explaining U.S. military technology, missions and 
stated objectives. While I found this information interesting, it equally seemed biased. 
Ultimately the U.S.-led coalition successfully “liberated” Kuwait and the war ended. While a 
strategic victory, it was unclear that U.S. military capability would produce a political victory. 
I graduated after the alleged U.S. military victory, but I refrained from enlisting in the 
armed forces subsequent to graduating from high school in the summer of 1991. I refused to 
become an instrument of what I perceived as unpredictable, aggressive U.S. foreign policy 
that was driven by economic interests. This perception was facilitated by the demonization of 
Saddam Hussein and the devastation wrought by the 1991 Persian Gulf War, whereupon my 
qualitative analysis of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Iraq was further undercut by the debilitating post-
war sanctioning imposed. Although Iraq’s military had been crippled by the Persian Gulf 
War, United States representatives repeatedly touted that the enforcement of economic and 
political sanctions were fundamental to ensuring Saddam Hussein was weakened and isolated. 
My skepticism was later confirmed as media outlets began emphasizing the humanitarian 
implications the policy was having on Iraq’s society, including food shortages. It was at this 
juncture that I was unable to reconcile a U.S. policy. At that time, the U.S. was punishing 
Iraq’s population as a means of isolating and weakening an authoritarian government that it 
had previously supported. 
Prompted by intrigue and frustration with U.S. politics and policy, I later enrolled at 
university as a mature student, concentrating on international studies. In August 2001, after 
one year of studies, I took a break from university and left the U.S. to enhance my perspective 
by traveling to obtain first-hand experience. Nearly a month subsequent to my departure from 
the United States, the September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) terrorist attacks on New York and 
Virginia occurred. While horrific, my location afforded me an opportunity to observe the U.S. 
response as an outsider. Equally beneficial, from my external vantage point, I was unexposed 
to U.S. media coverage and did not feel that I had been personally targeted or vulnerable. 
With the perspective of an outsider, it was easy not to become entangled in the frenzy of 
fear and anger so evident among the U.S. population following 9/11. As opposed to feeling 
insecure, I was busy contemplating why the event had taken place and observing similarities 
between the George W. Bush administration’s reaction and rhetoric to 9/11, to that which I 
had keenly observed in 1990 when the case for war with Iraq was presented. The similarities 
were profound: the United States was once again to assume for itself the role of benevolent 
leader, security provider and provider of justice. While the target in 2001 was initially 
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terrorism, an obscure concept, Iraq would later be identified as an existential threat to the 
United States, and a promoter and supporter of terrorism. 
As we know, the George W. Bush administration launched its “War on Terrorism” 
campaign against Afghanistan in the autumn of 2001. Soon thereafter, one could readily 
recognize that the Bush administration was gradually refocusing its attention onto Iraq. As a 
component of its transition of attention, the acting administration began to demonize Iraq, 
arguing that the post-war 1991 violent sanctioning and isolation of Iraq, which was still 
ongoing at the time, was insufficient for securing U.S. regional interests and reducing the 
international threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Within this frame, the Bush administration 
argued that regime change and imposed democratization were necessary to reduce the threat 
of international terrorism, and to empower and assist Iraq’s population, and stabilize the 
region. As rhetoric hardened, it became clear that George W. Bush was determined to affect 
regime change in Iraq using U.S. military force. His determination culminated in the 
controversial 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, whose campaign produced severe and 
long-term, albeit asymmetrical, ramifications in Iraq and the United States. 
Motivation 
This dissertation is a continuation of my master thesis in Peace, Development and Conflict 
Transformation, which explored the military and political components of George W. Bush’s 
“War on Terrorism” and their manifestation in Iraq. As a result of researching how U.S. 
counterterrorism policy was designed and implemented in Iraq in 2003, and the physical, 
psychological and social disruptions associated with its implementation, I was motivated to 
understand how the two countries might improve the quality of their relationship subsequent 
to decades of violence. In short, I wanted to know how the United States and Iraq could alter 
the quality of their relationship following decades of violent conflict that had produced 
animosity and grievance between both populations. Naturally, this inquiry led me to explore 
conflict resolution as a discipline and practice; a practice that scholars suggest can be utilized 
to improve conflictual relationships. 
During my research of conflict resolution as a discipline and practice, I quickly discovered 
two important research gaps. First, scholars frequently present their theories as representative 
of laypersons’ opinion, but no research, to my knowledge, analyzes laypersons’ understanding 
of conflict resolution. Thus, scholars imply their theories are representative, but it seems 
logical to question the veracity using quantitative research. Hence, the literature suggests it 
expounds upon a “Western” approach, or an “Arab/Muslim” approach to conflict resolution, 
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yet one is left wondering how accurate and representative scholarly theory is among those 
laypersons. Although few scholars qualify the opinion of laypersons, some emphasize the 
need to consult with societies when designing and implementing a conflict resolution 
program. 
The second research gap I discovered is the narrow approach that scholars commonly use 
when comparatively analyzing “Arab/Muslim” and “Western” conflict resolution theory and 
practices. Existing comparisons generally limit themselves to the Western structural approach 
theory whereupon conclusions are drawn concerning comparisons between “Western” and 
“Arab/Muslim” approaches. Consequently, the narrowly constructed cross-cultural 
comparisons conducted hitherto hypothesize that the Arab/Muslim and Western cultural 
approaches are incompatible and containing competing objectives and practices. However, 
Western scholarship embraces more than one approach to conflict resolution. In particular, 
two Western approaches to conflict resolution, the social-psychological and spiritual, have 
been largely marginalized when cross-cultural comparisons are made. This thesis aims to fill 
these research gaps and, thereby, to demonstrate that there is a greater degree of similarity in 
how conflict resolution is conceptualized and practiced across Arab/Muslim and Western 
culture than scholars hitherto acknowledged. 
Theoretical framework 
My research conducts a comparative analysis of conflict resolution in theory and practice 
at the interstate level to determine how the conflictual relationship between the United States 
and Iraq might be altered. Pursuit of this objective requires the construction of a theoretical 
framework that accommodates comprehensive understandings of conflict resolution as 
articulated in Western and Arab/Muslim literature, whereby more representative cross-cultural 
comparisons can be made across Arab/Muslim and Western approaches. Most importantly, 
we seek to establish a broad framework, which is necessary for two reasons. On the one hand, 
notwithstanding agreement on the importance of conflict resolution for transforming violent 
conflictual relationships, Western scholars sometimes disagree on pivotal conceptual and 
methodological aspects of the process. Such divergences complicate calls for conflict 
resolution since consensus on elements, such as which tools are compulsory and at which 
point these should be introduced, is not forthcoming in Western literature. Theoretical and 
practical dissension, as alluded to, arises as a result of the complexity of conflict resolution as 
a phenomenon, in addition to the amalgamation of innumerable theories across a wide 
spectrum of fields, and the existence of three peacebuilding approaches, or schools of thought, 
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in Western discourse. We determine, therefore, that it is essential to build a framework where 
the theoretical diversity advanced by the three Western schools of thought, conflict 
management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation, can be accommodated, By 
creating a broad framework, we can ensure that Western theory is holistically represented, and 
not reduced to the structural approach as has been common hitherto, before comparisons are 
made across cultures. 
On the other hand, a similarly inclusive approach must be applied when delineating and 
comparing Arab/Muslim theory with that advocated in the West. As noted above, most 
Arab/Muslim comparative literature produced hitherto is based on a narrow comparison. 
Based on this restricted framework, scholars conclude there are prominent cross-cultural 
incongruities between Western and Arab/Muslim approaches, a finding that leads those same 
scholars to hypothesize that Western conflict resolution principles and practices are 
inappropriate or unacceptable in the Arab/Muslim context. However, when a broad Western 
framework is applied, many of the theoretical and practical divergences denoted in the 
literature diminish. Moreover, there are some Arab/Muslim scholars who acknowledge cross-
cultural convergences, but their work is frequently overlooked or dismissed by comparative 
literature. Thus, we believe it is theoretically beneficial to our research to establish a wide 
understanding of both Arab/Muslim and Western approaches to conflict, despite the challenge 
associated with locating relevant comparative literature (in the English language). 
Subsequent to delineating our broad Western framework, it will be possible to make cross-
cultural comparisons across scholarship as the Arab/Muslim tradition to conflict resolution is 
delineated. Once both macro level Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations have been 
articulated from our literature review, our analysis turns to comparing scholarly 
conceptualizations with those held by laypersons. At the same time, we are able to compare 
laypersons opinion with other layperson across samples, utilizing the data collected from a 
small sample of respondents from the United States and Iraq. At this juncture, the present 
thesis compares conceptualizations of conflict resolution across cultures as extracted from the 
literature review and across a sample of laypersons utilizing a questionnaire. The combined 
approach, I believe, demonstrates the high level of cross-cultural parallels at the macro and 
micro levels, which contradicts previous research conducted at the macro level. 
For this reason, my research is theoretically valuable for three reasons. First, I incorporate 
a wider framework than most when comparatively analyzing Western and Arab/Muslim 
theory. Instead of limiting my analysis to the Western structural approach, which has 
frequently been the case hitherto, I also consider the social-psychological and spiritual 
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approaches. As will be demonstrated, these latter approaches are more similar to Arab/Muslim 
theory, whereby their integration suggests increased parallels in theory and practices between 
Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution than generally 
acknowledged. 
The second theoretical contribution that this research makes is its inclusion of laypersons’ 
perceptions of conflict resolution into scholarly discourse. As stated previously, scholars 
frequently dismiss the practice of consultation when theory is drafted. Ironically, Western 
scholars emphasize the importance of inclusion and consultation of society when resolving 
conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels, yet they seldom include laypersons’ opinions 
into their publications. To reverse this trend, I incorporate laypersons’ opinion, in a micro 
setting (U.S.-Iraq), to juxtapose laypersons’ opinion across cultures with macro theory 
produced by scholarship. I anticipate that the introduction of public opinion will challenge 
several scholarly assumptions, and, consequently, I hope the practice will prompt and 
reinvigorate academic discourse on cross-cultural conflict resolution between two countries. 
Finally, and alluded to above, my analysis is not limited to macro level theory of 
Arab/Muslim and Western practices. Contrary, I introduce laypersons’ opinion, focused 
specifically on a convenience sample of citizens from the U.S. and Iraq. In this manner, my 
approach shifts the center of theoretical discourse away from conventional, scholarly 
generalizations (West versus Arab/Muslim approaches) to my sample of U.S. and Iraq 
citizens. Accordingly, scholarly understanding of conflict resolution, which is generalized to 
represent “Western” and “Arab/Muslim” approaches, is juxtaposed with my sample of 
laypersons. Incorporation of micro level opinion is logical since my interest is in exploring 
conflict resolution in the U.S.-Iraq case, and, therefore, my analysis should include these two 
groups of stakeholders. 
Hypotheses 
With my theoretical framework clarified, six working hypotheses guide the research. 
Hypothesis 1 states: There is a long-standing deconstructive conflict relationship between the 
United States and Iraq that has produced bilateral animosity between these respective 
societies. To qualify bilateral relations, a literature review of scholarly, independent and 
government resources, in the English language, is conducted to delineate the course of Iraq’s 
history. Our historical analysis begins with U.S.-Iraq conflict mapping. Testing of Hypothesis 
1 is completed with the qualification of the social impact of the U.S.-Iraq conflict relationship 
through an examination of open-source statistical data collected by various sources in the 
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English language, including independent research groups, media corporations and scholars, in 
chapter two. Amalgamated, the first two chapters of this research trace the history of U.S.-Iraq 
relations and prove the existence of a protracted conflictual relationship between the two 
countries respectively, which has produced suspicion and animosity across both societies. 
Following the qualification of Iraq’s history and U.S.-Iraq conflict mapping (1950s and 
2011), attention turns to analyzing scholarly literature on conflict resolution to transform 
conflict relations between two societies or states. References to conflict resolution in the 
context of U.S.-Iraq relations, raises the theoretical and practical issue of expected cross-
cultural divergence between U.S. (Western) and Iraq (Arab/Muslim) approaches. Namely, 
some Arab/Muslim scholars insist that Western approaches to conflict resolution are 
inapplicable and undesirable by Arab/Muslims. However, we believe that there is more 
commonality when conflict resolution is explored at the interstate level, and when all Western 
approaches to conflict resolution are considered. Hypothesis 2, therefore, states: Western and 
Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution, as articulated in the respective 
literature, will generally converge when a broad Western conflict resolution framework is 
applied. This hypothesis is tested through a literature review of topical material produced by 
Western and Arab/Muslim scholarship in the English language respectively. Our cross-
cultural comparison of approaches, tools and principles is conducted in three chapters, 
whereby we are able to produce and compare conceptual frameworks. 
Upon the comparative theoretical framework designed according to scholarly literature, 
our research shifts its attention from macro analysis to qualifying how a convenience sample 
of U.S. and Iraq respondents (or laypersons), the latter of which are hereafter referred to as 
Iraqis, conceptualize conflict resolution at the interstate level. This aspect of the research is 
guided by four working hypotheses. Among those, Hypothesis 3 broadly states: A majority of 
U.S. and Iraqi respondents from our research samples will similarly embrace sixteen conflict 
resolution principles. Next, Hypothesis 4 states that a majority of respondents from our survey 
samples will comparably embrace the same eleven tools for resolving conflict at the interstate 
level in general terms. Succinctly, I predict that our convience samples of laypersons will 
generally agree on principles and practices at the interstate level. This preliminary assumption 
is then taken one logical step further in conjunction with contemporary U.S.-Iraq conflict 
relations, to produces two additional hypotheses that must be tested. 
Foremost, Hypothesis 5 projects: Following decades of violent interaction, exemplified by 
the 2003 Iraq War, a majority of respondents from our convenience samples of U.S. and Iraq 
citizens will agree that conflict resolution is necessary to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq 
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relations. Testing this hypothesis requires qualification of our samples’ openness to a conflict 
resolution program in context. Finally, Hypothesis 6 suggests: A majority of those same 
respondents will support the use of a majority of thirteen conflict resolution techniques to alter 
the quality of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Hypothesis six, thus, examines acceptability 
of thirteen tools for advancing conflict resolution in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. To test 
hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6, I utilize an online survey. Data from our survey not only provides 
insight into how respondents perceive principles and tools associated with the advancement of 
conflict resolution between states, the first such study of its kind to the author’s knowledge, 
but also provides insight into how U.S.-Iraq relations might be pursued. Another theoretical 
advantage our approach is that our survey of laypersons allows us to comparatively analyze 
laypersons’ opinion against scholars’ opinion, whereby convergences and divergences can be 
qualified. 
Research objectives 
With our working hypotheses delineated, it becomes evident that our research has three 
broad objectives. The first objective is to outline Iraq’s historical trajectory while 
incorporating conflict mapping of U.S.-Iraq relations. Comprehensive delineation of Iraq’s 
history informs the reader about how the culture, politics and society of Iraq developed 
throughout history. Underscoring these developments is important because they have a direct 
impact on Iraq’s contemporary internal and external relations, social-political aspirations, as 
well as indigenous understanding of conflict and conflict resolution. Simultaneously, our 
historical analysis is valuable because it maps the conflictual relationship between the United 
States and Iraq, highlighting specific experiences, and demonstrating that there has been a 
long-standing violent relationship that has included the use of physical and structural 
violence. Within this frame, it is demonstrated that the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations has had a 
direct impact on citizens’ perceptions and welfare. In short, I qualify the existence of a 
protracted conflict relationship between these two countries and its impact on society, whose 
deconstructive nature suggests that conflict resolution should be pursued to alter the quality of 
the relationship between these two countries. 
Introduction of the concept of conflict resolution into this discourse raises the challenges 
of merging cross-cultural conceptualizations and the transference of theory and practice across 
cultures. Consequently, the second objective of this research is to comparatively analyze 
conflict resolution as articulated by Western and Arab/Muslim scholars. Analysis of the 
respective literature (in the English language) permits the creation of a framework of lexicon, 
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principles and practices of conflict resolution as articulated by scholars from both cultures. 
The values of this framework is that ours is broader, not limited to the Western structural 
approach alone, but also incorporating the social-psychological and spiritual approaches as 
well. Consequently, our cross-cultural comparison is broader than previous research, and is 
thereby able to better qualify convergences and divergences according scholarly articulations 
of theory and practice. Through the establishment of this framework, we are able to qualify a 
higher degree of cross-cultural convergence, which is fundamental to advancing conflict 
resolution between the United States and Iraq. Moreover, our comparative framework informs 
the creation of a questionnaire targeting laypersons, which is designed to qualify laypersons’ 
conceptualizations whereby we can measure opinions across samples and across laypersons 
and scholarly theory. 
The third and final objective of this research, as just alluded to, is to introduce laypersons’ 
conceptualization of conflict resolution at the micro level across cultures, and vis-à-vis 
scholarship, using a sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens. Our analysis is developed from a small 
convenience sample that was queried through an online survey. The survey qualifies 
respondents’ understanding of conflict resolution principles and practices in general, and then 
measures their perceptions of tools in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. The 
theoretical value of this survey is that it: a) comparatively analyzes layperson and scholarly 
conceptualization of conflict resolution; b) provides preliminary insight into laypersons’ 
openness to conflict resolution in the context of U.S. and Iraq; and c), identifies which of the 
principles and tools presented to the sample are deemed acceptable to improving interstate 
relations following conflict. This line of questioning, to my knowledge, is the first time micro 
level research has been conducted in this particular dichotomy. 
Combined, this research is a comprehensive case study that first traces the history of Iraq, 
and then qualifies U.S.-Iraq protracted conflict relations. Thereafter, it explores the possibility 
and viability of altering those relations by qualifying scholarly and laypersons’ 
conceptualizations of conflict resolution across cultures. The ultimate selection of these two 
samples as exemplars for evaluating conflict resolution across Arab/Muslim and Western 
culture is obvious. Summarily, the media has constantly spotlighted U.S.-Iraq relations for as 
long as I have been fascinated with U.S. foreign policy, and my research interests continues to 
be centered on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East in general, and Iraq in particular. 
In the context of this research, I perceive U.S.-Iraq relations are a microcosm of U.S.-
Middle East relations. More specifically, I believe that Iraq epitomizes the violent relationship 
between the United States and other countries in the Middle East. While I could have just as 
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easily selected Afghanistan, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia as case studies to argue my thesis and 
test my hypotheses, Iraq was selected because the 2003 invasion and occupation was 
internationally unpopular, unnecessary, and counterproductive. Thus, while this thesis focuses 
immediately on transforming the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations, the historical experiences 
outlined in this text, as well as the hypotheses and theories examined herein, in my opinion, 
could be transposed onto other cases. Stated simply, I believe that many of the theories 
articulated, and conclusions drawn, from this research are applicable in the context United 
States’ relationship with other Arab/Muslim countries. 
Literature review 
The present research utilizes English language literature reviews due to my limited 
language knowledge, buttressed by the fact that scholars frequently publish on the topic of 
conflict resolution in the English language. Literature reviews are initially used to trace the 
history of Iraq, to qualify the trajectory and impact of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations, and 
are incorporated to comparatively analyze conflict resolution in theory and practice across 
Western and Arab/Muslim scholarship. My choice of resources centers predominantly on 
scholars from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, as these are the most readily accessible 
resources in my mother tongue. Nonetheless, within this limited pool of English language 
resources, I have attempted to select a variety of sources throughout each stage of my research 
to provide comprehensive accounts that articulates, and to contrast events, theory and 
perspectives while exploring Iraq’s history, mapping U.S:-Iraq conflict relations, and 
delineating conflict resolution from a Western and Arab/Muslim scholarly perspective. I also 
utilize a wide range of academic resources, including literature produced by historians, peace, 
and conflict resolution experts and practitioners. In addition, I have integrated some 
alternative English language resources outside of academia to broaden or reinforce theory. 
The latter resources include publications from the U.S. government and military, think 
tanks, as well as public opinion polls and mainstream news reports. The inclusion of 
supplementary English material such as media productions and publications is designed to 
ground my research in readily accessible material that U.S. citizens could access via 
television, radio, or the Internet. Utilization of this combination of resources, I hope, assists in 
the creation of a thesis that is not only academic in nature, but is equally comprehensible and 
appealing to those outside of scholarship and peace studies. Since two primary objectives of 
my research are to demonstrate the ramifications the conflict relations between the U.S.-Iraq 
has had on respective citizens’ perceptions, and then to qualify how a sample of those 
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individuals perceive conflict resolution in this instance, I believe that it is imperative that 
those same individuals have the opportunity to read and understand the contents of this thesis. 
Methodology 
The six hypotheses outlined are tested utilizing a literature review and a questionnaire. 
The first hypothesis is tested qualitatively with a literature review that recounts the history of 
Iraq, and another that examines public opinion at the micro and macro level as articulated by 
scholarly resources and public opinion polls. In this instance, we rely on historians and 
political commentary, reinforced by open source polling data. Hypothesis two is equally 
tested qualitatively through a comparative literature review of Western and Middle Eastern 
scholars’ conceptualization of conflict, conflict resolution, and the techniques and principles 
deemed appropriate to resolve conflict. The theoretical advantage of our approach over 
previous research is our incorporation of a wide framework when comparatively analyzing 
Western and Arab/Muslim theory. Instead of limiting analysis to the Western structural 
approach, which has frequently been the case hitherto, we also consider the social-
psychological and spiritual approaches found in Western discourse. As illustrated below, 
these approaches share increased similarities with Arab/Muslim theory, and thereby contradict 
scholarly assumptions of incompatibility. Consequently, we are able to identify additional 
cross-cultural parallels in theory and practices between Arab/Muslim and Western measures 
for advancing conflict resolution. 
Our final four hypotheses are tested quantitatively and qualitatively utilizing an online 
survey targeting a convenience sample of adult citizens from the United States and Iraq. 
Those citizens consented to complete an online survey on conflict resolution. Respondents 
were recruited using snowball and convenience sampling techniques whereby contact was 
made with one respondent, and that respondent then recommended the survey to others. In 
any event, the questionnaire contains over seventy questions, which query respondents on 
their understanding of conflict and conflict resolution in general, and then focuses attention on 
a hypothetical conflict resolution program between the U.S. and Iraq to elicit their opinion in 
this context. 
Subsequent to outlining survey methodology, we delineate how the data was processed, 
reliability was tested and findings were comparatively analyzed across samples using am R 
software package. Then, we descriptively analyze how our sample understands concepts such 
as conflict, in addition to their opinions on conflict resolution, and some associated principles 
and tools. During scrutiny of the survey data in chapter six, findings are comparatively 
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analyzed across sample groups (U.S. versus Iraq sample), in addition to the samples’ 
responses vis-à-vis scholarly theory as articulated in the literature review (part two of this 
thesis). Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that since the combined research sample is 
demographically non-representative, our findings qualify respondents’ opinion of conflict and 
conflict resolution and does not profess to represent U.S. or Iraq public opinion at large. 
Despite being non-representative, we are able to qualify important theoretical convergences 
and divergences across the survey samples, and between the survey sample and scholars, that 
contribute to cross-cultural conflict resolution discourse by approaching the topic from the 
micro, as opposed to the macro, level. 
Thesis structure 
To accomplish its objectives and test my working hypotheses, the thesis is divided into 
three distinct parts. The first part contextualizes historical events and experiences in Iraq for 
three fundamental reasons. First, historical experiences influence social-political 
developments in contemporary Iraq. Experience, in turn, impacts on collective identity, 
broadly defined as the manner in which people associate themselves, using markers such as 
ethnicity, religion, and so forth. The combination of elements has a profound impact on 
social-political trajectory of Iraq, and its internal and external relations. Second, and 
interconnected, these nuances simultaneously impact on inhabitants understanding of conflict 
and conflict resolution. This impact is better explained in the second part of this research. 
Finally, as our review of Iraq’s history progresses, attention centers on the conflict 
relationship between the United States and Iraq that impact on the country’s trajectory and 
societal perceptions. More specifically, we map the conflictual relationship between the 
United States and Iraq in detail since 2003. 
Chapter 1, The 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and Occupation, focuses specifically on the U.S. 
military invasion and occupation of Iraq, a component of the post-9/11 U.S. national security 
policy. This chapter stands alone for four reasons. Foremost, it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to detail the complete history of U.S.-Iraq relations. While regretful, the opening 
section of this chapter provides a brief summary of said relationship between the 1950s and 
2003, highlighting several geopolitical events. Secondly, the gravity of events, especially their 
impact on the political, social and economic trajectory of Iraq, is staggering and well 
documented. Third, this event is the catalyst of my research and, therefore, is examined in 
detail. Lastly, I purposefully wanted to center my research on U.S.-Iraq relations up to 2011. 
The decision to confine my research to 2011 was determined necessary, because it is essential 
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to restrict the complex and ongoing relationship to one that can be managed within the 
confines of this thesis. This research, therefore, assesses U.S.-Iraq relations up to the point 
that U.S. troops left Iraq in December 2011, and when direct physical violence was 
terminated. The termination of physical violence is the period when many scholars conclude 
that conflict resolution between two countries can be pursued. 
Chapter one begins by contextualizing the relationship between the United States and Iraq 
between the 1950s and 2003. It then focuses on events around the turn of the century, 
including existing dissatisfaction among some U.S. decision-makers with the containment 
policy implemented vis-à-vis Iraq during the 1990s. This sentiment advanced the call for a 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to purposefully overturn the political and social framework of Iraq, 
under the guise of a global counterterrorism campaign. However, only minimal resources 
were devoted to planning or contingency planning of the post-war environment. Once 
implemented, the U.S. invasion of Iraq upset the fragile social-political balance Saddam 
Hussein had managed to enforce. In the power vacuum created, preexisting ethnic-sectarian 
tensions inside Iraq violently ruptured into pervasive social unrest, which coincided with 
popular repugnance toward, and the use of violence against, the U.S. occupation. The 
combination of events destabilized occupied Iraq. Poorly conceived and implemented 
decisions during the occupation made by the U.S.-led governing authority exacerbated 
internal division, anti-occupation sentiment, and significantly impacted on the general welfare 
of Iraqis. 
To qualify developments and the U.S. role during the occupation, the chapter chronicles 
the transition of authority from the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs 
(ORHA), which was charged with temporarily managing reconstruction until an indigenous 
government could be established. Instability cut ORHA rule short, and a semi-permanent 
governing body, the Coalition Provisional Authority, was dispatched to rule Iraq until Iraq 
could elect a permanent government. During the transition of authority to an elected 
government, consecutive internal and external governing institutions were plagued by 
insurgency and civil violence, poor decision-making and questionable legitimacy. Although 
sovereignty was eventually returned to Iraq, the United States persistently interfered in Iraq’s 
social and political affairs throughout the occupation, imposing decisions, standards, and 
benchmarks to dictate the trajectory Iraq was expected to follow. The population at large did 
not share many objectives set by the United States, amounting to structural violence. 
In terms of conflict mapping, chapter 1 highlights numerous incidents of physical and 
structural violence committed by the United States when recounting the transition of control. 
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For instance, it outlines how particular events and decisions made by the United States 
institutionalized sectarian divisions in the newly created governing framework. 
Institutionalization of sectarian divisions, thereby, produced a spiral pattern, exacerbating 
social fear and animosity, which further induced sectarian mistrust and violence. As a result of 
these destabilizing trends, attempts were made to manage social-political relations to reduce 
internal conflict. Conflict management techniques included U.S. political pressure on 
government and recommendations for a national reconciliation program to be implemented—
the latter of which is directly examined in a later chapter of this research. 
In addition to sectarian and political upheaval produced by the invasion, humanitarian 
concerns proliferated under the occupation. Insecurity was prevalent, displacement common 
and post-war reconstruction hampered by poor planning, decision-making, and persistent 
violence. When the United States withdrew its military forces in December 2011, Iraq was 
fragile. Its government was weak and lacked popular support, sectarian and political tensions 
persisted, only a semblance of security had been restored to the country, and reconstruction 
was making slow but steady progress. Combined, the circumstance and events denoted in this 
chapter, including the structural and physical violence perpetrated, had a qualified impact on 
society at large, producing hardship and/or intensifying popular grievances and animosity 
toward the United States for its actions and involvement. 
Chapter 2, Qualifying the Bilateral Impact of U.S.-Iraq Conflict Relations, highlights the 
social impact of two decades of structural and physical violence mapped in chapter one. It 
utilizes scholarly resources and open-source opinion polls conducted at the national and 
regional levels to qualify popular sentiment at the micro and macro levels. Amalgamated with 
the literature review, our findings test Hypothesis one. The primary objective of chapter two 
is, therefore, to qualify the impact of the protracted conflictual relationship between the U.S. 
and Iraq upon public opinion, with the purpose of showing how stakeholders perceive various 
aspects of the relationship and the “other”. Our conclusions determine that historical 
experiences have impacted upon popular perceptions at the micro and macro levels, producing 
distrust, animosity and grievance. These byproducts suggest the conflict resolution should 
undergo transformation to reduce tensions and nurture amicable relations. 
Our overview of effects and opinion is divided into three sections: effects of the conflict 
relationship on Iraqis; effects on the U.S.; and macro level opinion. The first examines 
outcomes and opinions through the lens of Iraqis. Assessment first qualifies the general 
impact of the 2003 War on Iraqis, qualifying public opinion, the human cost, and the degree 
of animosity and distrust expressed toward the United States, as a result of historical and 
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contemporary experiences. Amalgamated, this section demonstrates a high degree of 
animosity toward the United States, mainly couched on historical and contemporary 
experiences articulated in chapters one and two. 
Next, the impact of the invasion and occupation of Iraq is analyzed through the lens of 
U.S. citizens. Since the decades-long conflictual relationship between Iraq and the U.S. was 
asymmetrical, both in terms of military capability and venue, among other criterion, our 
assessment reflects this reality. It consequently examines public opinion and the human cost, 
but then dovetails into qualifying: military overstretch, fiscal burdening, censorship and 
negative U.S. perceptions of Iraq. The combination emphasizes the historical and 
contemporary quality of U.S.-Iraq relations has produced problems and grievances within 
United States society. 
Lastly, macro level opinion, from the viewpoint of the Middle East and the West/U.S., are 
examined. This analysis demonstrates that micro level sentiment held between Iraqis and U.S. 
citizens are mirrored at the macro level. Combined, this section confirms the influence of 
micro level policy and historical experience on macro level opinion, to the degree that 
scholars propose conflict resolution should be utilized to transform the quality of bilateral 
relations between the West/U.S. and predominantly Arab/Muslim countries in the Middle 
East. This thesis takes this macro level recommendation and narrows it to micro level 
relations between the United States and Iraq, and later directly tests the viability of promoting 
conflict resolution in this instance in chapter six. 
Subsequent to the provision of a historical backdrop, conflict mapping, and a qualification 
of public opinion, our research enters part two. Upon determination that a conflictual 
relationship exists between the United States and Iraq, part two transitions our attention to 
elucidating how scholars conceptualize conflict and conflict resolution. Because our interests 
are on U.S.-Iraq relations, cross-cultural analysis is centered predominately on intrastate and 
interstate conflict resolution as articulated in Western and Arab/Muslim literature. In 
consideration of the historical, relational and cultural differences between these two entities, 
this thesis assumes, as other scholars do, that the concept and practice of conflict resolution 
will differ across cultures. To test this theory, we begin by examining Western literature 
before transitioning into Arab/Muslim theory to juxtapose cross-cultural approaches. 
Consequently, the primary objective of this part of the research is to comparatively 
analyze conflict and conflict resolution as articulated by Western and Arab/Muslim scholars. 
During our analysis of “Western” literature, I create a framework whose lexicon, principles 
and practices can later be compared across cultures. The Western theoretical framework 
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constructed in chapters three and four accommodates a broad understanding of conflict 
resolution, including the structural, social-psychological and spiritual approaches. 
Nevertheless, the combination of resources referenced throughout this section, while broad, 
do not suggest that my research accurately represent all theory and practice as conceptualized 
and articulated in alternative Western languages, including French, Spanish, Italian or 
German. Nevertheless, part two consists of three independent chapters. 
Chapter 3, From Conflict to Conflict Resolution: Western Lexicon, Conceptualization and 
Framework, analyzes conflict resolution as a discipline, theory and practice in the West. It 
opens by demonstrating how the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq intensified criticism of the 
discipline of conflict resolution while contextualizing contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. 
Because some U.S. representatives portrayed the invasion of Iraq as a necessary means of 
proliferating democracy, good governance, and/or as an exercise in state building—practices 
commonly associated with conflict resolution and/or peacebuilding in its broadest sense, these 
associations augmented criticism of contemporary conflict resolution in both theoretical and 
practical terms. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to detail such critiques, their 
introduction emphasize the impact the invasion of Iraq had on the field, although scholars 
persist in their belief that conflict resolution remains viable for improving deconstructive 
intrastate and interstate relationships when implemented in an objective, accommodating and 
inclusive manner. 
Next, I define recurring concepts including conflict, conflict resolution, conflict 
transformation, cognitive transformation and reconciliation. When conflict resolution is 
examined, it is necessary to introduce the three primary schools of Western peacebuilding: 
conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. In general terms, most 
comparative studies conducted hitherto rely predominantly on the Western structural 
approach. Subsequent to presenting the three Western disciplines, and their associated 
theories, I position the research within these schools of thought. I select to establish a broad 
Western theoretical framework that integrates all three disciplines. This wide approach, in my 
opinion, is ideal for combining theory from the three Western schools of thought and for 
making cross-cultural comparisons. 
Subsequent to defining relevant terminology and explaining associated processes, Louis 
Kriesberg’s concise theoretical framework of conflict resolution is introduced. This 
framework simplistically reduces conflict resolution to three components: the units, 
dimensions and degree. The theoretical significance of this framework is its simplification of 
a complex process that aids reader understanding of how scholars perceive conflict resolution 
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functions. Upon this foundation, deeper analysis of Western conceptualizations of conflict 
resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels can occur in chapter 4. 
Chapter 4, Conflict Resolution in the West: Principles, Approaches and Problems, 
deepens our understanding of conflict resolution, as articulated by Western scholars in the 
English language. This chapter makes three theoretical contributions to our cross-cultural 
comparative analysis. First, it qualifies prerequisites hypothesized necessary for introducing 
conflict resolution at the intrastate or interstate levels. While the prerequisites introduced 
provide a basic understanding of when scholars believe that a program should ideally be 
implemented, there is dissension among scholars concerning their importance and the order in 
which they must be fulfilled. Nonetheless, many of the parameters examined are useful for 
making cross-cultural comparisons later. 
Second, three Western principled approaches to conflict resolution are introduced. The 
three approaches are broadly another means of classifying the three Western disciplines of 
peacebuilding: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. The 
principled approaches analyzed are the structural, social-psychological and spiritual 
approaches. Each approach emphasizes specific, interrelated principles when resolving 
conflict, many of which are shared across approaches. By outlining these approaches, the 
Western theoretical spectrum of influential principles and tools are highlighted, whereby later 
comparisons of Western theory vis-à-vis that advocated in Arab/Muslim literature can occur. 
Finally, chapter four closes by denoting multiple precautions and problems associated 
with the theory and practice of conflict resolution. Precautions and problems are introduced 
because they demonstrate the complexity of a conflict resolution program, and ground 
expectations by emphasizing the capacities and limitations of the process as conceptualized by 
scholars. Many of these precautions and problems recapitulate benchmarks and theory 
analyzed above. Chapter four completes our delineation of conflict resolution according to 
Western literature, transitioning our attention to Arab/Muslim theory and practices. 
Chapter 5, Arab/Muslim Conceptualization of Conflict Resolution, explores conflict 
resolution literature written by Arab/Muslim scholars, in the English language, to analyze how 
the process is conceptualized and practiced in predominately Arab/Muslim communities. This 
comparative approach tests Hypothesis two. Namely, the chapter makes cross-cultural 
comparisons of essential concepts, theory and practices using my wide Western theoretical 
framework. While analyzing Arab/Muslim literature, this thesis juxtaposes Arab/Muslim 
theory and practice with Western peacebuilding approaches of conflict management, conflict 
resolution and conflict transformation. Among its theoretical findings, the contents 
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demonstrate that historical, religious and cultural nuances unique to the Middle East, and 
which were outlined in the first part of this research, influence associated precepts and 
practices. In particular, characteristics such as robust family-community ties and Islam 
influence how conflict, peace and conflict resolution are conceptualized and how conflict 
resolution is implemented. While examining these elements, it will be demonstrated that some 
scholars suggest that specific conflict resolution theory and practices in the West contradict 
those found in Arab/Muslim culture. 
Most noteworthy among the cultural differences are the Arab/Muslim prioritization of 
religion and its traditional implementation of conflict resolution at the community level. 
Unequivocally there are some divergences that must be considered and accommodated when 
resolving conflict across these cultures. However, our review of Arab/Muslim scholars’ 
conceptualizations of conflict resolution, compared to the wide Western theoretical 
framework established in chapters three and four, suggests that there are multiple cross-
cultural convergences overlooked by previous comparative research. Cross-cultural 
similarities qualified include fundamental concepts, principles and tools. Most importantly, 
we find that the conflict transformation school of thought, represented by John Paul 
Lederach’s spiritual approach, mirrors many aspects of the Arab/Muslim approach. The 
commonalities qualified suggest a noteworthy degree of cross-cultural compatibility, far 
greater than most Arab/Muslim scholars hitherto have acknowledged. Nonetheless, 
Arab/Muslim scholars counsel there are marked discrepancies across cultures. 
Concurrently, our comparative analysis underscores fundamental theoretical and practical 
voids in Arab/Muslim conflict resolution, most notably the absence of techniques for 
resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate level. Since Arab/Muslim traditional practices 
manage or resolve conflict at the familial level, there is no traditional mechanism available for 
resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels. This theoretical and practical void 
stimulates Arab/Muslim scholars to demand preexisting practices be supplemented and 
reformed. That said, although there is a lack of traditional techniques available for resolving 
conflict at the higher levels, Arab/Muslim scholars insist that the same principles and 
practices applied at the community level are applicable when resolving conflict at the higher 
levels. 
Several conclusions deduced from our comparative analysis are tested in the subsequent 
chapter. Namely, multiple concepts, principles and practices articulated in chapter five are 
incorporated into a questionnaire targeting a convience sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens to 
examine how conflict resolution is perceived and deemed most appropriately applied at the 
  
19 
 
interstate level. The theoretical advantage of the survey is that it extends our research beyond 
scholarship and macro level analysis by sampling laypersons’ opinion at the micro level to 
determine how they conceptualize conflict and conflict resolution between two countries. 
Following our cross-cultural comparative analysis of conflict resolution traditions as 
articulated in the literature, part three of the present research refocuses our attention on the 
micro level where three hypotheses concerning Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations 
of conflict resolution at the interstate level are tested among a convenience sample of 
respondents from the U.S. and Iraq. The objectives of this part of the research are threefold. 
First, it qualifies and quantifies whether a majority from a sample of U.S. and Iraq 
respondents embrace sixteen conflict resolution principles (Hypothesis 3) and eleven tools or 
techniques of advancing resolution in general (Hypotheses 4). Then it qualifies whether a 
majority of those same respondents agree that conflict resolution is necessary to improve 
contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations (Hypothesis 5). Finally, our survey tests whether a majority 
of respondents agree on thirteen resolution tools for transforming the quality of contemporary 
U.S.-Iraq relations (Hypothesis 6). During our evaluation of laypersons’ opinion, responses 
are comparatively analyzed vis-à-vis the scholarly conceptualizations as extracted from the 
literature review in part two of this thesis. Part three of this thesis contains two chapters and 
several appendices. 
Chapter 6, Survey of Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Conflict Resolution: Questionnaire 
Design, Methodology and Findings, articulates how the research questionnaire was designed, 
piloted and implemented. At this point, I explain which conflict resolution tools were included 
into the survey and why others were omitted. I also discuss how pilot participants and survey 
respondents were selected. Subsequent to explaining the demographic nature of our samples, 
the data is descriptively analyzed. 
Chapter 6 contains four sections. The first reiterates the need for conflict resolution in the 
context of U.S.-Iraq relations. It re-contextualizes information extracted from the previous 
two parts, and returns our attention to micro level relations. The second explains how my 
questionnaire was designed and piloted. At this point, we explain why tools were included or 
omitted, and outline piloting methodology. It then traces the reduction of tools that advance 
conflict resolution extracted from the literature in Appendix 1 to eleven of the most preferred 
and recognized techniques through pilot research. At this time, we explain why some methods 
were excluded from the research and why others were included. 
The third section outlines survey research methodology. It explains how the online 
questionnaire was implemented and how the sample of U.S. and Iraq respondents was 
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obtained. Next, research weaknesses are articulated, including the unrepresentative nature of 
the sample due to challenges experienced recruiting respondents and with recruiting assistance 
to circulate the questionnaire. I then explain how data was processed, how the internal 
reliability of the data was measured and how it was analyzed. 
The closing section of chapter 6 details survey findings gleaned from our convenience 
samples. Our analysis is subdivided into: how conflict is conceptualized; general perceptions 
of conflict resolution principles; general perceptions of techniques which advance conflict 
resolution; opinions concerning the effects of the 2003 war and occupation; and, a rating of 
techniques in the hypothetical context of improving U.S.-Iraq relations. Combined, this 
chapter qualifies how interstate conflict resolution is perceived at the micro level by a sample 
of U.S. and Iraqi respondents. To my knowledge, this is the first such research of its kind in 
this particular context. We determine that there are many similarities between how 
respondents across our samples conceptualize conflict resolution between two states. These 
findings challenge existing research that indicates that Arab/Muslim and Western approaches 
are incompatible. 
The final chapter of this thesis, Conclusions and Recommendations, recapitulates the six 
working hypotheses and findings gleaned from the research. While reviewing the validity of 
each hypothesis, several recommendations are made based upon my research findings. These 
recommendations are thought useful on two levels. First, I propose several research gaps that 
should be filled to advance understanding of conflict resolution across cultures at the micro 
and macro levels. Second, I suggest conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq 
should be pursued. 
This chapter is succeeded by a list of resources utilized in the main text and appendices. 
Four appendices follow the list of sources. Appendix 1 contains conflict resolution 
mechanisms utilized at the intrastate and interstate levels deduced from the literature during 
the course of the research. Appendix 2 provides a copy of the questionnaire. Appendix 3 
contains comparative bar graphs of our survey data for each question according to country of 
origin. Appendix 4 is the contact log of institutions solicited for assistance with circulating my 
survey. Appendix 5 provides a basic overview of how to calculate and interpret p-values 
provided in chapter six. 
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Chapter 1 The 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and 
Occupation  
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to map the conflict between the U.S. and Iraq by 
reconstructing the role of the United States in the evolution of Iraq between 2002 and 2011. 
Violent conflict between the United States and Iraq escalated subsequent to the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion and occupation of Iraq, politically and socially destabilizing Iraq. The contents of 
this chapter chronicles events in Iraq during this period, highlighting some of the social and 
psychological impacts they had on Iraqis. Occurrences articulated herein contribute to the 
testing of Hypothesis 1, which states there is a long-standing conflict relationship between the 
United States and Iraq that has produced bilateral animosity between these respective 
societies. 
Of particular importance, the overthrow of Iraq’s government fractured its society, 
exacerbating preexisting ethnic and sectarian tensions. Social fracturing produced an 
unprecedented degree of ethnic, sectarian and tribal turbulence in the power vacuum 
manufactured by the invasion and occupation. Simultaneously, U.S. intervention exacerbated 
preexisting anti-American sentiment that was rooted in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and a 
decade of economic sanctioning imposed by the United States and the international 
community thereafter. Combined, Iraqis’ general repugnance toward U.S. intervention and its 
policies during the occupation, compounded by the sectarian fissures created, generated 
backlash in the form of a civil war and insurgency. The manifestations of violence had a clear 
impact on Iraq’s society and inhabitants’ perceptions. The precise social impact of events 
during the occupation is expounded upon in chapter 2. 
The present chapter commences by summarizing the quality of bilateral relations between 
the U.S. and Iraq between the 1950s and 2003. Due to the sake of space, we only denote 
important geopolitical events that impacted on the typology of U.S.-Iraq interaction, namely 
the Cold War rivalry, the Revolution in Iran and Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait. Thereafter, we 
trace the escalation of tensions between the United States and Iraq prior to the events of 9/11. 
It denotes how some U.S. policymakers had become frustrated with the containment of Iraq, 
and were appalled by Saddam Hussein’s bulking at international sanctions and weapons 
inspections. Determined to respond, the events of 9/11 provided impetus for a full-scale 
military invasion under the banner of a U.S. global counterterrorism strategy. Nevertheless, 
the fallible justifications for the invasion offered by administration officials, including Iraq 
being an existential threat due to its possession of WMD and support for terrorism, were 
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widely unaccepted by the international community. Therefore, the United Nations refused to 
endorse U.S. intervention. In response, George W. Bush created “a coalition of the willing” 
and proceeded to implement the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. 
Following a brief review of the invasion, a chronological outline of the occupation is 
provided to illustrate how the coalition assumed control and (mis)managed Iraq as the 
occupying power. Some failures were a consequence of the United States administration’s 
expectation that the reconstruction of Iraq and its transition to a representative government 
would progress rapidly. To temporarily manage the rapid handover of sovereignty, the U.S. 
first dispatched the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA). However, 
the ORHA’s tenure was prematurely terminated when civil disorder and ethnic violence 
exceeded coalition capacity. 
The George W. Bush administration subsequently dispatched the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA). This act terminated U.S. plans for a rapid transfer of governance back to 
Iraq, prolonging the unpopular occupation for an unspecified duration. Once in control, the 
CPA assumed extensive responsibility for governing and reconstructing the country. During 
its tenure, two early decisions made by the CPA proved counterproductive to social and 
political stability. More specifically, de-Baʻathification and the dissolution of Iraq’s military 
and security forces produced sectarian backlash that gave impetus to an insurgency and 
precipitated ethnic-sectarian violence. These two examples of CPA decisions are highlighted 
because of their impact on the social and political evolution of occupied Iraq, and because 
they qualify as obvious examples of structural violence perpetrated by the U.S. during the 
occupation. Other examples of structural violence likewise occurred, and are briefly noted 
elsewhere in this chapter, including the U.S. failure to provide security, the ad hoc and poorly 
implemented reconstruction strategy, and U.S.-imposed governing frameworks, to name a 
few. 
Because of local and international criticism of conditions inside Iraq, and persistent 
appeals for rapid transfer of sovereignty back to Iraq, the U.S. appointed the Iraqi Governing 
Council (IGC). Jointly, the CPA and the IGC managed the daily affairs of Iraq and established 
official guidelines and a timetable for transferring authority from the United States to an 
elected Government of Iraq (GOI). The benchmarks and time frame established called for a 
phased transfer of authority over a three-year period. However, as the transition occurred, 
many of the decisions of the IGC and forthcoming governing bodies were subject to U.S. 
interference. Thus, despite local and international criticism, the United States continued to 
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intervene in Iraq’s sovereign affairs throughout the occupation, and this tendency persisted 
even following the election and seating of the GOI. 
While analyzing the CPA’s role, we qualify the deteriorating security situation. In 
summary, Iraq experienced violence from mid-2003 to 2011, which reached its pinnacle 
around 2007. Violence had a significant impact on the well-being of Iraqis, undermining 
reconstruction, and exacerbating social and political tensions, prolonging the occupation, 
generating grievances and challenging the transition of authority. Eventually, a combination 
of events aided in the reduction of violence, including the increased capacity of Iraq’s 
military. The purpose of highlighting the security situation is to classify the complex internal 
conflict that manifested during the occupation to qualify the degree of violence experienced. 
At this point, we also identify groups of actors, and several root causes that precipitated their 
activity. Finally, denotation of the security situation contextualizes U.S. government and 
military shortcomings when securing Iraq, for instance their failure to plan for contingencies, 
or effectively counteract civil disorder during the early period of the occupation. 
After qualifying violence, we explore several practices implemented by the CPA to restore 
security and reconstruct occupied Iraq. Techniques are broadly reduced to military kinetic 
operations and the training of a reconstituted Iraq military; advancing regional cooperation; 
reconstructing infrastructure; and promoting national reconciliation. The latter is a salient 
component of conflict resolution and transitional justice. Nevertheless, many programs 
designed to reduce violence and reconstruct Iraq were improperly planned, subject to 
setbacks, and sometimes outright rejected by Iraqis because they had been imposed. Despite 
their shortcomings, stabilization and reconstruction practices were sustained throughout the 
occupation and responsibility for their implementation was ultimately transferred to the GOI. 
With the deteriorating security situation and U.S. reconstruction policy outlined, our 
historical account then summarizes the transition of authority to a permanently elected 
government. The outline includes a brief overview of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), the 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA), and the Government of Iraq (GOI). For the sake of 
space, we only highlight dates, tasks and a general critique of each governing body. Whenever 
possible, the activities of these bodies are contextualized within the frame of U.S.-Iraq 
relations. In particular, we denote U.S. interference with their mandates to underscore how the 
United States persistently intervened in Iraq’s sovereign affairs. Tracing their development 
likewise illustrates how sectarian differences became politicized and institutionalized within 
Iraq’s (re-)emerging institutions, a phenomenon which undermined popular trust and 
legitimacy of the GOI. Thus, the sectarian and ethnic fighting that engulfed post-war Iraq not 
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only challenged successive governing bodies, but also became institutionalized in Iraq’s 
emerging governing framework. 
The chapter concludes with a brief critical summary of the invasion and occupation. It 
recapitulates invasion and post-war policy, as well as highlights internal social and political 
dynamics. Combined, the contents herein provide an overview of the occupation and its social 
and political impact. This information is essential for testing Hypothesis 1. Lastly, this chapter 
functions as a prelude to chapter 2, which qualifies and quantifies how many of the 
experiences traced below affect society and public opinion at the micro and macro levels. 
1.1 Prelude to operation Iraqi Freedom (1950s-2003) 
U.S.-Iraq (conflict) relations matured following the withdrawal of Britain’s influence from 
the Middle East in the mid-1900s. At this juncture, the United States and the Soviet Union 
became increasingly involved in the Middle East, with both the nuclear rivals engaging 
regional leaders to selfishly augment the hegemons’ relative influence (Kepel, 2004: 25). As 
part of its strategy, the United States utilized enticements, and sometimes violence, to coerce 
Iraq’s leaders to conform to policies the U.S. determined favorable to its regional interests; 
which, among others objectives, were designed to undermine the regional authority of the 
Soviet Union, and to secure the flow of Middle East petroleum onto the international market 
(Galvani, 1972: 32-33). From its utilization of covert operations supporting Kurd rebels in 
Iraq (Neff, 1991: 31), to offsetting Iraq-Soviet relations by courting and assisting Iran 
(Cottam, 1970: 4; Marsh, 2003: 2-3), the United States regularly implemented policies which 
counteracted Iraq’s leaders when they acted contrary to the desired objectives of the standing 
U.S. administration. The U.S. government1 deployed analogous policies throughout the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s, generally perceiving Iraq as a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. 
1.1.1 Iran’s Revolution 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. engaged Iran as a strategic ally to balance the 
influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East (Gerner, 2004). The quality of U.S.-Iran 
relations, nonetheless, were challenged by the 1979 Iran Revolution that replaced the Shah 
                                                          
 
1 Government in this text refers to the political structures, their representatives, and administrators who manage 
affairs and relationships among groups of individuals within a given territory (Modelski, 1978: 214-215). These 
structures broadly “includ[e] the executive, legislative, administrative and judicial” bodies which combine to 
establish a framework that produces and enforces “the laws, procedures, and norms by which the state operates” 
(Buzan, 1991: 82-83). The term government, as utilized, can be applied at multiple levels, including the local 
(villages, cities); the state (or national) (Iraq or the United States); the regional (the European Union); and the 
global level (Pax Britannica) (Modelski, 1978: 214-215). 
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with a Shi‘a clerical government directed by the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini (Gerner, 
2004: 122-123; Katzman, 2009: 2; Neff, 1991: 28). The Shah had exiled Ayatollah Khomeini 
to Iraq during the 1960s for his criticisms of Iran’s government (Skocpol, 1982: 274). In exile, 
Khomeini “preach[ed] to students and pilgrims that the Shah was an agent of anti-Islamic 
foreign imperialism, and he called on the ulama, or the Arab/Islamic community, to assert 
their right to lead ‘the Islamic community’ in direct opposition to such unjust authority” 
(Skocpol, 1982: 274). Khomeini’s rhetoric appealed to Shi‘a clerics and Muslims in Iran, as 
outlined in the previous quote, who had increasingly become frustrated with the Shah and 
were determined to remove him from power (Skocpol, 1982: 274). Ironically, the Shi‘a 
revolution inspired by Khomeini terminated a long-standing tradition of the clergy’s 
disassociation with politics (Visser, 2007: 814). Equally important, the event changed the 
geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and threatened neighboring Sunni-led governments. 
Iran’s revolution influenced the perception that Iran threatened U.S. geopolitical interests, 
notably Middle East social and political stability (Goldschmidt, 2004: 72; Public Broadcast 
Service, 2001). Suspicion in the U.S. was exacerbated by Iran’s clerical leadership’s blatant 
criticism of the United States and their expressed disinterest in maintaining diplomatic ties 
(Kepel, 2004: 167; Sick, 1989: 238). Faced with the improbability of continued U.S.-Iran 
relations, the Reagan administration adapted its geopolitical strategy—although Neff (1991: 
28) argues that no coherent U.S. policy ever manifested. To the advantage of the United 
States, Iran’s severing of ties with the U.S. forfeited valuable military assistance, which 
complicated Iran’s regional ambitions of hegemony and spreading the Shi‘a revolution into 
neighboring countries (Karsh, 1990: 265-266; Neff, 1991: 28; Tripp, 2007: 222). 
Consequently, the U.S. turned to Iraq.2 
With bilateral suspicion and tensions escalating in the region, Iran and Iraq progressed 
closer to military conflict. Prior to the 1979 Revolution, Iran-Iraq relations had oscillated 
between cooperation and hostility (Karsh, 1990: 257; Sick, 1989: 232-234). Concerning the 
latter, disputes and military intervention, when they manifested, were generally founded on 
issues including the demarcation of territory, Shi‘a and Sunni religious ideology or identity, 
and the increasing contest for regional hegemony (Oberg, 2007: 68; Parasiliti, 2003: 152; 
                                                          
 
2 The implications of Iran’s revolution and evangelistic rhetoric threatened more than Sunni-led Iraq or U.S.-Iran 
relations. It likewise aroused suspicion among other Sunni-led countries including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
(Gareau, 2004: 175; Goldschmidt, 2004: 71; Roy, 2007: 95; Tripp, 2007: 212). The governments of these 
countries, like Iraq, feared that the Shi‘a revolution would spread into the Shi‘a communities within their own 
countries (Gagnon, 2002; Gareau, 2004: 175; Roy, 2007: 103-105; Sick, 1989: 232-233; Tripp, 2007: 212-222). 
This hypothetical occurrence would threaten political stability and the existing governing arrangements where, in 
some instances, a minority of Sunni Arabs ruled a majority population of Shi‘a Arabs (Gagnon, 2002; Gareau, 
2004: 175; Roy, 2007: 103-105; Sick, 1989: 232-233; Tripp, 2007: 212-222). 
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Sick, 1989: 232-234). Suspicion and enmity grew steadily during the 1970s. During this 
period, for example, both countries were guilty of making cross-border incursions and 
covertly supporting sectarianism inside their rivals’ borders to politically undermine the other 
(for instance, Iran’s support of Iraq’s Kurd) (Neff, 1991: 28-30; Tétreault, 2004: 154-155; 
Tripp, 2007: 158-159). However, Saddam Hussein decided to outmaneuver and weaken Iran 
since it appeared vulnerable following Iran’s Revolution, its proselytizing rhetoric, and 
increased support of Shi‘a and Kurd rebellions inside Iraq (Parasiliti, 2003: 152; Tripp, 2007: 
193-225). 
Iran’s vulnerability to a military campaign spearheaded by Iraq was presumed since the 
revolutionary leaders were experiencing difficulties consolidating their control over the newly 
created Islamic Republic of Iran (Skocpol, 1982: 276). In fact, popular uprisings in Iran were 
recurrent subsequent to the removal of the Shah (Skocpol, 1982: 276). Under the false 
assumption that the ongoing political and social turmoil inside Iran would prevent Iran’s 
government from meeting Iraq’s military challenge, Saddam Hussein instigated what he 
anticipated would be a limited military engagement to demonstrate Iraq’s power vis-à-vis Iran 
(Tripp, 2007: 223-225)3. The calculation proved fallible. 
Rather than acquiesce, Iraq’s invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980, initiated the Iran-
Iraq War (1980-1988) (Alfoneh, 2013: 88; Haass, 2009: 26; Iran Chamber Society, 2011; 
Sick, 1989: 230) 4. Saddam Hussein premised his military incursion on a number of Iran-Iraq 
disputes, such as the long-standing border dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and Iran’s 
interference in Iraq’s sovereign affairs (support for Shi‘a and Kurds) (Iran Chamber Society, 
2011; Sick, 1989: 231). In geopolitical terms, by default, Iraq’s invasion made it the primary 
actor in a regional policy of containment, here narrowly defined as the process of isolating a 
hostile country and preventing its ideological and territorial expansion (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 225; Miller, 2005: 27; Parasiliti, 2003: 154; Roy, 2007: 80; Tripp, 2007: 223-225). In 
particular, Iraq’s invasion provided its Sunni neighbors and the United States an opportunity 
to offer financial and/or military assistance to contain Iran (Allawi, 2007: 298). 
                                                          
 
3 Contrary, Karsh (1990: 267) asserts that while Saddam Hussein’s government realized that their chances of 
success against Iran were marginal, they decided that war was the only way of containing Iran. 
4 Wilmer (1998: 90-113) defines “War as structured violence that occurs either between or within states.” By 
comparison, J. David Singer’s (1972) Correlates of War (COW) project defines war as an organized military 
conflict between at least two groups that results in 1,000 or more battle deaths per year among the warring 
factions (Correlates of War, 2006). COW distinguished between three broad categories of war: intrastate (a war 
fought inside a given state between at least two organized actors—either the governmental versus 
nongovernmental actors or a conflict between two or more nongovernmental actors); interstate (involving two or 
more different countries); and extra-state war (between a government and nongovernmental actors) (Correlates 
of War, 2006). The term war, as used in this text, refers to all three types, unless otherwise specified. 
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Officially, the U.S. government took a neutral stance on the Iran-Iraq War, imposing an 
arms embargo on both countries (Neff, 1991: 30). However, the Reagan administration 
arbitrarily enforced the policy as the war persisted (Neff, 1991: 30). Initially pleased that Iraq 
maintained the military advantage between 1980 and 1981, the U.S. remained indifferent 
(Tétreault, 2004: 155; Tripp, 2007: 225-226). Nevertheless, Iran acquired the military 
advantage in 1982 (Battle, 2003; Sullivan, 2005: 1) and in April, Saddam Hussein proposed a 
ceasefire that Iran rejected (Alfoneh, 2013: 89). With hostilities continuing, President Reagan 
had Iraq removed from the State Department’s list of countries that sponsor terrorism, which 
allowed the U.S. to provide Iraq with economic aid and sell it military hardware (Battle, 2003; 
Sullivan, 2005: 1). This support proved valuable to the trajectory of the war. 
In Iraq, Saddam Hussein was challenged by the need to fill the military ranks. To recruit 
soldiers, he utilized rewards and incentives offered to tribal leaders who would then entice 
their male members to join the fight against Iran (Hassan, 2007: 3). Hussein also relied on 
Shi‘a conscripts (Terrill, 2003: 8). Ironically, despite the harsh treatment of the Shi‘a in Iraq, 
Shi‘a conscripts proved themselves on the battlefield against Iran. Terrill (2003: 8) 
hypothesizes Shi‘a conscripts’ performance was rooted in their allegiance to their 
communities rather than Saddam Hussein or his war against Iran. Their actions are surprising, 
considering Saddam Hussein had ordered Shi‘a dissident Ayatollah Sayyid Muhmad Baqir al-
Sadr to be executed in 1980 and he continued to expel Shi‘a Arabs to Iran (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 217). 
As the mid-1980s drew nearer, Iraq’s military forces began experiencing territorial losses 
against Iran. Consequently, Reagan again increased support to Iraq in late 1984 to enhance its 
military capability (Battle, 2003; Haass, 2009: 28; Neff, 1991: 30; Sick, 1989: 239). At the 
same time, other Gulf States, namely Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, provided 
material support to Iraq through financial loans and/or armament (Parasiliti, 2003: 158; 
Tétreault, 2004: 155; Tripp, 2007: 229). Due to this influx of assistance to Iraq, the Iran-Iraq 
War edged closer to military stalemate during the mid-1980s (Battle, 2003; Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 225; Haass, 2009: 26; Sick, 1989: 238). To shift the balance of power, the Reagan 
administration again increased assistance to Iraq (Battle, 2003; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 225; 
Haass, 2009: 26; Sick, 1989: 238)5. 
While U.S. commitment to Iraq appears relatively straightforward, U.S. regional policy in 
the mid-1980s was convoluted (Neff, 1991: 30-31; Sick, 1989: 239). More specifically, the 
                                                          
 
5 For a concise overview of U.S. policy toward Iraq during the early years of the Iran-Iraq War, see Battle 
(2003). 
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United States provided covert assistance to Iran and overt assistance to Iraq simultaneously 
(Sick, 1989: 239). The Reagan administration’s covert provision of arms to Iran between 1985 
and 1986 is commonly referred to as the Iran/Contra Affair (Koh, 1988: 1257; Neff, 1991: 31; 
Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 130; Scheffer, 1987: 696-723; Sick, 1989: 239). “[T]he Iran/Contra 
affair [was] an 18-month operation to trade weapons through Israel to Iran in the hopes of 
gaining the release of [U.S.] hostages held in Lebanon and, in addition, to help fund the 
Contras fighting against Nicaragua” (Neff, 1991: 31). Disclosure of the activity outlined in 
Neff’s quote prompted U.S. Congressional inquiries, for instance the 1986 House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, where some mid-ranking military officials were accused of 
wrongdoing (for instance Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North) (Koh, 1988: 1275-1276; Walsh, 
1994: 594)6. However, no high-ranking politicians were charged with wrongdoing. 
Reagan’s duplicitous policy (further) discredited the United States as an actor in the 
Middle East (Neff, 1991: 30-31; Sick, 1989: 239). This was especially the case in Iraq, since 
Saddam Hussein had been skeptical of the United States prior to his invasion of Iran (Neff, 
1991: 30; Sick, 1989: 239). Hussein, nonetheless, agreed to accept economic and military 
assistance from the U.S. during the Iran-Iraq War to shift the balance of power in his favor 
(Neff, 1991: 30; Sick, 1989: 239). Subsequent to the public disclosure of covert support to 
Iran, and the fallout from its exposure, the Reagan administration reversed its policy and 
singularly supported Iraq by 1987 (Sick, 1989: 239-240). Despite mistrust, Saddam Hussein 
continued to accept aid provided by the United States. 
Continued U.S. assistance in the latter half of the 1980s allowed Iraq to regain the military 
initiative (Goldschmidt, 2004: 72; Sick, 1989: 239; Tripp, 2007: 230). Following the 
transferal of momentum back to Iraq, hostilities expanded into international waters as Iran and 
Iraq’s navies targeted their rival’s ships (Goldschmidt, 2004: 72; Sick, 1989: 239; Tripp, 
2007: 230). When the naval warfare escalated, Iran subsequently targeted Kuwait-owned oil 
tankers to discourage Kuwait’s government from providing assistance to Iraq (Goldschmidt, 
2004: 72; Sick, 1989: 239; Tripp, 2007: 230). Iran’s naval tactics prompted the U.S. 
government to register Kuwait’s ships in the United States, and then to dispatch the U.S. Navy 
                                                          
 
6 Oliver North was an architect of the illegal exchange of weapons for hostages and then funneling proceeds to 
the Contras in Nicaragua (Walsh, 1994). North was granted immunity prior to testifying before congress on the 
Iran-Contra Affair, which undermined the ability to prosecute his actions. Although initially convicted and given 
a light sentence, the decision was overturned on appeal due the immunity granted by Congress (Walsh, 1994: 
594). For a detailed account of the legal implications of the Reagan administration’s covert sale of arms to Iran, 
see Scheffer (1987). For an overview of the affair and the legal and political efforts to conceal Reagan 
administration involvement, see Sofaer (2003). 
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to provide convoy protection to secure shipping lanes and the flow of petroleum onto the 
international market (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 225; Sick, 1989: 239; Tripp, 2007: 230). 
Although the war endured for eight years, the United Nations worked to secure a cease 
fire and peace agreement (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 24). Since it appeared that the conflict 
would escalate, and perhaps spread throughout the region, efforts to broker a ceasefire were 
redoubled in the late 1980s (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 24). Following increased pressure from 
the United Nations and Saudi Arabia, a cease-fire agreement was ultimately brokered in 
August 1988 (Alfoneh, 2013: 91; Neff, 1991: 31; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 24-25; Sick, 1989: 
243). Both countries had suffered significant human loss and were devastated in 
infrastructural and economic terms, and, therefore, succumbed to negotiations. 
Concerning the type of assistance provided by the United States to Iraq during the 1980s, 
it included military and economic aid, as well as surveillance and intelligence information 
(Lieberfeld, 2005: 8; Tétreault, 2004: 156; Tripp, 2007: 232). Moreover, the U.S. abetted the 
development of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programs, commonly referred to as 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Gagnon, 2002; Haass, 2009: 30; Johnson, 2004: 224; 
Tétreault, 2004: 156). For example, the U.S. is reported to have provided Iraq biological 
cultures, or bacteria, needed to produce biological weapons (Johnson, 2004: 224). The U.S. 
also sold “dual-use technology”, defined as technology that can be utilized for both peaceful 
civilian purposes and for manufacturing nuclear weapons (Milhollin, 2000)7. Other countries 
including England, Holland and Switzerland, likewise assisted in the development of Iraq’s 
military capability (Gareau, 2004: 176-177). Germany also constructed a facility that 
produced chemical weapons but was officially billed as a pesticide production factory 
(Milhollin, 2000), and France built the Osirak nuclear power plant (Neff, 1991: 27; Tripp, 
2007: 229). In any event, scholars cannot agree on the ramifications of this assistance. 
For example, some claim U.S. aid was insignificant in terms of Iraq’s military capability 
(Haass, 2009: 49), while others perceive it as very significant (Milhollin, 2000). On the one 
hand, Richard Haass (2009: 49) dismisses criticism of U.S. assistance, suggesting that 
numerous U.S. congressional investigations into executive policy discovered no wrongdoing. 
On the other hand, Gary Milhollin (2000) and Chalmers Johnson (2004: 224-225) condemn 
the type and magnitude of military assistance provided during the 1980s and its implications 
                                                          
 
7 Dual-use technology is strictly regulated and monitored by western states and international agencies such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) due to the potential of its utilization in the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (Martin, 2004: 1578-1579). Examples of dual-use technology include high-precision 
electronic switches that can be used in the medical field and in circuitry for detonating nuclear warheads. 
Additional examples include glass and carbon fibers that can be utilized to build solid fuel rockets as well as for 
the manufacturing of sports equipment (Milhollin, 2000). 
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on national and regional events. For instance, Iraq’s military utilized chemical weapons 
against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (Rovner, 2014: 489-490), and later deployed them 
against Iraq’s Kurds during a 1989 uprising (Roth, 2005: 7; Sick, 1989: 243). Irony should 
equally not be lost on the fact that, as detailed later in this chapter, although Western countries 
assisted Iraq’s development of WMD in the 1980s, a few years later, their possession would 
be posited as a motivating factor for the U.S.-international community policy of containment8. 
The Iran-Iraq War was costly for both belligerents in terms of treasury and the human toll 
(Fattah and Caso, 2009: 226). Iraq’s oil revenue had halved and it “had contracted a vast 
amount of debt owed to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States” (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 
226). Hence, the quote denotes that Iraq emerged from the eight-year war as an economically 
fragile regional military power indebted to its neighbors (Allawi, 2007: 40; Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 226; Neff, 1991: 33-34; Parasiliti, 2003: 157-158; Sick, 1989: 243; Tripp, 2007: 239). 
Determined to reacquire his strength, Saddam Hussein sought to circumvent his predicament 
by negotiating economic assistance from his Sunni-led regional neighbors (Allawi, 2007: 40; 
Fattah and Caso, 2009: 226). His diplomatic strategy did not produce rewards. 
Perceiving that neighboring Sunni-led countries had benefited from his containment of 
Iran, Saddam Hussein expected his neighbors to demonstrate their gratitude through economic 
concessions (Allawi, 2007: 40; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 226). Among the concessions, Saddam 
sought debt forgiveness and an increase in the price of petroleum, policies which would allow 
Iraq’s economy to be nurtured back to health. However, neighboring states would not yield. 
Absent assistance, Hussein applied pressure. His rhetoric increasingly incorporated subtle 
threats vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Allawi, 2007: 40; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 226-227; 
Tripp, 2007: 242). Part of his increasingly harsh rhetoric implied that military force would be 
used if necessary to secure favorable concessions, which generated fear (Tripp, 2007: 242). 
While tensions increased between Iraq and its Sunni neighbors, U.S.-Iraq relations were 
subject to oscillation (Neff, 1991: 31-32). Foremost, and noted above, “Saddam’s traditional 
suspicions of the United States [had been] confirmed with the revelation of the Iran/Contra 
scandal in 1986” (Neff, 1991: 31). Donald Neff (1991: 31) goes on to express this suspicion 
noting, “Saddam and other Iraqi officials would cite the Iran/Contra scandal as added proof—
                                                          
 
8 Throughout this text, the term “West” is shorthand for Anglo Saxon countries (Australia, England, the United 
States and Canada) and Western European countries, in full realization that there are vast differences across these 
elements. The author understands that defining the “West” is challenging, controversial, and is subject to 
Manichean stereotypes such as “us” and “them,” or dichotomies with terms such as “developed” or 
“undeveloped” countries. However, since much of the literature utilized in this dissertation makes comparisons 
between “Arab/Muslim” politics, culture, ideology, religion and philosophy with those of the “West,” this 
distinction is applied. The adjective Western broadly suggests individuals or ideas originating in the West. 
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along with the Nixon-Kissinger secret operation to support the Kurds in the early 1970s—that 
Washington’s true goal was the overthrow of the Iraq government.” Neff’s quotes emphasize 
U.S. duplicity during the Iran-Iraq War, and previous assistance to the Kurds had a significant 
impact on the way the U.S. was perceived and which goals Iraqi politicians and the population 
thought it held. The experience thereby increased Iraqi suspicion of the United States. 
Two incidents in late 1998 further undermined the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations (Neff, 
1991: 31-32). The first occurred on September 8, 1988, when Reagan’s Secretary of State, 
George Shultz, accused Iraq of using chemical weapons against Iraq-Kurdistan villages, an 
accusation Iraq’s government adamantly denied (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 225; Neff, 1991: 31-
32; Wimmer, 2003: 118-119). The events referenced occurred in February and March 1989, 
when a Kurd uprising was launched. In response, Iraq’s military utilized chemical weapons 
and razed entire villages, such as Halabja. During this repressive campaign, Alex Bellamy 
(2004: 138) estimates that 100,000 people were killed. While the U.S. military was aware of 
the massacre, the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administration downplayed the events to 
prevent Congress from terminating economic assistance to Iraq (Allawi, 2007: 41; Exoo, 
2010: 26-27; Gareau, 2004: 178). Accordingly, both administrations placed such a high 
priority on maintaining positive relations with Iraq that they willfully disguised war crimes. 
The second incident that strained U.S.-Iraq relations manifested in mid-November 1989. 
At this time, Iraq expelled the head of the U.S. Embassy’s political section (Neff, 1991: 33-
34). The expulsion prompted a U.S. reprisal and an “Iraqi diplomat from Washington” was 
expelled from the United States (Neff, 1991: 33-34). Similar tit-for-tat expulsions continued 
between governments during the next few months, escalating tensions and suspicion in both 
countries (Neff, 1991: 32). Meanwhile, the George H.W. Bush (January 1989-January 1993) 
administration continued to try to stabilize and improve relations with Iraq. 
Despite the ongoing diplomatic altercations, the George H.W. Bush administration 
continued to foster cordial relations with Iraq, as demonstrated on October 26, 1989, when the 
President signed National Security Directive (NSD) 26 (Gagnon, 2002; Gareau, 2004: 178; 
Haass, 2009: 46)9. NSD 26 emphasized the administration’s interest in maintaining political 
relations and the strengthening of U.S.-Iraq military cooperation (Gareau, 2004: 178; Haass, 
                                                          
 
9 Mott and Fox (2012) define National Security Directives as a particular type of executive order that functions 
as administrative law. NSDs are drafted by the National Security Council, at the request of a President, who later 
signs the order making it legally binding (Mott and Fox, 2012). Controversially, executive orders can be used to 
supplant or circumvent the legislative branch of government thereby giving a U.S. President the possibility of 
bypassing Congress altogether to expedite a given policy and to circumvent Congressional disapproval (Mott and 
Fox, 2012). Once signed, NSDs are forwarded to federal agencies and agents where they function as policy 
guidelines (Mott and Fox, 2012). 
  
34 
 
2009: 47-48). Controversially, the directive was signed subsequent to, and despite, Saddam 
Hussein’s aforementioned military suppression of the Kurd uprising (Allawi, 2007: 35-37; 
Bellamy, 2004: 138; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 
2004: ix). Nevertheless, bilateral relations continued to deteriorate. 
As tensions between the U.S. Congress and Iraq escalated in 1990, additional diplomats 
were expelled from both countries and rhetoric became harsh (Neff, 1991: 37). For instance, 
Saddam Hussein publicly expressed his dissatisfaction at an Arab Cooperative Council 
meeting on February 24, 1990, and again in a speech to Iraqis on July 17, 1990 (Neff, 1991: 
35-37). Paraphrasing both speeches, Hussein accused the United States, Israel and other 
countries of subverting his leadership (and that of other Middle East leaders), manipulating oil 
production and prices to undermine Iraq’s economic recovery, and of denying Iraq its 
sovereign right to technological advancements (including WMD) (Neff, 1991: 35-38). 
Approximately one week following Hussein’s July speech, the U.S. Congress responded by 
restricting financial assistance through the imposition of economic sanctions, a policy 
President George H.W. Bush protested (Neff, 1991: 38) 10. 
Meanwhile, regional tensions increased because Saddam Hussein persisted to threaten 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia into granting economic concessions (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 228-
229; Neff, 1991: 38). The situation climaxed on August 2, 1990, when Iraq’s military invaded 
and occupied Kuwait (Haass, 2009: 60-61; Johnson, 2004: 224-225; Kepel, 2004: 218). This 
exploit increased international anxiety that Saudi Arabia would be annexed (Greenwood, 
1992: 163; Haass, 2009: 60-61; Johnson, 2004: 224-225; Kepel, 2004: 180-218). The 
annexation of Kuwait forced the George H.W. Bush administration to reverse its approach 
toward Iraq (Haass, 2009: 60-61; Johnson, 2004: 224-225; Kepel, 2004: 218). The act also 
placed Iraq at odds with the international community (Haass, 2009: 60-61; Johnson, 2004: 
224-225; Kepel, 2004: 218; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 18). The stage had been set for military 
confrontation since Saddam Hussein’s actions were interpreted as unprovoked hostility and 
threatening to regional stability. 
1.1.2 Persian Gulf War and post-war containment (1991-2001) 
Approximately nine months after President George H.W. Bush signed NSD 26, U.S.-Iraq 
relations were fractured by Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait (Gareau, 2004: 178; Haass, 2009: 47-
48). In the face of excruciating debt incurred from its war with Iran, Iraq sent its military 
                                                          
 
10 For a critique of sanctioning in foreign policy, see Thomas Weiss (1999). 
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forces into neighboring Kuwait in early August 1990 (Greenwood, 1992: 153; Tripp, 2007: 
243). Hussein justified his behavior with two explanations (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 228-229; 
Goldschmidt, 2004: 75; Tripp, 2007: 242-243). First, he claimed the annexation was a 
reassertion of territorial claim since Kuwait had once been a part of the province of Basra 
(Fattah and Caso, 2009: 228-229; Goldschmidt, 2004: 75; Tripp, 2007: 159-160). Second, 
Hussein accused Kuwait of pilfering Iraq’s oil through a process called slant drilling, or 
drilling diagonally into the earth, whereby Kuwait could extract oil located within Iraq’s 
frontier (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 228-229; Goldschmidt, 2004: 75; Haass, 2009: 55). 
There were also other interests purported to have driven Hussein’s annexation of Kuwait. 
For instance, scholars conjecture that Saddam Hussein wished to bolster Iraq’s economy by 
absorbing Kuwait’s oil reserves (Greenwood, 1992: 154-155; Haass, 2009: 55). The increased 
revenue from the annexation of Kuwait was expected to provide an economic infusion into 
Iraq’s ailing economy by alleviating Iraq’s debt, of which Kuwait was a major financier, and 
increasing oil revenue (Greenwood, 1992: 154-155; Haass, 2009: 55-56)11. Others supplement 
this hypothesis suggesting Hussein wanted to demonstrate his determination and strength to 
neighboring Saudi Arabia, whose government had likewise persistently refused to provide 
economic concessions (Greenwood, 1992: 154-155; Haass, 2009: 55). Finally, some suggest 
Hussein’s motivations included a desire to advance Iraq as regional hegemon (Allawi, 2007: 
43; Parasiliti, 2003: 156-163). Regardless of the rationale, it is unclear whether Hussein 
calculated the response of the United States and the international community. 
Numerous scholars suggest that Saddam Hussein anticipated that the U.S. would refrain 
from intervention, an estimation that may have been the product of mixed signals from the 
U.S. government (Allawi, 2007: 432; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 229; Gareau, 2004: 116-232; 
Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003: 54-55; Neff, 1991: 36-37). For instance, critics reference a mid-
July 1990 meeting between Saddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, to 
support their hypothesis that the U.S. may have (intentionally) misled Saddam Hussein 
concerning Kuwait’s sovereignty (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 229; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003: 
54-55; Neff, 1991: 36-38). Being summoned by Hussein, the U.S. Ambassador communicated 
to Hussein that the George H.W. Bush administration had “no opinion on the Arab-Arab 
conflict, like your border disagreement with Kuwait” (Neff, 1991: 38). This comment denoted 
by Neff, in conjunction with an earlier U.S. State Department announcement suggesting that 
Washington had “no special defense or security commitments on Kuwait,” may have been 
                                                          
 
11 Terrill (2003: 15) suggests that Iraqis may have generally supported the endeavor. 
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interpreted by Hussein as U.S. indifference on the matter of Kuwait’s sovereignty 
(Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003: 54). However, not all scholars ascribe to this interpretation. 
Contrary, Richard Haass (2009: 56-57) accuses critics of taking Glaspie’s comments out 
of context. He counters that Ambassador Glaspie emphasized that George H.W. Bush sought 
a peaceful resolution to the affair, and the meeting even succeeded in having Saddam Hussein 
agree to border negotiations hosted by Saudi Arabia (Haass, 2009: 56-57; Neff, 1991: 38-39). 
WikiLeaks released April Glaspie’s (1990) July 25 cable12 sent to the State Department 
following her meeting with Saddam Hussein, and the cable emphasizes that Saddam Hussein 
held the George H.W. Bush administration, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates responsible 
for keeping petroleum prices low, which aided in the constriction of Iraq’s economy (Glaspie, 
1990; Parasiliti, 2003: 152). The ambassador’s cable also stresses that Saddam Hussein had 
agreed that nonviolent resolution was preferable, and that he would not act until the joint 
meeting brokered by Saudi Arabia was held (Glaspie, 1990). Glaspie’s (1990) cable concludes 
that Saddam Hussein had not ruled out military intervention. Therefore, Haass may be correct 
in his assertion that Glaspie’s words are taken out of context. However, the contents of the 
cable demonstrate that Saddam Hussein did not trust the United States and had not eliminated 
the option of a military campaign against Kuwait. 
While it is impossible to determine the intentions of the George H.W. Bush administration 
prior to August 2, 1990, both the U.S. and the United Nations (UN) immediately denounced 
Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait and called for a return to the status quo (Haass, 2009: 61). The 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) promptly passed UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 660 (August 2, 1990) condemning Hussein’s occupation and demanding an 
immediate withdrawal of Iraq’s military (Haass, 2009: 60-61; United Nations, 1990a). Upon 
noncompliance, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 661 (August 6, 1990), which 
imposed economic sanctions to coerce Iraq’s withdrawal (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 233; Tripp, 
2007: 244; United Nations, 1990b). Simultaneously, Britain and the U.S. mobilized their 
military and organized an international coalition to protect other Gulf countries, for instance 
Saudi Arabia, which feared annexation (Greenwood, 1992: 163; Kepel, 2004: 180-181). 
While the coalition military buildup progressed, diplomatic efforts continued in tandem at the 
bilateral, regional and international level to resolve the issue absent military intervention 
(Haass, 2009: 104-108; Rovner, 2014: 482-483). 
                                                          
 
12 To access Ambassador April Glaspie’s cable forwarded to the State Department following the meeting, see 
Glaspie (1990). 
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Iraq’s persistent noncompliance occasioned additional responses. For instance, Iraq was 
again placed on the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism on September 
13, 1990 (Miles, 2004). Two months later, UNSCR 678 was passed on November 29, 1990, 
reiterating the demand that Saddam Hussein renege on his territorial claim and withdraw 
troops from Kuwait (Greenwood, 1992: 165-166; United Nations, 1991). United Nations 
(1991) SCR 678 also included a January 15, 1991 deadline for compliance, authorizing the 
use of military force to eject Iraq’s military if necessary (Greenwood, 1992: 165-166; Haass, 
2009: 103; Tripp, 2007: 245). In this manner, the international community provided Hussein 
with an ultimatum to conform to its dictum. 
Saddam Hussein, nevertheless, remained non-compliant (Haass, 2009: 103-116). When 
the deadline expired, the coalition military operation (Operation Desert Storm), under the 
auspice of the UN, was launched to expel Iraq’s military from Kuwait on January 16, 1991 
(Calhoun, 2005: 95; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 231; Haass, 2009: 116; Tripp, 2007: 245). The 
Persian Gulf War (1991) lasted for six weeks before Saddam Hussein capitulated (Rovner, 
2014). While a comparatively short war, an estimated 200,000 Iraqis, both civilian and 
military, died in the few weeks of hostilities (Gareau, 2004: 180). The operation likewise 
decimated Iraq’s deteriorated infrastructure (an outcome of the Iran-Iraq War), weakened 
Iraq’s military capability and pushed it back inside Iraq’s internationally recognized borders 
(Gareau, 2004: 180; Tripp, 2007: 245-246). 
Securing the flow of petroleum was one factor prompting the United States to restore the 
status quo to the Middle East, as it has been and continues to be of salient interest to ensure 
market availability (Haass, 2009). Saddam’s acquisition of Kuwait markedly increased his 
percentage of Middle East oil production, which would have given him leverage against the 
United States and the international community (Haass, 2009: 112). Richard Haass (2009: 76) 
simultaneously asserts that other issues equally influenced the war. Among the alternative 
issues, he includes the use and support of international terrorism and maintaining security 
commitments to Israel. By comparison, the stated objective of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Iraq 
according to the George H.W. Bush administration was to reverse the annexation of Kuwait 
(Haass, 2009: 115). As a result, following the “liberation” of Kuwait, a cease-fire agreement 
was brokered (Byman, 2001: 500-501) and Saddam Hussein was not removed from power. 
According to Haass (2009: 130-131) the Persian Gulf War was terminated following the 
removal of Iraq’s military forces from Kuwait for several reasons. Foremost, the U.S. wanted 
to avoid additional troop casualties expected with the invasion of Iraq. Second, the United 
States wanted Iraq to remain sufficiently stable to counterbalance Iran’s regional influence. 
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Third, it is suggested that the administration feared becoming an occupying power. More 
specifically, the administration feared the internal instability and a violent insurgency that 
foreign occupation was expected to generate. Lastly, Haass (2009: 130-131) suggests that the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein would have exceeded the administration’s mandate in the eyes 
of the United Nations Security Council and the U.S. Congress; an outcome the George H.W. 
Bush administration felt would be counterproductive to its interests. 
Rather than remove Saddam Hussein by military force, the United States and the 
international community implemented a policy of containment by employing five tools to 
weaken and isolate Iraq. Containment included: 1) economic sanctions13; 2) weapons 
inspections; 3) a foreign military presence (to enforce no-fly zones); 4) military strikes; and 5) 
the provision of assistance to internal and external political movements striving for regime 
change in Iraq (Badie, 2010: 282; Byman, 2001: 500; Lieberfeld, 2005: 12). This containment 
strategy spanned three U.S. administrations over twelve years, encompassing the George 
H.W. Bush (1989-1992), William “Bill” Clinton (1992-2001) and George W. Bush (2001-
2009) administrations (Badie, 2010: 282; Byman, 2001: 493-494)14. Nonetheless, indigenous 
and foreign attempts to undermine Saddam Hussein’s control of Iraq proved ineffective 
(Fattah and Caso, 2009: 241). Hussein remained in power, and was openly defiant of the 
United States and the international community (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 241; Rovner, 2014: 
484-485; Tripp, 2007: 259-260). For this reason, there was increased criticism within the 
United States government and military of the stagnation and impotence of the containment 
strategy (Dobransky, 2014; Ricks, 2007: 4-5; Roy, 2007: 14; Tripp, 2007: 270). Nevertheless, 
such critiques had been fermenting since 1991. 
More specifically, some U.S. decision-makers had criticized the premature termination of 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Lieberfeld, 2005: 14; Ricks, 2007: 4-5; Roy, 2007: 14; Tripp, 
2007: 270). They condemned George H.W. Bush for ending hostilities before Saddam 
Hussein had been removed from power (Lieberfeld, 2005: 14; Ricks, 2007: 4-5; Roy, 2007: 
14; Tripp, 2007: 270). Critics felt that 1991 had been the perfect opportunity to effect regime 
change in Iraq. However, acting President George H.W. Bush was not convinced, and he 
terminated hostilities following the liberation of Kuwait, selecting to impose a containment 
                                                          
 
13 Both the United States and the international community sanctioned Iraq before, during and after the 1991 
Persian Gulf War. Sanctions are defined as real or threatened political and/or economic measures deployed by a 
government or other organizational body (such as the European Union or the United Nations) to restrict the 
capacity of the targeted individual, group, government, and thereby coerce desired behavior (Galtung, 1967: 379-
380; Smith, 1996: 229-231). 
14 For a detailed account of how these U.S. tools were utilized to contain and weaken Saddam Hussein, see 
Byman (2001). 
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policy instead. To summarize sentiment within the U.S., while most policymakers and 
analysts agreed that Hussein was a threat, no consensus could be achieved on the appropriate 
measures to eliminate the threat: containment or military overthrow (Badie, 2010: 282-283). 
During the next decade, political dissension and frustration continued as the U.S. 
maintained its containment policy. Critics persisted to argue that containment was insufficient 
because Hussein was repeatedly non-compliant (Badie, 2010: 282-283; Dobransky, 2014; 
Lieberfeld, 2005: 12; Mazarr, 2007: 3; Ricks, 2007: 4-5; Rovner, 2014: 492-500; Roy, 2007: 
14; Tripp, 2007: 270). Alternatively, these individuals proposed that direct military 
intervention in Iraq was necessary to demonstrate U.S. resolve and to alter the geopolitical 
configuration of the Middle East (Dobransky, 2014; Lieberfeld, 2005: 12; Mazarr, 2007: 3-6; 
Ricks, 2007: 4-5; Roy, 2007: 14; Tripp, 2007: 270). Several detractors, for instance Paul 
Wolfowitz, acquired influential positions in the George W. Bush administration in January 
2001 (Allawi, 2007: 98; Marsella, 2005: 661; Mazarr, 2007: 5; Roy, 2007: 14-15; Suskind, 
2006: 64). Their presence suggests that Iraq was identified as a threat to U.S. interests in the 
infancy of George W. Bush’s presidential term (Kepel, 2004: 98; Mazarr, 2007: 5-6; Roy, 
2007: 14-15; Suskind, 2006: 64). 
The influence of such critics was mute in the early months of the new administration. 
George W. Bush alternatively maintained the familiar Iraq containment strategy established 
by his predecessors (Badie, 2010: 278-280; Bush, 2003; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 241). 
Sanctions, no-fly zones, and (demands for) weapons inspections continued to be touted by the 
administration as necessary to isolate Saddam Hussein (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 241). That 
approach radically changed seven months into Bush’s presidency following the events of 
9/11. From this period, internal political momentum against Iraq amplified as policymakers 
and advisers suggested that Iraq be the primary target a U.S. military response to 9/11 
(Allawi, 2007: 80; Badie, 2010: 285; Dobransky, 2014; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 241; Haass, 
2009: 186; Roy, 2007: 13). 
Despite their recommendations, George W. Bush initially focused U.S. retribution on 
Afghanistan during the fall of 2001 (Mazarr, 2007: 5-8; Roy, 2007: 11-13). This approach 
was temporal. By the end of the year, the administration was contending that U.S. national 
security was conditioned on military intervention to remove Saddam Hussein from power 
(Allawi, 2007: 80; Dobransky, 2014; Kepel, 2004: 6-7; Lieberfeld, 2005: 3; Mazarr, 2007: 8-
9; Roy, 2007: 6; Rubin, 2003: 46-47; Western, 2005: 107-111). To advance the agenda, Bush 
launched a campaign to demonize Saddam Hussein in late 2001 (Martin, 2004: 1579; Roy, 
2007: 15-16; Tripp, 2007: 272; Western, 2005: 111). For example, while speaking before 
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Congress on January 29, 2002, Bush called Iraq, Iran and North Korea an “axis of evil,” 
thereby insinuating that the three countries constituted existential threats to international 
security and U.S. interests (Calhoun, 2005: 101; Davies, 2008: 385; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 
47; Katzman, 2002: 3; Kepel, 2004: 199; Public Broadcast Service, 2002; Tripp, 2007: 272). 
Simultaneously, he demanded Saddam Hussein concede to UN dictum, threatening a full-
scale military invasion if UN weapons inspections did not resume (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 
242-423; Tripp, 2007: 272-274). 
The message and timing of the administration’s bellicose discourse was pivotal for four 
reasons. First, U.S. citizens felt vulnerable to additional attacks of terrorism and prioritized 
national security (Exoo, 2010: 30; Gallup, 2010; Lieberfeld, 2005: 14; Western, 2005: 111). 
The Bush administration was able to monopolize upon anxiety and use it to garner popular 
support for intervention in Iraq (Roy, 2007: 1; Western, 2005: 107-108). Second, there was a 
general desire among U.S. citizens for revenge following 9/11 (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 83). 
Western (2005: 109-110) claims retributive yearning remained unsatisfied subsequent to U.S. 
intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001, and was therefore transposed onto Iraq. Third, 
and linked to the former, the Bush administration perceived that its “war on terror” was 
progressing positively—notably the goals of removing the Taliban-led government in 
Afghanistan and challenging al Qaeda’s sanctuary in that country were being attained, and 
perceived that the counterterrorism strategy could be implemented in Iraq (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 242; Kilcullen, 2009: 43; Roy, 2007: 11-12). Fourth, through his staunch 
encouragement of intervention, the President “staked his reputation” on fulfilling the objective 
(Davies, 2008: 388). This meant that if Bush failed to proceed according to his convictions, he 
risked losing support of the U.S. electorate (Davies, 2008: 388). The interplay of these 
influences had a profound impact on government determination to implement the policy, and 
public acceptance of that policy. 
With these factors at play, another component of the campaign for intervention in Iraq was 
the establishment of the Office of Special Plans (OSP) inside the Department of Defense, 
headed by Undersecretary of Defense Policy Douglas Feith (Badie, 2010: 287-290). Assured 
the CIA was failing in its ability to produce evidence of Saddam Hussein’s link with terrorism 
and pursuit of WMD, the OSP (re-) evaluated intelligence and presented findings that 
supported the administration’s policy objectives (Badie, 2010: 287-290). OSP operations, 
therefore, purposefully minimized critical analysis of intelligence whereby a public policy 
campaign based upon (manufactured) evidence could be constructed (Badie, 2010: 289-290). 
In this manner, the Bush administration was able to provide evidence of Hussein’s link to 
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terrorism and WMD, while marginalizing analysis provided by other agencies, such as the 
CIA or Department of State (DOS), that contradicted those assertions (Badie, 2010: 289-290; 
Mazarr, 2007: 9-18). 
Simultaneously, measures were taken to prepare for an impending invasion. In November 
2001, as part of the administration’s preparation for war with Iraq, the President ordered 
various government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD) and the DOS, to 
make arrangements for a potential military invasion (Brennan and others, 2013: 22; Mazarr, 
2007: 7; Suskind, 2006: 81). During the planning phase, obvious divergences emerged 
between the DOD, CIA and DOS conceptualization of U.S. objectives, as well as preference 
for approaches and expected challenges (Brennan and others, 2013: 22-23). Associated with 
these discrepancies, and equally problematic, cross-institutional collaboration at all levels of 
planning was limited, and when information was shared, the DOD neglected or relegated 
external input (Brennan and others, 2013: 22-23; Rathmell, 2005: 1020-1021). As a result, the 
DOD and DOS could not agree on objectives or contingency plans, and the limited interaction 
and information sharing between the two agencies were further curtailed. Absent 
collaboration, the quality of planning suffered, while the disposition established between these 
agencies during the planning stage was transferred into Iraq once the invasion had occurred. 
In addition to DOS and DOD preparation, other institutions likewise involved themselves 
in projecting how a hypothetical invasion might transpire. Several governmental and 
nongovernmental agencies conducted research to determine outcomes and best practices in 
Iraq. Among them, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2002) published a (later) 
declassified assessment entitled “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: 
Implications for Iraq.” The essay provides an abridged comparative analysis of the U.S.-led 
post-World War II occupation of Germany and Japan, and applies lessons learned from those 
historic experiences to a hypothetical invasion and occupation of Iraq (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2002). The assessment provides three important recommendations. First, the CIA 
argues that an efficacious occupation of Iraq would require an international mandate (UN 
approval) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002: 2-3). Second, it suggests that internal stability 
would have to be firmly imposed utilizing a large number of occupying troops (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2002: 3-4). Finally, the CIA claims the endeavor would have to be 
buttressed by a prolonged U.S. military-political commitment to ensure a successful transition 
of authority to an indigenous government of Iraq (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002: 1-2). 
With the advantage of hindsight, the recommendations provided in this report were relevant. 
By comparison, another independent working group formed by the Council on Foreign 
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Relations, co-chaired by Edward P. Djerejian and Frank G. Wisner (2003: 9), was organized 
to contemplate the invasion. This report argues that the post-war occupations of Germany and 
Japan are theoretically and practically irrelevant when envisaging an invasion because Iraq 
would not be a defeated country but a liberated one. Despite this theoretical divergence, the 
study identifies hazards similar to those articulated in the CIA (2002) assessment. It does, 
however, provide additional recommendations. For instance, Djerejian and Wisner (2003: 5-6) 
recommend that Iraq’s military be maintained to provide post-war security rather than be 
dissolved. Furthermore, the study advocates that United States authorities, as an occupying 
power, not impose policies and tools on Iraq during the occupation, but rather cede control of 
the (re)organization and (re)construction of Iraq’s political and social structures to the 
international community and Iraqis (Djerejian and Wisner, 2003: 2)15. Despite the value of 
their recommendations, as detailed below, these proposals were not implemented. 
At the same time various government agencies were independently planning for war, the 
Bush administration continued campaigning to acquire support for intervention before a 
domestic and international audience from early 2002 to 2003 (Exoo, 2010: 31; Haass, 2009: 
202-231; Western, 2005: 109-111). Arguments for war were couched on several U.S. national 
security objectives. For instance, some scholars, such as Paul Williams (2006), assert that the 
invasion was primarily about usurping control of Iraq’s natural resources. This assertion is 
supported by Paul Wolfowitz’s testimony before Congress in which he stated that tens of 
billions of dollars could be generated from Iraq’s oil revenue (Williams, 2006: 1074). In a 
similar vein, many Iraqis felt that acquiring control over oil was the principal motivation for 
the invasion. 
Additionally, the justifications presented to the general U.S. public for war, although later 
expanded, centered on two salient points. First, it was argued that deposing Saddam Hussein 
was essential to undermining a current, or future, link between “rogue states,” such as Iraq, 
and non-state groups, such as al Qaeda, which employ the tactic of terrorism (Calhoun, 2005: 
97-98; Dobransky, 2014; Galtung, 2009: 48; Hamilton and others, 2006: 23; Hoffman, 2004: 
9; Ikenberry, 2006: 241; Johnson, 2004: 229; Katzman, 2002: 3; Kepel, 2004: 5-7; Ricks, 
2007: 66; Roy, 2007: 15-16). Second, it was asserted with great certainty that Iraq possessed 
and continued to pursue WMD (Calhoun, 2005: 97-98; Dobransky, 2014; Hamilton and 
others, 2006: 23; Hoffman, 2004: 9; Ikenberry, 2006: 241; Johnson, 2004: 229; Katzman, 
                                                          
 
15 See Djerejian and Wisner (2003). For a brief overview of additional internal U.S. Government documents 
(from the CIA and Pentagon) that warned of the negative consequences of invading Iraq, see Bowen (2009: 13-
19) and Ricks (2007: 40). 
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2002: 3; Kepel, 2004: 5-7; Ricks, 2007: 66; Roy, 2007: 15-16). Concerning the former 
justification, no link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, or other groups that deploy the 
tactic of terrorism, was convincingly demonstrated by the administration (Banks and others, 
2008: 312; Katzman, 2002: 8; Roy, 2007: 13, 15-16; Sageman, 2008: 91). Concerning the 
latter, intensified U.S. rhetoric and accusations that Saddam Hussein possessed and/or was 
proliferating WMD, was (in hindsight) unsubstantiated (Blix, 2003; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 
242-423; Fisher, 2003: 393-394; Rubin, 2003: 52; Tripp, 2007: 272-274). Nevertheless, the 
increased pressure exerted by the U.S. prompted Saddam Hussein to allow UNMOVIC into 
Iraq in late 2002 to resume nonproliferation oversight and weapons inspections that had been 
suspended since UNSCOM’s ejection in early 1999 (Blix, 2003; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 242-
423; Fisher, 2003: 393-394; Rubin, 2003: 52; Tripp, 2007: 272-274). 
Three months after UNMOVIC’s entry into Iraq, its leader Hans Blix, presented his 
findings before the UNSC on 14 February, 2003, where he stated that no WMD had been 
located (Allawi, 2007: 88; Blix, 2003). His preliminary assessment reiterated UNSCOM’s 
March, 1999 analysis that WMD in Iraq had been largely dismantled or eliminated during the 
previous decade (Allawi, 2007: 88; Blix, 2003). Although UNMOVIC’s analysis had not 
documented any significant breeches in nonproliferation or noncompliance (Blix, 2003; 
ElBaradei, 2003), its assessment was downplayed by the Bush administration. The Bush 
administration counteracted those claims, presenting their own exaggerated or falsified 
intelligence when making the case for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein (Calhoun, 2005: 
101-102; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 242-243). As a consequence of persistent U.S. pressure, and 
an inevitable U.S. invasion of Iraq, UNMOVIC was prematurely removed from Iraq before it 
could complete its investigation and without discovering any serious breaches in compliance 
(Tripp, 2007: 274). Since there were conflicting reports between the UN and the U.S. 
concerning the status of Iraq’s weapons programs, the international community remained 
reluctant to endorse the U.S. invasion of Iraq. This meant that the decision to go to war was 
transferred to the U.S. public and the U.S. would have to unilaterally manage any overthrow. 
Among U.S. constituents, the administration`s rationalizations proffered for intervention 
in Iraq did not resonate equally (Western, 2005: 122-133). On the one hand, some U.S. 
citizens favored a multilateral approach, suggesting the Bush administration work closely with 
the United Nations and give international inspectors additional time to fulfill their mandate 
(Kull and others, 2004: 570; Western, 2005: 122). Advocates of providing the international 
community with more time were most likely influenced by the contradicting reports proffered 
by the UN and U.S. government. On the other hand, by emphasizing the issue of U.S. national 
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security (Bellamy, 2004: 134), the Bush administration was able to acquire sufficient 
domestic popular support to commit troops to Iraq (Davies, 2008: 389; Western, 2005: 122-
133). Scholars posit that this degree of popular support can be partially attributed to a mid-
October 2002 joint resolution by Congress which authorized the President to utilize military 
force when and where he determined necessary to secure the United States and its interests 
(Gareau, 2004: 201; Haass, 2009: 229; Ricks, 2007: 61-63; Tripp, 2007: 273; Western, 2005: 
132). Consequently, Bush obtained approximately 64% domestic popular support for 
intervention (Western, 2005: 119). This was a sufficient mandate to pursue the invasion. 
At the international level, most countries overwhelmingly opposed U.S. military 
intervention (Abdallah, 2003: 63; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 242; Fukuyama, 2006: 97; Jackson 
and Towle, 2006: 48-51; Rubin, 2003: 47). Because George W. Bush’s WMD and terror 
justifications were unsubstantiated, the international community refused to subscribe to the 
assertion that Iraq posed an imminent threat to its regional neighbors or the United States 
(Jackson and Towle, 2006: 48-51; Rubin, 2003: 54). Moreover, unable to associate the events 
of 9/11 with Iraq, politicians and citizens of many countries distanced themselves or palpably 
opposed intervention (Hamilton and others, 2006: 23; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 48; 
Lieberfeld, 2005: 14; J. Smith, 2005: 179; Zimmermann and Wenger, 2007: 2). For instance, 
European allies, such as Germany and France, publicly voiced opposition at the UN, fearing 
that U.S. policy threatened European security rather than providing for it (Abdallah, 2003: 63; 
Carty, 2011: 80-81, 95-96; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006: 56; Haass, 2009: 238-244; Jackson 
and Towle, 2006: 51; Mann, 2006: 196)16. Correspondingly, millions of people around the 
world protested against the war and petitioned their governing representatives not to support 
the U.S. invasion (BBC News, 2003; Carty, 2011: 86-88). Hence, most citizens and officials 
among the international community disapproved of an invasion of Iraq. 
Encountering marginal international support, the Bush administration underwent a 
strategic shift since the terror-WMD nexus proved insufficient for mustering international 
endorsement (Rubin, 2003: 46-49; Wimmer, 2003: 111). Gradually, justification was 
reformulated to include “[r]emoving tyranny, building a democracy, introducing human and 
civil rights, [and] writing a progressive constitution” (Allawi, 2007: 459). Interestingly, the 
additional justifications proposed for intervention, and noted by Allawi, had become widely 
                                                          
 
16 Jan Oberg (2007: 72) notes that while Germany and France voiced their opposition, as two of the largest 
countries in the European Union, they were limited in their ability to dissuade other European Union countries, 
such as Italy and Spain, from joining the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. 
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accepted within the UN and among scholarship as a component of liberal peacebuilding17, and 
such references have a theoretical impact on the perceived utility of contemporary state 
building and conflict resolution as noted in chapter three (Johansen, 2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham 
and others, 2011: 3). Nevertheless, the modification of rationalizations for war did not garner 
increased international support. 
Frustrated by the United Nation’s reluctance to endorse or support its planned invasion, 
the George W. Bush administration argued that extraordinary circumstances dictated the use 
of preventive unilateralism and the creation of a “coalition of the willing” (Carty, 2011: 80; 
Johansen, 2004: 4; Lieberfeld, 2005: 3; Tripp, 2007: 273)18. The U.S. thereby organized an ad 
hoc coalition willing to participate in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In several instances, 
the citizens of coalition countries did not support their government’s involvement; this 
popular sentiment later weakened the coalition when governments were gradually pressured 
by their populations to withdraw their forces during the occupation (Carty, 2011: 95-98). 
Nonetheless, following the formation of this coalition prior to the invasion, and its 
deployment to the Middle East, the United States gave Saddam Hussein and his two sons, 
Quasi and Qusai, an ultimatum on March 18, 2003 to depart Iraq within forty-eight hours or 
be removed by force (Calhoun, 2005: 90; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247; Tripp, 2007: 274)19. 
This unrealistic ultimatum ensured that war was inevitable (Calhoun, 2005: 90). 
Since Hussein refused to comply with Bush’s ultimatum, the U.S. conducted a premature 
surgical air strike on March 19, 2003, on a compound near Baghdad following false 
intelligence reports suggesting Hussein was there (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247). Subsequent to 
this failure, the U.S. led its coalition—including Britain, Denmark, Spain, Poland and 
Australia—into Iraq under the military code name Operation Iraqi Freedom (Bellamy, 2004: 
131; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247; Gareau, 2004: 201; Suskind, 2006: 211; Tripp, 2007: 274). 
Coalition forces launched their ground offensive largely from Kuwait, since Turkey would not 
permit U.S. forces to use its territory to open a second front in Iraq-Kurdistan (Fattah and 
Caso, 2009: 247; Rubin, 2003: 62). Turkey’s reluctance to cooperate, consequently, reduced 
                                                          
 
17 Peacebuilding as used herein broadly refer to the process of transforming intrastate or interstate relations by 
reformation of the structural components producing and/or sustaining conflict relations (Ramsbotham and others, 
2012: 32). Practices include democratic reform, improvements in the judicial system and rule of law, 
demobilization and disarmament and countless other techniques to resolve conflict (Sharp, 2013: 158). 
18 Some scholars use the term “preemptive” to classify the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Bellamy, 2004: 134; Calhoun, 
2005: 95-96; Davies, 2008: 385). However, the term preemption is normally utilized to describe a military attack 
when an adversary poses an imminent threat (Johansen, 2004: 4). Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the 
United States thereby making the invasion preventive (Johansen, 2004: 4). 
19 Laurie Calhoun (2005: 90) astutely notes: “By making this the single acceptable condition for the avoidance of 
war, the Bush administration effectively precluded the possibility of stopping the invasion, and then blamed it 
upon Hussein for refusing to do what would have been patently irrational for him to do.” 
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the speed at which the coalition could assume control of Iraq. 
During planning and execution of the invasion, United States officials had largely 
expected to be welcomed by Iraqis; they predicted Iraqis would be grateful for coalition 
assistance with the removal of Saddam Hussein (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 166). However, as 
opposed to appreciation of the invasion, animosity manifested. Two reasons explain the 
bellicose popular sentiment, namely distaste for being occupied and a marked degree of 
distrust of the United States. A third reason may have been that, prior to the invasion; Saddam 
Hussein promoted armed resistance against the coalition (Terrill, 2003: 9). Among other 
things, Iraqis were told that the United States sought to occupy the country and take control of 
its natural resources, an assertion that exploited disgruntlement towards occupation and 
existing distrust of the United States (Terrill, 2003: 9). Hussein’s appeal to his constituents, 
however, does not appear to have significantly influenced initial organized armed resistance 
(Terrill, 2003: 9-12). Contrary, Iraq’s military provided a measure of resistance in the 
southern Shi‘a areas of the country, and then organized armed opposition to the coalition 
gradually waned (Rathmell, 2005: 1023; Terrill, 2003: 10-12). 
As the coalition pressed deeper into Iraq’s frontiers, Iraq’s military dissolved itself 
(Dunlap, 2013: 14; Rathmell, 2005: 1023). Its dissolution minimized resistance against 
coalition advancements, at least in the short term, prompting Saddam Hussein to escape from 
Baghdad (Allawi, 2007: 148; Bowen, 2009: 54; Tripp, 2007: 274). While their dissolution 
expedited the speed at which the coalition acquired control, some military analysts suggest 
that the dissolution of Iraq’s military was problematic in the long-term, since it was never 
defeated (Dunlap, 2013: 141). Absent defeat, soldiers were later able to reorganize, with the 
assistance of the population, to produce an insurgency (Dunlap, 2013: 141). The insurgency, 
in turn, complicated and prolonged the occupation, as detailed below. 
In the short term, the U.S. military eventually prevailed. On April 9, 2003, the United 
States arrogated control of Iraq as the occupying power (Suskind, 2006: 233; Tripp, 2007: 
274). At this point, “The UN Security Council recognized American authority over Iraq but 
did not endorse it, nor was the United States under any obligation to report back to the 
Security Council or seek periodic renewal of its mandate” (Dobbins and others, 2009: 12). 
Hence, while the UN recognized U.S. authority over Iraq and its associated responsibilities as 
the occupier, as indicated in the quote, it did not endorse the occupation, nor was the U.S. 
answerable to the UN or any other external authority. Through its overthrow of the existing 
government, the U.S. had essentially accepted absolute responsibility for occupied Iraq. 
After capturing Baghdad, coalition forces continued northward to Iraq-Kurdistan (Fattah 
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and Caso, 2009: 248). Kurds did not resist the invasion, and its militia, the Peshmerga, instead 
provided assistance (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 248). The last major city to fall to the United 
States was Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s birthplace, which was captured on April 14, 2003 (Fattah 
and Caso, 2009: 248). Although the U.S. had aggregated control over Iraq in less than one 
month, an insurgency would later manifest, both challenging and prolonging the occupation. 
Amalgamated, the U.S.-led coalition occupied Iraq from April 2003 to mid-December 
2011 (Logan, 2011). During this period, the U.S. was not only responsible for the security 
situation, but it hastened the establishment of a legitimate elected government while trying to 
influence the government’s composition and framework through the establishment of 
benchmarks and deadlines (Allawi, 2007: 4-9; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 9). For example, 
the U.S. frequently determined the demographic composition of particular governing bodies 
and committees, as elucidated below. At the same time, it operationalized and implemented 
poorly designed policies of security provision and reconstruction, as well as social and 
political reformation. These policies, which are structurally violent, had minimal 
consideration for their political and social ramifications upon Iraq. The following sections 
detail the transfer of authority during the occupation, and highlight several policies imposed 
by the United States to illustrate their negative social and political impact of said policies. 
1.2 The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs 
As the United States arrogated control of Iraq as an occupying power, the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), supervised by Jay Garner, was dispatched 
to oversee what had been projected as a short-term occupation (Bowen, 2009: 58; Brennan 
and others, 2013: 22; Tripp, 2007: 279). The ORHA itself had been briskly established. From 
the point of its initial establishment to its arrival in southern Iraq, the ORHA had 
approximately two months to recruit personnel, organize and prepare for deployment 
(Dobbins and others, 2009: 7; Rathmell, 2005: 1022). Following the invasion, a token team 
from the ORHA first entered Iraq in early April 2003 without Garner (Bowen, 2009: 56). It 
established itself in “Umm Qasr as a testing ground to calibrate its approach to the post-
invasion environment” (Bowen, 2009: 56). During this testing phase denoted by Bowen, the 
ORHA experienced several critical challenges, including U.S. cross-agency coordination 
deficits and localized civil unrest opposing the occupation (Bowen, 2009: 56). Its experiences 
foreshadowed acute challenges the ORHA would encounter following its permanent 
relocation to Iraq’s capital later that month (Bowen, 2009: 56; Brennan and others, 2013: 23-
25). After Baghdad fell into coalition hands, Jay Garner arrived in Baghdad on April 21, 2003 
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to manage a relocated ORHA that was now responsible for commencing operations 
throughout the country (Bowen, 2009: 59; Dobbins and others, 2009: 7; Tripp, 2007: 279). 
Garner’s chain of command ran through the U.S. DOD (Perito, 2005: 3), with the 
OHRA’s primary objectives as providing humanitarian relief to Iraqis (Rathmell, 2005: 1022-
1023), assisting for refugees, maintaining basic government services, and establishing law and 
order throughout the country (Brennan and others, 2013: 23; Tripp, 2007: 279). While quite 
complex, scholars argue that OHRA’s restrictive mandate partially illustrates the perceived 
ease with which the George W. Bush administration expected the occupation to progress 
(Tripp, 2007: 279), while its chain of command underscores the superiority of the DOD 
within the administration’s policy hierarchy. OHRA objectives likewise underscore the false 
assumption policymakers had, as they assumed that Iraq’s pre-war governing institutions and 
security forces would continue to function subsequent to the invasion (Brennan and others, 
2013: 23; Rathmell, 2005: 1023). Succinctly, Garner assumed that his organization would 
acquire temporary control over a generally functional government, military and police force 
inside Iraq (Perito, 2005: 3). Emphasizing his expectations, the ORHA head optimistically 
projected that political “elections for a transitional government [would occur] within 90 days 
of his arrival” (Dobbins and others, 2009: 38). This expectation denoted in the quote 
determined the strategy that Garner prepared and implemented as head of ORHA. 
To hasten the re-institution of Iraq’s governing and security framework, ORHA’s strategy 
hinged on “reconstitut[ing] as much of the old administration they could by recalling people 
to their posts, setting up temporary offices and guaranteeing salaries” (Tripp, 2007: 279). The 
arrangement summarized in the quote included the incorporation of low-level Baʻath party 
members into Iraq’s post-war structures (Dobbins and others, 2009: 7). To assist with this 
political transition, Garner “set up an interim Iraqi advisory group made of key Sunnis, 
Shi’ites, and Kurds to put a local face on the occupation government” (Dobbins and others, 
2009: 8). The advisory group mentioned was to assist ORHA staff, the latter of whom were 
projected to temporarily serve as governing functionaries, and then transition into an advisory 
role for Iraq’s (temporary) governing body until a new government could be elected (Dobbins 
and others, 2009: 8; Perito, 2005: 3). This transitional arrangement had been endorsed by 300 
diverse Iraqi representatives, who had attended the Baghdad Conference held on April 28, 
2003 (Dobbins and others, 2009: 38-39). The conference concluded with members agreeing to 
meet one month later (in May 2003) to form a transitional government that would assume 
control of the country from the ORHA (Dobbins and others, 2009: 38-39). Circumstances on 
the ground ultimately compromised the arrangements agreed upon. 
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To his credit, Garner intended to engage Iraqis in dialogue20 concerning how they desired 
post-war reconstruction to evolve and which changes they deemed appropriate (Tripp, 2007: 
279). Garner’s planned approach thereby conformed to Djerejian and Wisner (2003: 2) 
recommendations to engage and consult Iraq’s society throughout the occupation. However, 
Garner’s strategy was shelved following the proliferation of insecurity (Dobbins and others, 
2009: 8-9; Tripp, 2007: 279). When violence and civil disorder intensified, it exceeded a 
magnitude the U.S. had projected and prepared for (Allawi, 2007: 94). Although the U.S. 
military had planned for the possible sabotaging of Iraq’s oil fields, and thereby ordered U.S. 
troops to secure fields in Kirkuk and Britain’s troops to take control of the Rumaila fields in 
Basra (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247), the United States military neglected to anticipate 
widespread civil unrest (Allawi, 2007: 94). The decision to secure oil fields, as opposed to 
imposing law and order, offer credence to Paul Williams’ (2006) assertion that the invasion 
was primarily about obtaining control of Iraq’s natural resources. It equally played into the 
fears of the Iraqi people. 
The outbreak of looting and violence that manifested throughout the country during the 
first weeks of the occupation undermined the ORHA’s operational capacity (Allawi, 2007: 94; 
Bowen, 2009: 59-60; Dobbins and others, 2009: 8). The U.S. administration, nonetheless, 
appeared oblivious to events on the ground. Despite the proliferation of instability, on May 1, 
2003, aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, with an over-sized banner 
proclaiming “Mission Accomplished” in the backdrop, President George W. Bush publicly 
declared the end of major combat operations (Bellamy, 2004: 131; Brennan and others, 2013: 
25; CBS News, 2008; Dobransky, 2014; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 248). According to the 
President, Iraq had been liberated and reconstruction of the country had commenced. The 
ceremony proved premature because violence escalated over successive months. The spiral of 
insecurity prompted Bush to later claim that elements of the ceremony had not been 
adequately clarified (CBS News, 2008). Instead of the ceremony representing the end of 
major combat operations in Iraq, Bush insisted that the ritual was meant for U.S. service 
members on that particular navy vessel (CBS News, 2008). Despite the President’s attempts at 
concealing his impulsive action, the fact remains that security in Iraq spiraled beyond U.S. 
military control, and major combat operation in Iraq would persist for nearly a decade. 
                                                          
 
20 Dialogue is defined here as a constructive, symmetrical means of communicating, in which “minds open to 
take in new ideas and perspectives, modify earlier assumptions, and rethink judgments” (Saunders, 2009: 376-
378). 
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Analysts attribute the deterioration of security to numerous causes, namely the inadequate 
number of occupying troops and failure of leaders to provide orders to those troops in theatre 
(Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 57; Edelstein, 2004: 49; Haass, 2009: 257; Record, 2007: 
86). In total, the coalition committed 173, 218 troops to the invasion, which critics suggest 
was insufficient for maintaining law and order during the occupation (Rathmell, 2005: 1022; 
Tripp, 2007: 275). With insufficient numbers, and absent orders to intervene, coalition police, 
military and security contractors (or security forces) proved either unwilling or unable to 
restore order and thereby left civil violence largely unaddressed (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 
2009: 194-197). By early 2004, social-political dynamics escalated from sporadic civil 
disorder into a complex, violent conflict comprising of an insurgency21, sectarian and criminal 
violence, and terrorism (Allawi, 2007: 173-230; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 259; Hicks and 
others, 2011: 2). Adding impetus, key decisions made by U.S.-led occupying authorities 
precipitated destabilization and undermined reconstruction of Iraq by furthering popular 
resistance and sectarian divisions (Allawi, 2007: 155-159; Barakat, 2005: 578-580). The 
evolution of, and explanations for, the intensification of insecurity are detailed below. 
1.3 The Coalition Provisional Authority (May 2003-June 2004) 
Transfer of political and security responsibility to the U.S.-led coalition was met by social 
disorder and protest rather than the warm reception, popular support, or the short-term 
occupation that the Bush administration had predicted (Barakat, 2005: 572; Bowen, 2009: 60-
61; Oberg, 2007: 67; Perito, 2005: 3; Roy, 2007: 39; Stover and others, 2005: 831). These 
events in turn undermined plans for a rapid transfer of sovereignty. During the period of 
unrest, billions of dollars of Iraq’s state assets that were stolen, the weapons purloined, and 
government infrastructure that was damaged or destroyed, which undermined the 
reconstitution of an indigenous government and the reconstruction of Iraq (Bowen, 2009: 60; 
Dobbins and others, 2009: 8). In short, Bowen (2009: 61) states: “Chaos on the ground threw 
the plan for a rapid political transfer to an interim Iraqi authority into confusion.” The chaos 
Bowen references prompted the U.S. administration to alter its strategy. 
                                                          
 
21 An insurgency is defined a dichotomous armed conflict between an irregular force which utilizes an irregular 
form of warfare, or guerrilla-style tactics, combined with a political element of violent resistance against a 
country’s military or an occupying military (Kiras, 2008: 236). On one side of this dichotomy are the 
“insurgents”, those non-state actors attempting to usurp power. On the other side is the government or occupying 
forces, which are classified as the “counterinsurgents.” The overall goal of the insurgents is “to inflict ever-
increasing losses on government or occupying forces and tip the balance of forces in the insurgents’ favour,” 
whereby the counterinsurgent loses political and military control over a given territory and/or population (Kiras, 
2008: 236). Reversely, the counterinsurgent tries to obtain or maintain control of a population while 
marginalizing or defeating the insurgents (Kiras, 2008: 236). 
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Reflexively, President George W. Bush publicly announced OHRA’s dissolution on May 
6, 2003, after it had served less than one month in Iraq (Dobbins and others, 2009: 11; Tripp, 
2007: 282)22. Supplanting the OHRA, Bush dispatched a semi-permanent envoy to govern 
Iraq, whose extensive mandate was to endure until a functioning elected indigenous 
government could be established (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 250; Rathmell, 2005: 1025; Stover 
and others, 2005: 832). The U.S. provisional body that was dispatched was called the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which likewise fell under the aegis of the DOD 
(Dobbins and others, 2009: 12; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 250-251; Halchin, 2006: 1; Stover and 
others, 2005: 832; Tripp, 2007: 282). L. Paul Bremer III was appointed CPA head and he 
acted as the “executive, legislative and judicial authority” in Iraq throughout his tenure, giving 
him sweeping political authority (Bowen, 2009: 71; Dobbins and others, 2009: 111-112; 
Halchin, 2006: 1; Power, 2014: 343; Tripp, 2007: 282)23. 
As a consequence of the introduction of the CPA, the occupation of Iraq was prolonged 
without projecting the expected duration of its tenure (Brennan and others, 2013: 25). 
Insertion of the CPA, thereby, indicated that the United States had reneged on its promise of a 
rapid transfer of sovereignty (Dobbins and others, 2009: 39-41; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 250-
251). The immediate response of Iraqis to this decision was disgruntlement. As Dobbins and 
others (2009: 13) explain, Iraqis began to liken the U.S. occupation to Britain’s mandate. 
Nonetheless, U.S. policymakers had decided that a prolongation of the occupation was 
necessary to stabilize Iraq and ensure a smooth transition of authority back to Iraq. 
To hasten the stabilization and rebuilding of Iraq, Bremer rationalized that transition of 
sovereignty would be most efficiently accomplished subsequent to particular benchmarks 
being achieved (Brennan and others, 2013: 26; Dobbins and others, 2009: 42-43). Among the 
benchmarks imposed were the establishment of a constitution and the conducting of national 
elections (Brennan and others, 2013: 26; Dobbins and others, 2009: 42-43). Achieving these 
objectives required time, since political parties, in addition to rules and procedures associated 
with democratic processes, needed to be established (Brennan and others, 2013: 26; Dobbins 
and others, 2009: 42-43). In its broadest sense, prolongation of the occupation was determined 
necessary to advance the institutionalization of democratic parties, standards and practices. 
                                                          
 
22 According to Dobbins and others (2009: 8), Jay Garner was notified by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
of his replacement by the CPA on the night of April 21. 
23 For comprehensive analysis of the characteristics and personnel of the CPA, see Halchin (2006). For an 
overview of the legal responsibilities of the United States as the occupying power in Iraq according to 
international law, see Power (2014). 
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Within this frame, scholars likewise suggest that handover was postponed due to U.S. 
concerns that Iran-linked political groups, such as the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), would win early elections, because they were better established 
and organized (Dobbins and others, 2009: 43). According to this assessment, the U.S. was 
apprehensive that Iran’s influence in Iraq would undermine the establishment of a democratic 
framework and marginalize the potential of newly created political parties which required 
sufficient time to be founded and mature (Dobbins and others, 2009: 43). Therefore, 
postponement of the transition was judged crucial to provide time to firmly establish political 
parties to compete with SCIRI, and to marginalize Iran’s influence in Iraq’s sovereign affairs. 
Forgoing discussion on the associated challenges of fostering democratic development in 
Iraq, suffice it to say that the complexity and scope of the task assumed by the CPA was 
staggering (Bowen, 2009: 1-8). Among those responsibilities hitherto noted, the CPA likewise 
was responsible for: security; humanitarian assistance; the provision of basic services; the 
reconstitution of government; as well as the managing of day-to-day affairs of Iraq (Bowen, 
2009: 1-8). Innumerable obstacles complicated the fulfillment of these responsibilities. 
Among them, there were no clear chains of command, nor coordination or information sharing 
between the CPA, DOD, U.S. State Department and other agencies involved during the 
occupation (Dobbins and others, 2009: 15-18). The CPA likewise suffered from resource 
deficits, including perpetual staff shortages, with analysts suggesting it usually operated at 
half its envisioned strength, and many of its members lacked knowledge or experience in the 
Middle East or post-conflict settings (Dobbins and others, 2009: 244; Flavin, 2013: 178; 
Rathmell, 2005: 1026). Within this environment, Bremer and his staff endeavored to “rule 
postwar Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004” (Bowen, 2009: 8). Unsurprisingly, this period 
witnessed controversial and counterproductive policy implementation. 
Literature on the occupation underscores the acute lack of knowledge and appreciation for 
Iraq’s historical, cultural, political and social nuances among policymakers in particular and 
U.S. society in general (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268-270; Marsella, 2005: 664-665; Rifkind 
and Picco, 2014: 165). The absence of knowledge was present at the highest levels of the 
military and political establishments prior to the invasion, as demonstrated in the Bush 
administration’s expectation that a military invasion could rapidly alter Iraq’s historical 
experience and undermine traditional power distribution without contest (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 268-270; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 165). This acute knowledge deficit, (mis)informed 
most aspects of the invasion and occupation, undermining objective insight that contradicted 
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administrative thinking, and consequently, opposing insight and recommendations were 
promptly discarded. 
The close-minded nature and lack of knowledge continued to infect U.S. decision-making 
during the occupation. For example, Eric Stover and others (2005: 834-835) criticize that U.S. 
officials, including CPA employees, were detached from the political, social and economic 
conditions on the ground and insulated from Iraqi opinion even while serving in Iraq. 
Positioned in the fortified Green Zone, decision makers were “out of touch” with sentiment 
and events occurring beyond their immediate periphery (Allawi, 2007: 372). The differences 
in living standards, for instance, were profound since the Green Zone enjoyed relative security 
and the reliable distribution of basic services contrary to that experienced elsewhere in the 
country (Allawi, 2007: 372). Allawi (2007: 372), therefore, asserts that U.S. officials lived in 
a “bubble,” whereupon (misguided) CPA policies were implemented since decision-makers 
were out of touch with popular sentiment or the immediate needs of the population they were 
charged with representing (Allawi, 2007: 372; Stover and others, 2005: 834-835). As a result, 
many CPA decisions were imposed without consultation, which is structurally violent, and 
whereupon a political framework with questionable relevance (or legitimacy) in the context of 
Iraq’s historical, religious, social, political and cultural needs were institutionalized (Allawi, 
2007: 12-372; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268-270; Tripp, 2007: 292-293). In summary, 
disconnect between the occupier and the occupied existed at the political and social levels, 
from the planning of the occupation to its termination, prompting unpopular or superfluous 
decisions and actions by those charged with designing and implementing policy (Bowen, 
2013: 11-12; Stover and others, 2005: 834-835). 
1.3.1 Policy and structural violence 
Our focus briefly turns to examples of structural violence. During its tenure, the CPA (and 
other U.S. authorities) imposed post-war decisions that impacted on the social, political, 
economic and general security situation in occupied Iraq (Bowen, 2009: 6). As alluded to 
below, many of the activities outlined herein were part of a transitional justice program, but, 
nonetheless, their techniques and benchmarks constitute structural violence. Johan Galtung 
(1990: 249) defines structural violence as a process that marginalizes and fragments 
individuals or collectives. Comparatively, Reimann (2004: 9) adds: “Structural violence 
defines the social, political and economic structure of a conflict situation when unequal 
power, domination and dependency are perpetrated.” The quality of activity that Galtung and 
Reimann reference was implemented by the United States as the occupying power, and was 
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not only violent, but sometimes were counterproductive (Enterline and Greig, 2008: 885). For 
the sake of space, we will only scrutinize two examples of structural violence perpetrated 
during the occupation of Iraq at the moment. Other examples will surface later, including the 
failure to provide security (1.3.2), the ad hoc and poorly implemented reconstruction program 
(1.3.3.3), and various other U.S.-imposed decisions, including its influence over the 
composition of post-war governing frameworks (1.4). 
The two examples highlighted in the present subsection are examined because of the long-
term direct social and political impact these decisions have had on Iraq. Specifically, de-
Ba‘athification and the dissolution of Iraq’s security forces were structurally violent because 
they marginalized sectors of Iraq’s society and were imposed. These measures marginalized 
the Sunni, in addition to precipitated ethnic-sectarian fracturing, and attributed to increased 
insecurity that complicated the (re-) establishment of a functional and legitimate government 
(Allawi, 2007: 150-159; Bowen, 2009: 73-75). Each policy is addressed in turn. 
1.3.1.1 De-Ba‘athification 
The CPA’s first decree, Order Number 1, de-Ba‘athification, was issued on May 1, 2003 
(Allawi, 2007: 150; Brennan and others, 2013: 26; Dobbins and others, 2009: 15; Yamao, 
2011: 3-4). The order denied previously high ranking Baʻath Party24 members (the top 1%), 
who were predominantly of Sunni Arab identity, the opportunity of holding political and civil 
service positions in Iraq’s new governing and social framework as punishment for their 
complicit involvement in wrongdoing perpetrated under Saddam Hussein’s leadership 
(Allawi, 2007: 150; Bowen, 2009: 73-75; Dobbins and others, 2009: 115; Rifkind and Picco, 
2014: 167; Yamao, 2011: 3-4). In general terms, scholars support the use of vetting as a 
transitional justice technique in post-conflict settings, conditioned the practice does not 
undermine the advancement of peace. For example, Wimmer (2003: 126) perceives vetting as 
a necessary act to punish perpetrators of wrongdoing and to ensure justice is served and 
transition occurs. However, while its implementation in Iraq was necessary following the 
                                                          
 
24 The party was imported into Iraq in the late 1940s through Shiʻa student movements (Devlin, 1991: 1404; 
Fattah and Caso, 2009: 180; Neff, 1991: 24). It became an official political party in Iraq in 1951 (Farouk-Sluglett 
and Sluglett, 1991: 1415). Despite its Shiʻa origination, after 1963, Sunni members dominated the upper 
echelons of the party’s organizational hierarchy in Iraq (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991: 1415). Ideologically, 
the Baʻath were secular (Terrill, 2003: 6); they advocated pan-Arabism, the expulsion of foreign influence from 
Arab territory, and improved social conditions for the impoverished (Devlin, 1991: 1396-1404; Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 208-209; Gerner, 2004: 103; Tripp, 2007: 138). The Baʻath gradually spread into Iraq’s officer corps and 
went on to become the most influential political parties in Iraq between 1958 and 2002, as traced below. 
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decades of wrongdoing perpetrated by Saddam Hussein’s government, the breadth and depth 
at which it was implemented divided society. 
Vetting was socially divisive. Some Kurd and Shi‘a perceived vetting as necessary, and 
suggested punishment was warranted, whether Baʻath members were compliant or directly 
involved in wrongdoing under Saddam Hussein (Dobbins and others, 2009: 112-115). 
However, the top tiers of the Baʻath Party were predominantly Sunni, thus implementation 
created a potential strain. The disproportional sectarian composition of the organization’s 
hierarchy meant that vetting would need to be balanced with alternative measures to reduce 
the perception that the act was violent retribution targeting the Sunni. However, balance was 
not established in Iraq’s vetting process and the Sunni perceived de-Ba‘athification as 
discriminatory, or “de-Sunnification,” undoubtedly because, by its nature, the decree was 
predominantly targeted at the Sunni (Allawi, 2007: 150-152). Compounding Sunni 
disgruntlement, the decree was implemented broadly, affecting government representatives 
and civil servants alike, which magnified Sunni feelings of being purposefully singled out, 
sentiment which in turn exacerbated sectarian tensions (Allawi, 2007: 152). Summarizing 
sentiment, Perito (2005: 6) opines: the decree to which vetting was implemented “seemed not 
only unwise but also unfair”25. The unwise and unfair perceptions that Perito mentions, 
explains how de-Ba‘athification divided Iraq’s society, and produced a grievance among the 
Sunni. These circumstances prompted violent retaliation and armed efforts by the Sunni to 
secure their position within the developing social and political framework during the 
occupation. 
De-Ba‘athification produced individual and collective grievances predominantly because 
it constituted forcible unemployment simply because of one’s political affiliation (Bowen, 
2009: 73-74; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 167). It should be emphasized here that membership in 
the Baʻath Party virtually became a necessity under Saddam Hussein’s tenure (Farouk-
Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991). Nevertheless, the implications of being de-Ba‘athified exceeded 
redundancy. Not only did the act deny individuals the right to work, or to serve in a post-war 
political-civil capacity, but equally relegated the skills and experience of those Baʻath 
members who had not committed wrongdoing (Bowen, 2009: 74; Perito, 2005: 6; Rifkind and 
Picco, 2014: 73). Marginalization of skills, in turn, affected the reconstitution and 
effectiveness of post-war structures since experienced individuals not guilty of criminal 
                                                          
 
25 Once informed of the edict by the newly arrived Paul Bremer, Jay Garner unsuccessfully tried to persuade 
Bremer to challenge the de-Ba‘athification order and reduce its scope to prevent the public backlash Garner 
anticipated the policy would generate (Brennan and others, 2013: 26; Dobbins and others, 2009: 114). 
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wrongdoing were denied an opportunity to operate in Iraq’s new social and governing 
framework simply due to their political affiliation (Bowen, 2009: 74; Perito, 2005: 6; Rifkind 
and Picco, 2014: 73). Consequently, critics argue that resurrecting Iraq’s governing 
institutions was prolonged by the redundancies produced through de-Ba‘athification (Bowen, 
2009: 74; Perito, 2005: 6). Specifically, vetting innocent former employees meant that 
administrative and governing offices had to be staffed with less-experienced and often less-
skilled politicians and civil servants (Bowen, 2009: 74; Perito, 2005: 6). 
Despite this shortcoming, there are analysts who contend that de-Ba‘athification was 
necessary and appropriately implemented. Dobbins and others (2009: 115), for example, 
argue the decree rightfully targeted the top one percent of Baʻath Party members. They also 
assert that the measure was proportional, because there were a sufficient number of qualified 
alternative candidates capable of filling government and civil service ranks made vacant by 
vetting (Dobbins and others, 2009: 115). In their opinion, de-Ba‘athification did not remove 
experienced technocrats or civil servants, but properly punished those most responsible for 
wrongdoing under Saddam Hussein (Dobbins and others, 2009: 115). They support their 
hypothesis of proportionality stating that early polling in Iraq demonstrated that de-
Ba‘athification was widely accepted by Iraqis, especially by the Kurd and Shi‘a (Dobbins and 
others, 2009: 112-115). However, positive sentiment among these groups was expected, and 
the authors do not consider that some individuals in the top tier of government may not have 
been complicit in criminal misconduct. 
Although the CPA institutionalized and implemented vetting initially, Bremer transferred 
responsibility for vetting to a High National De-Ba‘athification Commission controlled by 
Iraq’s government later (Dobbins and others, 2009: 112-118). The maneuver was aimed at 
undercutting criticism of U.S. control (Dobbins and others, 2009: 112-119). However, under 
Iraqi authority, the vetting process became deeply politicized, partially because it was 
inconsistently and opaquely applied by the governing bodies charged with its implementation, 
who were composed predominantly of members of the Kurd and Shi‘a identity (Dobbins and 
others, 2009: 119, 132-134). Consequently, the High National De-Ba‘athification 
Commission experience popular and U.S. criticism at the way vetting was being managed and 
executed (Dobbins and others, 2009: 119, 132-134). 
As criticism of implementation mounted, Bremer intervened and overrode the de-
Baʻathification Commission in the spring of 2004 (Dobbins and others, 2009: 119, 132-134). 
At this time, he curtailed the depth of vetting subsequent to pervasive redundancies made in 
Iraq’s education sector as part of the vetting program (Dobbins and others, 2009: 119, 132-
  
57 
 
134). In particular, Bremer demanded that a portion of the teachers whom had been vetted be 
returned to their positions (Dobbins and others, 2009: 133). Bremer’s override is suggested to 
have been driven by the social and political divisiveness the de-Baʻathification process was 
producing (Dobbins and others, 2009: 136). Succinctly, the depth at which de-Ba‘athification 
was being implemented became controversial and rather than providing transitional justice 
and unite society, it was dividing the country across ethnic/sectarian lines. 
Open access qualitative research demonstrates the initial polarizing effect of de-
Baʻathification and a later fluctuation in popular opinion. For example, a 2005 study found 
that only 43.7% of Iraqis believed that all ex-Baʻath members should be barred from holding a 
position in government (International Republican Institute, 2005: 39). Within that study, 
34.1% believed that only those convicted of crimes should be banned from office 
(International Republican Institute, 2005: 39). Nevertheless, it appears that nearly half of all 
Iraqis at that time believed that de-Baʻathification, as implemented, was necessary. By 
comparison, in 2007, ABC News and others (2007: 11) found that “[n]inety-six percent of 
Sunni Arabs say ex-Baathists should be permitted to hold Iraqi government jobs. About two-
thirds of Shiites and Kurds alike say they should not.” The findings by ABC News and others 
demonstrate the degree of polarization that vetting produced within Iraq’s three primary 
identity groupings, indicating that the edict was divisive. The divisiveness of vetting among 
the population emphasizes the need for balancing implementation to satisfy all relevant 
stakeholders—to provide justice without making the Sunni feel isolated and victimized. 
One year later, a shift in popular opinion toward de-Baʻathification occurred. In 2008, 
ABC News and others (2008: 9) found that a majority of respondents (69%) declared that 
previous low-level Baʻath Party members should be permitted to hold public office. 
Moreover, and contrary to previous polling, respondents across ethnic and sectarian affiliation 
suggest that vetting had become too extreme (ABC News and others, 2008: 9). This finding 
demonstrates that Iraqis across ethnic and sectarian lines were beginning to appreciate that not 
all Baʻath Party members were complicit or responsible for wrongdoing and were realizing 
the divisive nature of the edict. Unfortunately, ABC News and others (2008) do not examine 
why the change occurred and their 2009 survey does not follow up on the issue. We 
conjecture that the escalation in insurgent and sectarian violence may have prompted the Kurd 
and Shi‘a to recognize that the scope of de-Ba‘athification was a catalyst of violent divisions 
since it produced Sunni grievances and which became their impetus to resistance. 
By way of conclusion, CPA Order Number 1 constituted a grievance for high-ranking 
Baʻath party members, who were mainly Sunni Arab. While the act was necessary as a 
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transitional justice tool, the depth and breadth at which it was implemented produced 
grievances among the Sunni and gave impetus to sectarian turmoil (since social-political 
stakes increased during the occupation), manifesting in an armed insurgency (precipitated by 
anger at the implementation and effects of the decree) partly due to its disproportional nature 
(Allawi, 2007: 150-152; Rathmell, 2005: 1024; Ucko, 2008: 363). Moreover, the forbidding 
of innocent, former high-ranking Baʻath party members from holding political or civil offices 
undermined U.S. moral credibility (claiming to be proliferating democracy) and the strategic 
objectives of stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq (Abdallah, 2003: 62; Allawi, 2007: 150-152; 
Ucko, 2008: 363). Summarizing general Iraqi sentiment, Allawi (2007: 151-152) argues that 
the enforcement of de-Ba‘athification is interpreted as the U.S. being more interested in 
exerting disproportionate control over Iraq’s internal processes, and its favoritism of the 
Kurds and Shi‘a, and less concerned about promoting democracy and state building. 
Similarly, Olivier Roy (2007: 40-43) suggests U.S. manipulation of de-Ba‘athification, in 
conjunction with other decisions (some of which are outlined below), compounded the 
challenges of creating a legitimate democratic government in Iraq. 
1.3.1.2 Dissolution of security services 
Prior to the invasion, some analysts had discussed downsizing and restructuring Iraq’s 
military (Djerejian and Wisner, 2003: 5-6; Dobbins and others, 2009: 53). However, 
subsequent to the sweeping desertion experienced among Iraq’s military and police forces 
during the invasion, “prewar plans to use the Iraqi military forces for post-war stability 
operations were rendered impractical, at least in the short term” (Dobbins and others, 2009: 
53). The quote emphasizes that following the voluntary dissolution of Iraq’s military, the U.S. 
military and other organizations associated with the occupation determined that Iraq’s security 
forces should be officially dissolved and reconstructed later (Dobbins and others, 2009: 52-
57). While expressing some reservations about the proposal, Bremer agreed to obey the 
dissolution edict, and officially instituted the decision to dissolve Iraq’s military and security 
services on May 23, 2003 (Dobbins and others, 2009: 52-57). 
Therefore, the second major decision of the CPA was the dissolution of Iraq’s military, 
intelligence and police forces (Allawi, 2007: 155-159; Bowen, 2009: 75; Dobbins and others, 
2009: 15; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 167; Tripp, 2007: 282; Ucko, 2008: 343). Bowen (2009) 
summarizes the decision’s content and scope: 
CPA Order Number 2, titled “Dissolution of Entities,” abolished 
seven institutions: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Information, 
the Ministry of State for Military Affairs, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, 
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the National Security Bureau, the Directorate of National Security, and 
the Special Security Organization. The order put every member of Iraq’s 
army, air force, navy, and air defense force, as well as the Republican 
Guard, the Special Republican Guard, the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence, and the Emergency Forces—some 500,000 men—
immediately out of work, many without any compensation. Although the 
roughly 300,000 conscripts could receive a small termination payment, 
no soldier with the rank of colonel or above was eligible for either a 
termination payment or a pension (Bowen, 2009: 75)26. 
The quote illustrates the scale of the decree and alludes to the social implications of the 
dissolution policy where a large number of Iraq’s security personnel were immediately made 
redundant without receiving compensation or being disarmed. 
Hence, there were several obvious shortcomings associated with Order Number 2 (Allawi, 
2007: 158). Foremost, no measures were initially implemented to provide alternative 
employment or financial compensation to many of those made redundant, creating animosity 
among former personnel who were now unable to provide for their families (Allawi, 2007: 
158; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59; Tripp, 2007: 282). The act thereby exacerbated post-war 
unemployment (Bowen, 2013: 12) but also increased anti-occupation sentiment and attributed 
to accumulating post-war grievances (Allawi, 2007: 158; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Rifkind and 
Picco, 2014: 167). Humiliated and incensed, some nonviolently protested the decree and these 
demonstrations rapidly transmogrified into larger riots for which coalition troops were 
dispatched to contain (Allawi, 2007: 158). As protests and riots failed, humiliated officers and 
soldiers joined an emerging insurgency to counter occupying forces (Allawi, 2007: 243; 
Dobransky, 2014; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Fontan, 2006: 227-235; Hashim, 2006: 92-97). 
At this juncture, humiliation in the context of Iraq’s culture should be briefly examined. 
Victoria Fontan (2006: 218) suggests that humiliation is synonymous with shame whereby an 
event “depriv[es] the subject of self-value, or self-respect, and also ultimately induc[es] 
feelings of rejection. Shame is the result of the self-perception of failure to live up to certain 
standards and ideals.” In consideration of Fontan’s definition, shame is subjective and varies 
according to culture and experience. Providing increased insight into how honor and shame 
are conceptualized and practiced in Iraq, Avishai Margalit categorizes Iraq as a shame society, 
where an experience perceived as humiliating demotes an individual and their family’s social 
status, and demotion in turn encourages a reaction to reclaim or reconstitute the social 
standing of the offended (Fontan, 2006: 219)27. 
                                                          
 
26 Comparatively, Allawi (2007: 157) estimates that 400,000, mostly Sunni Arab, soldiers were affected. 
27 Avishai Margalit “differentiates between two types of society with regard to humiliation: guilt and shame 
societies. Members of guilt societies internalize their norms, and therefore feel guilt when they disobey them, 
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Within Iraq’s culture, three broadly defined experiences constitute humiliation. These 
include: “A loss of physical force [ihtiram], the attempt to a woman’s ird [purity], and the 
disowning of one’s social rank [sharaf]” (Fontan, 2006: 219-220). Considering the three 
experiences that constitute humiliation articulated in the quote, the dissolution of security 
services was perceived offensive because of the loss of physical force and social rank (Fontan, 
2006: 219-220). The act thereby humiliated soldiers and security forces, which prompted a 
response to regain honor. With this basic understanding of honor and humiliation outlined, 
our attention returns to recounting events following the dissolution decree. 
As the groups of incensed and protesting soldiers multiplied, and insurgent activity started 
to increase, the CPA and DOD were forced to establish a scheme for compensating low 
ranking soldiers and conscripts (Allawi, 2007: 158; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-60). A 
review was undertaken in July 2003, and a compensation scheme was established to 
remunerate low-ranking soldiers (Allawi, 2007: 158; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-60). While 
the scheme did not guarantee employment of those soldiers or officers made redundant, it did 
provide a degree of compensation. According to DOD assessments, the compensation scheme 
successfully reversed the trend of protests and is thereby projected to have reduced popular 
animosity and the probability that former soldiers would become participants in the 
insurgency (Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-60)28. Nevertheless, the compromise was temporal. 
An associated problem of CPA Order Number 2 is that there was no systematic effort to 
demobilize, disarm and reintegrate soldiers or police officers made redundant (Ucko, 2008: 
344-345). In instances where disarmament orders were issued, their implementation was 
haphazard (Ucko, 2008: 346-353). Failure to disarm meant that former members of the 
security services were already armed and could join the insurgency to counter the occupation 
and their maltreatment (Allawi, 2007: 158; Ucko, 2008: 344-345). Disarmament was a 
controversial and complex undertaking in Iraq, which may partially explain why it was not 
implemented. For example, during instances of implementation, the act of disarming equally 
humiliated former soldiers because it removed an important source of family protection 
(Allawi, 2007: 158; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Wyatt-Brown and Fontan, 2005). Consequently, 
there was a high risk of offending men by removing their weapons, a policy by which 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
whereas the externalization of norms in shame societies leads their members to seek to maintain their honor and 
good name in the eyes of others, this at all costs” (Fontan, 2006: 219). As indicated, Iraq falls in the latter 
category (Fontan, 2006: 219). 
28 Following implementation of the DOD payment scheme, insurgents started offering financial rewards to entice 
recruits for the insurgency. Dobbins and others (2009: 60) note “that insurgent groups began to pay young men 
$100 to kill a U.S. soldier and $500 to disable a Bradley or Abrams armored vehicle.” This counter-offer is 
believed to have tempted Iraqis to join the insurgency (Dobbins and others, 2009: 60). 
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humiliating consequences were equally probable to compel Iraqis to join the insurgency 
(Wyatt-Brown and Fontan, 2005). In this frame, disarmament produced a paradox, where 
failure to disarm ensured armed men could join the insurgency, while implementation was 
equally probable to offend Iraqi men and drive them to join the insurgency. 
Despite growing insecurity, the process of reconstituting security forces was postponed for 
several months while U.S. officials determined the size and structure they believed Iraq would 
need (Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-62). Following contemplation, CPA Order Number 22, 
promulgated on August 18, 2003, re-established Iraq’s Army (Dobbins and others, 2009: 62). 
Thereafter, recruitment and training of military and security personnel began (Bowen, 2009: 
124-135). The process of re-establishing Iraq’s security forces was, however, complicated by 
a lack of trainers, facilities and other resources (Bowen, 2009: 124-135). As a result, it took 
seven years for Iraq’s military to be re-established to a sufficient degree where it could 
qualitatively and quantitatively operate independently (Department of Defense, 2010: 41). 
In summary, the dissolution of Iraq’s security services proved problematic. Associated 
policies, namely disarmament, were haphazard and poorly implemented, with its fallout 
increasing the number of challenges encountered during the occupation. Most importantly, the 
acts of dissolution and disarmament incensed former soldiers and are suggested to have 
contributed to social instability (Allawi, 2007: 157; Bowen, 2009: 75; Brennan and others, 
2013: 28; Dobransky, 2014; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Rathmell, 2005: 1024). Overall, 
dissolution of the security services qualifies as another example of structural violence. 
With two primary examples of structural violence delineated, the next subsection outlines 
the origination and development of violence under the occupation. While violence spanned 
eight years and several governing bodies (outlined in section 1.4), insurgent and civil violence 
took root under the CPA’s mandate. As mentioned, coalition inability to provide security 
equally constitutes another example of structural violence perpetrated by the United States 
during the occupation. 
1.3.2 Increasing violence and insecurity 
Throughout the tenure of the CPA, violence deepened and expanded. Meanwhile, the 
U.S.-led coalition seemed unprepared or unable to manage it (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 
57; Haass, 2009: 257; Record, 2007: 86; Steele, 2008: 1-2). Some attribute coalition failure to 
initially isolate and contain civil disorder to improper planning and the failure to consider 
contingencies (Allawi, 2007: 94; Rathmell, 2005: 1022). Civil unrest began with popular 
protests against the occupation, which quickly transformed into looting and targeted ethnic-
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sectarian violence (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 57; Haass, 2009: 257; Rathmell, 2005: 
1020-1022; Record, 2007: 86). Left unaddressed, civil disorder spread and magnified, 
transmogrifying into an insurgency and civil war (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 57; Haass, 
2009: 257; Rathmell, 2005: 1020-1022; Record, 2007: 86). Despite its potentiality, the 
coalition reacted to events as opposed to adopting a proactive response. 
Coalition military reporting captures the trend of increased violence between 2004 and 
2010 (Department of Defense, 2010: 27). See Figure 1 and its integrated information for 
details. The graph illustrates the marked increase in violence from April 2004 until its zenith 
in June 2007 (Department of Defense, 2010: 27). Afterward, a combination of events led to 
the notable decline in violence during the summer of 2007. Two important reasons for the 
reversal include an increase in the number of U.S. troops (the surge) and greater emphasis on 
bridging sectarian and political divisions among Iraqis (Kuehl, 2010: 2-3; Simon, 2008: 57-
60; Ucko, 2008: 357-362). These activities are detailed below. 
Figure 1 Department of Defense (2010) Weekly Security Incidents 
 
Figure 1 cites a Department of Defense (2010: 27) graph of violent incidents by typology between January 2004 
and May 2010. The graph illustrates the steady increase of insurgent and sectarian violence up until the summer 
2007 “Awakening” and the “surge” in U.S. troops. It also identifies key events, such as national elections and the 
Samarra mosque bombing and the resulting increase in violence generated by those events. 
 
With the time-line and magnitude of violence introduced, our attention turns to qualifying 
its social impact. The impact of violence exceeds the thousands of deaths and injuries 
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resulting from the unrest (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 252; Johnson, 2004: 234; Terrill, 2003: 13). 
For instance, post-war disorder, especially the plundering and destruction of Iraq’s cultural 
heritage (for instance the Antiquities Museums in Baghdad and Mosul), increased popular 
frustration and suspicion of the coalition (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 252; Johnson, 2004: 234; 
Terrill, 2003: 13). In this frame, most Iraqis were incensed that the coalition would not 
prevent looting and violence, and this frustration is also projected to have influenced Iraqis to 
join the insurgency (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 252; Johnson, 2004: 234; Terrill, 2003: 13). 
Similarly, Sarkin and Sensibaugh (2009: 1065-1066) opine that initial lawlessness 
(looting) had a significant impact on the speed and potentiality of post-war reconstruction and 
transitional justice. For instance, many of Iraq’s ministries were pilfered or destroyed, 
including ministry documents, furnishings and infrastructure (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 251-
252; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1065-1066). Those losses curtailed the speed in which a 
transfer of governance from the CPA to Iraq could transpire because ministries had to be 
completely reconstructed (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 251-252; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 
1065-1066). Additionally, the annihilation of certain government assets, including files, 
denied Iraqis the opportunity to uncover the truth and/or prosecute Saddam Hussein-era 
injustices (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1065-1066). Absent the documentary evidence 
necessary for conducting investigations and prosecuting human rights abusers, it became 
difficult or impossible to provide transitional justice (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1065-
1066). Combined, looting and destruction complicated the re-establishment of Iraq’s post-war 
political framework, and undermined the chances of discovering the truth, providing justice, 
and bridging sectarian divisions among Iraqis under this framework (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 
2009: 1065-1066). The latter aspects are essential to conflict resolution as examined later. 
Unfortunately, space does not permit further exploration of the impact of violence. 
Instead, our attention briefly transfers to those perpetrating violence aside from the United 
States. Actors involved in post-war violence include four general groupings: “insurgents” who 
opposed the occupation; ethnic/sectarian groups who engaged their rivals; foreign nationals 
who participated in the insurgency and facilitated sectarian violence; and criminal elements 
that took advantage of the prevailing security void (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 260; Hashim, 
2006: 82-120; Rathmell, 2005: 1020; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1046). These groupings 
deployed a range of tactics including kidnapping, torture, murder and ethnic cleansing (Steele, 
2008: 2). Only the former three groups are qualified below since they were motivated by 
political or socials interests, and represent the political and social atmosphere under the 
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occupation, while the latter is excluded, as criminal elements were primarily concerned with 
self-enrichment (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1046). 
1.3.2.1 Insurgency 
Fattah and Caso (2009: 251) argue that maturation of the insurgency was predictable, but 
had been unforeseen by the United States. The historical precedence for popular resistance 
against occupation and foreign rule existed (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268-269). Recalling Iraq’s 
history, the authors abridge: 
From the first insurrections in Iraq against Umayyad rule to the civil 
war erupting in Baghdad as a result of the Persian annexation of Basra in 
the 1770s to the opposition movement spawned by the government 
signing of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948, Iraqis have always rebelled at 
externally imposed diktats and foreign hegemony. And they will continue 
to fight foreign invaders until they leave the country once and for all, 
taking with them the patchwork agreements and piecemeal treaties the 
invaders once thought could govern the thousand-year-old nation of Iraq 
(Fattah and Caso, 2009: 270). 
Despite the precedence highlighted in the quote, the United States-led coalition was 
unprepared when insurgency spread throughout the country (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 
57; Haass, 2009: 257; Record, 2007: 86). Consequently, it sluggishly responded, which 
allowed the insurgency to take root and required several years before the United States was 
able to reverse the intensity of violence. 
Similarly, Allawi (2007: 177) convincingly argues that insurgency was inevitable simply 
due to the nature and circumstances of the U.S. invasion and occupation. Such reactions were 
especially expected among the Sunni, whom the author proclaims “rejected the occupation in 
its entirety and refused to countenance any long-term changes to the political structure of the 
country that were based on it” (Allawi, 2007: 177). Outright rejection denoted in the quote not 
only guaranteed armed resistance to the occupation, it likewise compromised popular 
acceptance of occupational political processes, its frameworks, representatives, and their 
perceived legitimacy (Allawi, 2007: 177; Roy, 2007: 40-43). 
Similarly, military analysts had predicted an insurgency early in the occupation (Terrill, 
2003: 13). For instance, in July 2003, W. Andrew Terrill (2003: 13) from the Strategic Studies 
Institute warned that a prolonged U.S. occupation or an “attempt to install a pro-American 
government” would likely trigger indigenous resistance. Terrill’s prediction came to fruition, 
expedited by other influences including the U.S. military’s disproportional use of force and 
decisions made by the CPA. 
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Turning to its manifestation, analysts conclude that organized opposition to the occupation 
originated in Fallujah on April 28, 2003, when U.S. soldiers fired on protesters during a 
demonstration (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 255). The violence perpetrated against peaceful 
demonstrators amplified preexisting popular disgruntlement toward the occupation (Abdallah, 
2003: 65). From this juncture, determination to resist the occupation increased as grievances 
mounted (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 255). Between the spring of 2003 and the spring of 2004, 
the insurgency evolved from sporadic guerrilla-style resistance targeting occupying security 
forces, into a full-scale insurgency that exploited the tactic of terrorism (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 256-260; Hashim, 2006: 183-200). As the occupation persisted, popular sentiment 
continued to sour. By 2007, one survey found that 51% of Iraqis rhetorically supported 
organized violence against occupying troops (ABC News and others, 2007: 2). Hence, tacit, if 
not explicit, support for the insurgency was common in Iraq. 
Numerous explanations are proffered to explain Iraqis’ endorsement of, and/or 
participation in, the insurgency. Noteworthy among them are: the perception of the foreign 
military presence as unwanted (ABC News and others, 2007: 2; Hashim, 2006: 102-104; Hull, 
2009: 12); the systematic violence perpetrated against Iraqis by insurgent and 
counterinsurgent forces (Gage and others, 2003: 4-5); the culturally insensitive and 
asymmetrical manner in which coalition forces conducted military operations (actions that 
offended individual, tribal and/or national honor) (Emery, 2004: 4-5; Gage and others, 2003: 
1-7; Hashim, 2006: 257-319; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights 
Center, 2004: 30; Kuehl, 2010: 4-5); and a feeling of dis-empowerment following the removal 
of Saddam Hussein from political power (common among the Sunni, and reinforced through 
decisions such as de-Baʻathification) (Allawi, 2007: 94). These reasons, among others, 
prompted both the Sunni and Shi‘a to support the insurgency, while the Kurds were 
noticeably not represented, since they generally did not perceive the occupation as a threat to 
their collective interests (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 252). 
Numerous sources attribute the armed insurgency predominantly to Sunni Arabs (Allawi, 
2007: 457; Hashim, 2006: 129; Tripp, 2007: 286), while others suggest its demographic 
composition is difficult to qualify (Terrill, 2003: 11). Among the former, scholars believe that 
the insurgency started with the Sunni and then spread to the Shi‘a (Allawi, 2007: 150-159; 
Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254-255). Sunni Arab resistance was not immediate, as the group 
initially refrained from engaging occupying forces militarily (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254; 
Hashim, 2006: 123). The decision to be temporarily passive is theorized to be a result of their 
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uncertainty about the duration of the occupation or their place within the post-war social and 
political structures (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254; Hashim, 2006: 123). 
 The turning point came the CPA was imparted with absolute control and U.S. officials 
reiterated their determination to establish a democratically elected government, whereupon the 
Sunni recognized that the probability of their retaining political superiority had diminished 
(Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254-255). It was then realized that, by default, the Kurds and Shi‘a 
would increase their representation within a democratically elected government while Sunni 
relative influence would decrease. CPA Order Numbers 1, outlined above, further validated 
those suspicions by outright challenging the Sunni’s historic position of social and political 
domination (Allawi, 2007: 150-159; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254-255). Simultaneously, Sunni 
tribal leaders became disgruntled when they were ineligible for preferential treatment at the 
local level, as coalition forces began establishing local governments and services (Fattah and 
Caso, 2009: 255). Nevertheless, the social-political ambitions attributed to the Sunni here 
does not imply that Sunni Arab (insurgents) were unwavering supporters of Saddam Hussein 
or desired to marginalize other groups, but rather it indicates that the community wanted to 
advance their common interests (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254). 
By comparison, portions of the Shi‘a community later joined the insurgency as the 
occupation endured (Terrill, 2003: 17-23). Initially the Shi‘a cautiously embraced the 
occupation, although they aspired to minimize U.S. influence in post-war Iraq (Terrill, 2003: 
17-18). However, marked discrepancies later emerged within this community over the degree 
and typology of resistance that should be exercised (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 257; Terrill, 2003: 
19-23; Williams and Simpson, 2008: 209). 
On the one hand, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid al Sistani, the highest-ranking Shi‘a cleric in 
Iraq, issued a decree that the Shi‘a should not oppose the occupation by force of arms (Fattah 
and Caso, 2009: 257; Terrill, 2003: 19). Ayatollah Sistani, who continues to be an influential 
religious voice in Iraq (Ali, 2014: 22), also proclaimed that Shi‘a should not become involved 
with governing or administrative systems associated with the U.S.-led occupation (Fattah and 
Caso, 2009: 257-258). Aiming to reduce U.S. influence and expedite its withdrawal, the 
Ayatollah instead called for immediate national elections to establish an indigenous 
government (rooted in Islam) (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 257-258). A rapidly elected 
government was endorsed to allow Iraqis to retake control of their country and its trajectory, 
whereby occupational forces could withdraw. 
On the other hand, Shi‘a started joining the insurgency around 2004 (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 256-259). In particular, Muatada al-Sadr deployed his militia, the Mahdi Army, to 
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engage U.S. forces (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Terrill, 2003: 21). His actions challenged 
both Sistani’s religious pronouncement and the U.S.-led occupation (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 
256; Terrill, 2003: 21). Al-Sadr thus represented a Shi‘a movement that was not bound by the 
Ayatollah, and would not submit to the occupation (Allawi, 2007: 321-333, 457). Through his 
political and military exploits, he successfully challenged both the mainstream Sunni 
hierarchy. 
Successfully utilizing his militia, al-Sadr captured and expanded the amount of territory 
under his control throughout sectors of Baghdad, Basra and other cities (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 257). Al Sadr’s militia likewise counterbalanced Sunni militias that were similarly 
trying to expand their authority in the power vacuum experienced during the occupation 
(Fattah and Caso, 2009: 257). The U.S.-led coalition fought several pitched battles against al-
Sadr’s Mahdi Army (Allawi, 2007: 457). Coalition counterinsurgency (COIN) operations 
against al-Sadr’s militia included ferocious battles in cities, such as Najif (Dobbins and others, 
2009: 313-314). The disproportional use of force during these campaigns augmented popular 
resistance to the occupation, and the Mahdi’s military capability, in combination with local 
discontent, prompted a U.S. military retreat on several occasions (Dobbins and others, 2009: 
313-314)29. Consequently, Muatada al-Sadr emerged as a recognized leader, later becoming 
directly involved in politics, prior to retiring in February 2014 (Ali, 2014: 14; Katzman, 2014: 
10-11). His influence, nevertheless, continues to be influential to the al-Sadr political party 
and the Mahdi Army. 
Against the Sunni and Shi‘a insurgency, coalition security forces took on the role of the 
counterinsurgent (Emery, 2004; Hashim, 2006). As noted below (1.3.3.1), a component of 
COIN operations include kinetic operations against insurgents. In addition, the U.S. had to 
engage the population to persuade them to espouse occupying forces, or at minimum to 
dissuade them from supporting the insurgents (Emery, 2004: 11-12; Garfield, 2007; Hashim, 
2006: 329-339). However, the U.S. had difficulty enticing Iraqis for the reasons noted above 
(Emery, 2004: 11-12; Garfield, 2007; Hashim, 2006: 329-339). Although impossible to 
accurately qualify, it is obvious that Iraqis supported the insurgency because insurgents were 
supplied and recruited mainly from among Iraq’s population (Emery, 2004: 11-12; Hashim, 
2006: 131-159; Krepinevich, 2005: 100-101). Nevertheless, there was an element of foreign 
                                                          
 
29 The United States had entertained the notion of arresting al-Sadr for his alleged connections with the 
assassination of Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Khoei around mid-2003 but feared the social repercussions of his 
detainment (Dobbins and others, 2009: 297-301). Other Shi‘a organizations likewise joined the insurgency 
(Terrill, 2003: 22; Williams and Simpson, 2008: 209). For example, the SCIRI, funded by Iran and headed by 
Ayatollah Mohammad Bakir al Hakim, fielded its militia (the Badr Corps) to engage occupying forces (Terrill, 
2003: 22; Williams and Simpson, 2008: 209). 
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resources (including foreign fighters, material and funding, which also contributed to the 
violence (Emery, 2004: 11-12; Hashim, 2006: 131-159; Krepinevich, 2005: 100-101). The 
next subsection qualifies the contribution foreign fighters made to violence. 
1.3.2.2 Foreign infiltration 
Foreign infiltrators attributed to deteriorating security in occupied Iraq (Hashim, 2006: 
138-140). These elements, consisting of freelance warriors and foreign intelligence personnel, 
entered Iraq prior to and after the invasion to resist the U.S.-led occupation and problematize 
achievement of U.S. military-political objectives (Allawi, 2007: 184; Hashim, 2006: 138; 
Krepinevich, 2005: 89). Those operating in this capacity originated from innumerable 
countries throughout the Middle East and Europe (Hashim, 2006: 140), and “were motivated 
to fight what they saw as the despoliation of a Muslim land by infidels” (Hashim, 2006: 147). 
In this case, the “infidels” were the United States and its coalition partners, which foreign 
fighters perceived to be coming to take control of Iraq’s people and resources, and to 
undermine Islam. In conjunction, foreign interveners from neighboring Syria and Iran also 
amplified internal violence, as those countries dispatched personnel to influence social and 
political dynamics within occupied Iraq (Brennan and others, 2013: 125; Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 259-260; Perito, 2005: 8). Iran, for instance, is credited with supporting Shi‘a militias in 
Iraq, providing them with financing, weapons and training (Brennan and others, 2013: 127-
129). The porous and unsecured borders of Iraq were easily infiltrated by foreign elements 
and circumstances facilitated weapons transfers (Brennan and others, 2013: 131; Perito, 2005: 
8). Coalition failure to patrol the borders thus precipitated the flow of men and material that 
amplified violence in occupied Iraq. 
Once established within Iraq’s frontiers, foreign infiltrators facilitated both insurgent and 
sectarian violence through their appropriation of ideological and material resources (Allawi, 
2007: 184; Hashim, 2006: 138; Krepinevich, 2005: 89; Nasr, 2004: 13; Tripp, 2007: 287). 
Their influence on the intensity of violence is profound, since they are credited with the 
increase in acts of terrorism and bombings (Hashim, 2006: 139). One such example is the 
bombing of the Shi‘a al-Askari Mosque in Samarra on February 22, 2006 (Bowen, 2009: 274; 
Brennan and others, 2013: 41; Simon, 2008: 58; Tripp, 2007: 306). The al-Askari bombing 
was pivotal in the trajectory of violence in occupied Iraq as it was reportedly designed to 
intensify civil animosity between the Sunni and Shi‘a (Bowen, 2009: 274; Tripp, 2007: 306). 
Following that incident, there was a spike in sectarian violence as Iraq was driven closer to 
civil war. 
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Ultimately, coalition forces experienced difficulty undermining the influence of foreign 
elements, especially among those affiliated with al Qaeda. However, momentum shifted 
following the Sunni Awakening in 2006 (detailed in a later chapter) (Rodano, 2012: 39; Ucko, 
2008: 359). The windfall was partially instigated by Sunni frustration at the wanton violence 
perpetrated by foreign fighters associated with al Qaeda in Iraq (Ucko, 2008: 359). The shift 
in Sunni allegiance enabled Sunni-coalition cooperation that significantly, albeit temporarily, 
reduced the capacity and appeal of foreign elements in occupied Iraq. 
Nonetheless, the impact of the foreign element in contemporary Iraq continues to be 
significant. At the time of writing, the foreign element, combined with indigenous actors, has 
strengthened and is challenging the integrity of Iraq. The radical Sunni organization Islamic 
State of Iraq and Sham (IS)30, whose origins are in the U.S. occupation and insurgency, 
remained active in Iraq throughout and beyond the occupation in a reduced capacity, and it 
later dispersed into Syria. The group has proven a persistent and noteworthy challenger in 
both Syria and Iraq since 2013 (Gulmohamad, 2014; Katzman, 2014: 9). IS territorial gains at 
the time of writing include large portions of both countries (Katzman, 2014: 9). The 
organization has thereby become a decisive stakeholder in Iraq and the Middle East, and a 
serious threat to the integrity of Iraq. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
analyze events beyond 2011, denoting the existence of such groups is important, as its roots is 
in the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and it is greatly associated with the sectarian fracturing of Iraq 
that occurred under occupation. 
1.3.2.3 Ethnic-sectarian fracturing 
In the post-war security vacuum, Iraq’s society increasingly identified itself in ethnic-
sectarian terms (Williams and Simpson, 2008: 206) and violently fractured (Allawi, 2007: 
145; Brennan and others, 2013: 147). Enterline and Greig (2008: 881-882) suggest that 
sectarian violence in Iraq was predictable since tensions were preexisting and long-standing. 
In addition to historic divisions, the Sunni realization that the democratic transformation 
envisaged by the United States would naturally predisposition the Kurd and Shi‘a populations 
to acquire increased representation guaranteed a (violent) sectarian response (Allawi, 2007: 
136; Möckli, 2012: 2-3). In short, scholars expected the Sunni would counterbalance 
structural changes to secure their collective social and political interests. 
                                                          
 
30 The organization initially referred to itself as ISIS, and then selected to use the term IS in late 2014. For a 
detailed review of IS(IS), see (Gulmohamad, 2014). 
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Therefore, Sunni (perceived) marginalization exacerbated ethnic violence, causing the 
community to mobilize to protect their interests (Möckli, 2012: 2-3). Mobilization was 
likewise necessitated since Kurd and Shi‘a (retributive) violence was also being perpetrated 
against the Sunni during the early period of the occupation. Subsequent to the fall of Baghdad, 
Shi‘a and Kurds mobilized to perpetrate retributive justice targeting Baʻath Party members 
and intelligence officials (Allawi, 2007: 136-145; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1048). As a 
means of vengeance and/or protecting collective interests, Shi‘a, Sunni and Kurd groups 
founded, and/or deployed, independent militias to perpetrate acts of violence against members 
of other groupings (Bowen, 2009: 57; Tripp, 2007: 306). Sectarian militias were equally 
deemed necessary to fill the security void produced during the invasion since the United 
States-led occupying forces failed to provide security (Bowen, 2009: 57; Tripp, 2007: 306). In 
addition to retributive killings and the provision of security, ethnic-sectarian based militias 
also performed social service tasks, such as garbage collection, and thereby garnered local 
support (Kepel, 2004: 235). Their provision of security and basic services no doubt increased 
their popular appeal since the coalition and Iraq’s governing bodies were unable to provide 
services or security. 
As a consequence of their activities, the magnitude of violence between Iraq’s various 
groups increased throughout the occupation (Allawi, 2007: 443-444). By 2006, the Shi‘a, 
Kurd and Sunni were utilizing roaming death squads to summarily execute sectarian rivals 
and ethnically cleanse neighborhoods (Allawi, 2007: 453). With the numbers of the militias 
swelling, and the frequency and brutality of their operations expanding, a multidimensional 
power struggle at the local and national levels materialized, with militias committing violence 
against their sectarian rivals, and sometimes targeting coalition forces (Bowen, 2009: 229; 
Kilcullen, 2009: 125-126; Ucko, 2008: 342). At its height in the summer of 2007, Iraq became 
engulfed in a civil war (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254)31. Interestingly, the increase in sectarian 
violence occurred despite popular support. When questioned about their perceptions of 
sectarian violence, Iraqis broadly condemned the phenomenon (Visser, 2007: 815). 
Nonetheless, sectarian-based conflict was not only observable in its physical manifestation 
on the streets of Iraq; it spread into government institutions as well. Some ethnic-sectarian 
(mainly Shi‘a) elements are alleged to have infiltrated and operated inside Iraq’s Security 
Forces and government ministries once they were established (Hashim, 2006: 165). 
Infiltration of political and security structures increased popular distrust of the various 
                                                          
 
31 Internal sectarian divisions also emerged within the Shi‘a, Sunni and Kurd populations, compounding 
instability under the occupation (Terrill, 2003: 19-32; Williams and Simpson, 2008: 210). 
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governing bodies (Allawi, 2007: 136, 443-445; Bowen, 2009: 274). For instance, members of 
the Ministries of Interior have been accused of acting for the benefit of the Shiʻa rather than 
the interests of Iraqis (Allawi, 2007: 136, 443-445; Bowen, 2009: 274). Comparable events 
give credence to notions that (certain) governing institutions prioritize sectarian interests over 
those of the population. It also lends to the popular perception of government illegitimacy, 
since portions of the population feel targeted by the government or particular ministries as 
opposed to being represented by them. 
Combined, the U.S. overthrow of Iraq’s government fractured unstable sectarian relations 
and had an impact at the local, national and regional levels. At the local and national levels, 
the social-political restructuring manufactured prompted a retributive cycle of violence 
spearheaded by Shi‘a and Kurd against the Sunni (Allawi, 2007: 443-445). Simultaneously, 
the historical marginalization of Iraq’s demographic majority was reversed in post-war 
structures when the Shi‘a acquired the dominant political position in Iraq’s governing 
framework (Möckli, 2012: 1-2; Nasr, 2004: 7; Roy, 2007: 108). Consequently, the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein’s government instigated (violent) competition for power and spoils in the 
post-war environment at the local and national levels (Allawi, 2007: 443-445). 
At the regional level, the sectarian political balance of power, which had witnessed Sunni 
control in countries, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was overturned (Kam, 2011: 
100-101; Möckli, 2012: 1-2; Nasr, 2004: 7). The invasion thereby increased Shiʻa geopolitical 
influence, challenging the long-standing political domination by the Sunni in Iraq and the 
Middle East (Brennan and others, 2013: 126-127; Kam, 2011: 100-101; Möckli, 2012: 2; Roy, 
2007: 108). Viewed from another perspective, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein augmented 
Iran’s geopolitical influence and leveraging capability in post-war Iraq by empowering Iraq’s 
Shi‘a (Brennan and others, 2013: 126-127; Kam, 2011: 100-101; Möckli, 2012: 2; Roy, 2007: 
108). Ironically, Iraq’s contemporary geopolitical weakness and its Shi‘a led government 
undermines U.S. endeavors to isolate Iran. With the violence and its perpetrators qualified, 
our emphasis is redirected toward delineating how the coalition counterbalanced deteriorating 
social and political circumstances in Iraq. 
1.3.3 Methods of stabilization 
The U.S.-led coalition utilized several practices to counter the complex violent conflict 
that emerged, and its techniques was replicated throughout the duration of the occupation with 
fluctuating degrees of success (Kilcullen, 2009: 127, 141; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199; 
Yamao, 2011: 1-2). For the sake of space, we reduce these approaches to four broad strategies 
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extracted from the literature. First, as a short-term solution, the coalition forces conducted 
military-policing kinetic operations centered on the use of force to kill or capture insurgents 
(Department of Defense, 2010: 32; Kilcullen, 2009: 124), or to geographically separate 
sectarian groups to minimize insurgent and ethnic-sectarian violence (Kilcullen, 2009: 145; 
Krepinevich, 2005: 88). Similarly, coalition forces trained Iraq’s Security Forces (hereafter 
ISF) for the purposes of assisting with and gradually assuming responsibility for the country’s 
security (Department of Defense, 2010: 3; Kilcullen, 2009: 61, 130; Krepinevich, 2005: 94-
96). Second, efforts were made to advance regional dialogue to increase bilateral cooperation 
and address mutual security concerns (United Nations, 2012: 4-5; United States Institute of 
Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 1-4). Third, focus was placed on 
(re)constructing Iraq’s infrastructure to restore order and improve basic living conditions 
(United Nations, 2012: 13). Fourth, the U.S. and other actors promoted national reconciliation 
to reduce internal tensions and violence (United Nations, 2012: 4; Yamao, 2011: 1). Each 
practice is briefly outlined below. 
1.3.3.1 Kinetic operations and ISF training 
To undermine the insurgency and sectarian violence, U.S.-led coalition security forces 
engaged in counterinsurgency and policing operations deploying physical violence (Kilcullen, 
2009: 60-63). The objective of kinetic operations was to neutralize those involved in the 
proliferation of insecurity. Nonetheless, the U.S. was slow in its provision of security; and 
consequently, it was not until late 2007 that combined militia-military forces in Iraq were able 
to markedly reduce the magnitude of violence (Brennan and others, 2013: 54). Equally 
problematic, while attempting to advance security, the U.S. frequently used disproportional 
degrees of force that killed and wounded civilians, offended Iraqis, and isolated occupying 
forces from the occupied population (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Equivalently counterproductive, 
the U.S. military sometimes tried to physically separate warring ethnic elements, through 
practices including the construction of barriers and walls, as observed in Baghdad, to 
minimize violent interaction through the isolation of communities (Kilcullen, 2009: 142-143). 
These insulating techniques exacerbated social frustration since it inhibited daily life (Ucko, 
2008: 355-356). Additional analysis of kinetic operations is included in chapter 2 when U.S. 
military tactics are qualitatively analyzed vis-à-vis their bilateral impact on Iraq’s society. 
Another aspect of kinetic operations was the coalition forces’ training of the reconstituted 
ISF as a means of reconstructing Iraq’s institutional capacities (Department of Defense, 2010: 
41). Military and police training occurred in quantitative and qualitative phases, starting in 
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early August 2003 (Brennan and others, 2013: 28). Iraq’s military was taught general policing 
and military operations in addition to counterinsurgency and counter terrorism techniques 
(Department of Defense, 2010: 41; O’Hanlon and Livingston, 2010: 23). As the quantity of 
ISF personnel and their quality of training increased, security responsibility was gradually 
transferred from the coalition to the ISF (Department of Defense, 2010: 41). 
The transition of security responsibility followed a phased course where joint coalition 
and ISF operations were initially conducted; then the ISF acquired a more pronounced role 
(with coalition forces providing air and logistics support), until the ISF obtained the 
quantitative and qualitative capacity to assume complete control of security in Iraq 
(Department of Defense, 2010: 41). Accordingly, ISF training progressed so that U.S. 
“combat troops” were withdrawn from Iraq in 2010, leaving approximately 39,000 troops that 
were primarily involved in training and support (Belasco, 2009: 2). All U.S. troops were 
withdrawn from Iraq on December 18, 2011 (Katzman, 2012: 14). Hence, it took seven years 
to build Iraq’s military capacity to the point where it could operate independently. 
Critical of the process, Brennan and others (2013: 51) criticize that prolonged instability in 
Iraq was “facilitated in large part by an ISF that was too small, inadequately trained, and 
complicit in the sectarian violence in many cases.” The U.S. was clearly complicit in the 
reduced size and quality of training expressed in this quote, as well as responsible for the lack 
of funding and organization (Brennan and others, 2013: 29). These circumstances undermined 
the speed at which the ISF could be trained, equipped and deployed. Simultaneously, the ISF 
and other security institutions became infused with sectarian-loyal personnel who operated 
according to sectarian interests (Allawi, 2007: 453). As a result, some ISF forces were 
deployed to combat sectarian rivals, as opposed to provide security for all Iraqis, regardless of 
their identity. The partiality of security institutions and their leaders raised popular suspicion 
and mistrust of the ISF and government. 
Overall, the coalition’s training program was plagued by numerous challenges. The 
security services, for example, also suffered from insurgent infiltrators whereby individuals 
loyal to the insurgency were recruited and then operated from within these institutions to 
undermine progress (Allawi, 2007: 453; Oliker, 2007: 6; Bowen, 2009: 202). To illustrate, an 
independent Iraq media organization reports that “insurgents” infiltrated Iraq’s security forces 
and leaked sensitive security information to the insurgents (Alsumaria Iraqi Television, 2011). 
Infiltration thereby compromised operations and organizational unity, making operations 
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vulnerable to sabotage and their members suspicious (Bowen, 2009: 202). These conditions 
compromised training and recruitment (Bowen, 2009: 202)32. 
Equally problematic, ISF forces also experienced regular externally perpetrated attacks to 
decrease the number of recruits and undermine troop morale (Sly and Salman, 2010)33. Such 
attacks frequently manifested in shootings and bombings of training or recruitment centers. 
Despite their regular perpetration, the Department of Defense (2010: viii) claims they had no 
significant impact on the quality of ISF training or readiness. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to 
conclude that such events might have discouraged individuals from joining Iraq’s security 
forces, which reduced the speed at which these institutions could be reconstructed. 
1.3.3.2 Advancing regional cooperation 
The coalition prioritized the enhancement of regional cooperation to reduce cross-border 
interference and infiltration by foreign state and non-state entities (Brandon, 2006a: 1-3; 
2006b: 128-133; Perito, 2005: 8; United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian 
Strategic Studies, 2007: 2). Regional cooperation was advanced for two broad reasons. On the 
one hand, there were mutual security concerns among neighboring countries since (non-) state 
actors moved across Iraq’s borders to conduct (counter)attacks and/or find sanctuary 
(Brandon, 2006a: 1; 2006b: 128-133). More specifically, freelance warriors were infiltrating 
Iraq’s borders to fight the United States and instigate sectarian violence, as denoted in section 
1.3.2.2. At the same time, Iran and Turkey reported armed incursions by Kurd organizations, 
notably the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) or the Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan 
(PJAK) that were allegedly operating from inside Iraq’s frontiers (Brandon, 2006a: 1-3; 
2006b: 2-3; Katzman, 2014: 32). In response to the Kurd attacks, Turkey and Iran made 
several military incursions into Iraq’s territory to undermine Kurdish operations launched 
from the Mount Qandil area (Brandon, 2006a: 2-3; Cordesman, 2010: 8-9; United Nations, 
2012: 4)34. Accordingly, it was essential to establish regional dialogue to discuss border 
security to protect the interests of all stakeholders involved. 
                                                          
 
32 For example, on January 15, 2011 a recruit-in-training smuggled live ammunition onto a firing range in Mosul 
and killed two of his U.S. trainers (CNN News, 2011). 
33 An August 17, 2010 attack on a recruitment center in Baghdad serves as a case in point when a suicide bomber 
killed 51 recruits and injured more than one hundred others (Sly and Salman, 2010). However, the population did 
not support such attacks. For instance, a May 2004 survey found that an overwhelming majority (91%) of Iraqis 
perceived attacks on Iraq’s police forces unjustifiable (Burkholder, 2004d). 
34 For instance, Turkey’s military attacked Kurdish forces based inside Iraq in mid-October 2011 following 
violent clashes between Kurdish “rebels” and Turkey’s military (Katzman, 2014: 32), operations which 
continued into 2012 (United Nations, 2012: 4). 
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On the other hand, and stated above, neighboring countries, such as Iran, were intervening 
in Iraq (assisting Shi‘a groups) to influence social-political developments during the 
occupation (Cordesman, 2010: 62-64; Katzman, 2014: 30). Iran’s overt and covert activities, 
in particular, raised considerable concern among U.S. politicians, coalition military officials, 
and Iraq’s Sunni population alike (Cordesman, 2010: 62-64). For these reasons, and others, it 
was determined that the development of regional security cooperation was essential to 
stabilizing Iraq and reducing tensions throughout the region (United States Institute of Peace 
and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 1). To this end, various efforts were 
implemented at the interstate level. 
For example, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Center for Eurasian 
Strategic Studies (ASAM) sponsored and hosted a “non-official dialogue” in 2007 (United 
States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 1). At the 
conference, six regional neighbors, including Iran and Syria, negotiated a framework to 
enhance Iraq’s security and that of the wider region (United States Institute of Peace and 
Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2-4). The dialogue ended with the signing of the 
Marmara Declaration for regional cooperation and security (United States Institute of Peace 
and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2-4). The declaration emphasizes that 
participants should not incite (ethnic-sectarian) violence within their neighbors’ borders and 
underscores the mutual value of promoting political and social stability in Iraq (United States 
Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2). Correspondingly, the 
United Nations continues to function as a third party to promote regional peace and security 
through continued bilateral dialogue between Iraq and its neighbors (United Nations, 2012: 5). 
The relative utility of regional dialogue, however, appears to be marginal. On the one 
hand, Iran continues to intervene in Iraq. It most recently has been supplying weapons and 
intelligence to Shi‘a militias engaged in civil unrest during 2013 and 2014 (Katzman, 2014: 
30). On the other hand, Iraq’s Shi‘a have been supporting anti-government fighters in Syria to 
undermine Syria’s government (Ali, 2014: 18-19). Both examples challenge national 
sovereignty and manufactures bilateral friction between these countries. 
1.3.3.3 (Re) Construction 
In addition to kinetic operations and the promotion of regional cooperation, the coalition 
engaged in reconstruction of Iraq’s governing institutions and infrastructure to restore the 
functioning of the state and to address social needs and grievances. Stuart Bowen (2009: 259) 
defines reconstruction in Iraq as: “the restor[ation of] the core capacities of government—its 
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strategic and policy-planning ability, as well as its financial, information, and human 
resources management.” Reconstruction, according to the quote, thus broadly refers to 
institution building (governing bodies) and infrastructural development (construction of roads 
and the provision of utilities), in conjunction with assistance (financing) to achieve these 
objectives (Bowen, 2009: 187-192; Iraq Study Group, 2006: 25-26). The United States, its 
coalition allies and other international actors (the UN and other NGOs) have been involved in 
the reconstruction effort (Bowen, 2009: 187-192; Iraq Study Group, 2006: 25-26). Their 
operations continued throughout the duration of the occupation and persisted following the 
departure of U.S. military forces. 
Reconstruction was implemented at multiple levels by numerous actors (Power, 2014: 
347-348). These actors utilized both a top-down and bottom-up approach, rebuilding central 
government capacity, in addition to the structural capacities at the local level (Bowen, 2009: 
10-23). Activities include the reconstruction of power plants, water treatment facilities, the 
refurbishment and supplying of schools and the establishment and training of local and 
national governing institutions and members (Bowen, 2013). Such measures were foremost 
believed to enhance internal stability and bring a measure of GOI legitimacy through the 
provision of representation, public goods and services (Bowen, 2013: 10; Brennan and others, 
2013: 15; Iraq Study Group, 2006: 25; Levi and others, 2009: 356). Efforts were likewise 
designed to improve the humanitarian/living conditions inside Iraq by (re)building social and 
governing structures and their capacities (the provision of basic services) (Bowen, 2009: 23). 
Reconstruction was, nonetheless, fraught with multiple problems. The first notable 
challenge was post-war violence (Bowen, 2013: 14-85). For example, targeted attacks 
complicated the rehabilitation of Iraq’s dilapidated or damaged infrastructure, hindering the 
production and distribution of basic services, such as water and electricity (Bowen, 2013: 14; 
Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Hashim, 2006: 34; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 40). Insurgents’ 
purposeful targeting of Iraq’s infrastructure, including oil and electrical facilities, had 
noteworthy consequences (Bowen, 2013: 75; Kepel, 2004: 222; Tripp, 2007: 289). The 
targeting of oil production throughout Iraq, for instance, problematized delivery of petroleum 
at the local level creating fuel shortages, while simultaneously reducing GOI revenue by 
limiting the amount of petroleum available for sale on the international market (Allawi, 2007: 
175; Bowen, 2013: 84; Hafez, 2007: 97). Moreover, the quality and quantity of attacks forced 
the coalition to reallocate fiscal appropriations from one sector to another because essential 
infrastructure was continuously damaged or destroyed and thereby required additional funding 
for repairs (Bowen, 2009: 170). The volume and persistence of the violent and devastating 
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cycle reached a point where finances, previously earmarked for reconstruction projects, had to 
be re-appropriated to the security sector to protect functioning installations and undermine the 
cycle of destruction (Bowen, 2009: 170). In this manner, some reconstruction projects were 
shelved so that security at functioning sites could be funded. 
Setbacks were also experienced as a result of insurgents’ targeting of foreign and domestic 
contractors (Bowen, 2009: 75, 179; 2013: 75; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256). Such attacks were 
designed to undermine the reconstruction effort by striking at contractors’ ability to operate 
safely while compromising staff morale. Similarly, insurgents attacked essential indigenous 
human resources, including translators, police, and public officials, to discourage cooperation 
with the coalition (Allawi, 2007: 373; Burkholder, 2004d; Kepel, 2004: 238). The insurgent 
strategy was successful. The hazards manufactured problematized reconstruction, resulting in 
work stoppages and difficulties in recruiting staff (Bowen, 2009: 75, 179; 2013: 75). 
 Combined, insurgent operations complicated reconstruction, while underscoring the 
fallibility of the coalition and Iraq’s governing bodies. Persistent violence demonstrated that 
the coalition and Iraq’s government were ineffective, and unable to provide security or basic 
utilities (Bowen, 2013: 40-41; Garfield, 2007; Gunarantna, 2007: 197). Nevertheless, 
ineffectiveness against violence was not the only means of demonstrating coalition and GOI 
ineffectiveness, as much of the reconstruction program was beleaguered with problems 
manufactured by those charged with reconstruction. 
Figure 2 ABC News and others (2009) Post-war Living Conditions 
 
Figure 2 cites ABC News and others (2009: 13), which trends the provision of services during the occupation. 
The graph depicts the absence of basic services, including potable water and electricity, while the insurgency 
intensified, which demonstrates that targeted violence had an impact on reconstruction between November 2005 
and February 2008. 
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In particular, scholars characterize U.S. planning and implementation of reconstruction as 
“poorly conceived, overambitious, and often at cross-purposes” (Bowen, 2009: 327), an 
assertion endorsed by others (Benjamin and Simon, 2005: 187; Flavin, 2013: 178; 
Gunarantna, 2007: 197; Hoffman, 2004: 109). Poor design was partly the result of a U.S. 
failure “to consult sufficiently with Iraqis to understand what they really wanted from the 
reconstruction program” (Bowen, 2009: 327). These failures emphasized in Bowen’s quotes 
resulted in instances of infrastructural projects that consumed millions of dollars in revenue 
that were unwanted by the population or never completed (Bowen, 2013: 4). It likewise 
alludes to the lack of oversight of the overall reconstruction program. Consequently, there are 
numerous instances of U.S. mismanagement of Iraq’s oil revenue and corrupt behavior by 
U.S. contractors and decision-makers, some of who have been found guilty of criminal 
behavior (Bowen, 2009: 154-327). The systematic relegation of local ownership, the inability 
to properly plan, implement and oversee reconstruction, as well as the misappropriation of 
resources, increased local suspicion and exacerbated negative popular sentiment (Bowen, 
2009: 327; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1061; Stover and others, 2005: 834-835). 
Combined, the challenges denoted profoundly hindered reconstruction, since only slight 
progress was recorded despite several years of efforts (Bowen, 2009: 232; O’Hanlon and 
Livingston, 2010). Delays in turn had a social impact. In 2005, for example, 39% of Iraqis 
perceived reconstruction as ineffective (Oxford Research International, 2005: 10). Three years 
later, ABC News and others (2008: 2) found that 88% of respondents still lacked electricity in 
their homes, and oil production remained markedly below pre-war production levels (ABC 
News and others, 2009: 5, 13; O’Hanlon and Campbell, 2008). Figure 2 trends the availability 
of basic goods and services between 2004 and 2009, which is graphed by ABC News and 
others (2009: 13). It also demonstrates a decline in services as the insurgency strengthened 
and repeatedly targeted reconstruction efforts, events that exacerbated poor planning. 
Despite modest improvement, the reconstruction of Iraq remained lethargic throughout the 
occupation. As late as mid-2010, sixty-six percent of Iraqis felt that the provision of basic 
services continued to be the greatest challenge facing the country (International Republican 
Institute, 2010: 15, 30, 32). That same year, another survey found that respondents lacked 
sufficient personal funds to purchase food (18%) and 13% alleged they still did not have 
water in their neighborhoods (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 65). Hence, reconstruction in Iraq 
was hindered by numerous challenges and the impediments created social deprivations. 
Prevalent conditions affected popular sentiment toward occupying forces, and later Iraq’s 
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governing institutions. Consequently, some scholars emphasize that the inability to 
reconstruct Iraq constitutes structural violence (Tripp, 2007: 292-293). 
1.3.3.4 National reconciliation 
The coalition and other third parties (the United Nations, Arab League) promoted 
peacebuilding and nation building in Iraq, concepts which need to be defined. Peacebuilding 
“underpins the work of peacemaking and peacekeeping by addressing structural issues and the 
long-term relationships between conflictants” (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32)35. 
Ramsbotham and others’ definition identifies measures for managing roots causes of the 
conflict as well as manufacturing nonviolent relations between rival groups as peacebuilding. 
Comparatively, Miller (2005: 56) defines peacebuilding as “[p]olicies, programs, and 
associated efforts to restore stability and the effectiveness of social, political, and economic 
institutions in the wake of a war or some other debilitating or catastrophic event.” According 
to Miller’s (2005: 58) broad understanding, peacebuilding “encompass[es] democracy, 
development, gender, human rights, and justice,” to name a few objectives. Extrapolating 
from the definitions provided, it is clear that the peacebuilding is a holistic approach of 
stabilizing and restructuring a country to prevent conflict continuation (Hellmüller, 2013: 221-
222; Miller, 2005: 58). By comparison, nation building is the process of forging a common 
national identity and cooperative behavior among a heterogeneous population within a given 
territory to reduce the potentiality of conflict between those entities (Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 199). Both strategies were implemented in occupied Iraq. 
Coalition members, led by the United States, in addition to other parties including the 
United Nations, spearheaded peacebuilding and nation building in Iraq (Sarkin and 
Sensibaugh, 2009: 1073; Triponel, 2007: 277-319). Amalgamated these practices were 
broadly designed to reconstruct social relationships and political institutions (Allawi, 2007: 
127; Triponel, 2007: 308-309; Ucko, 2008: 354-355). For instance, third parties tried to 
broker political compromise on contentious issues, such as oil wealth distribution (Sarkin and 
Sensibaugh, 2009: 1073; Triponel, 2007: 277-319). For the moment, suffice it to say that such 
approaches were designed to stabilize Iraq, and were generally incorporated into a transitional 
justice and national reconciliation program. 
                                                          
 
35 Peacemaking is the process of facilitating warring parties in their settlement of a given conflict, including a 
change in the attitudes of belligerents (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32). Peacekeeping utilizes international 
military and/or police forces to separate and monitor warring parties to qualitatively and quantitatively reduce 
violent interaction (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32). 
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1.4 Transition of authority 
Following exploration of the CPA and its tenure, the violence that gripped occupied Iraq, 
and several tools used to stabilize the country, our analysis turns to recounting transfer of 
sovereignty from the United States to Iraq. The following subsections describe the time-line 
of transfer, the governing bodies involved, and several events and circumstances that 
manifested between July 2003 and December 2011. The present section covers the Iraqi 
Governing Council, the Iraqi Interim Government, the Transitional National Assembly, and 
the Government of Iraq respectively. In addition to highlighting the social and political 
challenges, outlining these institutions underscores that Iraq’s transitional institutions were 
confronted with instances of structural violence perpetrated by the United States, which 
included the appointment of representatives, and the imposition of policies and benchmarks. 
1.4.1 Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) (July 2003-June 2004) 
As mentioned beforehand, the CPA was not well received by Iraqis. Comparable 
sentiment was expressed at the regional and international levels, where criticism was rampant 
against the United States for establishing the CPA (Allawi, 2007: 107; Tripp, 2007: 285). The 
Arab League, for example, argued that the U.S. should not impose a government or prolong 
the occupation, but should instead allow an elected government of Iraq be established 
immediately (Allawi, 2007: 107; Tripp, 2007: 285). In the face of mounting criticism, and 
reinforced by a U.S. desire to expedite the transfer of governance back to Iraq, the CPA 
appointed a provisional governing body in July 2003 to give the impression Iraqis were 
involved and authority was being transferred (Allawi, 2007: 107; Tripp, 2007: 285). The body 
referenced was labeled the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). 
David Ucko (2008) explains the origination and composition of the IGC. He writes: 
the CPA appointed a body of Iraqi authorities to the Iraqi Governing 
Council (IGC), which was to advise the CPA and lend an Iraqi face to the 
occupation. The US wanted the IGC to be established quickly and for its 
membership to reflect Iraq’s ethnic composition—as a body founded by 
the US, this was to be its claim to legitimacy. Problematically, the US 
was in too much of a hurry to allow and encourage truly representative 
leaders to emerge from the clean slate that was Iraqi civil society in 2003. 
Instead, CPA officials distributed political power to “twenty-five Iraqi 
leaders well-known to them” and who appeared to represent the ethnic 
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constituents of Iraq—that is, the leaders of the political wings of the 
country’s various militias (Ucko, 2008: 350)36. 
Ucko’s quote underscores several salient points. First, the IGC was appointed and not 
elected, which fell short of calls for an elected body to assume control. Second, although the 
composition of the IGC “appeared to represent” the demographic distribution of the country, 
it instead represented the armed factions within Iraq. As a result, the United States was 
criticized for creating a body whose members inadvertently infused ethnic-sectarian division 
into Iraq’s first post-war governing body (Dobbins and others, 2009: 33; Tripp, 2007: 284). 
As highlighted throughout the remainder of this chapter, politics and Iraq’s governing bodies 
quickly espoused sectarian identity, creating ethnic-sectarian dissension that became 
institutionalized in Iraq’s social and political structures. 
During its tenure, the IGC served in conjunction with the CPA from mid-July 2003 to 
June 2004 in a restrained capacity (Allawi, 2007: 203; Brennan and others, 2013: 30; Dobbins 
and others, 2009: 46; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 251; Tripp, 2007: 284-285). For the most part, 
the CPA maintained control of decision-making while the IGC was subordinated. Among its 
accomplishments, the IGC selected individuals to temporarily head Iraq’s government 
ministries (Dobbins and others, 2009: 47). Additionally, in late 2003, the IGC assisted the 
CPA in establishing benchmarks for the creation of a democratically elected Government of 
Iraq (GOI) (Allawi, 2007: 216-226; Brennan and others, 2013: 30; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 
258). The arrangement negotiated was called the November 15 Agreement, and it outlined the 
transitional framework which demarcated benchmarks such as national elections of a 
transitional body, the writing of a constitution, and election of a permanent governing body 
(Allawi, 2007: 216-226; Brennan and others, 2013: 30; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 258). 
However, the manner in which these provisions were to be achieved was unspecified and 
constricted by a rigorous schedule of transition (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 258). 
The schedule and benchmarks were legislated as the Transitional Administrative Law 
(TAL) on March 8, 2004 (Allawi, 2007: 224). To summarize, the TAL established an 18-
month deadline that consisted of a series of progressive phases (Brennan and others, 2013: 30-
31). The first phase of the transfer dictated the establishment of an Iraqi Interim Government 
(IIG) that would replace the CPA and the IGC simultaneously (Dobbins and others, 2009: 12; 
Global Security, 2011; Katzman, 2008: 1; Tripp, 2007: 286). Once the IIG assumed control, it 
would theoretically govern the country independent of foreign influence. 
                                                          
 
36 In terms of IGC composition, it consisted of 13 Shi‘a, 5 Kurd, 5 Sunni, 1 Turkmen and 1 Assyrian Christian, a 
composition which the U.S. administration thought represented the demographic composition of Iraq (Tripp, 
2007: 284-285). 
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As the CPA and IGC’s tenure neared its end, there was rampant popular criticism of both 
bodies (Allawi, 2007: 286-287). On the one hand, an April 2004 poll found that forty-two 
percent of respondents assessed the CPA’s performance as “poor” or “very poor” 
(Burkholder, 2004e). On the other hand, on June 1, 2004, the IGC received a thirty-five 
percent positive performance rating, sentiment which may be attributed to the fact that a 
majority of Iraqis (79%) believed that “its policies and decisions (are) mostly determined by 
the coalition’s own authorities” (Burkholder, 2004a). Similarly, scholars also criticize the 
CPA and IGC. For instance, Allawi (2007: 286) asserts IGC members tasked with drafting the 
TAL were “exiles” who “had no feel for the prevailing sentiments of the majority of Iraqis,” a 
weakness he blames on the U.S. for appointing IGC representatives (Allawi, 2007: 221-222). 
Allawi’s insight underscores the lack of representation of the local indigenous population. 
At the same time, Allawi (2007: 222) lambastes the TAL as “utterly alien in construction 
and phraseology from the Arabic language and the Iraqi experience.” He adds to this criticism 
that the framework “embodied western, specifically American notions” such as “gender 
rights” and “separation of powers.” Allawi’s critical assessments, as articulated in the quotes, 
emphasize the degree of influence the U.S. exerted over the IGC and its drafting of the TAL. 
Demonstrating the negative perceptions generated by the TAL’s content and design, Allawi 
(2007: 224) concludes, “the TAL was deeply resented by a large majority of Iraqis” that could 
not identify with its content and perceived it as manipulated and imposed by U.S. authorities. 
Despite the degree of unpopularity noted in the quote, the TAL established the guidelines 
upon which post-war governance in Iraq was transferred. In short, the TAL’s designers, and 
its controversial and alien nature, guaranteed the population would question the legitimacy of 
each subsequent governing body as transfer of sovereignty progressed. 
1.4.2 Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) (June 2004-May 2005) 
The TAL ordained that the IGC and the CPA formally transition their authority to an 
appointed provisional governing body titled the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) (Allawi, 
2007: 286; Tripp, 2007: 292). That transfer occurred on June 28, 2004 (Allawi, 2007: 286; 
Tripp, 2007: 292). At this time, the IGC and CPA were dissolved, completing the first phase 
of Iraq’s transition to a popularly elected GOI (Allawi, 2007: 286; Global Security, 2011; 
Tripp, 2007: 286). According to the U.S. military, when the IIG acquired control, the formal 
occupation of Iraq ended (Brennan and others, 2013: 32-33). The military, nonetheless, 
remained, and Iraqis still considered the country under foreign military occupation. 
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According to polling, a majority of Iraqis initially approved the transfer of CPA and IGC 
authority to a temporary governing body (Burkholder, 2004a; 2004c). Nonetheless, 
respondent simultaneously expressed pessimism toward the ultimate degree of autonomy that 
such a governing body would enjoy (Burkholder, 2004a). Only forty percent of Iraqis 
believed that the transfer would officially grant complete sovereignty to the IIG (Burkholder, 
2004a). Most perceived transition was only a symbolic formality and expected the U.S. would 
continue to exert control over the country (Burkholder, 2004a). As noted below, respondents’ 
assumptions were accurate since the United States continued to exercise authority over 
political developments in occupied Iraq. 
Following its establishment, IIG members nominated Ayad Allawi as interim Prime 
Minister (Allawi, 2007: 285). Once Allawi had been appointed, the IIG (June 2004-May 
2005) was authorized to manage daily affairs and oversee the continual achievement of TAL 
benchmarks (Allawi, 2007: 214-215; Global Security, 2011). Among the latter, the IIG 
supervised a national census and national elections to determine the composition of the 
forthcoming Transitional National Assembly (TNA), which would supplant the IIG (Allawi, 
2007: 214-215)37. Following the conduct of a census, the IIG oversaw national elections on 
January 30, 2005, to select the 275 members of the TNA (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 269; 
Katzman, 2008: 1). However, two issues problematized the elections: increased insecurity and 
sectarian divisions (Brennan and others, 2013: 39). 
On the one hand, some recommended that elections be postponed, since it was feared that 
insecurity was too great to permit Iraqis to safely visit the polls (Fattah and Caso, 2009). On 
the other hand, the Sunni were disgruntled at their marginalization hitherto and threatened to 
boycott the elections. Sunni grievances included persistent U.S. influence in Iraq’s domestic 
political affairs and Sunni under-representation in the provincial governing councils 
(Katzman, 2008: 1). Both concerns were relegated by the U.S., which pressured compliance to 
the election schedule (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 260; Ucko, 2008: 352). Escalating sectarian 
tensions and disgruntlement ultimately occasioned the Sunni to boycott the elections (Allawi, 
2007: 389-392; Ucko, 2008: 352). As a result, Shi‘a and Kurdish candidates obtained a 
majority of seats in the TNA while the Sunni were under-represented due to self-
marginalization via the boycott (Allawi, 2007: 389; Katzman, 2008: 1; Ucko, 2008: 352). As 
                                                          
 
37 Comparatively, when questioned which powers the IIG should possess in a 2003 survey, a majority of Iraqi 
respondents suggested that it should be given the authority to replace ministers and governors, disarm and 
demobilize militias, tax and eject coalition troops from Iraq (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil 
Society Studies, 2004: 20). The latter task confirms that Iraqis perceived themselves under occupation. 
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denoted in the next subsection, volatile conditions and the election outcome required the TNA 
to later compromise in the distribution of seats to avoid a debilitating political deadlock. 
Concerning its responsibilities, the IIG unsuccessfully tried to suppress sectarian and 
insurgent violence through the use of Iraq’s security institutions (Allawi, 2007: 429). 
However, once the IIG had acquired control, Iraq’s evolving security institutions had become 
disproportionately sectarian in composition with either Sunni or Shi‘a operating through them 
(Allawi, 2007: 429). Disproportional ethnic-sectarian composition was a result of the 
politicization and institutionalization of identity, whereby representatives who acquired 
positions in respective ministries filled those ministries with individuals from their own 
sectarian group (Allawi, 2007: 429). Due to their disproportional composition, the activities of 
some institutions were perceived to be directed by sectarian interests (Allawi, 2007: 429). 
Consequently, popular suspicion increased, undermining the popular legitimacy of Iraq’s 
ministries and security forces, and exacerbating ethnic-sectarian tensions and mistrust at the 
political and social levels, which fed back into a conflict spiral (Allawi, 2007: 429). 
By way of conclusion, a great deal of criticism has been leveled against the IIG. Both the 
Arab League and Iraqis deemed the body as illegitimate since its members had not been 
popularly elected (Allawi, 2007: 301). Allawi (2007: 334) critically identifies the IIG as “an 
unnecessary interlude” between the CPA and the establishment of a legitimate government of 
Iraq. Following its eleven-month tenure, the IIG transferred its authority as stipulated by the 
TAL. 
1.4.3 Transitional National Assembly (TNA) (May 2005-May 2006) 
Following national elections, members of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) 
gathered to select leaders. On April 6, 2005, TNA members selected Kurd Jalal Talabani as its 
President and Shi‘a Ibrahim al-Jaafari as Prime Minister (Allawi, 2007: 393). On May 3, 
2005, the IIG transferred its authority to the TNA, commencing the second phase of transition 
to a permanent elected government (Global Security, 2011). Polling at this time suggests that 
Iraqis initially perceived the transitional government as representative of the country, and a 
majority expressed confidence in its ability to govern (International Republican Institute, 
2005: 19-20). With an apparent popular mandate, the TNA assumed its responsibilities. 
One fundamental TNA responsibility was the forming of a committee who would draft 
Iraq’s permanent constitution (Allawi, 2007: 214-215). According to the TAL, that draft 
constitution was then subject to a national referendum whereby Iraqis could accept or reject 
the document (Allawi, 2007: 214-215). The Constitutional Committee was established on 
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May 10, 2005, and was composed of 55 TNA members (Allawi, 2007: 404; Katzman, 2008: 
1; Tripp, 2007: 296-303). Public opinion polls found that Iraqis felt that the two principle 
things a constitution should do were: “define and protect the rights of the people” (38.6%) and 
“define the structure of government” (22.3%) (International Republican Institute, 2005: 23). 
Despite the public’s simplified conceptualizations, as outlined in the quote, the drafting of a 
constitution proved laborious and polarizing among Constitutional Committee members. 
While fulfilling its mandate, the Constitutional Committee faced several obstacles 
(Allawi, 2007: 214-215, 404-406). Foremost, it was tasked with drafting Iraq’s constitution 
within a five month time period (Allawi, 2007: 406). The imposed time frame added pressure 
and urgency to a process that was already challenged by the body’s ethnically diverse 
membership who embraced different conceptualizations of how the governing framework 
should manifest. Secondly, there were numerous and salient contentious issues concerning the 
appropriate design of Iraq’s governing framework that needed to be negotiated and resolved 
(Allawi, 2007: 214-215; Tripp, 2007: 300-301). Polarizing issues included the applicability of 
federalism, oil wealth distribution and the status of Kirkuk (Brennan and others, 2013: 148-
150; Katzman, 2008: 2; Ryan, 2010: 69). Finally, the lack of Sunni representation became a 
subject of contention; since “[o]nly two of the original fifty-five members were Sunni Arabs” 
as a result of the Sunni boycott of the January 2005 TNA elections (Allawi, 2007: 404). The 
unrepresentative composition of the committee created deadlock and a compromise had to be 
reached to increase Sunni representation. 
The marginalization of Sunni within the committee provoked Sunni protest and 
dissatisfaction, sentiment that was shared by U.S. authorities who feared that a constitution 
might not be drafted or ratified within the time frame allocated if the issue was not resolved 
(Tripp, 2007: 300). Consequently, the Sunni and the United States pressured the TNA to 
increase the number of Sunni representatives on the Constitutional Committee (Tripp, 2007: 
300). The TNA acquiesced, increasing the number of Sunni representative by fifteen 
permanent members and ten advisers (Katzman, 2008: 2; Tripp, 2007: 300). With a more 
representative committee established, the assembly began negotiating a draft constitution 
(Katzman, 2008: 2). Despite the more representative nature of the committee, the draft 
constitution produced was subject to criticism for numerous reasons, including its sectarian 
nature. 
The first criticism leveled at the draft constitution centered on the representative nature of 
the constitutional committee. More specifically, the Sunni continued to perceive that they 
were under-represented in government and thereby dubbed the October 2005 draft 
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constitution a “sectarian text” (Ucko, 2008: 353). Succinctly, the Sunni argued that the 
constitution failed to adequately address their needs. Secondly, several divisive issues 
remained unresolved because of an inability of committee members to achieve compromise 
within the allotted time frame (Katzman, 2008: 2). Unresolved issues included oil revenue 
distribution and the status of Kirkuk within Iraq’s federation (Brennan and others, 2013: 148-
150; Katzman, 2008: 2; Ryan, 2010: 69). Unable to achieve compromise, the Constitutional 
Committee elected to transfer responsibility for resolving divisive issues to the forthcoming 
GOI (Katzman, 2008: 2; Ryan, 2010: 69). The general frame of the draft constitution was also 
subject to criticism. Pascual and Pollack (2007: 9), for example, argue that the “constitution 
that the United States helped to broker” was a manipulated text, which the U.S. perceived 
necessary “to demonstrate the progress of democracy.” The quote emphasizes U.S. 
interference in the design and content of the draft, which raised issues of legitimacy (Pascual 
and Pollack, 2007: 9) since the United States continued to repeatedly intervene. 
Despite its shortcomings, a popular referendum on the draft constitution was held on 
October 15, 2005 (Allawi, 2007: 416; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 261). According to referendum 
criterion, the draft would be rejected if two-thirds of the population in three of Iraq’s eighteen 
provinces voted no (Katzman, 2008: 1-2). In the run-up to the referendum, sectarian divisions 
were demonstrated in a Sunni Arab call to reject the draft (Allawi, 2007: 416; Katzman, 2008: 
4; Tripp, 2007: 301). Nevertheless, more than sixty percent of eligible voters participated in 
the plebiscite (Allawi, 2007: 416; Katzman, 2008: 4; Tripp, 2007: 301). While exercising their 
right, polling results indicate that voters cast their ballots according to ethnic-sectarian 
affiliation (Allawi, 2007: 416; Katzman, 2008: 4; Tripp, 2007: 301). 
Referendum results demonstrate polarization across Iraq’s society, since majorities in the 
predominantly Kurd and Shi‘a provinces approved the draft constitution, while most voters in 
predominantly Sunni provinces rejected it (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 262; Tripp, 2007: 301). 
Concerning the latter, “The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% 
‘no’ vote, respectively” (Katzman, 2008: 2). However, the predominantly Sunni province of 
Nineveh voted 55% “no,” thereby missing the threshold for rejecting the draft (Katzman, 
2008: 2). Consequently, Katzman emphasizes that the draft constitution was narrowly ratified, 
despite being rejected by most Sunni voters. 
With the constitution approved by most of Iraq’s provinces, the TNA supervised 
parliamentary elections, the next step according to the TAL, for transferring governance 
(Allawi, 2007: 441). On December 15, 2005, approximately eighty percent of eligible voters 
elected 275 representatives to the GOI (Allawi, 2007: 441; Tripp, 2007: 301). According to 
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election guidelines, twenty-five percent of those selected had to be female (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 262). The latter was a provision advocated by the United States. Like the constitutional 
referendum, Iraqis largely voted according to sectarian affiliation (Katzman, 2008: 2; Tripp, 
2007: 301). Once tallied, final election results awarded the Shi‘a political conglomeration, the 
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), with almost half of the parliamentary seats (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 263; Katzman, 2008: 2). To its credit, analysts commend the election results, noting that 
the distribution of seats were demographically more representative than the IIG had been 
(Fattah and Caso, 2009: 263; Katzman, 2008: 2). With members elected to parliament, and no 
clear majority in control, negotiations had to be conducted to form a coalition government 
(Allawi, 2007: 442). 
Formation of a government proved challenging and controversial, taking parliamentarians 
nearly four months to appoint a Prime Minister due to inter-factional and sectarian quarreling 
among members (Allawi, 2007: 442-443; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 265). On February 12, 2006, 
a secret ballot was held in parliament and Ibrahim al-Jaafari won a slight majority and 
technically should have been appointed Prime Minister (Allawi, 2007: 442; Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 260). Dissatisfied by the ballot results, some Shi‘a, Kurd and U.S. officials expressed 
“that [al-Jaafari] was [a] divisive figure” and insisted he was unacceptable to lead the GOI 
(Allawi, 2007: 442). These actors applied pressure on Jaafari to reject the post, and ultimately 
he conceded to allow another to assume the position (Allawi, 2007: 443). Another round of 
negotiations led to UIA’s representative, Nuri Jawad al-Maliki, being selected (Allawi, 2007: 
443; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 260). Al-Maliki’s appointment was, therefore, another instance of 
U.S. interference in Iraq’s democratic political processes (Allawi, 2007: 442; Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 265). The forced compromise undermined the democratic process in Iraq, while U.S. 
intervention frustrated politicians and civilians alike. 
1.4.4 Government of Iraq (GOI) (May 2006-December 2011) 
The TNA was replaced by the GOI on May 20, 2006 (Aljazeera, 2010). During the four 
and a half years of GOI tenure under the occupation, the body was plagued by sectarian and 
political infighting among the three major ethnic-sectarian groups (Allawi, 2007: 446-460; 
Katzman, 2008: 2-4; Roy, 2007: 108). These experiences reflect the magnitude of divisions at 
the societal level as Iraq edged closer to civil war. Increased sectarian tensions and the 
decreasing security situation at this time prompted the U.S. to surge, or increase, coalition 
troops as one technique of reversing the spiral of violence (Brennan and others, 2013: 52; 
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Rodano, 2012: 38)38. The surge, in combination with other internal events, successfully 
managed to reverse the escalation of violence. 
While violence was eventually curbed, the GOI lacked popular legitimacy (Brennan and 
others, 2013: 51). For instance various ministers were repeatedly accused of advancing 
sectarian interests from within their given ministries (Allawi, 2007: 446-460; Katzman, 2008: 
4). Simultaneously, polarizing issues, including the depth and scope of de-Baʻathification and 
the status of Kirkuk, continuously plagued the GOI (Katzman, 2008: 2-3). The combination of 
GOI failure to provide security or basic services, its partisan actions, and inability to achieve 
compromise, undermined popular trust and reinforced ethnic-sectarian divisions. 
The degree of factionalism within the GOI was demonstrated repeatedly throughout the 
first few years of the GOI. In 2006, for instance, the formation of government was delayed for 
months by sectarian and inter-party rivalry and their inability to achieve compromise 
(Katzman, 2014: 2-5). Some compromises were eventually reached in 2008 that aided to the 
reduction of sectarian tensions and violence (Katzman, 2014: 5). One of those issues, which 
had been outstanding following the Constitutional Committee’s inability to reach 
compromise, was resolved when the Provincial Powers Law (Law Number 21) was agreed 
upon (Katzman, 2014: 5). This piece of legislation granted provinces the authority to form 
their own governments, enforce laws and spend fiscal appropriations (Katzman, 2014: 5). 
While a significant achievement in terms of national reconciliation benchmarks, the law 
continued to be popularly criticized as insufficient. 
Sectarian and political divisions again manifested during the 2010 national elections. With 
tensions rising within the Shi‘a political coalition, support for al-Maliki declined (Katzman, 
2014: 6). Prior to the election, al-Maliki used his authority to purge candidates from the 
January 2010 ballot using the de-Baʻathification law (Katzman, 2014: 7). This action was 
designed to augment al-Maliki’s chances of retaining office, but it exacerbated sectarian 
tensions. During the elections, 62% of Iraqis went to the polls, but no political party obtained 
a clear majority (Katzman, 2014: 7). As a result, power grabbing by politicians, including al-
Maliki, commenced and the GOI experienced difficulty determining and establishing a 
government (Katzman, 2014: 7). 
Due to political wrangling, it took the parliament an unprecedented eight months to agree 
on the distribution of positions in government following the elections (Brennan and others, 
2013: 98). The episode set a historical record among democratic parliamentary governing 
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systems for the length of time necessary to form a governing coalition (Muir, 2010). After 
prolonged political horse-trading, a compromise was ultimately reached. Part of the 
November 2010 compromise was that al-Maliki would retain his position of power in 
exchange for the breadth of de-Ba‘athification being minimized (Katzman, 2014: 7). While 
Ahmed Ali (2014: 9) conjectures that the 2010 elections hinged on competition between the 
three major sectarian and ethnic groups, who were acting in identity-based political coalitions, 
sectarian cooperation declined as frustration became rampant within political parties. 
In conclusion, Iraq’s permanent government was paralyzed by partisanship and needed to 
learn how to cooperate and compromise across parties and sects. However, the complex 
social-political environment created by the removal of Saddam Hussein, including the 
violence, sectarian fracturing, and the imposition of a U.S. framework, made cooperation and 
compromise difficult (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259). Therefore, equitable social 
and political resolutions, broadly defined as one that is mutually acceptable and beneficial to 
relevant stakeholders, proved challenging (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259). In this 
dissonant environment, scholars emphasize the importance of achieving compromise to 
resolve issues and cultivate public trust (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259). Unable to 
reach compromise, the United States frequently forced political compromise through exertion 
of pressure on the GOI and its leaders. 
One example of U.S. pressure on the GOI was its push for the pursuit of national 
reconciliation (Katzman, 2008: 3). Pressure in this frame was applied through the 
establishment of standards, which predicated continued U.S. financial assistance on the 
achievement of reconciliation benchmarks (Katzman, 2008: 3). Benchmarks included 
legislation on oil wealth distribution, a constitutional review, and the granting of amnesty to 
former insurgents, some of the many issues that created perpetual political deadlock within 
Iraq’s government (Katzman, 2008: 5-6). Realization of these standards was periodically 
evaluated prior to disbursement of U.S. financial assistance (Katzman, 2008: 3). In this case, 
the United States used its purse strings to muscle Iraq’s government into making 
compromises, an outcome the U.S. deemed necessary to stabilize Iraq socially and politically. 
Nonetheless, Iraq’s government has failed to meet many of the benchmarks established prior 
and subsequent to U.S. withdrawal (Katzman, 2012: 14-17). 
1.4.5 Post-occupation GOI and contemporary developments 
While this thesis concentrates primarily on U.S.-Iraq relations and events up to December 
2011, the present section highlights social and political events subsequent to the end of the 
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U.S. occupation to contextualize contemporary conditions inside Iraq. Following the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops in late 2011, internal political and social tensions continued to 
persist. Within the GOI, power arrangements agreed upon during the paralyzing 2010 
elections proved short-lived. These resulted in the manifestation of regular popular protests 
against the GOI in December 2012, and a re-escalation of sectarian violence, which assisted 
the spread of IS violence as Sunnis became disgruntled (Ali, 2014: 29). To minimize IS 
influence and undermining reversion back to civil war, the U.S. pressured al-Maliki to make 
political compromises in 2012, including the release of Baʻath prisoners (Katzman, 2014: 15). 
Although al-Maliki conformed, by late 2012 he was again targeting Sunni political opponents 
and this action generated additional Sunni demonstrations (Katzman, 2014: 16). Sunni 
grievances included the desire for more prisoners to be released, the process of de-
Ba‘athification be reformed, and improvements in public services (Katzman, 2014: 16). 
However, no meaningful compromises were forthcoming. 
Consequently, popular uprisings continued into early 2013, and IS continued to make 
territorial gains. Persistent internal disorder prompted al-Maliki to dispatch the ISF to quell 
the popular protests (Katzman, 2014: 16). The ISF’s use of disproportional force, including 
the killing of protesters, however, exacerbated popular dissatisfaction (Katzman, 2014: 16). 
Events thereby culminated in a resurgence of sectarian violence as Sunni militias were 
mobilized against the Shi‘a dominated ISF (Ali, 2014: 9; Katzman, 2014: 16). With sectarian 
violence continuing to escalate throughout the spring of 2013, and Sunni forces joining IS 
ranks, the United States became increasingly involved (Katzman, 2014: 4). 
The U.S. again urged al-Maliki to make political compromises, leading to a mid-2013 
settlement whereby concessions were made on the Provincial Law and de-Ba‘athification 
reforms were established (Katzman, 2014: 17). Concerning the former, the amending of the 
provincial powers law imparted additional authority to provinces, including increased 
responsibility for security and fiscal spending (Ali, 2014: 28; Katzman, 2014: 5). The political 
compromises reached, unfortunately, had no obvious effect on the security situation. IS, Sunni 
and Shi‘a violence continued to proliferate (Katzman, 2014: 17). 
By late 2013, IS was an important stakeholder as it increasingly gained control over 
territory throughout Iraq (Ali, 2014: 21; Katzman, 2014: 9). Hoping to boost his image, al-
Maliki dispatched the ISF and it reclaimed some territory from IS (Ali, 2014: 16; Katzman, 
2014: 15). Thereafter, al-Maliki undermined his political gains when he turned his attention to 
weakening the Sunni through arrests (Ali, 2014: 16; Katzman, 2014: 15). The latter strategy 
produced a social and political crisis that evolved from street protests into an armed Sunni 
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revolt (Ali, 2014: 16-21, 18-24). Some of these Sunni forces joined IS, creating a more 
formidable opponent for the GOI (Ali, 2014: 21, 24; Katzman, 2014: 10-11). 
As a result, the GOI increasingly experience defeats to IS, losing control of Fallujah in 
early 2014 (Ali, 2014: 12). IS continued to make territorial headway on two fronts, nearing 
Baghdad and simultaneously moving into Iraq-Kurdistan in the fall of 2014 (Katzman, 2014: 
19). ISF forces proved incapable of containing or defeating IS on their own, with the ISF 
experiencing mass desertions of soldiers who abandoned equipment and hardware that was 
then captured by IS fighters (Katzman, 2014: 19). Simultaneously Shi‘a militias continued to 
join IS, further augmenting its strength in Iraq (Katzman, 2014: 19-20). 
Meanwhile, on April 30, 2014, parliamentary elections were held (Katzman, 2014: 20). 
The 2014 election cycle witnessed the implosion of the larger sectarian political coalitions that 
had cooperated in 2010. Analysts suggest that al-Maliki’s long-reign of power39 and his brutal 
efforts to consolidate authority by undermining political opponents led to stringent opposition 
among the Shi‘a (especially the Sadr), Sunni and Kurd political parties (Ali, 2014: 9-10). 
Nonetheless, al-Maliki managed to win the largest portion of votes during the election 
(Katzman, 2014: 20). Albeit, persistent IS gains in Iraq undermined al-Maliki’s acquisition of 
another term in office (Katzman, 2014: 20). In an effort to stabilize Iraq against the IS threat, 
the United States urged a rapid formation of a new government whereby political compromise 
could be achieved and energy directed toward defeating IS as opposed to sectarian wrangling 
(Katzman, 2014: 20-21). A coalition government was eventually established, but Iraq 
continues to experience sectarian divisions and violence, exacerbated in part by IS operations. 
Al-Maliki’s political activities, undoubtedly, have played a notable role in increasing 
sectarian tensions and the advancements made by IS. He has used the judiciary, ISF and other 
security forces for his own political gain (Ali, 2014: 19-21). His tactics have included arrests 
and disqualification of political opponents, actions that has earned him many political 
opponents (Ali, 2014: 19-21). Al-Maliki’s activities likewise have had a social impact. There 
still continues to be a general lack of public trust in the government and its institutions, for 
reasons including GOI inability or unwillingness to provide security to all Iraqis, problems of 
political corruption, and stagnation in reconstruction (Ali, 2014: 9-10). Public disgruntlement 
subsequently feeds into the civil unrest, violence and the appeal of IS. 
To inhibit IS gains in Iraq, the U.S. has dispatched hundreds of advisers and a contingent 
of troops to assist ISF and Peshmerga troops (Katzman, 2014: 22-24). The advisers are 
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involved in training and these U.S. forces are immune from prosecution (Katzman, 2014: 24). 
The U.S. has also been assisting through military airstrikes and the provision of weapons and 
equipment (Katzman, 2014: 19-24). Other European countries have likewise been providing 
assistance to Iraq, including Germany and the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, ISF 
and the Peshmerga are making advances against IS, reclaiming territory. 
Overall, IS has created several dilemmas for Iraq should IS influence be dislodged from 
the country. While it has hastily united the ISF and Peshmerga against a common enemy, 
foreign assistance is being provided to both the ISF and the Peshmerga. Assistance offered to 
the latter will likely increase its relative strength vis-à-vis the ISF, which could produce future 
tensions, since the Kurds will have the a stronger militia to confront centralized rule 
originating in Baghdad once the common IS threat has been reduced or eliminated. 
Additionally, there has been increasing tensions between the GOI and the Kurds, with 
rhetorical references to Kurdish independence. Of particular interest, Kurds began exporting 
oil through Turkey against GOI directive in May 2014 (Ali, 2014: 19, 24; Katzman, 2014: 13-
14). Direct sales give Iraq-Kurdistan the opportunity to earn direct revenue by circumventing 
Baghdad. Following tensions concerning the trade arrangement, a compromise was reached 
which states that all oil income generated by the Iraq-Kurdistan be routed through Baghdad 
(Ali, 2014: 19, 24; Katzman, 2014: 13-14). Direct Kurd sale of petroleum, nonetheless, is 
another step toward increased autonomy. Finally, subsequent to the ISF’s retreat from Kirkuk, 
the Peshmerga captured Kirkuk after it ejected IS (Katzman, 2014: 13). This acquisition 
places the disputed area of Kirkuk firmly under the control of the Kurds. The two 
circumstances compound preexisting tensions between the GOI and Iraq-Kurdistan, and will 
have to be added to the list of issues that must be managed once Iraq’s interior is secured. 
Simultaneously, they demonstrate that Iraq-Kurdistan is edging closer to independence, which 
remains a sticking point for the Sunni and Shi‘a who do not desire Iraq’s territorial 
disintegration. 
1.5 Qualitative summary of the war and occupation 
Scholars assert that 9/11 changed U.S. domestic and foreign policy (Haass, 2009: 186; 
Kepel, 2004: 5). Following that event, the George W. Bush administration prioritized the use 
of military force to pursue U.S. security interests and to counter terrorism (Roy, 2007: 13). 
One component of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy was the use of military force to 
proliferate democratic forms of governance through regime change and state building 
campaigns (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 223-224; Roy, 2007: 29). This U.S. 
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(counterterrorism) strategy was implemented foremost in Afghanistan in 2001 (Ramsbotham 
and others, 2011: 223; Rogers, 2008: 163; Roy, 2007: 11; Rubin, 2003: 46), and repeated 
through the U.S. unilateral and preventive invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003 
(Carty, 2011: 80; Johansen, 2004: 4; Kepel, 2004: 197-198; Lieberfeld, 2005: 3; Ramsbotham 
and others, 2011: 223; Roy, 2007: 13; Rubin, 2003: 46; Tripp, 2007: 273). 
As noted above, the invasion of Iraq was advocated, among other reasons, to remove 
Saddam Hussein from political power because of his alleged support of international terrorism 
and pursuit of WMD (Jackson and Towle, 2006: 111-112; Kam, 2011: 97). Adhering to its 
democratic-proliferation (counterterrorism) strategy, the Bush administration later argued that 
in addition to securing the U.S. and countering the WMD-terror nexus, the U.S. invasion 
would extend democratic governance to Iraq and the Middle East (Brennan and others, 2013: 
8; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 53; Kepel, 2004: 6). To maintain domestic approval, the Bush 
administration argued that the overall strategy would increase U.S. security, improve the lives 
of Iraqis, and advance regional and international peace (Renshon, 2007: 20)40. As outlined, 
events on the ground did not generate peace or security, and the durability of Iraq’s weak 
democratic framework is uncertain and will have to be evaluated in the future. 
Scholars, hitherto, criticize the U.S. war on terrorism and its manifestation in Iraq as 
ineffective and problematic for numerous reasons (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 223-224; 
Steele, 2008: 2). Foremost, critics discredit it as a counterterrorism campaign (Allawi, 2007: 
10; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 111), since Iraq became a sanctuary of terrorism following the 
invasion (Sageman, 2008: 91). Succinctly, the invasion of Iraq did not minimize the use of 
terrorism but proliferated violence. Secondly, U.S. credibility was called into question when 
no WMD were found (Allawi, 2007: 338; Suskind, 2006: 239) and its peace enforcement, 
nation building and state building efforts failed (Etzioni, 2007: 14; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 
136; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199-207). Most important in the context of this research 
is the production of insecurity, factionalism, and the manufactured humanitarian crisis that 
produced a staggering degree of death, injury, displacement and deprivation. In hindsight, 
                                                          
 
40 Strategic thinking among some in the George W. Bush administration held that deposing “rogue leaders,” such 
as Saddam Hussein, would complicate or deter state sponsorship of terrorism (Hobsbawm, 2007: 115-119; Kam, 
2011: 88). It was also hypothesized that extending democracy and increasing counterterrorism capabilities of 
particular Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia, would strengthen international political will and 
capacity to eradicate the use of terrorism vis-à-vis the United States (Kam, 2011: 88). George W. Bush’s (2003, 
2006) National Strategy to Combat Terrorism (NSCT) illustrates the importance of democracy as a component of 
his counterterrorism strategy. For instance, the NSCT (Bush, 2006: 9-10) presents democracy as a long-term 
antidote to terrorism because it promotes international stability and peace (Bush, 2006: 16). As witnessed in Iraq, 
Brennan and others (2013: 8-9) suggest that policymakers paradoxically have a tendency of expanding 
motivations and goals during a mission that is subject to failure since they have invested a great deal into 
initiating the war and want it to end as a success. 
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U.S. objectives had a low probability of success because they were imposed through the use 
of military force, haphazardly planned and implemented, and had not considered indigenous 
needs and desires (Etzioni, 2007: 14; Haass, 2009: 136; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 136; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199-207). 
Much of the literature associated with the occupation emphasizes the responsibility of the 
United States for the social and political conditions manufactured inside Iraq (Allawi, 2007: 
202; Commonwealth Institute, 2008: 9; Stover and others, 2005: 857). Forgoing discussion on 
the legality and legitimacy of intervention, the deteriorating social and political circumstances 
created by the United States undermined the reconstitution of security, governance and basic 
services (Kilcullen, 2009: 152; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199); marginalized indigenous 
input from Iraqis (Stover and others, 2005: 834-835); and suffered from an acute lack of 
understanding and appreciation of political, cultural, and religious nuances which influence 
contemporary politics, society and culture inside Iraq (Allawi, 2007: 286; Dobbins and others, 
2009: 8; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268-270; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 166). Within this milieu, 
an internal conflict spiral was created, which compromised public support, increased tensions 
and violence and thereby expanded the coalition’s momentous tasks of peacebuilding and 
state building to include counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations as violence escalated 
(Kilcullen, 2009: 152; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199). 
The coalition gradually came to realize that these objectives were fused and self-
reinforcing. More specifically, the systemic nature of peacebuilding, state building, 
reconstructing and stabilization in Iraq was confirmed as setbacks in one sector problematized 
advancements in another, demonstrating the mutual dependence and complexity of such 
processes in post-conflict settings (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 210). For instance, 
coalition inability to contain insurgent violence, especially violence targeting essential 
services, hindered the provision of public goods (an effort of state building), for which the 
coalition and GOI were responsible (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Hashim, 2006: 34). 
Reversely, as security increased, it was possible to increase the provision of basic services. 
In hindsight, insurgency against the coalition should have been expected and planned for, 
as a quick historical review of the region confirms. Nonetheless, antipathy toward the 
coalition was exacerbated by factors including the prolongation of the occupation, prevailing 
insecurity, the inability to provide basic services, and the imposition of decisions and 
benchmarks (Allawi, 2007: 178, 270-271). The combination deepened anti-occupation 
sentiment and hastened an insurgency; it likewise precipitated sectarian fracturing that, when 
left unaddressed, transformed into civil war (Allawi, 2007: 178, 270-271). Hence, the United 
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States invasion was subject to rebellion, and its failures in planning and recognizing the 
interplay of peacebuilding and state building exacerbated the situation. 
In conjunction with insecurity and the challenging living conditions, U.S. authorities also 
negatively influenced the capability and legitimacy of Iraq’s evolving governing framework 
through the setting of standards and repeat intervention in the development and composition 
of elements of the governing framework (Allawi, 2007: 136; Kilcullen, 2009: 50-52; Roy, 
2007: 40-41; Ryan, 2010: 69; Ucko, 2008: 351). For instance, the imposition of the IGC and 
the benchmarks and timetables for transition abetted the institutionalization of an unsound 
governing framework with questionable legitimacy and representation (Allawi, 2007: 136; 
Kilcullen, 2009: 50-52; Roy, 2007: 40-41; Ryan, 2010: 69; Ucko, 2008: 351). While 
interference produced what the U.S. perceived as proportional representation and adherence to 
democratic practices, scholars criticize the governing framework and the ideals it imposed as 
alien and unwanted (Allawi, 2007: 222). Combined, U.S. intervention produced a system that 
is not considered representative of Iraq’s interests and needs. 
Equally problematic, while establishing Iraq’s governing framework, critics suggest that 
the United States fostered sectarian tensions. Sectarian relations fractured when the CPA 
appointed IGC members (Dobbins and others, 2009: 33; Tripp, 2007: 284; Ucko, 2008: 350). 
These divisions compounded imposed policies, such as de-Baʻathification, whose depth 
likewise created ethnic/sectarian divisions and serve as an example of structural violence 
perpetrated by U.S. authorities (Allawi, 2007: 150-152; Galtung, 1969: 4-8; Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 207). Concerning the latter, the disproportional punishment and marginalization 
of the Sunni through vetting, inevitably led the Sunni to conclude that the U.S. favored one 
group over another (Ucko, 2008: 350-351). Assured that favoritism was driving U.S. policy 
and exacerbated by the unpopular changes being institutionalized, violent popular backlash 
manifested in the form of an insurgency (Allawi, 2007: 150-152; Terrill, 2003: 13). At the 
same time, U.S. inability to provide post-war security inevitably allowed individuals and 
collectives to engage in retributive and sectarian targeting (Allawi, 2007: 94-95, 170, 276). 
These conditions equally increased civil distrust, aggravated tensions and produced violence. 
By way of conclusion, the United State socially and politically destabilized Iraq. Many 
scholars emphasize that Iraqis do not feel that the GOI operates according to collective 
interest, but rather for self-interest (corrupt) (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 33, 65), and the 
interest of their sectarian-based constituents, as identity became politicized early in the 
occupation and persists at the time of writing (Allawi, 2007: 53, 127, 228; Möckli, 2012: 3-4; 
Serwer and Parker, 2008: 4; Ucko, 2008: 363; Visser, 2007: 809). Reflecting on the GOI in 
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2008, Serwer and Parker (2008: 2) profess that the “political reality in Iraq is a weak and 
divided central government with limited governing capacity. Mistrust among leaders in 
Baghdad remains high.” Supporting the authors’ conclusion, polling in 2010 found a majority 
of Iraqis (59%) were pessimistic about the trajectory of the country (International Republican 
Institute, 2010: 12-14). The assessment suggests that the future of Iraq is bleak, unless 
politicians and civilians can find a way to prioritize collective interests over partisanship and 
reform the social/political framework established during the occupation. However, these 
changes do not appear to be on the horizon. 
Subsequent to the December 2011 U.S. military withdrawal, sectarian and political 
turmoil persists (Al-Ansary, 2012; Möckli, 2012: 4). For example, the Kurds continue to 
assert their right to self-determination, and insist on maintaining or expanding their autonomy 
(Katzman, 2012: 21; Möckli, 2012: 2-3; Tripp, 2007: 309-311). Autonomy would dissolve 
Iraq. However, there are sticking points to the dissolution of Iraq, particularly Kurd claim of 
the oil-rich area of Kirkuk (Terrill, 2003: 26). Resolving outstanding issues will have to be 
balanced within discussions of increased autonomy or possible independence (Terrill, 2003: 
26-27). Caution will have to be applied as the combination of issues have a high probability of 
producing a hostile response from Iraq’s Sunni and Shi‘a population, many of whom do not 
wish to compromise the territorial integrity of the country (Terrill, 2003: 26-27). Although the 
GOI agreed to schedule a census and conduct a referendum on the status of Kirkuk in late 
2007, the referendum has been postponed repeatedly due to internal divisions and increasing 
instability caused by sectarian divisions and IS operations since the U.S. withdrawal 
(Katzman, 2014: 13). 
In short, the long-term stability of Iraq is indeterminable (Möckli, 2012: 1; Roy, 2007: 
119-120). Anthony Cordesman (2010: 6) optimistically predicts it will take five to ten years 
for Iraq to make the necessary social and political transformation to reduce sectarian tensions. 
However, this assessment was made prior to the advances made by IS in Iraq and the increase 
in sectarian tensions and violence subsequent to the U.S. withdrawal. Other analysts 
pessimistically suggest a longer period is necessary to stabilize Iraq since stability is 
predicated on internal and external regional factors (Möckli, 2012: 3-4; Timberg, 2011). The 
immediate threat of IS, the associated turmoil in Syria, and Iran’s operations in Iraq, all have a 
systemic effect on the stability and integrity of Iraq. The resources devoted to combating IS 
prolongs the incubation period scholars suggest is necessary to root and stabilize Iraq socially 
and politically. Moreover, due to the gravity of the persistent sectarian divisions in the 
political and social spheres, reconciling internal divisions and increasing popular trust in 
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government and its institutions equally require a significant amount of time and effort to alter 
(Al-Ansary, 2012; Möckli, 2012: 4). While these internal and external events unfold, it is 
difficult to predict what further social and political challenges will manifest. 
1.6 Conclusion 
The primary objective of the present chapter was to reconstruct the contemporary role of 
the United States in the evolution of the state of Iraq between 2002 and 2011. Its contents, 
therefore, mapped the conflict between the U.S. and Iraq as violence escalated between the 
two countries following the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. In addition to highlighting 
U.S. activity during this period, contents detail some of the political and social consequences 
of the U.S. intervention. A more in-depth analysis of the social impact of the war and 
occupation is conducted in the next chapter. 
Chapter 1 demonstrates an escalation in the conflictual relationship between the United 
States and Iraq following the 1991 Persian Gulf War and sanctioning, and simultaneously 
provides insight into the typology and degree of violence perpetrated. On the one hand, 
between 2003 and 2011, the U.S. perpetrated direct physical violence in its overthrow of 
Iraq’s government. Direct physical violence continued as the U.S. implemented its 
counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations throughout the duration of the occupation. 
Military force was frequently disproportional, as detailed later, and produced significant 
casualties that compromised Iraqi opinion. On the other hand, the United States perpetrated 
structural violence through its imposition of benchmarks and policies, for instance de-
Baʻathification and the dissolution of Iraq’s security forces. Other examples of structural 
violence include the U.S. failure to provide security, the poorly planned and implemented 
reconstruction program, failure to provide basic services, and U.S.-imposed decisions of post-
war governing frameworks, to name a few. These activities impacted on internal dynamics 
and general public opinion. While not exhaustive, decisions and events analyzed herein 
confirm Hypothesis 1—that there is a long-standing conflict relationship between the United 
States and Iraq that has produced bilateral animosity between the respective societies. The 
degree of social animosity is further qualified in the next chapter. 
Similarly, the present chapter likewise denotes how identity continued to impact political-
social developments in Iraq in two ways. Firstly, it was demonstrated how the U.S. overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein violently fractured Iraq’s society, exacerbating historical and preexisting 
identity-based tensions. Fracturing produced unprecedented ethnic, sectarian, and tribal 
turbulence as actors engaged in retributive justice and competed for scarce resources in the 
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vacuum created by the invasion and occupation. These tensions transformed into full-scale 
social-political competition and civil war among the three primary groupings: Kurd, Sunni 
and Shi‘a. Its manifestation undermined political and social stability throughout the 
occupation and persists in contemporary Iraq. 
Secondly, there was a general repugnance towards external (U.S.) intervention. In the 
context of historical analysis excluded from this thesis, U.S. intervention exacerbated 
preexisting anti-Western and anti-U.S. sentiment rooted in historical experiences (such as 
Britain’s mandate). Indigenous response to the occupation was initiated by protests and later a 
violent insurgency designed to hasten the end of the occupation. It was, nonetheless, 
explained that the insurgency was limited predominantly to the Sunni and Shi‘a. Combined 
with the challenges of rebuilding Iraq’s political and social structures, the U.S.-led coalition 
had to deal with an insurgency and a civil war which was produced in the wake of the security 
vacuum the invasion created. Both forms of internal violence compounded the challenges 
faced by coalition forces as they simultaneously embarked on peacebuilding and nation 
building campaigns. The systemic nature of peacebuilding, nation building and security 
provision was demonstrated since failures on one front undermined advances in another. 
Further complicating peacebuilding and nation building, the poor performance and decisions 
imposed by the U.S. had a clear impact on the welfare of Iraqis and their perceptions, through 
the perpetration of structural violence. 
Chapter one began by sketching the prelude to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. It 
highlighted preexisting frustration with the containment of Iraq among some U.S. politicians 
and their avocation for regime change. The events of 9/11 provided momentum to calls for 
policy change in the form of military intervention. Once the George W. Bush administration 
had decided to intervene, it emphasized that Saddam Hussein was an existential threat to the 
United States and its interests, in addition to a destabilizing force to regional and international 
peace. While the administration’s justifications for intervention, including links to terrorism 
and possession of WMD, were partly accepted by U.S. citizens, the international community 
and many foreign leaders rejected the idea and protested against an invasion. Absent broad 
international support, and the United Nations’ failure to endorse intervention, the U.S. 
assembled an ad hoc coalition and conducted a preventive invasion of Iraq in the spring of 
2003. 
After highlighting the invasion, the chapter delineated how the U.S.-led coalition 
arrogated control as the occupying power and slowly transitioned authority back to an elected 
government of Iraq. The account began with the creation of a temporary governing body, the 
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ORHA. While Garner, as head of the ORHA, had determined to rapidly transition sovereignty 
and to involve indigenous input and assistance, his tenure was prematurely terminated 
because of the proliferation of civil unrest. Substituting the ORHA, the CPA was dispatched 
to rule Iraq until stability was established and an indigenous government could be elected. 
Introduction of the CPA thereby prolonged the occupation for an undetermined period of 
time. 
The U.S. decision to install the CPA was not well accepted by the local population or the 
international community, and criticism of the prolongation of the occupation was rampant. In 
sectarian terms, the arrival of the CPA produced serious concern among the Sunni, whom 
came to realize the gravity of changes the United States was about to implement. This 
realization precipitated a violent reflexive response, instigating an insurgency and 
compounding mounting sectarian violence as retributive acts and competition arose in the 
security vacuum. Persistent U.S. failures to curb initial lawlessness allowed insurgent and 
sectarian conflict dynamics to mature, producing a full-scale insurgency in conjunction with 
civil war. 
Overall, scholars and analysts criticize the U.S. occupations for multiple reasons, 
including its failure to (contingency) plan, lack of coordination among institutions involved, 
and the small number of troops committed to Iraq. Concerning the latter, several institutions 
had recommended a larger number of troops be deployed to provide policing during the 
occupation, but the Department of Defense rejected these suggestions. The security vacuum 
meant that looting, lawlessness, and sectarian targeted killings were left unattended. It was not 
until 2006 that an increase in the number of troops was implemented. Associated U.S. failures 
meant that responses to rapidly transforming conditions on the ground were ad hoc and poorly 
coordinated. Other critics argue that indigenous actors should have been engaged in the 
reconstitution of Iraq’s political and social framework, but those suggestions were generally 
dismissed or rejected by the Department of Defense. 
In conjunction, the CPA made two profound decisions that impacted on Iraq’s political 
and social trajectory. First, de-Baʻathification, or vetting, was a form of structural violence 
perpetrated by the CPA that intentionally marginalized and punished high-ranking Sunni 
members of the Baʻath Party, even if they had not been found guilty of wrongdoing. While 
vetting was necessary, the depth and breadth of its implementation had numerous social 
effects, including forced unemployment, the marginalization of the Sunni, and the 
marginalization of potential government and civil service employees. Due to the breadth of its 
implementation, vetting was no longer viewed as a tool for advancing transitional justice but 
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rather punishment of the Sunni. Second, the dissolution of Iraq’s security forces enraged 
soldiers because they were forcefully unemployed and not provided compensation. 
 Prior to their implementation, analysts had discouraged both decisions because of the 
social-political implications they were projected to generate. Nonetheless, decision-makers 
overlooked their warnings and implemented the orders.  By way of summary, the dissolution 
of security services and de-Baʻathification measures are examples of structural violence. 
Simultaneously, the measures were counterproductive to social unification, peacebuilding and 
nation building in occupied Iraq. Both decisions humiliated and enraged party members and 
soldiers respectively, who protested nonviolently and violently against the occupation, further 
destabilizing the country. Indicating its salience, the issue of de-Baʻathification continues to 
be a sticking point in contemporary Iraq, and has been frequently utilized throughout the 
occupation, and by politicians who seek to advance individual political interests through the 
marginalization of the Sunni. Finally, de-Baʻathification and the dissolution of security forces 
are suggested to have attributed to the decline in security and the proliferation of sectarian 
tensions inside Iraq. 
Afterward, the deteriorating security situation in Iraq was qualified. Due to the 
combination of failures and decisions outlined, the United States military was slow to counter 
the social disorder that manifested early in the occupation. Failure to provide initial security 
and quell lawlessness allowed retributive killings, looting and crime to flourish in occupied 
Iraq. Over time, a complex conflict emerged which included insurgent, ethnic-sectarian 
fighters, foreign infiltrators and criminal elements. The combination of these forces wreaked 
havoc at the societal and political levels. As security continued to decrease and the occupation 
endured, local animosity and grievances toward sectarian rivals and the United States-led 
coalition amplified violence throughout the country. 
As part of its peacekeeping, nation building and state building campaigns, the United 
States utilized four broad strategies to stabilize Iraq. The strategy involved kinetic military 
operations targeting insurgents and the training of a reconstituted Iraq military; advancing 
regional cooperation; reconstruction; and a national reconciliation program. Many of these 
programs were improperly planned, subject to setbacks, and frequently imposed. Due to their 
failures, ethnic-sectarian social-political tensions and violence, and poor living conditions 
persisted throughout the eight-year occupation as governance and security responsibility was 
gradually transferred from the United States to an elected GOI. Prevailing conditions 
undermined popular perceptions of the United States and Iraq’s governing bodies. 
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Meanwhile, as political institutions at the local and national level were revived and 
staffed, often according to coalition pronouncement, ethnic-sectarian strife became 
institutionalized and politicized. Political and social strife played out in government and on 
the streets making social and political compromise difficult, since groups coalesced around 
identity and community interests. As Iraq’s leaders assumed increased responsibility for 
governance, sectarian identity and division became institutionalized. Sectarianism became 
institutionalized as politicians filled ministry posts with sectarian affiliates, and then used 
those ministries to act in accordance with partisan interests. As events continued to evolve, 
identity-based mistrust expanded, ultimately undermining the legitimacy of Iraq’s emerging 
governing framework and representatives, many of whom seemed more interested in 
advancing sectarian interests than creating mutually acceptable compromises and 
improvements that promoted collective, national interests. 
In total, the transition of Iraq’s governing bodies from the CPA and IGC to the IIG, TNA 
and the GOI required three years. The process involved two different sets of national elections 
and the writing of a constitution. These transitional benchmarks were established in the TAL, 
and have been criticized for numerous reasons. Among the criticisms analyzed, it was 
highlighted that the framework was heavily influenced by U.S. ideals and interests, and was 
subject to strict time restraints and marred by sectarian divisions. Partisanship, corruption, 
weakness, and repeat U.S. interference led the population to perceive Iraq’s evolving 
governing bodies as illegitimate. 
Meanwhile, civil violence and the insurgency persistently challenged each governing 
body. The combined violence not only impacted the evolution of politics, but it wrought 
humanitarian calamity from the human toll (death and displacement). Violence further 
undermined the haphazard efforts made by the coalition to reconstruct Iraq’s infrastructure. It 
was not until late 2007 that a downward trend in violence was qualified. Around the time of 
the 2011 U.S. withdrawal, violence had been markedly reduced but sectarian tensions were 
simmering. At the same time, the reconstruction effort had made only marginal 
improvements, with some Iraqis complaining that they lacked basic services and the means to 
provide for their families. Since the 2011 coalition withdrawal, security has again deteriorated 
as a result of IS forces and sectarian disgruntlement, which frequently manifests in violence. 
Although we limit our evaluation to the end of the occupation in December 2011, we 
noted that political and social tensions have again increased to the point of steady violence 
since 2012. Sectarian groups have once again mobilized their militias to provide security and 
engage their rivals. Contemporary events are partly a result of the high degree of Sunni 
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popular frustration at government activities, including the use of the Shi‘a-led ISF against 
protesters, and the feeling that governing and security institutions do not act in the interest of 
all Iraqis. Political corruption and power consolidation have likewise undermined popular 
trust in the GOI. Nuri al-Maliki has been one contributor to internal turmoil, using his 
authority to weaken the political opposition through arrests and his manipulation of de-
Baʻathification to purge candidates from competing against him. His actions have ensured 
politics and society remain fractured and Iraqis frustrated at government. Al-Maliki’s 
activities have equally prompted repeat U.S. demands for compromise. Some compromises 
have been made, such as increased provincial authority and a review of de-Baʻathification, but 
those actions appear to be temporary and insufficient as dissension persists. 
In short, political and social divisions that manifested during the occupation and subsided 
prior to the U.S. withdrawal have once again become overt. Popular disgruntlement frequently 
turns violent, and the numbers of issues that must be resolved to stabilize Iraq politically and 
socially are multiplying. For example, while the ISF and Kurds are united against IS, political 
chasms have emerged between the GOI and Iraq-Kurdistan’s government. In addition to calls 
for independence, Kurdistan has been selling oil directly to Turkey, and it acquired Kirkuk 
following ISF retreat against IS advances. Such disputes compound preexisting political and 
social problems facing Iraq should IS be expelled. Resolution of these issues in the future will 
require additional compromises be made among a government that has demonstrated great 
difficulty with brokering mutually satisfactory settlements. The United States has responded 
to the sectarian divisions and the gains by IS by repeatedly recommending compromises be 
made and by dispatching air support, weapons, trainers and troops to aid Iraq. Similarly, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and other governments have equally become involved in the 
fight against IS. 
The chapter concluded with a condensed review and critique of the invasion and 
occupation to underscore the overall significance of events. Combined, mapping of the 
occupation demonstrates four salient points. First, it demonstrates a continuation of the violent 
relations from 1991 to 2011, thereby supporting Hypothesis 1, that there is a long-standing 
conflict relationship between the U.S. and Iraq. Second, it denotes the adverse political and 
societal effects the occupation had on Iraq’s political and social framework. Third, and a 
component of the second, it qualifies the degree of ethnic-sectarian rupture in Iraq’s 
previously strained relations. Lastly, it provides insight into the quality and roots of deep anti-
American sentiment, as the United States is held responsible for political and social outcome 
that has manifested. 
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The next chapter continues our qualification of U.S.-Iraq conflict relations by quantifying 
popular opinion of Iraq and U.S. citizens in particular, and Arab/Muslim opinion throughout 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in general. This information will demonstrate that 
the decades-long conflict between the United States and Iraq has had an impact on societal 
perceptions at the micro and macro levels, allowing us to complete our testing of Hypothesis 
1. Analysis provided in the next chapter proves the existence of bilateral grievances and 
animosity, which is rooted in society, and is a result of the protracted conflictual relationship 
between the U.S. and Iraq. Their existence suggests that conflict between these two entities is 
likely to continue. The likelihood of conflict continuation suggests the U.S. and Iraq should 
pursue a process of conflict resolution at the societal level.  
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Chapter 2 Qualifying the Bilateral Impact of U.S.-
Iraq Conflict Relations 
 
The previous chapter mapped U.S.-Iraq conflict relations during the 2003 war that had 
been preceded by a 1991 war and twelve years of economic sanctioning and containment. The 
2003 invasion of Iraq was then followed by eight years of U.S. military occupation. Our 
objective in the present chapter is to further test Hypothesis 1, and to prove that the long-
standing conflict relationship between the United States and Iraq has produced bilateral 
animosity between these respective societies. Using open-source data and scholarly literature 
in the English language from a variety of sources, popular sentiment is qualified at the micro 
and macro levels. Our literature review confirms that historical experience outlined negatively 
influences bilateral perceptions of the “other.” 
Chapter 2 contains three sections. The first provides a general qualification of the impact 
of the U.S. invasion on Iraqis. It initially qualifies public opinion of the 2003 invasion and 
trends deepening animosity as the occupation persisted. Next, the human and social impact of 
the war and occupation, including estimates regarding death and displacement associated with 
the war and occupation, are analyzed to emphasize the human toll. Attention thereafter turns 
to qualifying Iraqi perceptions of U.S. military conduct and the security situation during the 
occupation. Incorporation of the issues listed provides insight into how Iraqis rate U.S. 
military performance, and underscores which concerns they prioritized during the occupation. 
Next, opinion of sectarian violence is examined. Iraqis’ opinion concerning violence is 
included because responsibility for shattering internal relations inside Iraq is attributed to the 
United States, as denoted in the previous chapter. Finally, section one closes with a brief 
examination of general suspicions of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation. At this point, we 
mention some of the objectives Iraqis felt were driving U.S. policy in Iraq. Combined, it is 
demonstrated that Iraqis widely hold negative opinions of the United States and its 
occupation. 
The second section analyzes U.S.-Iraq relations through the lens of U.S. citizens. Since the 
invasion and occupation was asymmetrical in terms of military capability, venue, and effect, 
our assessment reflects this reality. Mirroring our analysis of Iraq, the second section 
examines public opinion about the war and the human cost on the United States. It is 
determined that most U.S. citizens felt that the war was counterproductive and ineffective. 
Analysis then dovetails into qualifying aspects different from those experienced in Iraq. 
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Among the latter aspects, the price of the war in terms of the quality and integrity of the 
armed forces is explored, opinions which reflect the structural problems produced by the 
invasion. Next, we include the ballooning of the federal deficit. Due to intentional U.S. policy, 
the fiscal burden of the war was postponed to counteract potential popular frustration. In 
addition, citizens were exposed to increased media censorship that was either imposed at the 
federal level or self-imposed by the media outlets. As a result, the mainstream U.S. media 
failed to critically analyze events, sometimes providing biased reports or misinformation. 
Lastly, we explore the negative sentiment held by U.S. citizens and soldiers. Here we 
demonstrate that negative sentiment towards Iraq has been long-standing. 
The final section included in the present chapter analyzes macro level perceptions through 
the lens of inhabitants from the Middle East and Western countries. This analysis is 
incorporated to demonstrate parallels with micro level opinion (conducted in the previous two 
sections). The first two subsections explore Arab/Muslim opinion of the United States and the 
West respectively to reiterate the existence of a conflictual relationship at the macro level and 
to qualify points of inter-cultural dissension. Reversely, the last subsection comparatively 
analyzes U.S. opinion of Arab/Muslims, further underscoring that a majority of U.S. citizens 
perceive there is an antagonistic relationship between Iraq and the United States. 
The inclusion of macro level opinion is theoretically advantageous for two fundamental 
reasons. Foremost, some scholars call for conflict resolution to be pursued between the West 
and the Middle East. While the petition is warranted, I perceive the approach is too broad, and 
I have selected to narrow my focus to analyzing conflict resolution between the U.S. and Iraq. 
Nevertheless, since conflict and conflict resolution literature is compared across cultures in 
the second part of this research, and its theories are predicated on macro level relations 
(generalized) as opposed to micro level (relations between specific countries), the second 
value of this section is to demonstrate the parallels between micro and macro sentiment, and 
hence confirm conflict resolution as advocated by scholars at the macro level is equally 
relevant and necessary at the micro level. 
Amalgamated, the chapter qualifies and quantifies the existence of cross-cultural 
animosity and distrust at two levels. Foremost, it demonstrates a deconstructive conflict 
relationship and the associated negative perceptions between the United States and Iraq. The 
typology of sentiment qualified proves that decades of violent interaction between the United 
States and Iraq, especially the 2003 occupation, has produced animosity and distrust, 
confirming Hypothesis one. Secondly, contents herein prove the existence of a conflict 
relationship between Arab/Muslims and the West in general, and between Arab/Muslims and 
  
107 
 
the United States in particular. The existence of the latter deconstructive relationship is well 
documented in the literature, and scholars go on to advocate conflict resolution be pursued at 
the macro level. Once I have proven the existence of a deconstructive conflictual relationship 
between the United States and Iraq, the research enters into its second part, where Western 
and Arab/Muslim theory and practices of conflict resolution can be introduced and 
comparatively analyzed as part of my call for conflict resolution to be pursued between the 
United States and Iraq. 
2.1 Effects of the 2003 war on Iraqis 
Violent conflict produces negative consequences including death, injury, physical and 
psychological suffering, in addition to associated grievances resulting from these experiences 
(Galtung, 1969: 169-174; Parent, 2012: 26-30; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 32; Shriver, 1995: 
125-130). Forgoing a discussion on specific traumas, Donald Shriver (1995: 127) emphasizes 
the psychological element of war when he writes: “War wounds every side’s capacity for 
empathy.” With Shriver’s insight in mind, our interest centers on qualifying some 
psychological consequences of the historical relationship between the U.S. and Iraq, notably 
those associated with the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and occupation. Nonetheless, some of the 
physical manifestations of the occupation will likewise be denoted in our treatment below. 
The following subsections briefly outline distinct social-psychological implications of the 
2003 U.S.-Iraq War on citizens of Iraq by qualifying effects and quantifying their impact on 
public opinion when possible. For the sake of space, we have selected a few of the most 
recognizable exemplars so the reader can observe how the U.S. invasion and occupation of 
Iraq has had a direct social-psychological impact on Iraqis. Our qualification of perceptions is 
designed to test the hypothesis that the U.S.-Iraq conflictual relationship has had a social 
impact, and, consequently, has produced grievances and negative sentiment toward the United 
States. The existence of said sentiment confirms the conflict relationship is rooted at the 
societal level and needs to be resolved or transformed. 
2.1.1 Public opinion of the war and occupation 
Some Iraqis initially supported the military overthrow of Saddam Hussein (Fattah and 
Caso, 2009: 246). Support was most prominent among the Shi‘a and Kurd populations, as 
well as among exiled Iraqis (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 246). Concerning the latter, exiles 
participated in pre- and post-war U.S. planning, and even publicly endorsed the invasion prior 
to its implementation, arguing that the operation would be beneficial to Iraq (Fattah and Caso, 
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2009: 246; Rathmell, 2005: 1021). Following the invasion, Iraq’s society became increasingly 
apprehensive of the potential political and social effects the invasion was having on politics 
and society (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 246). As the occupation endured, and internal political 
and social stability deteriorated, negative opinions across society proliferated (Fattah and 
Caso, 2009: 247). 
Independent researchers began trending public opinion subsequent to the invasion. The 
data they acquired allows us to trend perceptions throughout the occupation. In February 
2004, Oxford Research International (2004: 4) found that only 41.8% of Iraqis felt that the 
invasion “liberated Iraq,” while 41.2% believed it “humiliated Iraq.” Their finding suggests a 
near polarization in terms of perceptions toward the invasion. Similarly when the invasion 
was viewed from a moral perspective, Iraqis were likewise torn on its value. More 
specifically, 19.6% of Iraqis viewed the U.S.-led invasion as “absolutely right” and 28.6% 
perceived it as “somewhat right” (Oxford Research International, 2004: 3). Comparatively, 
39.1% thought the invasion was “wrong” or “absolutely wrong,” while 12.7% suggested it 
was “difficult to say” (Oxford Research International, 2004: 3). Opinion, nevertheless, 
fluctuated from month to month as conditions deteriorated and the occupation endured. 
In late April 2004, a Gallup poll found that most Iraqis felt that the U.S. invasion to 
remove Hussein had been worth the effort (Burkholder, 2004e). It should, however, be 
emphasized that sectarian and insurgent violence was just beginning to escalate. It should 
equally be highlighted that ethnic-sectarian identity influenced responses. In particular, the 
Shi‘a and Kurd populations predominantly viewed the overthrow of Hussein more positively 
compared to Sunni respondents (Burkholder, 2004e). Divergences across ethnicity and 
sectarian identity would be expected since the Sunni generally rejected U.S. intervention and 
the changes the event wrought. 
Despite the generally positive attitude expressed to Gallup in April 2004 concerning the 
overthrow, respondents were extremely pessimistic when considering the intervening military 
forces. In fact, seventy-one percent of respondents viewed coalition forces as occupiers rather 
than liberators (Burkholder, 2004e). Occupation carries with it negative connotations, 
especially considering regional historical experience under colonial powers such as Britain. 
Reinforcing perceptions of disdain, twenty-nine percent of Iraqis at that time believed that 
attacks on coalition forces were morally justified (Burkholder, 2004e). Gallup polling thus 
demonstrated that while some Iraqis may have thought the removal of Saddam Hussein was 
positive, many respondents did not embrace the occupation, and a minority believed violence 
was justified to hasten its termination. 
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By May 2004, a poll found that 92% of Iraqis perceived the coalition as “occupiers” 
(Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 35). The data 
demonstrates there was a sizable increase from the Gallup findings one month previous. 
Simultaneously, rejection of the occupation was obvious, with 41% of respondents expressing 
a desire for the coalition to leave Iraq immediately (Independent Institute for Administration 
and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 36). Escalation in sectarian and insurgent violence around 
this period is thought to have attributed to the rapid decline in public sentiment toward the 
occupation (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 259). The establishment of the CPA that same month 
would have equally influence public sentiment. 
In November 2005, Oxford Research International (2005: 21) qualifies a further increase 
in opposition to U.S. presence. Likewise, there was a change in sentiment toward the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein. At this point, half of respondents (50.1%) expressed that it 
was wrong for the U.S. to invade the country (Oxford Research International, 2005: 3). As the 
security situation continued to deteriorate, and the occupation persisted, it clearly influenced 
popular perceptions. 
That Iraqis held the U.S. responsible for the violence that proliferated during the 
occupation is evident in polling conducted in late 2006 and early 2007. In September 2006, a 
slight majority (61%) of Iraqis believed that the withdrawal of U.S. forces would reduce 
violence (Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006: 9). Disapproval of the occupation 
likewise remained high and violence against the coalition became more acceptable. For 
instance, a March 2007 survey found that 78% of Iraqis opposed U.S. presence and 51% 
believed that it was acceptable to attack coalition forces to hasten their withdrawal (ABC 
News and others, 2007: 2). Hence, a clear majority perceived the presence of coalition forces 
was counterproductive, and toleration of violence against the coalition had markedly 
increased. 
In mid-March 2009, at a time when security was improving, fifty-six percent of Iraqis 
continued to perceive that it was wrong for the United States to invade their country (ABC 
News and others, 2009: 3-4). In fact, only 18% of respondents expressed a positive view of 
the United States (ABC News and others, 2009: 3-4). Perceptions in these instances were 
influenced by sectarian identity (ABC News and others, 2009: 8-9). For instance, Sunni were 
more likely to view the invasion in negative terms (89%), while the Shiʻa were polarized 
(49%) and Kurd populations were positive in their assessments (with only 19% critical) (ABC 
News and others, 2009: 20). By comparison to earlier assessments, the U.S. had lost some 
Shi‘a and Kurd support due to the experiences endured under occupation. 
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Even as the U.S. withdrawal neared and security continued to improve, Iraqi sentiment 
remained negative. Around mid-2010, forty-four percent of respondents perceived the U.S. 
invasion was harmful to Iraq (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 13). However, the Shi’a did not 
share the perception of the invasion as harmful, and contrariwise expressed the invasion had 
been worth the cost (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 13, 61-62). The latter perception was 
undoubtedly influenced by social-political changes engendered, as the Shi‘a had managed to 
consolidate their hold over Iraq’s governing framework, and, therefore, perceived the invasion 
beneficial. The data thereby provides some insight into how Iraq’s diverse groupings held 
conflicting views of the invasion, the U.S., and the changes the overthrow institutionalized. 
Overall, Iraqis remained divided on the perceived benefits and necessity of the invasion 
during the early months of the occupation (ABC News and others, 2009: 3-4). As the 
occupation endured, clear majorities repeatedly expressed their desire for an immediate U.S. 
withdrawal, regardless of whether they felt the invasion had been positive or negative 
(Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 13, 63; Independent Institute for Administration and Civil 
Society Studies, 2004: 36). Desire for the occupation to end spanned ethnic and sectarian 
divisions. The anti-occupation sentiment was dangerous because high percentages of Iraqis 
condoned the use of violence against occupying troops to hasten their withdrawal (ABC News 
and others, 2007: 2). As qualified in the following subsections, animosity toward the 
occupation and the United States was complex and intertwined with popular sentiment on 
other issues, including the human toll experienced as a result of the invasion and occupation. 
2.1.2 The human cost 
The 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and occupation resulted in the death and injury of a large portion 
of Iraq’s society (Commonwealth Institute, 2008: 8). At the time of the invasion, the United 
Nations Population Division estimated that 26 million people lived in Iraq (United Nations, 
2003). Although no official records were maintained, various independent organizations 
published assessments of the human cost throughout the occupation. One of the first estimates 
to emerge was conducted by Defense Alternatives Research, which released its findings in 
October 2003 (Conetta, 2003: 2-3). It calculates that between 11,000 and 15,000 Iraqis were 
killed between April and October 2003. Among those fatalities, it projects that 30% of these 
deaths were civilians (Conetta, 2003: 2-3). 
Approximately one year later, the British Medical Journal, The Lancet, published a report 
estimating 100,000 Iraqis had died between 2003 and 2004 as a result of the war, insurgency, 
militia and/or criminal violence (Exoo, 2010: 137; Roberts and others, 2004: 1; Tripp, 2007: 
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295). The Lancet’s estimate received stark criticism for its extraordinary figures (Exoo, 2010: 
138). Subsequently, it produced a 2006 (re-) calculation that estimated 650,000 Iraqis had 
died between 2003 and 2006 (Exoo, 2010: 138). Meanwhile, in 2005, independent research 
group Opinion Research Business estimated the Iraqi death toll at 1.2 million (Exoo, 2010: 
138). The extraordinarily high figures referenced are concerning as they only calculate deaths 
for about half of the duration of the occupation, and violence in Iraq actually peaked between 
2006 and 2007, prior to or when these figures were published. Variations across estimates 
equally highlight the challenges of estimating the death toll when no accurate records were 
being kept. 
Another estimate released in 2008 by Commonwealth Institute (2008: 8) suggested that 
“at least 83,000 Iraqi non-combatants have died in the continuing conflict since the U.S. 
invasion, [although] the actual number is probably in the hundreds of thousands.” Although 
Commonwealth Institutes estimate followed the peak in violence between 2006 and 2007, and 
is centered on civilian deaths, it acknowledged the difficulty of calculating the human toll. By 
comparison to previous estimates, this figure seems modest, especially concerning that 
approximately one hundred Iraqi civilians were being killed each day during the peak of 
violence (Tripp, 2007: 308). 
Finally, Hagopian and others (2013: 9-10) published the most recent approximation of the 
human cost. Their assessment projects almost half a million people died during the war and 
occupation. With these diverging figures in mind, scholars acknowledge that it is impossible 
to precisely determine the human cost of the Iraq War and occupation (Exoo, 2010: 138; 
Fattah and Caso, 2009: 267). Competing figures are a result of diverging research 
methodology and the lack of accurate documentation (Exoo, 2010: 138). However, when 
considering even the most conservative assessments, most agree that hundreds of thousands of 
Iraqis were killed or injured between 2003 and 2008 (Exoo, 2010: 138; Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 267). Converting the examined data to a percentage, Commonwealth Institute (2008: 8) 
conservatively estimates that approximately one-fifth of Iraq’s total population were killed. 
The figures provided are extraordinary and have far-reaching social implications. 
For instance, it was projected in December 2007 “that as many as 5 million Iraqi children 
had been orphaned, accounting for nearly 35 percent of the child-age population,” as a result 
of the war and occupation (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 267). The social implications of the cost of 
the war as underscored in the quote are staggering and long-term. Equally demonstrating the 
breadth of the social impact, an ABC News and others (2009: 4) poll found that “one in six 
Iraqis said someone in their own household had been hurt or killed; more than half reported an 
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immediate relative or close friend harmed” by violence during the occupation. The gravity of 
these losses qualified by ABC News and others’ polling illustrates the degree to which 
violence affected society, an outcome that is expected to endure for generations. 
While this section is restricted to presenting unverifiable estimates of the death toll, 
culpability for civilian deaths is explored below to demonstrate that many Iraqis hold the U.S. 
responsible. This conviction is partially based on the disproportional violence coalition troops 
deployed during the occupation (section 2.1.4) and the unwillingness or inability of coalition 
forces to contain and reduce violence through the provision of security (section 2.1.5). 
2.1.3 Internal and external displacement 
In addition to the death toll, the invasion and occupation of Iraq displaced citizens on a 
magnificent scale. An independent U.S. task force to Congress introduced its 2008 
recommendations for U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq by emphasizing the quantity of death 
and displacement caused by invasion and occupation (Commonwealth Institute, 2008: 8). 
Concerning displacement, the task force's report states: “The UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees estimates that perhaps two million Iraqis have fled their country and that a further 
2.7 million have left their homes for safer locales within Iraq” (Commonwealth Institute, 
2008: 8). The quote indicates that nearly five million Iraqis were internally or externally 
displaced because of the invasion and occupation. By comparison, Fattah and Caso (2009: 
267) approximate that “4 million, or 16 percent of the total population,” were displaced. These 
statistics are concerning when combined with the estimated death toll outlined earlier. 
As denoted, approximately half of the number of Iraqis displaced (about 2 million) fled 
Iraq finding refuge in other countries (Amnesty International, 2010: 23; Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 267). Some relocated to neighboring countries, including Syria or Turkey (International 
Rescue Committee, 2011; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010), while 
others moved to Europe and elsewhere. The remaining 2.7 million largely relocated inside 
Iraq, becoming internally displaced, to avoid battles between coalition forces and insurgents, 
or they were subject to ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods through the (threatened) use of 
force. In the latter case, sectarian violence created buffers according to identity. 
In terms of social buffering, defined here as a process where groups are isolated from one 
another, it increasingly occurred as sectarian violence, or the threat of violence, intensified 
(Ryan, 2010: 68). For instance, the Mahdi Army has been accused of ethnic cleansing in areas 
under its control during peak of the civil war in occupied Iraq (Ali, 2014: 28). As a result of 
real or threatened violence, social enclaves were created, redistributing Iraq’s population 
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according to ethnicity or religion affiliation (Ryan, 2010: 68). Researchers have qualified the 
demographic repercussions of the buffering phenomenon. 
For instance, in February 2008, ABC News and others (2008: 3) found that 6 in 10 Iraqi 
respondents proclaimed that they could not live where they wanted without facing 
persecution, especially in the areas of Baghdad and Basra. Follow-up research released in 
March 2009 found that the number of Sunnis and Shi‘a who claimed to live in neighborhoods 
completely inhabited by their sectarian counterparts increased from 27 to 36 percent (ABC 
News and others, 2009: 5). The study also found that “nearly six in 10 Iraqis say they only 
have friends of the same doctrine as their own” (ABC News and others, 2009: 5). The quote 
illustrates a marked degree of political and social gravitation toward the “in-group,” which is 
likewise denoted by military analysts (Kilcullen, 2009: 125). Combined, the statistics provide 
a snapshot into the degree to which ethnic cleansing and (forced) internal displacement altered 
Iraq’s demographic distribution. 
Buffering, nonetheless, was not only precipitated by threats and violence between 
sectarian groups; it was equally facilitated by the coalition military response to the volume of 
sectarian violence (Kilcullen, 2009: 142-143). For example, the U.S. military facilitated 
demographic separation in residential quarters of Baghdad by erecting concrete barriers to 
provide neighborhood security to isolate communities from one another (Kilcullen, 2009: 
142-143; MacAskill, 2007). While military strategists argue such measures were efficacious 
and necessary to increase security by decreasing cross-sectarian infiltration into 
predominantly Shi‘a or Sunni neighborhoods (Kilcullen, 2009: 142-143), they equally 
attracted international criticism because they isolated communities and were disruptive to 
everyday life (Kilcullen, 2009: 142-143; MacAskill, 2007). In this frame, the U.S. was guilty 
of physically creating buffered communities, as was sectarian violence. 
Once displacement occurred, neither the United States government nor the GOI made 
significant efforts to provide aid to, or support the return of, those internally or externally 
displaced (Cordesman, 2010: 59-60; International Rescue Committee, 2011). Many of those 
displaced from the war and occupation continue to remain in the locales where they sought 
refuge. Persistent instability, in addition to limited opportunities in terms of housing and 
employment, among other issues, has undermined repatriation subsequent to the U.S. 
withdrawal (International Rescue Committee, 2011; United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 2010). Due to the lack of employment and living arrangements, the literature 
suggests that the displaced are hesitant to return (International Rescue Committee, 2011; 
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010). At the time of writing, IS activity in 
Iraq and Syria are further displacing citizens from both countries, exacerbating the situation. 
Displacement of this magnitude is certain to have profound long-term social and political 
implications. Its impact is obvious when one observes the demographic nature of those who 
relocated prior to and during the occupation. In terms of human capital, for instance, those 
displaced “include large percentages of Iraq’s former political elite, professionals, doctors, 
lawyers, engineers, and technocrats” (Cordesman, 2010: 33). Fattah and Caso (2009: 267) 
project approximately “40 percent of Iraq’s middle class had fled.” A closer examination of 
just one of those fields of expertise, the medical profession, suggests a significant strain on 
Iraq’s infrastructural capacity. More specifically, Fattah and Caso (2009: 266) estimate that 
25% of Iraq’s medical staff fled Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion. The displacement of these 
individuals no doubt complicated the reconstruction of Iraq (Cordesman, 2010: 33) and is 
expected to have long-term effects. 
2.1.4 Disproportionate use of force 
Criticism of U.S. military conduct during the war and occupation of Iraq is common in the 
literature. Paul Kennedy (2004), for instance, argues that the Iraq War is an example of the 
degeneration of war41. Similarly, Kilcullen (2009: 124), a military analyst, condemns United 
States brutality which he suggests could have been minimized if the U.S. had adapted military 
tactics in a manner congenial to counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and urban warfare. 
Overall, it is generally conceded that U.S. military forces deployed indiscriminate and a 
disproportionate quantity of violence in urban areas, resulting in preventable civilian 
casualties during major combat operations and the occupation (Alvord and others, 2003; 
Amnesty International, 2003: 5; Hicks and others, 2011: 12; Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5; 
Roth, 2005: 10). While condemnation is common across fields of study, some military 
analysts believe that civilian casualties are inevitable in combat (Flavin, 2013: 175-176), and 
attempt to minimize the gravity of civilian deaths through its use of substitute terminology. 
In particular, some pundits and military officials apply the sterile idiom “collateral 
damage” to identify civilian casualties (Calhoun, 2005: 89; Kiernan, 2003: 847). Collateral 
                                                          
 
41 Martin Shaw (2003: 25) defines the “degeneration of war” as trend of increased brutality and expansion of 
scope. He identifies four components of degeneration which are quoted at length: “(1) the extension of the 
definition of the enemy to include civilians as well as the military; (2) the deliberate targeting of elements of the 
civilian population as well as military forces; (3) intensified means of destruction which kill a large number of 
people more rapidly and efficiently; (4) but also increasingly indiscriminate slaughter which kill people across 
broader areas with little precision as to their membership of any enemy group” (Shaw, 2003: 25). 
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damage is broadly defined by the U.S. military as the unintentional injury or death of civilians 
and/or damage to civilian structures as a result of a military operation (Human Rights Watch, 
2003: 18). The application of this terminology eliminates references to the human element. 
Despite the terminology applied, according to Article 57 of Protocol 1, of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, written in 1977, a military should take precautionary measures to minimize 
civilian deaths, including the cancellation or postponement of an attack if it is projected to 
cause “excessive” loss of civilian life or property “in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated” (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 18-19; United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1977). This internationally recognized and 
accepted standard for military conduct during wartime requires a military to accurately assess 
their targets, and weigh the tactical advantage of a given strike with the projected cost in 
human life, before force is deployed. Consequently, proportionality is supposed to be 
balanced with military objectives to ensure civilian casualties are minimized to some degree42. 
While Human Rights Watch (2003) acknowledges that the U.S. military made efforts to 
reduce civilian casualties while operating in Iraq, they argue that increased precautions were 
warranted. In some instances, they suggest the tactical advantage of particular targets did not 
outweigh its human cost (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Hence, it is argued that some targets 
or operations should have been removed or postponed to protect civilians, or that a 
proportional degree of military force be deployed. For example, rather than deploying artillery 
or bombing urban areas, troops should be deployed. These precautionary and proportional 
measures, however, contradict the propensity of a Western military to minimize the risks to 
their own soldiers by increasing the quality and quantity of force deployed (Rogers, 2008: 7; 
Shaw, 2003: 157). In this sense, military and political leaders perceive it more advantageous 
to deploy a disproportional degree of force, even at the cost of civilians, to minimize the risk 
to one’s own troops and to ensure the military objective is accomplished. 
The military expression for protecting one’s troops is “force protection” (Cambell, 2008: 
37-53; Record, 2000: 5). A brief discussion of the doctrine is relevant as it has direct 
repercussions on civilian welfare in war zones, since risk is inevitably transferred from troops 
to civilians in an area of operations (AO) when force protection is indiscriminately applied 
(Cambell, 2008: 37-53; Record, 2000: 5). Contemporary force protection in United States 
military parlance is commonly known as the “Wineberger-Powell Doctrine” or simple the 
                                                          
 
42 Obviously the protocol is not without its flaws. For example, it fails to provide guidelines for how the 
calculation should be made, and the given weight of each component. Nonetheless, in spirit, it advocates for 
militaries to deploy force in a calculated, proportional and responsible manner. 
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“Powell Doctrine” (Record, 2007: 81)43. The doctrine is rooted in U.S. military experience in 
Vietnam (1959-1975) and the ambition to prevent the U.S. from improperly engaging in 
warfare which politicians or planners have no political intentions of winning (Record, 2000: 
5-6; 2007: 80). The Powell Doctrine emphasizes four standards when military force is 
deployed, and adherence to its principles was observable in Iraq. 
To summarize, the doctrine prescribes that: 1) military force be applied decisively; 2) 
force be deployed en mass; 3) U.S. military casualties be kept to an absolute minimum; and 4) 
political and military planners must be determined to win the war (Record, 2007: 81-83). 
When warfare adheres to the given standards, it is thought that the United States government 
will commit sufficient resources to the campaign and not imprudently sacrifice U.S. (human) 
resources. Such military strategies are not limited to the United States. Analogous policies are 
widely practiced by other Western countries, which likewise attempt to reduce their military 
casualties when deployed in conflict zones (Shaw, 2003: 157). 
While the military value of force protection is apparent, there are political dividends—
namely that the reduction of troop casualties diminishes the chances of popular support for a 
given conflict being compromised (Shaw, 2003: 202). The assumption that there is political 
value in reduced troop casualties is rooted in the theory that the Western public is adverse to 
troop casualties, which suggests that as the numbers of fatalities increase popular support for 
the military campaign will decrease (Shaw, 2003: 202). Succinctly, elected Western officials 
(political) recognize domestic constituents will not tolerate prolonged military engagements 
resulting in significant and sustained deaths of military personnel (Shaw, 2003: 91). Shaw’s 
hypothesis is, nonetheless, subject to debate since the exact influence of troop casualties on 
public opinion of a war is uncertain. 
Contradicting Shaw, other researchers suggests that populations utilize complex analytic 
processes when evaluating success during war, including political affiliation, total combat 
casualties, and a strategic calculation of those casualties vis-à-vis the overall stated political 
objectives of the military campaign (Boettcher and Cobb, 2006: 839, 849; Gelpi, 2010: 93). 
Under this framework, the volume of combat casualties alone does not significantly increase 
or decrease popular support for a given war (Boettcher and Cobb, 2006: 839, 849; Gelpi, 
2010: 93). Instead, calculations are made according to objectives, advancement toward those 
objectives and the cost of the war. Hence, while some scholars believe that troop casualties 
                                                          
 
43 The doctrine’s namesake derives from its designers, former Secretary of State Casper Wineberger and General 
Colin Powell (Record, 2007: 79). For additional information on force protection, see Record (2007) and Cambell 
(2008). For an alternative view of how Colin Powell aided in the demise of his own doctrine in Iraq, see LaFeer 
(2009). For a critique of the Powell Doctrine and force protection, see Record (2000). 
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significantly influence popular opinion of a war, others believe that it is one component in a 
complex calculation and casualties alone have limited impact on domestic popular opinion.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to untangle the relative impact of troop 
casualties on the voting public, or critique the practice of force protection in detail, it is 
important to contextualize the strategy’s affects in Iraq, especially since military strategists 
(Galula, 2006; Kilcullen, 2009) and the most recent United States Army (2006: Chapter 2.6) 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24 acknowledge that force protection should be 
balanced with the proportional deployment of military power during COIN operations. A 
central reason for minimizing force protection and deploying military power proportionally is 
to reduce the risk to civilians, whose casualties’ forfeit popular support among the occupied 
population as a result of the military’s failure to protect citizens (Galula, 2006: v-vi). Clearly 
stated, purposeful protection of troops, which is inevitable when adhering to the Powell 
Doctrine, by default increases the risk of civilian casualties in urban warfare because 
disproportional force is deployed as a means of self-protection, and troops are subject to 
refraining from engaging in combat when the risk is high (Gage and others, 2003: 9; Kuehl, 
2010: 13). Within the presented paradigm, a paradox is created since both the deployment of 
disproportional force and inaction for fear of troop casualties undermine trust among the 
occupied population, thereby engendering anger and producing grievances toward occupying 
troops that deploy excessive force at the expense of civilians and/or fail to provide security to 
the occupied population (Gage and others, 2003: 9; Kuehl, 2010: 13). In a nutshell, COIN 
strategy recommends minimizing risk to civilians under occupation by curbing force 
protection and deploying a proportional degree of force, whereby the population is protected 
and popular support is augmented because the inherent risk of the insurgency is absorbed by 
the military. 
This approach is not without criticism, with some analysts questioning the relative utility 
of a human-centered approach to COIN. Dunlap (2013: 140-143), for example, argues that the 
counterinsurgents objective should not be to win “hearts and minds,” but to ensure the 
unconditional defeat of the insurgents and population alike. Failure to defeat the military and 
citizens in Iraq, he argues, was the obvious mistake made by the coalition, which ultimately 
prevented the unconditional capitulation of insurgents and society (Dunlap, 2013: 140-143). 
Subsequent to the coalition failure to outright defeat Iraqis, civilian or otherwise, an 
insurgency and resistance was permitted to foment. By comparison to most civilian-centric 
COIN literature, Dunlap is extreme in his assertion that capitulation of the insurgents and 
civilians is necessary to undermine an insurgency. 
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Adopting a civilian-centered approach, David Kilcullen (2009: 149) maintains that COIN 
principles were applicable in Iraq, despite the fact that the occupation was not a traditional 
insurgency but rather a hybrid form of warfare—including insurgency, terrorism, communal 
conflict, and criminal elements. In this environment, he concludes that the coalition and Iraq’s 
security forces needed to combine military tactics such as counterinsurgency (COIN), 
counterterrorism, peace enforcement, and traditional policing practices to be effective 
(Kilcullen, 2009: 146-150; Williams, 2010: 39). Foregoing a discussion on the assortment of 
tactics mentioned, Kilcullen (2009: 146-150) emphasizes the importance of classical COIN 
principles in Iraq to promote amiable military-civilian relations through the regular provision 
of security and the reduction of civilian casualties. To this end, COIN tacticians endorse 
soldiers living among and continuously interacting with the occupied population to develop 
and maintain a cooperative relationship and secure environment for civilians (Brennan and 
others, 2013: 45; Kilcullen, 2009: 124)44. The strategic advantage of establishing direct, 
affable relationships with civilians is that it undermines insurgent-civilian interaction by 
restricting the insurgents’ ability to gain authority or control over civilians and territory, while 
it creates a direct relationship between the occupier and the occupied (Brennan and others, 
2013: 45; Gage and others, 2003: 8-10; Hull, 2009: 6-8). However, a civilian-centered 
strategy increases risk to troops because they are forced to coexist in a manner that exposes 
them to threat and requires them to act in a manner that prioritizes the protection of civilians. 
These practices inevitably distribute risk to the troops and are expected to increase their 
casualties. 
With this in mind, the U.S. occupation of Iraq was challenged at the strategic level by the 
general remoteness of coalition forces to Iraq’s population and its disproportional use of force 
(Hull, 2009: 6-7). Concerning the former, Hull (2009: 6-7) cautions that COIN operations are 
challenging in general, but the counterinsurgent is placed at an increased disadvantaged if 
                                                          
 
44 COIN literature emphasizes the importance of a counterinsurgent to acquire and maintain (indigenous) public 
opinion for successful counterinsurgency (Gage and others, 2003: 6-9; Kienscherf, 2011: 520). Public opinion in 
an insurgency is complex, since all actors involved in the campaign, including the insurgents, the 
counterinsurgents, the local population (the occupied) and a foreign population where applicable, seek to acquire 
popular support at multiple levels (Gage and others, 2003: 6-7; Shaw, 2003: 202). In the case of Iraq, the 
insurgent and counterinsurgent competed for popular opinion on at least two fronts. First, both sides struggled 
for the popular support (and control) of the occupied population—in this case the citizens of Iraq—with the 
counterinsurgents and the insurgents demonstrating their strength and resolve to militarily protect and politically 
control Iraq’s citizens (Gage and others, 2003: 4-5). Second, both parties tried to influence U.S. popular opinion 
(Gage and others, 2003: 4-5). The United States, as the counterinsurgent, sought to demonstrate its probable 
success in Iraq to obtain/maintain U.S. domestic support for the occupation, while the insurgents attempted to 
demonstrate the futility of that occupation and thereby undermine U.S. popular support by increasing the costs of 
occupation (Gage and others, 2003: 6-7; Shaw, 2003: 202). Combined, U.S. military officials, U.S. politicians, 
and insurgents predicted that U.S. popular opinion would wane in a prolonged campaign that inflicted heavy 
casualties (Gage and others, 2003: 4-7). 
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they are foreign outsiders who are unknown or distrusted. Distrust among the occupied 
population is frequently rooted in, and can be exacerbated by, the counterinsurgent’s 
unfamiliarity with the political, cultural and historical intricacies that produce an insurgency 
(Hull, 2009: 6-7). Due to the occupiers’ unfamiliarity with the environment, civilians under 
occupation frequently perceive the counterinsurgent with suspicion, and are skeptical of the 
counterinsurgent’s capability or determination to maintain a mid- to long-term presence (Hull, 
2009: 6). Unconvinced of the occupier’s commitment, a population will hesitate to align 
themselves (Gage and others, 2003: 8-9; Hull, 2009: 6-8). The United States was an ill-
informed outsider in the case of Iraq, and Iraqis lacked trust and confidence in the U.S. prior 
to and throughout the occupation (Hull, 2009: 6-7). Suspicion was further exacerbated by U.S. 
inability to provide security and its disproportional use of force (Kilcullen, 2009: 124-150). 
Hence, the U.S. started at a disadvantage since it was perceived as an unwanted occupier 
(outlined in 2.1.1) (Burkholder, 2004e; Hull, 2009: 6-8; Oxford Research International, 2004: 
4), and its actions during the war and occupation further undermined its appeal through 
counterproductive behavior. Concerning the latter, coalition troops were perceived 
disinterested and/or impotent against initial civil unrest and criminal activity that emerged 
following the arrogation of U.S. control (Allawi, 2007: 94), and later ineffective against 
sectarian and insurgent violence (Perito, 2005: 7). These failures gave the impression that 
coalition forces were unable or unwilling to provide security to the population (Allawi, 2007: 
94). Returning our attention to the issue at hand, U.S. military preoccupation with force 
protection and its deployment of disproportional violence, as components of force protection, 
further compromised popular sentiment (Barakat, 2005: 579; Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Kuehl, 
2010: 13). The combination of elements eliminated Iraqi tolerance of the occupation. 
Diverting our attention from theory to practice, preventable civilian casualties were 
common as a result of U.S. military operations (Hicks and others, 2011: 12; Human Rights 
Watch, 2003: 16), particularly during counterinsurgency campaigns in Baghdad (Alvord and 
others, 2003) and Fallujah (Iraq Analysis Group, 2005). Disproportional force utilized by 
coalition forces include the deployment of weapons including dispensers, more commonly 
known as cluster munitions (Federation of American Scientists, 1999), in residential 
neighborhoods (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5-7; Roth, 2005: 11). While engaged in urban 
combat, U.S. ground troops requested Indirect Fire (IDF), defined as artillery or close air 
support, which sometimes deployed clusters to the urban AO (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). The 
deployment of such weapons substantially increased the risk to civilians living in those areas. 
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To provide clarification, once clusters are dispensed, the bomblets scatter and either 
detonate or remain “live,” functioning as landmines or unexploded ordinance (UXO). 
Bomblets are impossible to contain and control, and their dispersing poses an enduring threat 
to combatants and civilians. For example, UXO is subject to detonation when, for example, a 
child or civilian tampers with the explosive (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 54-60). The 
deployment of these weapons in populated areas draw stark criticism because of their 
indiscriminate nature and the distinct increase in civilian casualties their use generates 
(Alvord and others, 2003; Calhoun, 2005: 94; Human Rights Watch, 2003: 54-60). 
In such instances, civilian casualties could have been reduced if military SOP had 
minimized force protection and power had been projected in a discriminate manner (Barakat, 
2005: 579; Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Kuehl, 2010: 4-5). Examined from another angle, in many 
instances, U.S. troop risk was purposefully transferred from U.S. soldiers to the “enemy” and 
“civilians” in AOs by deploying disproportional degrees of force with notable consequences 
on the latter (Hashim, 2006: 92-102; Kilcullen, 2009: 38). As a result of its tactics, Hagopian 
and others (2013: 6) suggest, “coalition forces were reported to be responsible for the largest 
proportion of war-related [civilian] violent deaths (35%), followed by militia[s] (32%).” This 
quote suggests that the highest percentage of civilians killed in Iraq died at the hands of 
coalition forces rather than sectarian violence committed by militia members. High rates of 
deaths, injuries and grievances associated with the occupation compromised popular 
sentiment, encouraged mistrust and facilitated the armed insurgency because civilians wanted 
to retaliate against the coalition (Allawi, 2007: 244, 276; Gerges, 2009: 265; Hashim, 2006: 
92-102). 
A souring in Iraqi opinion toward U.S. military conduct is noticeable in polling. During 
the invasion, Iraqis expressed that the United States military maintained a semblance of 
professionalism and proportionality (Burkholder, 2004e). During the spring of 2003, a 
majority of Iraqis perceived that U.S. forces had conducted themselves well (Burkholder, 
2004e). That positive sentiment reversed in April 2004 when 58% of respondents expressed 
the opinion that U.S. forces were conducting themselves badly (Burkholder, 2004e). At this 
time, sixty-seven percent of respondents stated that U.S. troops were using indiscriminate 
force and not doing enough to protect civilians (Burkholder, 2004e). To contextualize, the 
survey was conducted at about the time that the insurgency and sectarian violence was 
beginning to root itself and intensify. Approximately one year later, Iraqis rated U.S. forces as 
doing “quite a bad” (18.8%) and “very bad job” (39.8%) while performing “their 
responsibilities in Iraq” (Oxford Research International, 2005: 21). Combined, not only was 
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the coalitions’ disproportional use of force blamed for claiming the lives of civilians, those 
same forces were perceived to be failing to provide security to civilians from sectarian and 
insurgent violence. These perceptions add credence to the theory that COIN practices should 
have been observed—military force should have been deployed in a manner that protected 
civilians from both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. 
Nevertheless, there were other noteworthy forms of disproportional violence deployed. 
For instance, the incarceration and interrogation techniques utilized by military and 
intelligence personnel (CIA) in Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere, which garnered 
international condemnation, were also forms of disproportional violence (Benjamin and 
Simon, 2005: 128; Gerges, 2009: 265; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 200; Kepel, 2004: 5; Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014)45. Such acts, including indefinite incarceration and 
mistreatment (stress positions, water boarding) of prisoners, violated U.S. civil law (the right 
to a trial and legal representation) and international conventional norms (Protocol I of the 
Geneva Conventions)46 (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2008: 63-69; Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 2014). Such practices damaged foreign perceptions of the United 
States (Carty, 2011: 101; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 187; Kepel, 2004: 5), and contradict the 
U.S. moral justification of deposing Saddam Hussein due to his human rights violations 
(Allawi, 2007: 459; Kepel, 2004: 237; Roy, 2007: 46). Critics conclude that their use was 
politically and morally counterproductive because they galvanized Iraqi-Arab public opinion 
and called U.S. integrity and intentions into question (Allawi, 2007: 185-186; Carty, 2011: 
101; Gerges, 2009: 265; Hashim, 2006: 102; Kepel, 2004: 237; Riedel, 2008: 135). 
An examination of public opinion supports the analysis that internment and interrogation 
techniques were unpopular and counter-intuitive in Iraq. Independent Institute for 
Administration and Civil Society Studies (2004: 44) quantified 48% of Iraqis believed Abu 
Ghraib humiliated Iraqis. Equally problematic, the actions of a few U.S. personnel were 
transposed onto broader society. Demonstrating their low expectations of U.S. citizens based 
on historical experience, Iraqi respondents claimed they were not surprised by events in Abu 
Ghraib because they “expect the worst from Americans” (Independent Institute for 
Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 45). A slight majority of those same 
respondents (51%) believed that “all Americans” act in an inhumane manner similar to those 
                                                          
 
45 For a detailed account of interrogation techniques applied by the U.S., see Danner (2004). For an extensive 
review of U.S. legal documents on interrogation practices post-9/11, see Greenberg and Dratel (2005). For a U.S. 
Congressional inquiry of U.S. interrogation methods, see Senate Armed Services Committee (2008). For a 
concise review of the policies and implications of Guantánamo Bay detention facility, see Ratner and Ray 
(2004). 
46 See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (1977). 
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at Abu Ghraib (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 46). 
In this case, inappropriate, illegal, and immoral behavior perpetrated by a few was perceived 
to represent U.S. society in general. 
The last word concerning disproportional force and its effects on Iraqi perceptions is given 
to Tripp (2007), who adeptly summarizes: 
U.S policy between 2001 and 2011 galvanized Iraqi opinion for 
several reasons through its utilization of physical and structural violence. 
Physical violence was exerted through policies such as: the 2003 
invasion and occupation of Iraq and the indiscriminate application of 
force during that campaign. Structural violence was exhibited under 
occupation by: the U.S. inability to provide security or basic services; the 
imposition of post-war policies (e.g. dissolution of security forces); the 
imposition of timetables (e.g. for drafting a constitution); and the 
favoritism displayed toward the Shi‘a. Moreover, even after sovereignty 
was returned to Iraqis, the United States continued to “undermine their 
authority” (Tripp, 2007: 292-293). 
Tripp’s quote succinctly outlines the various types of violence perpetrated by the United 
States during the occupation. Within this environment, negative sentiment and suspicion of 
the U.S. military, government and citizens proliferated among Iraqis. 
2.1.5 Security concerns 
Associated with the failures just noted, the literature on conflict resolution and 
humanitarian intervention underscores the importance of security in (post-) conflict settings 
(Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 213). Some scholars advocate physical security as the 
paramount objective when foreign countries intervene and embark on peace-, state- and/or 
nation building campaigns (Etzioni, 2007: 1-2; Kaldor, 2007: 191-197; Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 213). Contrariwise, other scholars question the theoretical and practical value of 
prioritizing security for reasons including the challenge of providing security and the 
associated risks of social-political manipulation of (human) security by intervening referents 
(defined here as individuals, groups, societies or countries) (Calhoun, 2005: 108; Kienscherf, 
2011: 530-531; Rathmell, 2005: 1015-1016). Within this frame, the United States military and 
governing authorities (rhetorically) placed a high priority on establishing security in Iraq 
(Ucko, 2008: 357). However, as denoted in the previous chapter, the U.S. experienced acute 
challenges providing security, for a variety of reasons including the complex nature of the 
conflict environment and the lack of planning or resources (Hashim, 2006: 339; Rifkind and 
Picco, 2014: 167). 
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The theoretical and practical value of human security is relevant to the case of Iraq, and 
before examining Iraqi public opinion on the issue, we momentarily introduce the concept of 
human security, its history and a critique. “Human security is commonly understood as 
prioritising the security of people, especially their welfare, safety and well-being, rather than 
that of states” (Duffield, 2006: 11). While most scholars adhere to a similar conceptualization 
as provided in the quote (Duffield, 2006: 21; Hudson, 2005: 163; McCormack, 2008: 115; 
Newman, 2001: 239), there is no consensual definition of the concept or practice (Peoples and 
Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 126). Further complicating the matter, a range of issues falls under 
the rubric of human security (Duffield, 2006: 23-24; King and Murray, 2002: 585-589; 
Newman, 2001: 243-247; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 121). Among its many 
objectives include individual physical security, disease prevention, in addition to the 
promotion of human rights, democracy and access to education (Duffield, 2006: 23-24; King 
and Murray, 2002: 585-589; Newman, 2001: 243-247). By addressing these multifarious 
issues, intervention is estimated to protect and improve the quality of human life. Moreover, 
the proliferation of human security is thought to generate a spillover effect, because 
fulfillment of human needs reduces local frustration and violence, which in turn augments 
local, regional and international security (Duffield, 2006: 12; Newman, 2001: 241). 
According to this conceptualization, human security is a public good. 
With a basic understanding of how human security is conceptualized, it is equally edifying 
to examine how the international political environment has aided in the development of the 
concept and practice. The human security movement debuted in the mid-1990s (Duffield, 
2006: 21; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 121) in response to political changes brought 
about by the end of the Cold War (Duffield, 2006: 12; Miklian, 2014: 494; Newman, 2001: 
241). The 1990s experienced an international re-orientation of attention from the fear of 
nuclear annihilation toward the provision of public needs (social, economic) of individuals, 
especially those residing in countries perceived to have weak or ineffective governments 
(Duffield, 2006: 12; Newman, 2001: 241). Within a few years of its introduction, the concept 
of human security was widely embraced by many scholars, policymakers, and institutions as a 
fundamental component of peacebuilding in (post) conflict zones (Duffield, 2006: 12). 
In theoretical and practical terms, human security rests upon the premise that: “Those who 
have the capacity to extend security to people perilously lacking in security have a basic 
human obligation to do so” (Newman, 2001: 240). The ideology emphasized in Newman’s 
quote led to the development of an intervention framework outlined by a 2001 report written 
by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) called The 
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Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Duffield, 2006: 25; Miklian, 2014: 499; Rotmann and others, 
2013: 363). In the R2P report, the ICISS theoretically divides the international community 
into a dichotomy of countries that effectively provide human security to their populace and 
those which do so ineffectively (Duffield, 2006: 25; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 162; Rotmann 
and others, 2013: 359). In the case of the latter group, R2P envisions external intervention by 
the former group to manage the assortment of issues, including poor governance, 
humanitarian catastrophes, disease, or civil instability, through strategies including the 
dispatching of aid or peacekeepers (Duffield, 2006: 25; Liotta, 2002: 483; Miklian, 2014: 494-
499; Rotmann and others, 2013: 359). 
Therefore, under the R2P framework, national sovereignty is privileged on the condition 
that countries uphold their responsibility to secure their inhabitants (McCormack, 2008: 122-
123; Miklian, 2014: 499; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 127; Rotmann and others, 
2013: 363-364). If a country is deemed in non-compliance, R2P declares the international 
community has a responsibility to respond to provide human security, and that the breadth of 
responsibility might require preemptive action in certain cases to protect human life 
(McCormack, 2008: 122-123; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 127; Rotmann and 
others, 2013: 363-364). Unsurprising, the conceptualized framework generates a great deal of 
criticism at multiple levels since, among other reasons, the prospect of intervention is subject 
to exploitation by (stronger) countries which might intervene in another country’s sovereign 
affairs for selfish purposes while falsely claiming to be doing so to advance human security 
(Miklian, 2014: 499-502; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 127). Although there are 
many critiques, which we examine below, the framework remains operational in theory 
despite international disagreement over many of its concepts and practices, and few direct 
instances of its actual deployment (Rotmann and others, 2013: 366). 
In the post-9/11 environment, human security theory underwent another change. Duffield 
(2006: 26-27) argues that the objective of human security expanded to include “securing 
failed and fragile states” which were identified as threatening to international stability or 
potential safe havens to individuals involved in international terrorism. At the same time that 
weak and failing states were prioritized, interest also shifted to homeland and border security 
(Duffield, 2006: 32-33; Hudson, 2005: 155; Liotta, 2002: 473; McCormack, 2008: 120). In 
fact, many of the undercurrents in human security theory, both in terms of fragile states and 
homeland security, are observable in the National Security Strategy (Duffield, 2006: 26-27) 
and rhetoric of George W. Bush during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, 
as Liotta (2002: 483) cautions: “military security, most especially intervention, can – and 
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often does – aggravate human security issues and can be more the cause of rather than the 
solution to human security dilemmas.” Liotta’s warning came to fruition in Iraq following the 
2003 invasion, creating insecurity rather than security. For this reason, and others, some 
scholars adamantly criticize human security. 
There are numerous and scathing criticisms of the human security articulated in the 
literature. For the sake of space, four are briefly noted. First, the concept and practice has 
“universalizing tendencies” because it presupposes that individuals and groups are 
homogenized and have the same needs across countries and cultures (Chandler, 2008: 429; 
Hudson, 2005: 157). Despite its alleged universal applicability, human security research and 
policy in practical terms have been predominantly concentrated in non-Western countries, 
partially because of the interconnection of security with economic and social development 
(Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 123). Hence, its universal applicability in theory has 
been reduced to research and implementation in mainly economically less-developed regions, 
such as Africa or Latin America. One exception is the contemporary emphasis on homeland 
security into human security discourse that incorporates Western countries. 
A second criticism is that implementation of human security policy requires capable and 
willful actors (institutions, countries, NGOs) that will responsibly realize policy (Hudson, 
2005: 165). The arrangement predisposes that the more powerful countries and actors in the 
international community are the primary instruments for ensuring human security is provided, 
which elevates their authority and status vis-à-vis their weaker neighbors (Hudson, 2005: 
165). Simultaneously, the theory equally assumes that actors are responsible and will respond 
when necessary. Yet, there are not always responsible and willful actors, as seen in 
contemporary Syria where the international community remained relatively aloof from the 
humanitarian calamity in 2013 and 2014. 
Linked to the former, a third criticism of human security is that the arrangement creates a 
“binary universalism (‘us versus them’)”, consisting of the developed and under-developed, 
the powerful and weak (Hudson, 2005: 166). The latter dichotomous arrangement raises two 
salient sticking points. On the one hand, Duffield (2006: 12) argues a range of problems 
(mainly present in under-developed countries), which have been identified by the stronger of 
the binary groups, is perceived as threating (to the developed) and, therefore, requires a 
response. Hence, the stronger set the agenda and enforce it on the weaker. On the other hand, 
since the stronger in this binary have the capacity and set the agenda, human security policy is 
perceived as neo-colonialism, or an alternative tool of exerting dominance over others 
(Duffield, 2006: 12; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 129). In simple terms, human 
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security is a technique, which some countries can exploit to take control/advantage over 
others through enforcement of external norms and agendas. 
The last criticism denoted here is that the arrangement has an integrated double standard 
that permits stronger countries to hold weaker countries accountable, while the actions of 
those stronger agents go unchecked (McCormack, 2008: 123). Hence, the countries that 
intervene to provide human security are not held to account for their actions and may not be 
accepted by the individuals being assisted. Failures and wrongdoing in these areas simply go 
unnoticed. McCormack’s criticism certainly applies to U.S. intervention in Iraq, assuming that 
the provision of human security was a policy driver. To overcome this and other criticisms, 
Brazil proposed an alternative policy dubbed “responsibility while protecting” which was 
rejected due to the polarization it created within the United Nations; particularly its emphasis 
on holding intervening countries to account for their actions (Rotmann and others, 2013: 368-
369). To date, the concept and practice of human security remains controversial and 
inconsistently endorsed and applied by members of the international community (Rotmann 
and others, 2013). 
Returning our attention to Iraqi public opinion of the security situation during the 
occupation, an examination of multiple surveys illustrates that public opinion concerning the 
quality of security provided by coalition troops fluctuated. In February 2004, Oxford Research 
International (2004: 6-7) found that sixty percent of Iraqis believed that security in their 
neighborhood was “good” or “very good.” Approximately three months later, sixty percent 
reported security as an urgent concern (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil 
Society Studies, 2004: 3). This trend continued as the security situation deteriorated. In June 
2004, twenty-eight percent expressed concern about the possibility of sectarian violence 
escalating into civil war (Burkholder, 2004b). At approximately the same time, another poll 
found that sixty-nine percent of Iraqis feared for their individual and familial welfare and 
safety, especially if they were perceived to be collaborating with the coalition (Burkholder, 
2004d). The increase no doubt compromised cooperation with the coalition. 
Confidence in coalition forces also fluctuated across time and surveys. Independent 
Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (2004: 6-7) found more than three 
quarters of those polled expressed minimal confidence in the coalition. By November 2005, 
half of respondents (54.6%) expressed a complete lack of confidence in U.S. and Britain’s 
security forces (Oxford Research International, 2005: 13). Perito (2005: 7) suggests the lack 
of confidence is associated with the perception that the U.S. was either unwilling or incapable 
of providing security. By November 2006, Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies 
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(2006: 6-7, 9) found that more than three quarters of respondents felt that the security, 
political and economic conditions were worse than before the 2003 invasion. As violence 
continued to escalate, a March 2007 survey qualified that the two greatest concerns expressed 
by Iraqis were the general lack of security (13%) and terrorism (12%) (ABC News and others, 
2008: 17). That same year, ABC News and others (2007: 6-8) qualified a general lack of 
confidence (82%) in U.S. and British forces. Eight out of ten respondents actually 
“disapproved of the way that the United States and coalition forces have carried out their 
responsibilities in Iraq” (ABC News and others, 2007: 6). Hence, the magnitude of insecurity 
appears to parallel expressed disgruntlement toward the coalition. 
Increased animosity directed at the coalition, and the degree of concern qualified, likewise 
parallels personal experience during the occupation. ABC News and others (2008: 34-37), for 
instance, quantifies the breadth of respondent exposure to violence throughout Iraq. At that 
time, 40% of Iraqis stated they had experienced some type of violence (a car bombing, 
terrorist attack, kidnapping) near their place of residence (ABC News and others, 2008: 34-
37). High incidents of violence coincide with a marginal degree of confidence in coalition 
security forces. In fact, approximately 33% of Iraqis stated they did “not [have] much 
confidence” in U.S. military forces while 46% claimed they had “no confidence at all” (ABC 
News and others, 2008: 26). In short, sixty-one percent of Iraqis perceived the U.S. military 
presence worsened the security situation rather than improved it (ABC News and others, 
2008: 5), sentiment that corresponds with increased incidents of violence. 
The intractability and intensity of the conflict in Iraq, the dislike of the occupation, and the 
weakness of Iraq’s institutions produced a dilemma for Iraqis (Dobbins and others, 2009: 96-
97). While many felt that U.S. presence exacerbated the security situation, and the occupation 
was largely perceived as unwanted, Iraqis simultaneously feared a coalition withdrawal 
(Dobbins and others, 2009: 96-97). This conundrum was acute since insecurity remained 
throughout the duration of the U.S. occupation, although incidents of violence began to 
diminish between 2007 and 2010. Nevertheless, it was not until mid-2010 that over seventy 
percent of respondents reported that security was improving (International Republican 
Institute, 2010: 26-27). 
In conclusion, Iraqis placed a high priority on security during the occupation. However, 
they felt that the U.S. military was incapable or unwilling to increase security. The security 
situation presented a paradox, since Iraqis wanted the unpopular occupation to end, but 
likewise feared an early withdrawal of U.S. troops would exacerbate the security situation. 
The United States continued to be held responsible for the quality and quantity of violence 
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experienced in occupied Iraq between 2004 and the military drawdown in 2010 (International 
Republican Institute, 2010: 16-27). 
2.1.6 Sectarian divisions 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq exacerbated internal political and social divisions, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of sectarian violence between Iraq’s heterogeneous communities 
(Roy, 2007: 110-113; Steele, 2008: 1-2). This outcome was expected, as Dobbins and others 
(2009: 398) note: “Any representative government in Iraq was going to shift power, wealth, 
and influence from the Sunni to the Shi’ite and Kurdish communities.” Disgruntlement and 
backlash at the overthrow of Iraq’s government was thus inevitable since the Sunni did not 
constitute a majority of the population, which meant that its traditional over-representation in 
political and civilian structures prior to the invasion would be curtailed. Once the U.S.-led 
coalition overturned the status quo, a violent competition for control was expected (Allawi, 
2007: 11; Brennan and others, 2013: 147). Social-political competition played out at the local 
and national levels and incorporated numerous contingents. 
For example, the three major ethnic-sectarian groupings mobilized to protect and assert 
their authority subsequent to U.S. intervention. From fielding their own militias and death 
squads, to usurping positions of power at the local and national levels, sectarian division and 
rivalry became acute (Allawi, 2007: 91; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 10-17; Ucko, 2008: 353-
354). As individuals and collectives, members prioritized the welfare of themselves or their 
community, and distributed goods, services and positions of authority according to identity 
(Allawi, 2007: 91; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 10-17; Ucko, 2008: 353-354). The (violent) 
conflict compromised stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq on multiple levels (Allawi, 
2007: 91; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 10-17; Ucko, 2008: 353-354). 
Aside from the obvious physical effects of the conflict (death and displacement), sectarian 
violence and turmoil equally influenced popular perceptions of (il)legitimacy and political 
(im)potence of coalition forces as well as Iraq’s governing and administrative bodies 
following their establishment (Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 10-17; Ucko, 2008: 344). Popular 
disgruntlement and suspicion were partially a result of the coalition and indigenous governing 
bodies’ inability to contain the violence or manage events on the ground. Moreover, as 
politicians and officials assumed positions, or were appointed, they acted in accordance with 
sectarian interests rather than the interests of Iraqis. Prevailing circumstances had profound 
social implications; for instance, it precipitated distrust of the GOI and perceptions of its 
illegitimacy (Cordesman, 2010: 16; DeYoung, 2007; Möckli, 2012: 2; Ryan, 2010: 72; 
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Williams and Simpson, 2008: 240). Paradoxically, while sectarian divisiveness persisted on 
the streets and in the halls of government, polling of Iraqis suggests that citizens were 
opposed to the dismemberment of Iraq according to ethnic or sectarian identity (Williams and 
Simpson, 2008: 201). 
In terms of responsibility for the sectarian rift created, many insist the United States is 
responsible for sectarian fracturing and its (violent) manifestation in occupied Iraq (Ryan, 
2010: 66). Ahmed Hashim (2006: 280-289), for example, criticizes that U.S. marginalization 
of the Sunni was an inextricable motivation for the invasion and occupation. He hypothesizes 
that “Sunniphobia” and “Shi‘aphilia” within the George W. Bush administration convoluted 
U.S. policy from its inception. Summarizing his theory, Hashim (2006: 280-289) explains 
U.S. decision-makers designed and implemented policy around their narrow conceptualization 
of conditions inside Iraq. Notably, they inaccurately identified the Sunni as the demographic 
minority who supported Saddam Hussein—and were hence antagonists of the United States—
while perceiving the Shi‘a as the demographic majority and the obvious social-political 
alternative for restructuring post-war Iraq (Hashim, 2006: 280-289). These misconceptions 
resulted in two strategic errors. 
The first mistake in U.S. policy was that it underestimated the potential for a violent Sunni 
backlash against the invasion which produced an insurgency (Hashim, 2006: 280-282). 
Second, U.S. officials assumed that by supporting the Shi‘a, they would espouse the 
occupation and the changes implemented (Hashim, 2006: 280-282; Roy, 2007: 39). The latter 
misconception disregarded preexisting mistrust Iraq’s Shi‘a had of the United States 
government, sentiment rooted in historical feelings of betrayal in 1991 when the U.S. failed to 
assist the armed uprising George H.W. Bush had promoted (Hashim, 2006: 286). Both 
inaccuracies precipitated an (un)expected insurgency that consisted of Sunni and Shi‘a 
elements. Despite evolving events on the ground, the U.S. generally maintained its strategy of 
favoring the Shi‘a while marginalizing and punishing the Sunni through violent policies, such 
as de-Baʻathification (Allawi, 2007: 89-152). The prejudiced approach instilled and 
institutionalized sectarian division within post-war politics and society (Simon, 2008: 57-74). 
Demonstrating implementation, the U.S. awarded political control over specific territory 
to warlords and sectarian leaders willing to cooperate with the coalition (Allawi, 2007: 91; 
Roy, 2007: 43). Accordingly, socially or politically well-positioned Iraqis (rhetorically) 
willing to pursue goals comparable to those of the U.S. were awarded with political (positions 
in government at the local and national levels) and social benefits (the provision of aid) 
(Allawi, 2007: 91; Roy, 2007: 43; Serwer and Parker, 2008: 3; Simon, 2008: 61). In many 
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instances those individuals would have been Shi‘a, since the Sunni widely rejected the 
occupation. Whatever their identity, U.S. appointment of individuals allowed those selected to 
sequentially distribute benefits into the community through sectarian-based favoritism 
(Allawi, 2007: 91; Roy, 2007: 43; Serwer and Parker, 2008: 3; Simon, 2008: 64-68). By way 
of example, a Sunni who agreed to cooperate with the coalition as a representative of a village 
was inclined to favor other Sunni while performing his duties. Such activity divided 
populations at the local level as opposed to uniting them, creating grievances and competition. 
An April 2008 USIP briefing paper to Congress acknowledges the counterproductive 
nature of such practices, stating that by cooperating “with those who can control their 
respective areas and whose interests are not out of line with those of the U.S.,” U.S. decision 
makers “reinforced Iraq’s political fragmentation, which may work against efforts to forge a 
truly national political compact, at least in the near term” (Serwer and Parker, 2008: 3). Iraqis 
equally concur with the sentiment articulated in the quote. Summarizing popular perceptions, 
Missy Ryan (2010: 66) asserts, “Many Iraqis blame the United States for empowering the 
religious and identity-based parties that presided over the governance disaster that followed 
the early 2003 military success.” Both quotes demonstrate the (perceived) role that the 
United States played in institutionalizing social and political fracturing in post-war structures 
at the local and national levels. As detailed elsewhere, many coalition-imposed policies, 
including de-Ba‘athification and the appointment of representatives at the local and national 
level, exacerbated social tensions and aided in the politicization of identity in Iraq’s social and 
political frameworks. 
2.1.7 General suspicion and enmity 
This subsection devoted to Iraqi sentiment subsequent qualifies the degree of suspicion 
and enmity leveled at the United States. In general terms, Iraqis expressed a marked degree of 
distrust of, and animosity towards, the U.S. following the 2003 invasion (Kull, 2007: 5). 
However, suspicion of the United States did not suddenly manifest as a result of the invasion. 
Instead, and outlined in the historical account in chapter one, the roots of mistrust are 
embedded in a combination of historical experiences and events that coalesced with 
experiences during the occupation (International Center for Transitional Justice and Human 
Rights Center, 2004: 30). Most importantly, enmity and suspicion was produced by decades 
of violent policy, especially the containment of Iraq throughout the 1990s. 
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Considering sentiment prior to the 2003 invasion, Edward P. Djerejian and Frank G. 
Wisner (2003) noted the paradox facing the George W. Bush administration if it chose to 
intervene in Iraq. Prior to the invasion they counseled: 
Achieving security and stability in the Middle East will be made 
more difficult by the fact that short-term necessities will seem to 
contradict long-term goals. For example, the strong American presence 
that will be needed to establish and maintain law and order immediately 
after conflict will appear at odds with the long-term goal of a sovereign 
Iraq. Similarly, protecting Iraq’s oil fields from sabotage will likely 
confirm the worst fears that America is pursuing war in order to steal 
local resources rather than convince skeptical audiences that such tactics 
directly benefit the Iraqi people (Djerejian and Wisner, 2003: 14). 
As the authors predicted, the invasion and occupation of Iraq was difficult to legitimize 
among Iraq’s population since the occupation was unwanted, prolonged, and subject to 
suspicion, and thereby was guaranteed to produce local grievance and discontent (Djerejian 
and Wisner, 2003: 14; Enterline and Greig, 2008: 888-889). 
As projected, the occupation exacerbated suspicion and mistrust, which is well qualified. 
In the spring of 2004, seventy-one percent of respondents viewed coalition forces as occupiers 
and 29% believed that attacks on coalition forces were morally justified (Burkholder, 2004e). 
At that same time, respondents believed Iraq’s government and its citizens should 
independently manage post-war efforts including the economy, security and the pursuit of 
transitional justice (Oxford Research International, 2004: 6-11). Iraqis, therefore, wanted 
immediate and complete control over the trajectory of their country. At its maxim, Iraqis were 
open to foreign assistance conditioned that providers of that support adhered to parameters 
Iraqis established (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 267). 
Popular reservations were reinforced by U.S. activity during the occupation (Abdallah, 
2003: 65-66; Bowen, 2009: 73). For instance, Bowen (2009: 73) reports that “Iraq’s 
indigenous tribal, political, and religious leadership” were apprehensive when the CPA 
assumed control over Iraq rather than establishing a provisional governing assembly 
comprising of Iraqis. The decision to install the CPA gave the impression that the United 
States intended to stay indefinitely. Similarly, U.S. failure to provide security and protect 
infrastructure and cultural heritage, and instead concentrating on securing oil fields, seemingly 
confirmed Iraqi suspicion that U.S. ambitions were to obtain control over Iraq’s oil reserves 
and to undermine its government and society (DeYoung, 2007; Independent Institute for 
Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 41; University of Michigan and Eastern 
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Michigan University, 2006; Zogby, 2008)47. At its extreme, Amit Paley’s (2007) independent 
research found respondents believed that the U.S. was deliberately sabotaging the country to 
serve its own interests. Comparable opinions were expressed in Basrah where British troops 
patrolled (Opinion Research Business, 2007). Such mistrust was reinforced by the 
prolongation and violent occupation and the innumerable calamities produced. 
In closing, International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and Human Rights Center 
(HRC) (2004) brilliantly summarizes Iraqi suspicion: 
Comments indicated distrust of the U.S. relating to two main issues: 
the nation’s history in supporting Saddam Hussein’s regime and the 
collapse of order and the difficult conditions of daily life that emerged 
with the fall of the regime and the beginning of the occupation. The 
failures of postwar planning in Iraq appear to have left a legacy of 
bitterness and suspicion concerning the U.S. motives, while the daily 
friction of being under occupation by a foreign military force seem to 
have eroded goodwill flowing from the overthrow of the regime. An 
undercurrent in negative attitudes toward the U.S. is the sense of 
humiliation and wounded national pride arising from the being under 
occupation (International Center for Transitional Justice and Human 
Rights Center, 2004: 30). 
As denoted in the quote, suspicion and grievance toward the United States is rooted in 
historical and contemporary actions. It is not a product of the invasion alone but a result of the 
long-standing violent relationship between the United States and Iraq.  
This section demonstrates how events delineated hitherto constitute a protracted conflict 
that has effected Iraqis’ perceptions of the United States. Equally relevant, several scholars 
note that Iraqis hold the U.S. morally responsible for Iraq’s current political, economic and 
social predicament (DeYoung, 2007; Gatehouse, 2011), including the country’s geopolitical 
weakness vis-à-vis neighbors, namely Iran (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 166; Tripp, 2007: 310). 
Amalgamated, our historical analysis and the sentiment traced herein confirm Hypothesis 1: 
the protracted violent relationship has produced an acute degree of negative sentiment toward 
the United States among Iraq’s society. 
2.2 Effects on the United States 
It is a recognized truism that there are “victims” among all stakeholders engaged in a 
violent conflict (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Montville, 1999: 326; Rosoux, 2009: 550; Shaw, 
2003: 187). The present section outlines some of the effects the war and occupation of Iraq 
                                                          
 
47 Sixty-six percent of Iraqis believed the coalition wanted to steal Iraq’s oil (Independent Institute for 
Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 41). 
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had on the United States. Nonetheless, the impact of the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq 
produced very different consequences in many respects. We make this assumption for obvious 
reasons, including the asymmetrical military power ratio between the two countries and the 
location of hostilities. Concerning the latter, since the war and occupation occurred in Iraq, its 
infrastructure and society experienced the most obvious and devastating effects. 
Due to the asymmetrical nature of the war and occupation, and since it is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to articulate all of the incalculable negative effects of the war, the issues 
examined herein center on the most recognizable effects that had extensive social impact. 
Several highlighted issues parallel those denoted in Iraq, while others are unique to the United 
States. Comparable issues include our examination of public opinion of the war and the 
human cost. Aspects which diverge include military overstretch, ballooning of the federal 
deficit, increased media censorship, and the long-standing animosity toward Iraq. 
2.2.1 Public opinion of the war 
In the fall of 2002, prior to the invasion, one survey conducted in the United States asked 
respondents if they would support military operations in Iraq if it “would result in substantial 
Iraqi civilian casualties” (Kiernan, 2003: 853-854). Nearly half of all respondents—forty-nine 
percent—“said that they would favor such a war” despite the casualties (Kiernan, 2003: 853-
854). Acceptance of the war is likely influenced by the security debate prevalent at the time. 
Most notably, respondent who believed that Iraq possessed WMD are expected to agree that 
the most effective means of eliminating the “threat” posed by Iraq was through the removal of 
Saddam Hussein (Smidt, 2005: 247). When the date of the invasion approached, U.S. citizens 
became slightly more cautious in their assessment. 
In February 2003, support for a hypothetical invasion dropped three percentage points 
when the U.S. citizens were again queried on their support for the invasion (Kiernan, 2003: 
853-854). Similarly, another poll found that most respondents supported U.S. collaboration 
with the United Nations to peacefully resolve issues with Iraq as opposed to war (Kull and 
others, 2004: 570). In this sense, it was agreed that the United States should not act alone and 
that a peaceful solution was preferable. However, once the President decided to invade Iraq in 
the spring of 2003, in collaboration with his small coalition, a majority of respondents 
supported the decision (Kull and others, 2004: 570). The shift in favor is most likely a result 
of citizens deciding to support the President in his decision, as opposed to outright support for 
the invasion. In short, respondents ceased expressing their opinion about a hypothetical 
invasion and selected to support the decision to implement the policy. 
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Once the occupation was underway, U.S. polling showed a decline in popular approval 
(Brennan and others, 2013: 8). For example, “by the summer of 2004, a majority […] called 
the war a mistake” (Dugan, 2013). The shift in public opinion is suggested to be a result of the 
increasing violence and the perception that the occupation would be more costly than initially 
anticipated (Brennan and others, 2013: 8). The trend of negative sentiment held into 2005, 
when more than half of U.S. respondents continued to perceive the invasion of Iraq as a 
mistake (Dugan, 2013). Nevertheless, U.S. popular opinion in these polls is divided according 
to political affiliation, with Democrats being likely to support the war than Republicans 
(Gelpi, 2010: 93, 108). It is believed that Republicans likely felt that they had to support the 
war because it was a Republican President that initiated the operation. 
In addition to evaluating popular sentiment towards the war and occupation, polling 
research qualifies the prevalence of misinformation among U.S. citizens prior to and after the 
invasion (Kull and others, 2004: 569-598). For instance, a majority of citizens falsely believed 
a link between Iraq and organizations using terrorism was firmly established by the U.S. 
government, and a plurality (68%) incorrectly believed Iraq was closely associated with 
events of 9/11 (Kull and others, 2004: 571-572). Polling, therefore, suggests that citizens were 
convinced that the two primary justifications for the invasion were validated. Misinformation 
also spanned other aspects of the war. For instance, a May 2003 poll qualified 34% of U.S. 
respondents falsely believed that WMD had been found in Iraq (Kull and others, 2004: 572). 
Further analysis of the data showed that individuals who held these misconceptions were 
more likely to support the war than their better-informed counterparts (Kull and others, 2004: 
569-572). 
In terms of the perceived effects of the war and occupation on the United States, periodic 
research between 2003 and 2006 trend a gradual increase in the number of U.S. respondents 
who observed the Iraq War was having a negative effect on their personal lives (Carrol, 2006). 
In April 2003, 16% held that opinion, and the figure doubled to 39% by March 2006 (Carrol, 
2006). Similar trending is also observable in respondents’ reporting that the war was having a 
negative impact on the United States (Carrol, 2006). In 2003, eighteen percent of the U.S. 
population perceived that the war had a negative impact on the United States, and the number 
of individuals who expressed corresponding opinions increased to fifty-eight percent by 
March 2006 (Carrol, 2006). See Figure 3. While the data shows that increasing numbers of 
citizens felt that the war was having a negative impact on personal lives and the country, the 
research does not qualify which negative effects respondents thought the war was having at 
either the individual or collective levels. 
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Figure 3 Effects of Iraq War on Personal Life 
 
Figure 3 is Gallup’s trending of U.S. respondents’ perception of whether the Iraq War had a positive, negative, 
or not much effect at all, on the respondent’s life (Carrol, 2006). The data quantifies how an increasing number 
of respondents between 2003 and 2006 reported that the Iraq War was having a negative impact on their 
individual lives (Carrol, 2006). 
 
As the occupation endured, perception of the futility of U.S. intervention in Iraq increased 
(USA Today and Gallup, 2009). Between 2008 and 2009, half of U.S. respondents continued 
to perceive the invasion of Iraq as a mistake (USA Today and Gallup, 2009). Perceptions of 
ineffectiveness influenced opinion of which future policies respondents preferred. By mid-
2009, a majority (78%) felt that U.S. military forces should be withdrawn from Iraq by 
December 2011 (CBS News and The New York Times, 2009a; USA Today and Gallup, 
2009). Interestingly, it was not until August 2010, as complete U.S. troop withdrawal neared, 
that attitudes shifted and a slight majority of U.S. respondents (57%) felt progress was being 
made in Iraq (CBS News, 2010). Positive perceptions at this point were held regardless of 
political affiliation (CBS News, 2010). While improved perceptions correspond with 
improving conditions, optimism did not translate into popular acceptance of the war. 
Contrary, U.S. citizens remained markedly pessimistic about the war and its outcome 
(CBS News, 2010). Despite perceiving progress, more than seventy percent of those polled 
believed the war was not worth the cost, compared to twenty percent who determined it 
appropriate (CBS News, 2010). Perhaps accounting for the perception of failure, CBS News 
(2010) found a majority of U.S. respondents did not believe that the United States had 
achieved its stated objectives in Iraq. For instance, only one quarter felt that the United States 
was safer compared to eighty percent which perceived the invasion had made the United 
States less safe (CBS News, 2010). Hence, respondents did not believe that the war in Iraq 
increased U.S. national security, one of the several justifications advanced for the invasion. 
The perception of the occupation as a failure remained steady following the complete 
military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. A March 2013 poll, for instance, found a 
slight majority (53%) of U.S. citizens continued to perceive the Iraq war as a mistake (Dugan, 
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2013). That opinion was divided according to political affiliation (Dugan, 2013). A majority 
of Republicans (66%) believed the decision to go to war in Iraq was appropriate in contrast to 
a plurality of Democrats (73%) who perceived it inappropriate (Dugan, 2013). Once again, it 
is surmised that political party members retained their partisan opinions since a Republican 
president was ultimately responsible for committing troops (Dugan, 2013). 
Before turning our attention to the impacts of the war, we wish to introduce another line of 
questioning found in the available literature. CBS News and The New York Times (2009b) 
asked U.S. respondents to speculate about Iraqis’ perceptions of the war. When asked how 
they thought Iraqis felt about the 2003 invasion, forty-four percent of U.S. respondents 
admitted that Iraqis were probably “resentful” (CBS News and The New York Times, 2009b). 
The question was repeated one year later and fewer (37%) felt that Iraqis were resentful while 
41% predicted that Iraqis were grateful (CBS News, 2010). The combination suggests that a 
clear majority of U.S. citizens thought that Iraqis were grateful for the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein. We, however, have demonstrated that nearly half of all Iraqis viewed the invasion as 
deconstructive in 2010 (2.1.1). Unfortunately, further elicitation of U.S. opinion pertaining to 
this topic was not pursued leaving critical questions unanswered, such as how U.S. 
respondents formed their conclusions. 
2.2.2 The human cost 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) (2008) estimates that 1.1 million U.S. military 
personnel served in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. A more recent estimate projects that the 
total number of U.S. military personnel that served in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 is 
approximately 1.5 million soldiers (Möckli, 2012: 1)48. All U.S. soldiers were volunteers who 
upon enlistment in the Armed Forces, whether active duty or reservists, are obligated to fulfill 
their duty, including wartime deployment (Defense Technical Information Center, 2013). The 
vast majority of soldiers serving in the armed forces between 2003 and 2011 obeyed their 
orders to deploy to Iraq (Christenson, 2011; McMichael, 2007)49. Once deployed, soldiers 
were prone to death or injury. 
                                                          
 
48 According to Martinez and Bingham (2011), an estimated 2,333,972 soldiers served in the U.S. armed forces 
between September 11, 2001 and August 30, 2011 and were deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq or both countries. 
49 There were numerous incidents of soldiers refusing to obey orders to avoid (repeat) deployment to Afghanistan 
or Iraq (Christenson, 2011; McMichael, 2007). In 2006 alone, the DOD estimates that a total of 5,361 U.S. 
soldiers were military deserters (McMichael, 2007). For instance, André Shepard, a veteran of the Iraq War, 
deserted the U.S. Army following orders to return to Iraq for a second tour (Meyer and Kaiser, 2008). He applied 
for asylum in Germany in November 2008 (Meyer and Kaiser, 2008). Hundreds of active U.S. soldiers also 
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Of the estimated 1.5 million who served, official sources indicate there were 4,356 U.S. 
combat deaths and over 30,000 service members wounded between March 19, 2003 and 
October 23, 2009 (Department of Defense, 2008). That figure increased to 4,488 combat 
deaths by the December 2011 U.S. withdrawal (Möckli, 2012: 1). By comparison to Iraq’s 
casualty estimates, the U.S. casualty figures are low (2.1.2). Nonetheless, the low numbers 
produced a disproportionally high rate of social effect. While only 0.75% of the U.S. 
population (according to the 2010 census) was active military personnel between 2003 and 
2010 (Martinez and Bingham, 2011), a Gallup survey in 2006 found that 58% of U.S. citizens 
“report[ed] personally knowing someone who ha[d] served in the U.S. military in Iraq since 
the war started” (Carrol, 2006). Of the majority denoted in the quote, 12% knew someone 
who had been wounded or killed (Carrol, 2006). Polling, thus, suggests that approximately 
half of all U.S. citizens knew someone who served, while a minority knew someone who were 
killed or injured. 
Beyond combat casualties, the social-psychological effects of the Iraq (and Afghanistan) 
war on veterans have become a serious public health concern in the United States (Tanielian 
and Jaycox, 2008: 4-5). Military veterans have suffered psychological health problems, 
manifesting in high rates of post-traumatic stress being reported among soldiers and 
repatriated veterans (Alvarez and Frosch, 2009; Bilmes, 2013: 5-6). According to Bilmes 
(2013: 5) “one-third of returning veterans are being diagnosed with mental health issues – 
suffering from anxiety, depression and/or post-traumatic stress disorder.” The high rates of 
social-psychological issues Bilmes refers to in the quote strain the health care system and 
directly impact society. For instance, combat related physical complications and 
psychological trauma are being associated with an increasing number of suicides among 
veterans (Alvarez and Frosch, 2009; Bilmes, 2013: 5; Korb and others, 2007: 11; Tanielian 
and Jaycox, 2008: 128-129). Similarly, there has been a quantified increase in incidents of 
domestic violence and divorce among military families since 2001 (Tanielian and Jaycox, 
2008: 201). As a result, the health and welfare of repatriated veterans and their families have 
become a public concern among health care professionals and the United States military 
(Alvarez and Frosch, 2009). The implications of the human toll are expected to affect the 
United States for many years. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
escaped to Canada seeking political refuge, although Canada’s government repatriated most (Montreal Gazette, 
2008). Those captured are subject to prosecution under military law (Montreal Gazette, 2008). 
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2.2.3 Military overstretch 
Our analysis now modifies to qualifying U.S. perceptions of, and action during, the war, 
since the war was asymmetrical in its impact when compared to that experienced by Iraqis. 
The first of these issues examined is U.S. military overstretch, defined here as exceeding the 
Armed Forces’ capability to recruit or maintain sufficient troop levels and their 
equipment/supplies as necessitated by ongoing operations. Overstretch was encountered 
because of the simultaneous occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan (Korb and others, 2007: 1-
13). Our interest here is not on fiscal appropriations or logistics, but rather how overstretch 
negatively impacted military effectiveness and readiness, which in turn impacted on soldiers 
and society (Korb and others, 2007: 7-11; Roy, 2007: 2). More specifically, the U.S. military 
was unable to provide appropriate equipment and supplies to an estimated one-quarter of 
troops deploying to Iraq in the fall of 2003 (Moss, 2006; USA Today, 2004). 
Consequently, troops were deployed without being provided the sufficient quality or 
quantity of personal equipment, such as body armor (Moss, 2006; USA Today, 2004). To 
compensate for the over-extension, individual soldiers and their families were forced to 
purchase protective equipment directly from distributors to guarantee it was immediately 
available to their family member being deployed (Moss, 2006; USA Today, 2004). Hence, the 
only way to guarantee that a soldier had what s/he needed was for the soldier or their family to 
purchase equipment independently since the military was unable to provide said material. 
Similar qualitative and quantitative oversights were made concerning the availability of 
sufficiently armored vehicles during the run-up to the war, and once the errors were 
recognized, delays and backlogs occurred as manufacturers were unable to meet the abrupt 
military demand (Moss, 2006). While small ticket items such as body armor could be 
purchased independently, individual soldiers and their families were unable to compensate for 
military failures for larger items. The combination of oversight and failure on the part of the 
Department of Defense compromised public confidence in the U.S. military and compromised 
troop morale (USA Today, 2004). 
In addition to supply issues, once the Iraq war was underway, the military encountered a 
significant decline in military recruits (Korb and others, 2007: 10-11). The recruitment deficit 
challenged U.S. military capacity to maintain dual occupations (Iraq and Afghanistan), which 
prompted political and military officials to take extreme measures to avoid making the 
domestically unpopular decisions of instilling conscription to fill military ranks (Korb and 
others, 2007: 10-11; Lieberfeld, 2005: 11). Among its controversial decisions, the U.S. Army, 
for example, parted with its policy which assures the general integrity of military troops, by 
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demanding its soldiers serve repeat tours in a combat zone without receiving recuperation and 
retraining between deployments (Korb and others, 2007: 10). Under customary guidelines, 
U.S. Army wartime deployment policy dictates at least one year of recuperation followed by 
an additional year of (re)training before soldiers are returned to combat duty (Korb and others, 
2007: 4). Due to the insufficient quantity of new military recruits, in combination with a high 
attrition rate, the duration of troop deployments were prolonged and regular troop rotations at 
the company and regimen levels were modified to offset the quantitative deficit (Korb and 
others, 2007: 10-11). In short, troops were forced to serve repeat tours without standard 
recuperation and/or retraining periods. 
Simultaneously, a “stop loss” policy was imposed by the military to sustain the necessary 
quantity of personnel (Korb and others, 2007: 6). Stop loss is the process of denying a soldier 
the right to depart the military despite fulfillment of their military contract (Korb and others, 
2007: 6). By preventing soldiers from leaving the armed services and return to civilian life, 
and by altering troop rotation schedules, the U.S. Army was able to maintain a sufficient 
quantity of troops at the expense of reduced troop morale (Garfield, 2007; Korb and others, 
2007: 4-10). In addition to the reduction of morale, prolonged and repeat deployments are 
hypothesized to have increased the probability of a service member’s suffering from war-
related psychological complications, including post-traumatic stress disorder (Korb and 
others, 2007: 6). Nevertheless, these counterproductive policies were implemented to preserve 
troop numbers despite the effects it had on troop readiness and capability. Military overstretch 
and the tactics deployed to compensate for the deficiencies were equally responsible for 
reduced confidence in the military among soldiers and civilians alike. 
2.2.4 Ballooning federal deficit 
Insulating U.S. civilians from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars was domestic fiscal policy 
(Kennedy, 2013: 84; Lieberfeld, 2005: 11; Roberts, 2010: 44-50). Alasdair Roberts (2010: 44-
50) demonstrates that the George W. Bush administration reduced the potential negative 
effects of the wars on the U.S. public through the maintenance of low taxation and the 
encouragement of public spending. The Bush administration’s approach contradicts the 
historic economic practices of increasing taxes to generate federal revenue and the 
encouragement of personal savings during wartime (Kennedy, 2013: 84; Roberts, 2010: 44-
50). These customary practices were avoided by the administration to avert popular 
opposition to the wars due to fiscal over-burdening (Roberts, 2010: 44-50; Shaw, 2003: 157). 
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While keeping taxes low and encouraging spending may have softened public sentiment, 
the downside of this fiscal policy was that the administration simply postponed the tax burden 
since the U.S. government was required to bankroll both wars with limited resources 
(Kennedy, 2013: 84). Consequently, the U.S. federal deficit dramatically increased (Bilmes, 
2013: 1-4; Lieberfeld, 2005: 11; Möckli, 2012: 1). Combined, 2013 estimates project the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars have contributed an estimated “$2 trillion to the national debt” (Bilmes, 
2013: 3)50. While the Bush administration successfully managed to distance the general public 
from the war and occupation in the short term, it simply deferred responsibility for payment. 
2.2.5 Media censorship and disinformation 
Although U.S. citizens frequently pride themselves on the right to freedom of the press, 
they were purposefully insulated from the war through federally imposed restrictions and self-
imposed media censorship that diluted or distorted U.S. media coverage (Exoo, 2010: 181)51. 
For example, the George W. Bush administration banned the practice of showing flag-draped 
coffins of soldiers who had died in Afghanistan and Iraq (D. Kennedy, 2008). By forbidding 
the publication or broadcasting of such images, the administration believed that it could 
manage the erosion of popular support for those military campaigns (D. Kennedy, 2008). In 
essence, the practice was designed to moderate references to the U.S. lives being lost in the 
Iraq war and occupation. 
Censorship of images was, nonetheless, domestically unpopular. A 2009 poll determines 
that 69% of the U.S. public felt that they should be allowed to see images of deceased U.S. 
soldiers (CBS News and the New York Times, 2009a). Nevertheless the ban remained in 
force, and most U.S. media outlets continued to self-censor coverage to appease corporate 
sponsors in lieu of providing impartial news and information (Exoo, 2010: 4-18). 
Additionally, the U.S. media did not broadcast images of civilians who died during the 
invasion of Iraq (Calhoun, 2005: 99). Once again, censorship reduced (visual) references to 
the impact of the war and occupation on Iraqis, sanitizing the operation. Nonetheless, 
censoring images of deceased and badly injured people has been a long-standing tradition 
within U.S. media coverage from my experience. While a means of sanitizing the news, this is 
equally a long-standing tradition in U.S. journalism. 
                                                          
 
50 Comparatively, Möckli (2012: 1) estimates the cost of the Iraq war at 3 trillion U.S. dollars. Similarly, Amy 
Belasco (2011: 17) estimates that the appropriations earmarked for Iraq during fiscal year 2012 alone was 800 
billion U.S. dollars. 
51 For assessment of the U.S. media’s role in the prelude to and coverage of the 2003 Iraq War and occupation, 
see Exoo (2010). 
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At the same time, some of the larger mainstream, or popular, U.S. media corporations 
have been criticized for their general reluctance to produce critical reporting which resulted in 
a lack of information or the production of disinformation (Johansen, 2004: 6). This is 
especially the case by certain media outlets, such as FOX News, which maintained a pro-war 
stance throughout the occupation (Kull and others, 2004: 581-598). Consequently, Kull and 
others (2004: 581-598) assert these media outlets were guilty of misinforming or misguiding 
the public on the war through their vague or biased reporting. As denoted in section 2.2.1, a 
large percentage of the U.S. population incorrectly believed that WMD had been found in Iraq 
and that Saddam Hussein was linked to groups that use terrorism (Kull and others, 2004: 569-
572). Precise and factual reporting, it is believed, would have reduced the percentage of 
misinformed citizens. 
Another external technique of regulating the quality and quantity of information provided 
to and distributed by the U.S. media was accomplished through the DOD’s practice of 
“embedded journalism” (Exoo, 2010: 106). Embedded journalists are assigned and integrated 
into military combat units, a practice that naturally encourages the war correspondent to bond 
with the troops they are reporting on (Exoo, 2010: 105-106; Mann, 2006: 119-121). Under 
this arrangement, the journalist’s safety is contingent upon the soldiers s/he is covering which 
can produce reporter bias (Mann, 2006: 119-121). Equally problematic, the practice of 
embedding enables the DOD to screen and censor journalist’s reports, since journalists must 
have their submissions vetted and they are forbidden to publish information the DOD deems 
sensitive, inappropriate or threatening to “the mission” (Exoo, 2010: 105-106). A journalist 
determined in violation of DOD protocol are immediately removed from their combat unit 
and denied future access (Exoo, 2010: 105-106). To maintain their privilege, journalists 
censor their reports or are subject to report in a biased manner because of the arrangement. 
Combined, there were numerous ways in which information provided by the mainstream 
media was censored. Some forms of censorship were imposed by the administration, while 
individual media outlets themselves equally and voluntarily implemented others. Despite its 
origins, censorship resulted in sanitized, sometimes biased, journalistic practices that 
undermined the freedom of the press. It is equally attributed to the high percentage of a 
misinformed public. In summary, predominant wartime media practices in the United States 
reduced partiality, and sometimes compromised the information provided by the free press. 
Consequently, sanitized and biased reporting affected popular opinion of the war and 
occupation, because citizens lack accurate knowledge or are exposed to misinformation. 
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2.2.6 Negative perceptions of Iraqis 
U.S. citizens have perceived Iraq negatively for over a decade. Between 1990 and 2003, 
U.S. respondents expressed an overwhelmingly negative opinion of Iraq (averaging 90%) 
(Gallup, 2014). The period covers Saddam Hussein’s annexation of Kuwait, the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War and containment policy that followed. While opinions fluctuated afterward, a slight 
majority (averaging 66%) of respondents continued to express negative perceptions toward 
Iraq between 2003 and 2013 (Gallup, 2014). At the time of writing, the most recent poll 
registered 80% of the U.S. population continues to hold a negative opinion of Iraq (Gallup, 
2014). Gallup’s trending confirms two decades of suspicion and dislike. 
Soldiers carried existing negative sentiment, reinforced by a general lack of awareness, 
into theatre, which was sometimes partly bolstered there. Gage and others (2003: 2), for 
instance, call attention to the insufficient linguistic and cultural training given to U.S. soldiers 
and the negative implications this deficit had. Soldiers not only lacked language skills, but 
also did not understand important cultural nuances, such as honor, in terms of Iraq’s history, 
society or culture. In their ignorance, female soldiers were, for example, used to direct traffic 
or present orders to Iraqi men (Fontan, 2006: 219-220). Such practice clashed with the 
patriarchal social norms present in Iraq and offended or humiliated Iraqi men (Fontan, 2006: 
219-220). This produced social tensions. 
Equally problematic, preexisting negative sentiment and misconceptions were 
unfortunately rarely challenged while the soldiers were deployed in Iraq due to military SOP. 
Recalling the challenges associated with utilizing force protection (2.1.4), we analyze the 
phenomena from the reverse angle to demonstrate how those same policies affected U.S. 
soldier proximity to violence and their cross-cultural interaction with, and perceptions of, 
Iraqis. Concerning the former, although U.S. soldiers serving in Iraq were exposed to the 
atrocities of war, most were likewise granted significant advantages over civilians in Iraq 
(Kilcullen, 2009: 124). In particular, U.S. troops had regular opportunities to insulate 
themselves since most combat units returned to forward operating bases on a daily basis after 
“commuting” to and from their AO (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). For example, troops patrolling 
Baghdad generally returned to “safe” areas, such as the “Green Zone”, where a measure of 
refuge was afforded inside fortified perimeters (Brennan and others, 2013: 54; Kilcullen, 
2009: 124). In hardened positions, U.S. troops had the possibility to (albeit temporarily) 
disassociate themselves from the war, a practice that facilitated intervals of regeneration and 
the creation of a sense of normalcy within the war (Kilcullen, 2009: 124-125). This advantage 
was unavailable to most Iraqis (Kilcullen, 2009: 124-125). However, from a strategic military 
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perspective, the act of isolating troops is counterproductive since their absence is associated 
with a failure to provide security to civilians and there is reduced interaction between the 
troops and civilians (Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Krepinevich, 2005: 92). 
Consequently, force protection ensured occupying troops remained physically, socially 
and politically detached from Iraqis even when on missions (Kilcullen, 2009: 124; 
Krepinevich, 2005: 92). As explained earlier, the U.S. military over-relied on its power 
projection capabilities to ensure force protection even in residential neighborhoods (Gage and 
others, 2003: 4-5; Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Perito, 2005: 7). By projecting power and maintaining 
distance from civilians, it was possible to minimize U.S. troop casualties (Shaw, 2003: 202). 
However, since U.S. troops rarely loiter near, or intermingle with Iraqis, soldiers not only 
shifted the risk of combat to civilians but often failed to obtain a general understanding of 
Iraqis in terms of their livelihood, culture, needs and desires (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). 
Separation thereby breeds disconnect, allowing misconceptions to take root, grow and 
solidify. 
The significance of distance and misconceptions between those engaged in a violent 
conflict is emphasized by Galtung (2004: 78), who argues that individuals develop opinions 
according to the quality and quantity of (inter)actions. Because a disconnection existed 
between the occupier and the occupied, compounded by the asymmetrical power balance of 
the occupier-occupied dyad in this particular context and the general lack of knowledge of the 
“other”, both parties often failed to closely interact which might have otherwise falsified 
(pre)existing stereotypes and enhanced cross-cultural understanding and appreciation 
(Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 73). The interaction-knowledge deficit led 
U.S. military personnel to generalize that every Iraqi was a potential “enemy,” either an 
insurgent or a collaborator, and thereby a threat to their welfare (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Those 
misconceptions reinforced self-preservation tendencies whereby the pattern of maintaining 
distance and deploying disproportional force were justified (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Such 
reinforcing patterns are problematic because it can cultivate a false understanding of the 
relational counterpart, and at its extreme, makes it easier to dismiss the “other” as being 
subhuman or evil (Flavin, 2013: 169; Maoz, 2004: 230; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 73). In the 
latter instance, disconnect absolves empathy and responsibility, which can significantly 
impact the trajectory of a relationship and is problematic for developing constructive relations 
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and undermining suspicion and violent behavior (Flavin, 2013: 169; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 
31, 58-60)52. 
An additional problem these deconstructive perceptions present are that once developed at 
the individual level, attitudes are subject to broad transfer onto society at large (Bar-Tal, 2000: 
358). On the one hand, and recalling a previous example, most Iraqis believed that actions 
performed at Abu Ghraib prison were representative of all U.S. citizens (Independent Institute 
for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 44-46). On the other hand, it was just 
noted that U.S. soldiers had a tendency of viewing all Iraqis as insurgents or sympathizers 
(Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Such Manichean world-views are conducive to a continuation of 
conflict relationships and the utilization of violence (Bar-On, 2005: 13; Calhoun, 2005: 104; 
Maoz, 2004: 231-232; Marsella, 2005: 663-664). They reinforce a collective conflict narrative 
that can be transferred to others, and can harden and escalate deconstructive patterns of 
thought and behavior. 
2.2.7 General assessment 
By way of summary, this section approached the effects of the war on the U.S. from two 
angles. On one hand, we illustrated certain outcomes parallel those experienced by citizens of 
Iraq. We first looked at U.S. public opinion toward the war. It was demonstrated that while 
support was nearly polarized prior to the war, sentiment rapidly converted to support the war 
once the campaign had been launched. Subsequent to the invasion, popular endorsement 
waned as the occupation continued and the security situation declined. Several years after 
troop withdrawal, nearly half of all U.S. citizens believed that war was a failure. However, the 
quality of sentiment expressed was influenced by political affiliation, with Republicans 
generally perceiving the war as necessary and achieving its objectives while Democrats 
largely hold opposing views. 
                                                          
 
52 From the military’s perspective of peacekeeping operations, analysts criticize the common practice of over-
expecting the military to have complete situational awareness on deployment. Although military analysts 
recognize the importance of the military possessing local political, historical, cultural knowledge during 
operations (Alamir, 2013: 247; Flavin, 2013: 162), some suggest that it is inevitable that an intervening military 
will have inadequate knowledge and skills when deployed abroad (Flavin, 2013: 159-160). This hypothesis is 
based on a combination of reasons including military culture, mentality and objectives. For instance, military 
practices, including troop rotation patterns, undermine the construction of knowledge in theater because troops 
are rotated at regular intervals, thereby withdrawing with them the experience and familiarity the rotating troops 
have acquired (Flavin, 2013: 161, 178). Similarly, the military’s primary objective is to locate and manage 
individual threats as opposed to a general population, which means it spends most of its resources on the enemy 
(Flavin, 2013: 161, 178). For these reasons, it is suggested that every effort should be made to educate and 
inform troops, under the full realization that expectations should be realistic since there will be unavoidable 
knowledge gaps. The recommendation further raises important structural and operational questions that the 
military should consider when contemplating operations of foreign intervention. 
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We then examine the human costs of the war. Over four thousand soldiers died in Iraq and 
tens of thousands were wounded. Interestingly, while these figures are minor in relation to the 
estimates from Iraq, and small in terms of the number of soldiers who actually served in 
theatre, nearly half of all U.S. citizens claimed to know someone whom had served in Iraq. At 
the same time, we examined several social-psychological effects of the war namely high rates 
of suicide among U.S. veterans and increasing instances of domestic violence in military 
families. The combination of traumas is expected to endure into the foreseeable future. 
Next we analyzed (fiscal) overstretch of the military and U.S. federal budget, which 
produced negative consequences. On the one hand, citizens and soldiers were forced to 
purchase personal protective equipment to be used during deployment to compensate for 
DOD mismanagement and oversight. The necessity to independently purchase equipment, 
combined with other policy decisions made by the U.S. military to reduce the military attrition 
rate and offset the inability to recruit new soldiers, compromised public support, troop morale 
and the soldier’s welfare. On the other hand, the fiscal cost of the war was purposefully 
postponed by the George W. Bush administration due to its reluctance to impose a tax burden. 
Hence, the policy discreetly deferred the cost of the war, and increased the federal deficit. 
Then we examined censorship and misinformation. Although United States citizens 
frequently pride themselves for upholding constitutional rights, such as freedom of the press, 
during the Iraq war censorship and misinformation was common. The Bush administration, 
for example, imposed bans on photos and film footage of deceased soldiers. Similarly, many 
war correspondents were embedded into combat units, a practice that censors information and 
encourages the journalist to bond with the unit they are attached to. The combination of 
measures produces biased reporting. At the same time, many mainstream media corporations’ 
self-censored information and/or provided disinformation. As a result, mainstream news 
coverage was frequently biased. These practices undermine disclosure of the truth, limit 
public awareness and freedom of the press. 
Finally, we examined U.S. public perceptions of Iraq. It was denoted that citizens have 
held predominantly negative opinions of Iraq since the 1990s. Associated with media 
censorship outlined earlier, we highlighted that there was a tendency for U.S. citizens to 
falsely believe in the validity of justifications proffered for the invasion (Iraq’s possession 
WMD and links to terrorism). At the same time, we analyzed the perceptions of soldiers and 
their activities. The literature confirms a lack of basic understanding of Iraq and its population 
(culture, history) soldiers, buttressed by avoidable military practices that were culturally 
insensitive. Moreover, soldiers failed to interact with Iraqis, in part a result of the practice of 
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force protection, a phenomenon that led to soldiers stereotyping Iraqis as either insurgents or 
sympathizers. Such negative perceptions and the distance maintained from an adversary foster 
misconception, alienation, and at its extreme, Manichean world-views that justify the use of 
violence. 
Amalgamated the present section confirms some of the negative consequences of the Iraq 
war, and demonstrated that U.S. citizens hold negative opinions of Iraq, thereby confirming 
Hypothesis 1 from the U.S. perspective. In the final section, we will explore relationships 
from the macro level. The following analysis parallels the micro opinions explored in the 
previous hitherto and is valuable for reiterating the existence of a conflict relationship at both 
the macro (West versus Middle East) and micro levels (Iraq versus the U.S.). 
2.3 Macro opinion 
With micro level public sentiment among Iraq and U.S. citizens qualified, attention turns 
to macro level opinion. We will analyze Arab/Muslim and U.S. opinion to: a) qualify U.S.-
Arab relations is influenced by micro level conflict; b) compare macro Arab/Muslim opinion 
to micro level opinion observed in Iraq; and c) underscore the importance of historical events 
and their systemic influence on Middle Eastern perceptions of the West in general, and the 
United States in particular, as explained by Funk and Said (2004). Inclusion of macro opinion, 
thus, demonstrates commonalities between micro and macro level sentiment, while 
simultaneously providing an opportunity to interject scholarly research and discourse on 
relations between the Middle East and West. Moreover, much of the research conducted in 
conflict resolution occurs at the micro level, or Arab/Muslim and Western cultures, as 
opposed to the micro level. For instance, most of the conflict resolution literature examined 
for this research centers on Arab/Muslim and Western traditions, as articulated in the 
forthcoming part of this thesis. 
With this in mind, scholars emphasize that Western intervention (Britain and the U.S.) in 
the region influences how inhabitants conceptualize their relational counterpart (Funk and 
Said, 2004: 10; Goldschmidt, 2004: 49-50). For example, historical experiences that influence 
sentiment include colonialism, the imposed demarcation of territory (creating 
territories/countries and appropriating authority over them as colonial powers), and 
exploitation of resources (petroleum) found in the Middle East (Funk and Said, 2004: 10; 
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Tétreault, 2004: 133-138). Such events, among others, have impacted perceptions of 
inhabitants in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)53. 
The following subsections follow a theoretical framework constructed upon Nathan Funk 
and Abdul Aziz Said’s (2004) essay, “Islam and the West: Narratives of Conflict and Conflict 
Transformation,” which qualifies contemporary relations between the United States/Western 
societies and Arab/Muslim societies. In their analysis, the authors underscore similarities 
across cultural perceptions and provide evidence to support the hypothesis that these societies 
are engaged in an epic struggle against the “other” (Funk and Said, 2004: 4). Summarizing the 
quality of the relationship, the authors write: “On both sides of the troubled relationship 
between Americans and the Muslim Middle East, there is deep estrangement and a growing 
belief in the futility of communication” (Funk and Said, 2004: 1). The deep estrangement 
denoted by Funk and Said, I believe, is observable at the micro level (U.S.-Iraq relations), and 
is subject to conflict continuation or escalation. We first analyze Arab/Muslim opinion of the 
U.S., then address Middle Eastern perceptions of the West, U.S./Western perception of 
Muslims and conclude with a general assessment of the findings presented. 
2.3.1 Arab/Muslim opinion of the U.S. 
Muslim enmity toward the United States is a long-standing phenomenon (Abdallah, 2003: 
62). However, negative sentiment deepened following the military intervention and 
subsequent occupations of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), as demonstrated in periodic 
polling (Jackson and Towle, 2006: 17; Pew Research Center, 2013; 2007: 14-15; University 
of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University, 2006). Between 2003 and 2009, a majority of 
respondents throughout the Middle East expressed negative opinions of the United States 
(Telhami, 2009: 2; Zogby and Zogby, 2009: 2). Following the election of Barack Obama, the 
U.S. enjoyed marginal improvement in public opinion throughout the world, including the 
Middle East, although a majority of Arab/Muslim respondents in the latter region continued to 
hold an “unfavorable” opinion (77%) of the United States (Telhami, 2009: 2-9). This minor 
alteration in sentiment correlates with an expected change in Obama’s foreign policy style, as 
51% of respondents in the MENA expected policy changes (Telhami, 2009: 2-9). Hence, there 
was an initial lull in popular sentiment, yet the MENA region continued to hold a 
predominantly negative opinion of the United States. 
                                                          
 
53 The use of the phrase North Africa in this text denotes the geographic region of northern Africa that borders 
the Mediterranean Sea. This region includes the recognized countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, 
Tunisia and Western Sahara. Because Egypt straddles the North Africa-Middle Eastern divide, it is included in 
both categories 
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The adjustment in popular opinion following the election of Barack Obama was, 
nonetheless, temporary. BBC News (in collaboration with GlobeScan and Program on 
International Policy Attitudes [PIPA]), for instance, found no observable increase in regional 
opinion of the United States (BBC News and others, 2010). Contrary, they found a majority of 
respondents from Turkey (70%) and Egypt (52%) continued to express negative sentiment 
toward the U.S. (BBC News and others, 2010)54. Follow-up surveys similarly demonstrate 
marginal fluctuation in general opinion of the United States throughout the region (Telhami, 
2011: 24-27). For instance a 2011 study shows a continuation in the predominant trend of 
enmity toward the United States (Telhami, 2011: 3). 
With a clear majority of inhabitants in predominantly Arab/Muslim countries throughout 
the MENA holding negative views of the United States for a prolonged period of time, we 
wish to examine the source of animosity. Root causes are generally divided into two 
categories: U.S. policy and cultural differences. On the one hand, some researchers suggest 
U.S. regional policy influences popular perceptions. In terms of policy objectives, surveys 
conducted between 2006 and 2008 found a majority of MENA respondents believe the 2003 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq sought: to control Iraq’s oil supply (Abdallah, 2003: 63; DeYoung, 
2007; Telhami, 2009: 17; University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University, 2006); to 
establish a permanent military presence in Iraq (Abdallah, 2003: 69-70; Kull, 2007: 7), and/or; 
to acquire complete control of Iraq (Abdallah, 2003: 62; Tripp, 2007: 282). Popular suspicions 
were reinforced by U.S. policies during the occupation, such as the introduction of the CPA 
(chapter 1, section 3) and the protection of Iraq’s oil production facilities, rather than ensuring 
civil order (chapter 1, section 2). The sentiment qualified also mirrors that expressed by Iraqis 
outlined in chapter 2, section 1.7. 
Later surveys conducted between 2009 and 2011 illustrate that regional respondents 
believed that U.S. interests in the Middle East were driven by the desire to control oil and 
protect Israel (Telhami, 2011: 31)55. These perceived strategic objectives are problematic for 
U.S.-Middle East relations because they contradict Arab/Muslim economic, social, political, 
and religious needs and aspirations (Abdallah, 2003: 62). U.S. regional policy also lends 
credence to suspicion. For instance, the U.S. occupied Iraq, it maintains tight relations with oil 
producing countries, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and it provides weapons and aid to 
Israel. For these reasons, it is logical that Arab/Muslims conclude corresponding interests 
                                                          
 
54 Exhaustive results of the survey are available at BBC News and others (2010). 
55 Comparatively, Telhami (2009: 17) found respondents believed the protection of Israel (52%); controlling the 
regional supply of oil (43%); weakening the Muslim world (38%); and preserving U.S. regional and global 
dominance (24%) were priorities of the United States. 
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drive U.S. policy; objectives that place the United States at odds with Arab/Muslim interests 
who generally desire for a complete withdrawal of U.S. influence from the region. 
Centering our attention on perceptions of U.S.-Iraq relations, most Muslims believe the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was unjustified and detrimental to Iraq and its inhabitants (Esposito 
and Mogahed, 2010: 61). Negative perceptions were exacerbated by U.S. implementation of 
controversial policies such as de-Ba‘athification and the utilization of indiscriminate violence 
that claimed civilian lives and trampled (individual and collective) honor (Fontan, 2006: 220-
227). Combined, U.S. policy contradicted the Bush administration’s stated objectives of 
providing humanitarian assistance, or promoting democracy and human rights in Iraq in the 
eyes of Arab/Muslims (Abdallah, 2003: 62; Kepel, 2004: 238). Contrary, the U.S. created a 
humanitarian crisis, institutionalized sectarianism, and violated basic human rights 
(incarceration and internment) during the occupation. Its policies, therefore, did not 
correspond to the stated intentions of the administration and increased regional suspicion. 
The impact of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq on regional sentiment was 
profound. As observed during our analysis of public opinion in Iraq, the degree of macro level 
negative sentiment expressed toward the U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan led 
Arab/Muslims throughout the region to condone the use of violence against U.S. military 
forces to hasten their withdrawal (Kull, 2007: 7; Program on International Policy Attitudes, 
2006: 2). Steve Kull (2007) qualifies Arab/Muslim endorsement of attacks against the U.S.-
led coalition as follows: 
On average … approximately half favored such attacks, with three 
in ten opposed, but there were substantial variations between countries. 
Very large majorities in Egypt said they supported such attacks, as did 
robust majorities in Morocco. Pakistanis tended to be divided and 
Indonesians were mostly opposed (Kull, 2007: 7). 
The condoning of violence throughout the MENA, as articulated in the quote, is dangerous 
and concerning since approximately half of the region advocated violence against U.S. targets. 
These figures demonstrate the degree to which Arab/Muslims in the region were opposed to 
U.S. intervention and the magnitude of dissatisfaction and suspicion they felt. 
Therefore, Telhami (2004) deduces that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is an 
influential referencing point when Arab/Muslim respondents formulate their opinions of the 
United States. Instructively, polling demonstrates that seventy-eight percent of Middle East 
respondents claim that their opinion of the United States is contingent on U.S. foreign policy 
rather than on what are (often ambiguously) described as “American values” (for instance, 
freedom of speech or the press) (Telhami, 2004: 38). Providing additional insight, polling 
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conducted between 2009 and 2011 determines which U.S. policies respondents claimed would 
alter their perception of the United States. One study found that Arab/Muslims in the Middle 
East desire: 1) a withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq (25%) and, 2) a U.S. military 
withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula (25%) (Telhami, 2009: 16). The third most popular 
policy change that respondents stated the U.S. could take to improve their opinion was to 
broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement (41%) (Telhami, 2009: 16). Others surveys 
likewise found that regional respondents’ favor reduced United States military presence in 
predominantly Muslim countries (BBC News, 2010d; Finel and Gell, 2007: 15-18; Funk and 
Said, 2004: 12; Telhami, 2011: 28). Combined, polling suggests that U.S. action influences 
regional opinion (Telhami, 2004: 38; 2011: 28; Zogby and Zogby, 2009: 6), which implies 
that the U.S could pursue policies that would reverse the degree of regional enmity expressed 
toward the United States. 
On the other hand, there is a cultural element that must likewise be considered when 
contextualizing Arab/Muslim perceptions of the United States. Research, for instance, shows 
that most MENA inhabitants believed that U.S. policy in the Middle East was designed to 
“weaken and divide the Islamic world” (79%) and to “spread Christianity” (64%) (Kull, 2007: 
5). Therefore, Arab/Muslims perceive U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq as threatening 
to Islam and Muslims, or their identity (Abdallah, 2003: 67; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 134). 
Such perceptions are disconcerting since they suggest the United States is an existential threat 
to MENA identity. Consequently, the sentiment is problematic for bilateral relations as 
identity impacts on perceptions and behavior, and has the potential to induce conflict 
continuation or escalation (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 13; Funk and Said, 2004: 6; Galtung, 
2004: 141; Lederach, 1995: 18). 
Reference to identity introduces complex evaluative parameters that include both positive 
and negative aspects in this particular instance. Abdallah (2003: 63) and Funk and Said (2004: 
11), for example, acknowledge the complexity of perspectives in the MENA, as inhabitants 
view both positive and negative aspects of Western society and culture. Summarizing a 
dichotomy of “envy and fear, admiration and suspicion,” Funk and Said (2004: 11) state that 
“Western technological, economic and political achievements are appealing, while the 
assertion of Western military, political, and economic power creates feelings of distrust and 
resentment.” The quotes emphasize that Arab/Muslims observe both admirable and distasteful 
qualities in the West (Abdallah, 2003: 63). One potential value of appreciating the complexity 
of Arab/Muslim perceptions of the West is that it demonstrates there are avenues for pursuing 
cross-cultural discourse, cooperation and practices for fostering improved relations (Funk and 
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Said, 2004: 15-18). Pursuit of improved relations requires dialogue, defined here as a 
symmetrical discussion on issues which aids in the enhancement of mutual awareness and 
understanding, problem solving and increased trust (Head, 2012: 41), to determine which U.S. 
actions would change attitudes and under which conditions and circumstances the region 
prefers to interact with the United States. 
The potential for productive dialogue naturally necessitates stakeholders view the “other” 
as a trustworthy partner. Unfortunately, as expressed above, regional experience and U.S. 
duplicitous behavior has compromised bilateral trust (Funk and Said, 2004: 12). For example, 
there are obvious contradictions between U.S. policy and its stated policy objectives and 
values as evident in Iraq. Most notably, the George W. Bush administration’s rhetorical 
promotion of democracy and human rights (which Arab/Muslim populations admire) was 
contradicted through practices such as the use of torture and illegal detention (Abdallah, 2003: 
66; Amnesty International, 2008; 2013: 12-13; Kepel, 2004: 237). Similarly, Abdallah (2003: 
68-70) includes U.S. support for undemocratic and oppressive governments throughout the 
Middle East, which equally contradicts political assertions by U.S. leaders that they desire to 
proliferate democratic governance or human rights internationally. In this latter instance, U.S. 
support for unpopular and undemocratic leaders in the Middle East, and mismanaged or 
misinformed policies, gives the impression of duplicity. Such sentiment, in turn, undermines 
Arab/Muslim popular trust because behavior does not correspond with rhetoric (Abdallah, 
2003: 68-70; Calhoun, 2005: 104; Marsella, 2005: 665), giving credence to the perception that 
the United States is untrustworthy and not a respectable counterpart for conducting dialogue. 
Exacerbating popular mistrust, the predominance of popular suspicion is often 
monopolized on by political or religious leaders and the media in the MENA, who aggravate 
or manipulate preexisting stereotypes of the U.S. to their advantage (Abdallah, 2003: 69; Funk 
and Said, 2004: 6; Gage and others, 2003: 3-4). For instance, Funk and Said (2004: 6) 
suggest: “Middle Eastern programming […] often provides grist for the mill of defeatist, 
conspiratorial theories of American foreign policy making.” Such propaganda, as outlined in 
the quote, is utilized to refocus attention away from Arab/Muslim leaders and onto the West 
(Funk and Said, 2004: 6-7). When MENA leaders and respected figures transfer responsibility 
for prevalent political-social conditions in the region to Western countries, focus and 
accountability is reallocated away from local representatives (Funk and Said, 2004: 6-7). 
While not always accurate, such excuses are widely accepted by local populations, as they are 
consistent with preexisting stereotypes of the West and/or the United States (Funk and Said, 
2004: 6-7). 
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In summary, there is a high degree of distrust and suspicion in the MENA of the United 
States. These qualities undermine bilateral relations and appeals for dialogue, scuttling hopes 
of establishing trust and pursuing mutual understanding. It was, however, noted that MENA 
inhabitants recognize both admirable and deplorable qualities when contemplating the United 
States government and society. The existence of admirable qualities may provide avenues for 
pursuing improved relations across cultures, should they be examined and monopolized upon. 
2.3.2 Middle Eastern perception of the West 
Funk and Said (2004: 14) argue the derivation of the conflictive relationship between 
Arab/Muslims and the West is mainly identity-based rather than associated to foreign policy 
in general. The authors emphasize identity as a source when articulating the dichotomous 
relationship between Arab/Muslims and Westerners with the “other.” They write: 
The problem […] has nothing to do with what we are doing, and 
everything to do with who they are and what motivates them – for 
example, hate, greed, and antipathy to our values. They are different 
from us; we value reasonable, peaceful approaches to problems while 
they seek to impose their own culture by force. The conflict is about 
identity, not policies – about opposed values but not about concerns, 
interests, and needs that often overlap (Funk and Said, 2004: 14). 
Funk and Said thus regard identity as the foundation of conflict between the West and 
Arab/Muslim communities, which challenge the hypotheses offered by Telhami (2009), Gage 
and others (2003), Mogahed (2006) and others that anti-Western/American perceptions are 
rooted in (U.S.) foreign policy, as emphasized in the previous subsection. The practical and 
theoretical implications of Funk and Said’s (2004: 14) assertion are that foreign policy 
alteration alone is insufficient for improving cross-cultural perceptions. Contrary, perceptions 
of the “other” should be the focal point to ensure cognitive reframing. 
Testing this theory, available open-source literature qualifies how Arab/Muslims 
conceptualize the conflict relation with the West. Polling data provides support Funk and 
Said’s (2004) hypothesis that negative perceptions are identity-based. For instance, Esposito 
and Mogahed (2010: 35) asked respondents to identify the roots of cross-cultural conflict, and 
found that respondents from MENA countries ranked religion (40%), political (40%) and 
cultural (9%) differences respectively. Of these, religion and culture are identity-based 
(Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 35). Fortunately, their research includes a sample of Iraq 
citizens, so it is possible to isolate their opinions. At the micro level, Iraqis perceived the roots 
of conflict between the Arab/Muslims and the West as 45% political, 36% religious and 10% 
culture (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 41), suggesting some variation between micro and 
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macro level sentiment. Nonetheless, nearly half of MENA and Iraqi respondents indicate the 
roots of conflict are identity-based (religion and culture), as opposed to policy based. 
Identifying the typology of roots is important since they qualitatively influence how 
current and future bilateral relations are perceived and how they might be altered (Esposito 
and Mogahed, 2010: 35-41). On the one hand, those respondents who view conflict as rooted 
in religion and/or culture are increasingly likely to predict conflict between Muslims and the 
West is unavoidable (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 36). In short, identity-based sources of 
conflict complicate the potential of implementing and achieving conflict resolution. On the 
other hand, those who view cross-cultural conflict as politically motivated tend to be more 
optimistic about the probability that future conflict can be avoided (Esposito and Mogahed, 
2010: 35-41), as it is easier to alter policy than identity. 
From these findings, it can be surmised that singular efforts to alter policy has the 
potential of mollifying respondents whom believe conflict is politically rooted (Gage and 
others, 2003: 2-3). Nevertheless, policy change will be less effective for altering opinions of 
those who perceive the conflict is rooted in cultural or religious differences (Esposito and 
Mogahed, 2010: 35-41). In this latter instance, conflict runs deeper and requires cognitive 
alterations. Hence, the emphasis on religion and culture as being sources of conflict indicates 
that conflict across the examined cultures is more resistant to conflict resolution or 
compromise (Svensson, 2013: 413-414). Conflict resilience is couched on the premise that 
alteration of deeply rooted and/or identity-based issues requires changing the perceptions of 
both parties to effect cognitive transformation. 
Despite the qualified root causes of conflict across cultures, researchers optimistically 
suggest that conflict resolution is still possible in this instance. Esposito and Mogahed (2010: 
21), for example, found that 61% of MENA respondents believe that the quality of Muslim-
West relations is pertinent to them. Equally positive, half of them (55%) feel that conflict 
between Arab/Muslim and Western culture can be avoided (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 
35). Respondents also overwhelmingly agree that Muslims respect the West (Esposito and 
Mogahed, 2010: 23), and sixty-one percent perceive the international Muslim community is 
committed to improving relations with the West (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 21). While the 
qualified opinions provide reasons for optimism among the “in-group”, Muslim respondents 
are less optimistic when projecting “out-group” opinion of Muslims or their interest in 
altering cross-cultural relationships (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 52). 
Although a majority of MENA respondents believe conflict between Muslims and the 
West is avoidable, “most did not believe conflict is being avoided currently” (Esposito and 
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Mogahed, 2010: 19). Hence, the quote emphasizes that responsibility for not avoiding conflict 
is transferred to the West. For instance, 65% of MENA respondents claim the West does not 
respect Muslims (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 52). Disrespect is problematic for building 
constructive relationships as it produces mistrust and grievances. In a similar vein, half of 
Arab/Muslim respondents believe that Muslims residing in the West are not “treated as equal 
citizens” and are instead “excluded from social, political and civic life” (Gallup, 2011: 6). The 
perceived grievances outlined in the quote are associated with inequality and exclusion; 
discriminatory practices which Muslim respondents desire the West to alter (Esposito and 
Mogahed, 2010: 24-55). 
In closing, the survey goes on to query those changes Arab/Muslim respondents deem 
necessary. To bridge cross-cultural differences, 63% of MENA citizens believe that increased 
social interaction would improve the quality of Muslim-West relations (Esposito and 
Mogahed, 2010: 24). Interaction is naturally expected to impart increased understanding and 
appreciation. Additional, a majority expresses a desire for inhabitants in the West to: respect 
Islam and its symbols; to treat Muslims fairly; and properly depict Muslims in film and media 
(Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 55; Gallup, 2011: 7). Once again, these are identity-based 
issues that cause Muslims to feel victimized by the West due to stereotypes and their 
treatment. However, completing our discursive circle, Mogahed (2006: 3) also found that 
Muslims want the West to “stop interfering in the internal affairs of predominantly Muslim 
states.” This discovery suggests that policy decisions, as well as identity-based issues, equally 
influence how Arab/Muslim and Western/U.S. conflict relations are formed and 
conceptualized. Conclusively, while foreign policy alterations are necessary, they need to be 
administered in conjunction with an alteration in cross-cultural perceptions and behavior to 
change the quality of bilateral relations across these cultures. 
2.3.3 U.S./Western perceptions of Muslims 
From the reverse angle, U.S./Western perceptions of the “other” mirror Arab/Muslim 
conceptualizations noted in the previous subsections. At the micro-level, anti-Muslim feelings 
among U.S. citizens increased subsequent to 9/11 (Mogahed, 2006: 1). Dalia Mogahed (2006: 
1) discovered that 39% of U.S. citizens admit to having “felt some prejudice” toward 
Muslims. Prejudice may correlate with Tessler’s (2003: 175) finding that 54% of U.S. citizens 
perceived the 9/11 attacks as a conflict between Christianity and Islam. Hence, U.S. negative 
opinion of Arab/Muslims is high, and respondents perceive religion is an important root in the 
contemporary cross-cultural conflict. 
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Other researchers have found that negative perceptions are rooted in the Western 
conceptualization of Arab/Muslims as being inferior and responsive only to coercion and 
violence (Hashim, 2006: 211; Lieberfeld, 2005: 13). The danger of such perceptions is that it 
degrades and demonizes the “other” while suggesting that violence is necessary to manage the 
quality and trajectory of the relationship (Galtung, 2004: 78). Further explaining the roots of 
negative sentiment, Funk and Said (2004: 4-14) accuse the West of misinterpreting and 
misunderstanding inhabitants of the Middle East and followers of Islam. Prevalent 
misinterpretation and misunderstanding is attributed to a general lack of knowledge or interest 
in Islam and the Middle East (in terms of history, culture, and so forth) (Fattah and Caso, 
2009: 268; Funk and Said, 2004; Mogahed, 2006: 2). Such bold accusations are supported by 
research data. For example, a majority of U.S. respondents openly admit to knowing very little 
about Islam (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 37; Mogahed, 2006: 2). Consequently, a 
knowledge deficit is projected to increase the likelihood of instances of racism (Hashim, 
2006: 287), distrust and hatred (Funk and Said, 2004: 4-14; Mogahed, 2006: 2-3). 
Demonstrating the subversive effects of the knowledge deficit, a 2002 survey found 39% 
of U.S. respondents perceive Islam as “more prone than other religions to encourage violence 
in defense of their faith” (Smidt, 2005: 249). The perceptions outlined in the quote are rooted 
in the stereotype that Arab/Muslims are religious radicals, and the common association of 
radicalism with terrorism as broadcast by Western media (Funk and Said, 2004: 4-14). 
Popular stereotypes of Arab/Muslims are, therefore, derived from a crude reduction of a 
complex community. 
Within this discourse, Funk and Said (2004) assert: 
The dominant image of Islam in the West conveys the idea that the 
religion of approximately one fifth of humanity is an intolerantly 
ideological and prone to violence. Instead of taking critical analyses of 
Western attitudes toward Islam and the Middle East seriously, many who 
claim knowledge of the Islamic world focus overwhelmingly on threads 
of hatred and fear articulated through religious discourse, without 
reflection on the complex and deeply conflicted situations in which these 
sentiments emerge. This reinforces a background of deep suspicion 
against which Muslims must acquit themselves in order to be heard in 
policymaking circles (Funk and Said, 2004: 13). 
The quote emphasizes how U.S. citizens crudely reduce Islam into a collective body of 
religious radicals, an inaccurate starting point from which Muslims are forced to escape. 
Complicating objectivity, the perception of Muslims being violent is propagated by 
political rhetoric and the mass media to which “the average Westerner” is exposed (Funk and 
Said, 2004: 12-13). In this manner, a complex social and religious system is reduced to “a 
  
156 
 
simple ‘moderate vs. extremist’ dichotomy, typically leaving the impression that the most 
‘strict’ and even disturbing interpretations of Islamic values are the most authentic and widely 
accepted” (Funk and Said, 2004: 6). The quote accentuates that the rudimentary manner in 
which Muslims and Islam are often presented by politicians and the media reinforces popular 
notions of an Arab/Muslim proclivity for violence. These notions are promoted through 
excessive media coverage of violence, terrorism, and radicalism that produce and reinforce 
stereotypes, while ignoring the fact that “radicals” in the Middle East have minor social, 
political and religious influence (Funk and Said, 2004: 12-15; Gerges, 2009: 290). As 
misconceptions proliferate, Western recipients “retreat into defensiveness rather than seek the 
reasons for passionately held Muslim views” (Funk and Said, 2004: 13). Western citizens are 
thus suggested to neglect acquiring increased knowledge of drivers of Arab/Muslim 
grievances and animosity toward the West, and contrary absolve responsibility by 
conjecturing that all Muslims are violent radicals.  
Upon this foundation, we redirect our attention to further examining how U.S. citizens 
conceptualize the root causes of cross-cultural violence. When qualifying root causes of 
conflict between Arab/Muslims and the West, 35% of U.S. citizens feel inter-cultural 
divisions are politically based, 36% that they are religiously, and 26% believe they are 
cultural (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 38, 41; Gallup, 2011: 4). Here, we observe that a 
majority of U.S. citizens perceive divergences are culturally and religiously influenced which 
suggest the conflict is identity based rather than policy based (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 
28-41). At its extreme, twenty percent of U.S. respondents feel that “most Muslims around the 
world are not accepting of other religions and of people of different races other than their 
own” (Gallup, 2011: 12). While a small percentage express such radical opinions, their 
accusatory approach, combined with the identity-based roots of the conflict, makes bridging 
relations across these cultures more challenging than resolving political differences (Esposito 
and Mogahed, 2010: 28-41). 
By way of conclusion, U.S. respondents are pessimistic that relations between 
Arab/Muslims and the West can become constructive (Mogahed, 2006: 1-2). Justification for 
pessimism is found in the fifty-eight percent of respondents who believed that Arab/Muslims 
are disinterested in improving relations with the West (Mogahed, 2006: 2). Like 
Arab/Muslims, U.S. respondents project blame for the quality of U.S.-Middle East relations 
onto the “other”. For example, “one-third of Americans say they think Muslim countries have 
a very unfavorable opinion of the U.S,” and they believe such sentiment is a result of 
“misinformation” (Gallup, 2011: 18-19). This sentiment creates a relational impasse. 
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Nonetheless, Western perceptions are not completely fatalistic. U.S. citizens, for example, 
perceive value in maintaining a relationship with Muslims. Approximately three quarters of 
U.S. respondents feel Muslim-Western interaction is beneficial (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 
22, 29). Moreover, those respondents who view a future relationship positively far outweigh 
the twenty-one percent that perceive Muslims as a threat (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 29-
30). Equally positive, 53% of U.S. citizens acknowledge, “the West does not respect the 
Muslim world” (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 52-53)56. This finding alone suggests that U.S. 
citizens recognize their contribution to the deconstructive relationship. The combination of 
findings denoted here are reassuring in terms of proclivity for cultivating improved relations, 
suggesting that there is a foundation upon which constructive relations could be established. 
2.3.4 General assessment 
This section qualified macro level sentiment between the West and the Middle East. We 
demonstrated that there has been long-standing Arab/Muslim enmity toward the U.S. and the 
West, of which negative sentiment toward the former was exacerbated by the 2003 invasion 
and occupation of Iraq. We also illustrated that scholars suggest animosity across Western and 
Arab Muslim cultures is rooted in policy and identity. On the one hand, U.S./Western policy 
is suggested by Arab/Muslims to demonstrate that the United States/West is trying to 
undermine Islam and take control of the region. Such sentiment, it was demonstrated, suggests 
that policy changes would help to alter popular sentiment. 
On the other hand, some scholars emphasize that the conflictual relationship between the 
West and Arab/Muslims is deeply rooted and identity based. Funk and Said (2004) brilliantly 
accentuate the depth of conflict at the macro level in this frame. They summarize: “The 
Western idea that Islam is violence-prone finds its Muslim counterpoint in the notion that the 
West is viewed as inherently oppressive; both views are rooted in particular ways of 
construing history—ways that are intended to legitimize warfare” (Funk and Said, 2004: 15). 
The present quote accentuates the existential nature of the conflict and the cross-cultural 
parallels in perceptions, which suggests that identity, behavior and cognitive processing all 
play a role in the construction and maintenance of the conflictual relationship. 
Qualifying the roots of conflict is essential for understanding how conflict resolution 
might be approached across cultures. If conflict is identity based, policy changes alone are 
insufficient because Arab/Muslims and Westerners perceive the cross-cultural conflict is 
                                                          
 
56 Acknowledged disrespect remained consistent between 2008 and 2011 (Gallup, 2011: 3). 
  
158 
 
rooted primarily in religious and cultural divergences. Consequently, mutual cognitive and 
behavioral changes must occur. Contrary, when conflict is rooted in political differences, it is 
considered less problematic by comparison to religious and cultural divergences, since it 
requires policy changes. In conclusion, it appears that both policy and identity influences 
bilateral perceptions and both should be addressed to resolve the conflict at the macro level. 
Finally, we briefly outlined U.S./Western perspectives of Muslims. It was demonstrated 
that U.S. citizens express enmity toward Muslims, while admitting that they have limited 
knowledge about Islam. Our analysis also qualified U.S./Western tendencies to stereotype 
Muslims as violent radicals. Such trends increase the propensity for suspicion and violence. 
Moreover, U.S./Westerners view religion as a primary root of conflict, since Islam is 
commonly perceived as promoting intolerance. It is expected to be difficult to pursue conflict 
resolution, because the conflict is rooted in identity rather than policy. 
Summarizing bilateral conflict sentiment, Funk and Said (2004) emphasize: “This idea of 
the ‘other’ as an inferior rival or shadow of the ‘self’ has led to dehumanizing stereotypes as 
well as to habits of selective perception in which negative interactions are remembered while 
more positive encounters are forgotten” (Funk and Said, 2004: 4-5). As denoted, these 
dichotomous and violent perceptions make conflict continuation across cultures likely. It is, 
therefore, necessary to alter the identity, perceptions, and behavior to advance conflict 
resolution. 
The depth of conflict within society complicates the probability of resolving the conflict. 
For instance, one recognized practice of improving relations is dialogue where discussions can 
be held on conflict roots and possible techniques of resolving outstanding, conflict-generating 
divergences  (Calhoun, 2005: 105; Funk and Said, 2004: 16; Head, 2012: 41; Ropers, 2003: 2-
4). However, Funk and Said (2004: 1) caution, “[o]n both sides of the troubled relationship 
between Americans and the Muslim Middle East, there is deep estrangement and a growing 
belief in the futility of communication.” Funk and Said’s quote suggests a methodological 
paradox, since dialogue is thought useful for designing a framework (Bar-On, 2004: 251; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 103-105) but is rejected by both cultures. While the depth of cross-cultural 
conflict is obvious, and practices to advance it are fraught with challenges, Funk and Said 
remain optimistic about the utility of conflict resolution in context as long as the program is 
not used “to establish the rightness of existing positions,” or convert the other (Funk and Said, 
2004: 13). Rather than using a process of conflict resolution to project and prove one’s 
rightness, as articulated in the quote, the authors argue that cognitive transformation should 
occur symmetrically whereby mutual change and amity can be advanced. 
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The former paragraph raises two issues. On the one hand, Funk and Said’s reference to 
conflict resolution raises an important conceptual and theoretical question: namely, is conflict 
resolution conceptualized and practiced in similar manners across these cultures? This 
question is examined in the second part of the research when conflict resolution is analyzed 
through a literature review of Western and Arab/Muslim scholars’ conceptualizations to 
qualify convergences and divergences across cultures. On the other hand, Gallup research 
found that most respondents throughout predominantly Western and Muslim countries “were 
neither receptive nor rejecting of Muslim-West relations” (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 49). 
Hence, at the macro level, both groupings can be most appropriately described as indifferent 
toward improved relations across cultures (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 49). Despite the 
suggested indifference, we argue that conflict resolution is necessary at the micro level and 
will test cross-cultural conceptualizations and openness to conflict resolution between the 
United States and Iraq through survey research in chapter 6. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The objective of the present chapter was to present numerous political, social and 
economic consequences of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and their repercussions on micro and 
macro level public opinion. Utilizing open source data and scholarly literature available in the 
English language, we were able to construct a snapshot of cross-cultural public opinion. Our 
analysis demonstrates there are social implications of historical and contemporary interaction 
between the United States and Iraq at the micro level, as well as between the U.S. and MENA 
at the macro level. The contents of this chapter, in addition to chapter 1, prove Hypothesis 1, 
that the long-standing conflict relationship between the United States and Iraq has produced 
bilateral animosity between the two societies, which is most easily qualified subsequent to the 
2003 war and occupation. 
The chapter opened by qualifying popular opinion in Iraq. It demonstrated that sentiment 
toward the invasion was initially polarized and then rapidly became negative as the 
occupation endured. It was simultaneously illustrated that perceptions initially diverged 
according to ethnic or sectarian affiliation, notably that the Sunni were usually more negative 
in their assessments than the Shiʻa and Kurds. However, by the end of the war, negative 
sentiment toward the occupation increased among all major identity groups in Iraq, signifying 
that events had decreased the quality of perceptions. The increased animosity expressed 
toward the U.S. and coalition forces as the occupation endured is determined a result of the 
conditions experienced, for instance increased sectarian violence and the insurgency. Equally 
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problematic in terms of the quality of bilateral relations, as negative popular sentiment 
increased, it is paralleled by increased acceptance of attacks on coalition forces. 
Increased avocation of attacks against the coalition is rooted in the perceptions of the 
occupation as unwanted, the U.S. as disinterested in the welfare of the country and its citizens, 
and the placement of blame for conditions experienced during the occupation squarely onto 
the United States. In particular, many Iraqis blame the U.S. for the prevailing insecurity and 
other problems experienced during the occupation. These include responsibility for increased 
sectarian divisions, the proliferation of insecurity, and the relative instability of Iraq in current 
geopolitical terms. At its extreme, Iraqis perceive that the U.S. purposefully sabotaged Iraq, 
stole its resources and functioned to undermine Islam. By the end of the occupation, most 
Iraqis, regardless of their identity, perceived the U.S. invasion was more harmful than helpful. 
Thereafter, we examined the human and social impact of the war and occupation on Iraq. 
While there are diverging estimates concerning the quantity of death produced, most agree 
that a minimum of 100,000 Iraqi civilians died as a result of the war and occupation. 
Similarly, a large portion of Iraq’s society was internally or externally displaced as a result of 
the war. Among the displaced, some citizens escaped prior to the invasion, while others were 
forced to relocate during the occupation. Included in the statistics examined, Iraq lost a 
respectable portion of middle class citizens and professionals that would have been beneficial 
to the reconstruction of the country. Displacement was caused by a combination of factors 
including U.S. military operations and (forced) ethnic cleansing of areas by sectarian militias.  
Irrespective of its origins, the pervasiveness of these human and social tragedies affected 
society at large, since at least one-fifth of the population are estimated to have died or been 
displacement as a result of U.S. intervention between 2003 and 2011. 
Attention then turned to Iraqi perception of U.S. military conduct. We illustrated that 
many Iraqis prioritized security, although most felt that the U.S. military performed 
inadequately and were responsible for the insecurity that proliferated. Our qualification of 
sentiment provides insight into Iraqi mistrust of the U.S. military which corresponds with 
their desire for a rapid end to the occupation and endorsement of violence against them to 
hasten a withdrawal. Overall negative sentiment expressed toward U.S. military performance 
is attributed to the unwanted occupation as well as its failure to provide security. In addition, 
the U.S. military’s prioritization of force protection, whose implementation witnessed troops 
protecting and isolating themselves, transferred risk to civilians. 
At this point, our literature review emphasized that force protection in Iraq was 
counterproductive as it undermined COIN strategy and failed to establish constructive 
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relationships between occupying force and the occupied. Such failures increased insecurity, 
placed the population at increased risk and undermined military-civilian interaction which 
otherwise might have increased trust, mutual awareness and cross-cultural understanding. 
Similarly, we noted that the projection of disproportional force is another component of force 
protection that equally transfers the risk of combat from the troops to civilians. By projecting 
power, military forces are able to reduce troop casualties, but the tactic has the propensity of 
increasing civilian casualties in urban combat. Combined, U.S. military practices during the 
occupation produced civilian casualties, humiliated and incensed Iraqis, and exacerbated anti-
occupation sentiment. 
Thereafter, security concerns were explored. To contextualize security in contemporary 
scholarly discourse, we briefly examined human security, as it is associated with the invasion 
and occupation of Iraq. Subsequent to a brief outline of human security, its history and 
shortcomings, we explored Iraqi opinion concerning security. It was noted that while the U.S. 
and Iraqis placed a high priority on security, the U.S. failed to deliver. Rampant insecurity 
caused the number of Iraqi civilian deaths to swell, which further undermined popular 
confidence in the coalition. Ultimately, prevalent insecurity placed Iraq in a dilemma, where 
Iraqis wanted the U.S. to withdraw immediately, but they simultaneously feared U.S. 
departure would intensify violence. Nevertheless, it was not until 2010 that Iraqis expressed 
the opinion that security was improving. However, these gains were reversed in 2012 when 
sectarian violence and IS operations caused another spike in insecurity. 
Exacerbating the social and political turmoil inside Iraq was the manifestation of (violent) 
sectarian division and competition. As denoted, sectarian fracturing first manifested in 
retributive killings and isolated violence, and later transformed into ethnic cleansing and 
competition for positions of authority at the local and national levels, which coalition forces 
failed to curb. The competition for authority witnessed individuals assuming posts and then 
distributing positions, goods and services according to sectarian identity. The United States is 
held responsible for producing sectarian conflict for two reasons. First, analysts and Iraqis 
perceive U.S. policy was driven by pro-Shi‘a and anti-Sunni sentiment, with the U.S. favoring 
the former over the latter, a (perceived) tendency that exacerbated preexisting social tensions. 
For instance, de-Baʻathification, as noted in chapter 1, is perceived a demonstration of 
favoritism. Second, the United States also aided and rewarded those who embraced goals 
similar to the occupier. In this manner, the U.S. appointed individuals to posts at the local and 
national levels who appeared to adhere to similar objectives. In many cases, the Sunni had 
refused to cooperate and thereby were marginalized. Combined, such policies benefited 
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particular identity groups, institutionalized sectarianism in Iraq’s political and social 
structures, and are believed to have augmented insecurity and violence between Iraq’s 
heterogeneous groups as competition escalated. 
Finally, analysis of opinion in Iraq closed by noting the general suspicions of the U.S. 
subsequent to the invasion and occupation. Here, we underscored several objectives Iraqis 
perceive were driving U.S. policy, such as the desire to acquire Iraq’s natural resources or 
counter Islam. We also noted that anti-Americanism was rooted in distrust of the United 
States as a result of historical experiences endured, including U.S. failure to aid rebellions 
following the 1991 War and the decade of sanctioning endured during the 1990s. Augmented 
by unpopular decisions made during the occupation, there was a persistent degree of negative 
opinions toward the United States across a spectrum of issues. 
The second section of chapter two qualified the effects of the war on the U.S. and its 
citizens. Since the invasion and occupation was asymmetrical both in terms of military 
capability, venue and effects, our assessment reflects this reality. We began by analyzing 
public perceptions of the war. While the issue divided popular opinion in the run-up to the 
invasion, once the invasion was underway, a majority of U.S. citizens supported the endeavor. 
However, as the occupation endured, many U.S. citizens reversed their opinion and 
determined that the war was a mistake. Subsequent to the end of the occupation, many citizens 
believed the operation in Iraq did not achieve its goals. 
Focus then shifted to the human cost of the war, in addition to the impact of the war on 
society. While U.S. casualties were quantitatively smaller than those experienced in Iraq, their 
social impact is quite profound. In fact, about half of U.S. citizens claim to have known 
someone who served in Iraq and twelve percent knew someone whom had been killed or 
injured while serving. The statistics are extraordinary considering that less than one percent of 
the U.S. population was active duty military personnel between 2003 and 2011. At the same 
time, we denoted the psychological complications experienced among veterans and their 
families. There has been a significant increase in the rates of suicide and domestic violence 
among soldiers and veterans of the war, creating long-term social concerns. 
We then examined the cost of the war in terms of military overstretch and the quality and 
integrity of the armed forces. Here it was demonstrated that U.S. military capacity was over-
extended, which pressured the DOD to make controversial decisions and implement critical 
measures that directly impacted on soldiers and society. On the one hand, the military lacked 
the necessary resources to provide personal protective equipment to troops deployed to Iraq, 
and in some instances, soldiers and citizens had to privately purchase such equipment to 
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ensure its availability. In this instance, military overstretch put the lives of U.S. soldiers at 
increased risk. On the other hand, the military was pressured to adapt wartime best practices 
through policies such as stop loss. Combined, these shortcomings undermined troop morale, 
popular trust, and are suggested to have impacted the psychological well-being of soldiers 
who served. 
Next, we analyzed the ballooning U.S. federal deficit. It was outlined that the fiscal cost of 
the war was purposefully postponed by the George W. Bush administration due to its 
reluctance to increase taxes. Rather than increase taxes and encourage savings, the generally 
accepted fiscal approach during wartime, citizens were encouraged to spend and taxes were 
kept to a minimum. While his policy may have reduced popular backlash throughout the 
occupation, it discreetly deferred the cost of the war and increased the federal deficit. 
We then examined media censorship and misinformation. Although U.S. citizens 
frequently prioritize (individual) constitutional rights such as freedom of the press, these 
valued principles were not observed during wartime. For instance, the Bush administration 
imposed bans on photos and film footage of deceased U.S. soldiers. Similarly, many war 
correspondents were embedded into combat units, a practice that censors information and 
encourages the journalist to bond with the unit they are attached to, thereby producing biased 
journalism. At the same time, mainstream media corporations self-censored information 
and/or provided disinformation, or failed to provide objective reporting. Accordingly, 
freedom of the press and objective reporting were undermined. 
Lastly, we examined U.S. public perceptions of Iraq. It was denoted that since the 1990s, a 
majority of U.S. citizens have expressed negative views of Iraq. In association with media 
censorship outlined earlier, it was also illustrated that there was a tendency for U.S. to falsely 
believe in the validity of justifications proffered for the 2003 invasion (Iraq’s possession 
WMD and links to terrorism). At the same time, we viewed perspective from the vantage 
point of the soldier, their actions and perceptions. The literature confirms soldiers lacked of 
basic understanding of Iraq’s history and its population (culture, history), which resulted in 
potentially avoidable culturally insensitive practices. At the same time, the failure of soldiers 
to interact with Iraqis, in part a result of the practice of force protection, led to U.S. soldiers 
stereotyping Iraqis as either insurgents or sympathizers. Corresponding negative perceptions 
and the distance maintained from an adversary is suggested to foster misconceptions, 
alienation, and at its extreme, Manichean world-views that justify the use of violence against 
the “other.” 
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Combined, our examination of the literature proves the war has affected popular sentiment 
among citizens of the U.S. and Iraq. The deconstructive sentiment associated with historical 
experiences proves Hypothesis 1, which states the protracted conflict relationship has 
produced bilateral animosity between these respective societies. The existence of social 
animosity, grievance, dislike and distrust indicates that conflict resolution is necessary to 
transform the relationship between these two countries. To reinforce this assumption and 
demonstrate parallels at the micro and macro levels, we examined macro level opinion, where 
most theory and research hitherto has been concentrated and where scholars insist that conflict 
resolution between the U.S./West and Arab/Muslims is necessary. 
We first qualified micro level animosity expressed by the Arab/Muslim community 
toward the United States. Here, it was illustrated that there has been long-standing enmity 
expressed toward the U.S., which was exacerbated by the 2003 occupation of Iraq. There are 
diverging perceptions concerning the exact roots of animosity. On the one hand, some 
scholars suggest that enmity is rooted in U.S. foreign policy. Undoubtedly, U.S. policy 
reinforces popular suspicions that the United States is trying to undermine Islam and/or 
acquire control of the Middle East region and its resources. Those suspicions are 
understandable when one objectively considers U.S. policy, which frequently deploys 
pressure and coercion to achieve its goals in the region, and seldom takes local popular 
opinion into consideration. Equally problematic, there are elements of hypocrisy, where U.S. 
representatives rhetorically promote one policy, such as the expansion of democracy, while 
implementing counter intuitive policies, including the support for authoritarian regimes, 
which contradicts official rhetoric. In short, these contradictions worsen popular mistrust. It 
can, therefore, be concluded that policy changes are warranted, and regional respondents have 
suggested in polling that certain policy changes would aid in the reversal of their opinion of 
the United States. Nonetheless, we recognize that policy changes alone are insufficient for 
altering the quality of the relationship. 
On the other hand, it was also determined that policy changes alone are insufficient for 
altering the conflictual relationship at the macro level. Instead, other Arab/Muslims perceive 
cross-cultural conflict is rooted in religious and cultural divergences. While political 
differences are less problematic to resolve, since they can be negotiated or avoided through 
policy change, religious and cultural divergences produce serious challenges as they originate 
in identity. The latter insight suggests that social/cognitive changes must occur to modify 
perceptions and behavior if conflict resolution is to be pursued. Necessity for such changes 
reinforces our call for conflict resolution, and the need to advance cognitive transformation, 
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defined in the subsequent chapter, to improve bilateral relations across cultures. While overall 
prognosis of the quality of future relations appears pessimistic, Muslim respondents claim 
they are optimistic that the quality of the relationship can change if Westerners become more 
respectful of Islam and Arab/Muslim culture. 
Finally, we briefly outlined U.S./Western perspectives of Muslims. It was illustrated that 
U.S. citizens express enmity toward Muslims, but admit that they have limited knowledge 
about Islam. It was also demonstrated that U.S./Western countries tend to stereotype Muslims 
as violent radicals. Associated deconstructive perceptions are frequently promoted through 
political rhetoric and the mass media, which are problematic because they increase the 
propensity for defensive posturing, negative sentiment and violent responses since the worst is 
assumed. Predictably, when qualifying the root causes of the cross-cultural conflict 
relationship, U.S. citizens perceive that religion and politics are fundamental catalysts of the 
cross-cultural conflict. The former is especially problematic, as many U.S. citizens perceive 
Islam as an intolerant religion and Muslims as disinterested in resolving the conflict. In this 
manner, we demonstrate that each side of the conflict relationship blames the other for the 
quality of the current relationship, indicating the importance of including society into a 
conflict resolution program. On a positive note, U.S. citizens widely believe that U.S.-Muslim 
relations are valuable, and they admit that they do not respect Muslims. 
The quantification and qualification of macro and micro bilateral perspectives articulated 
in this chapter confirms the existence of a conflictive relationship between the U.S./West and 
Middle East in general, and the U.S. and Iraq in particular. The latter theory was supported by 
the introduction of scholarly analysis of macro level relations, reinforced by survey research. 
Our literature review also demonstrates that the conflictual relationship between the United 
States and Iraq is long-standing and has affected perceptions in both countries. Based upon 
our findings, we emphasize the scholarly recommendation that protracted, violent relations 
that become rooted in society (cognitively and behaviorally), need to be altered to reduce the 
probability of a continuation of violent conflict. Since scholars argue that conflict and conflict 
resolution are conceptualized and practiced differently across cultures, the second part of this 
dissertation reviews English language literature to comparatively analyze how Western and 
Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize associated concepts and practices. The information 
provided in the subsequent part comparatively analyzes concepts, principles and practices at 
the macro level, and later uses some identified benchmarks to measure how a sample of 
laypersons conceptualize conflict resolution at the micro level in the context of U.S.-Iraq 
relations in the third part of this research. 
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Chapter 3 From Conflict to Conflict Resolution: 
Western Lexicon, Conceptualization and 
Framework 
 
Subsequent to conflict mapping and qualifying public opinion that proves the existence of 
a protracted conflictual relationship between U.S.-Iraq, we examine how a conflict 
relationship between two countries can be altered. More specifically, this part of the research 
examines how scholars in Arab/Muslim and Western cultures conceptualize conflict and 
conflict resolution. The present chapter provides an overview of “Western” understanding by 
defining associated terms and concepts as elucidated in the English language literature. The 
literature reviewed herein consists predominantly of resources from the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom. From the sources referenced, a wide conceptual framework is built and then 
expanded upon in chapter 4. Subsequent to delineating the Western approach, chapter 5 
elaborates our comparative analysis of “Arab/Muslim” conceptualizations of conflict 
resolution. Several findings extracted from our literature review in this chapter are 
operationalized in the third part of our research to qualify Iraqi and U.S. citizens’ 
conceptualization and bilateral support for conflict resolution at the interstate level in general 
and in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. 
With this overview in mind, the primary objective of the present chapter is to qualify 
conflict and conflict resolution as articulated by Western scholars. The literature review herein 
establishes a theoretical framework upon which lexicon, principles and practices of conflict 
resolution can later be compared across cultures. The framework utilized accommodates three 
recognized Western schools of peacebuilding: conflict management, conflict resolution and 
conflict transformation, whereby a variety of Western theory and practices are accommodated. 
Our wide framework accommodates later comparisons across cultures among scholars and a 
group of laypersons’ in forthcoming chapters of this research. 
Chapter 3 opens by contextualizing how the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq impacted 
perceptions of conflict resolution in theory and practice. Because U.S. representatives 
occasionally portrayed the invasion as necessary for humanitarian reasons, as a means of 
proliferating democracy, and/or as an exercise in state building—practices scholars frequently 
associate with conflict resolution and peacebuilding at the intrastate and interstate levels—the 
Iraq war incited criticism of contemporary conflict resolution in theoretical and practical 
terms. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to address associated criticisms in 
depth, their impact on discourse must be noted. Despite the critiques generated, scholars 
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continue to endorse conflict resolution as a viable process for improving deconstructive 
relationships at the intrastate and interstate level when implemented in an objective, sensitive 
and inclusive manner. 
In agreement that conflict resolution remains a viable practice, despite its challenges, the 
text then reiterates and qualifies the existence of a conflictual relationship between the United 
States and Iraq by denoting cognitive, behavioral and effective elements in context. Our 
references reiterate and build upon findings articulated in chapter four, buttressing our 
supposition that the conflict relationship between Iraq and the U.S. needs to be resolved. 
Necessity is warranted in light of the theoretical supposition that deconstructive, protracted 
conflict relationships have a high potential to continue or escalate conflictual patterns. From 
this point, we then delve into Western conflict resolution literature to examine how scholars 
conceptualize conflict and resolution by defining fundamental terminology. 
The first term to be defined and analyzed is conflict. We denote the elements of a conflict, 
behavioral typologies and the negative effects produced by conflict. Outlining components of 
a conflict underscores the fluidity and complexity of the phenomenon, which is commonly 
depicted in dichotomous terms: as either constructive or destructive. Classifying relational 
typology depends on cognitive, behavioral and discursive nuances, which frame and define a 
given relationship. Afterward, we examine how conflict components interact and can 
perpetuate a continuation of (de)constructive perceptions and behavior. These elements, 
compounded by the negative effects of violent interaction and their potentiality of reinforcing 
relational patterns, reiterate why Western scholars recommend that deconstructive conflict 
relationships be altered or resolved. 
The next term analyzed is conflict resolution, or the theory and practice of altering a 
deconstructive conflict relationship to create a constructive relationship. It is at this point that 
the three Western peacebuilding schools of thought are introduced. Each school of thought 
conceptualizes conflict differently and establishes diverse objectives when managing or 
resolving conflict. However, as exhibited, there is theoretical and practical overlap across the 
schools, and scholars sometimes utilize terminology that blurs the boundaries between the 
three disciplines. Consequently, and for the purposes of creating a holistic framework where 
converging Western theory can be amalgamated, we adopt a broad understanding of conflict 
resolution that accommodates conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation. Hence, our conflict resolution framework encompasses conflict termination at 
one end of the resolution spectrum and reconciliation at the other. 
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Subsequent to defining recurring terms and their associated processes, Kriesberg’s concise 
analytical framework of conflict resolution is introduced. The theoretical value of his 
framework is that it simplistically reduces conflict resolution to three components: the units, 
dimensions and degree. Units represent the referents engaged in a resolution process, which 
range from individuals to entire societies. Dimensions are the techniques used to advance 
transformation of the quality of a deconstructive relationship. Degree qualifies the changes 
experienced by comparatively analyzing the past, present and future trajectory of a given 
relationship and evaluating referents’ commitment to the process. 
Amalgamated, chapter 3 transitions our attention from mapping the U.S.-Iraq protracted 
conflict relationship, to understanding how conflicts develop and progress, and then to 
examining techniques for managing or advancing conflict resolution at the intrastate and 
interstate levels. Upon the basic Western framework, we later add principles, practices, 
approaches and problems in chapter 4. We begin our analysis by recalling the quality of 
contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. 
3.1 Contextualizing the improvement of U.S.-Iraq relations 
In instances of protracted violent relationships, as highlighted between Iraq and the United 
States in chapters 1 and 2, scholars hypothesize that individuals or collectives subjected to 
comparable experiences are increasingly probable to construct negative opinions of their 
adversary who is frequently deemed responsible for the wrongdoing, harms or humiliation 
endured (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354; Rosoux, 2009: 550). Paraphrasing Galtung’s (2007: 16) 
assessment of deconstructive relational patterns, he suggests “where there is conflict there 
may be frustration,” frustration leads to polarization, polarization can produce existential 
worldviews, existential perceptions can manifest in violent behavior and violent interaction 
produces trauma and aspirations for revenge. As the processes articulated in the quote evolve, 
deconstructive perceptions and behavior proliferate, protracting or escalating conflict, creating 
further animosity, trauma and destruction (Galtung, 2007: 16; Steele, 2008: 1-7). 
Contextualizing these tendencies, chapter 2 qualified and quantified the effects of the 2003 
U.S.-Iraq war at the micro and macro level, verifying the existence of a conflict relationship 
that negatively impacts on public opinion of the “other” (Hypothesis 1). The combination of 
experience and sentiment associated with them is problematic for the quality of future 
bilateral relations between these two entities. As Vasquez (2009: 171) emphasizes: “The 
history of prior interactions, particularly since the last major war, establishes a set of 
expectations and a reservoir of psychological hostility or friendship.” In the case of U.S.-Iraq 
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relations, the quote is validated through the demonstration of animosity and blame rooted in 
more than twenty years of deconstructive interaction that is likely to persist unless addressed. 
Conflict perpetuation, in such instances, is likely to occur for multiple reasons. Providing 
one explanation, Martin Shaw (2003: 120) posits: “In every active conflict, states, parties and 
movements construct and disseminate their own, highly partisan version of history.” Shaw 
here illustrates that perceptions are formulated and then dispersed through the collection, 
interpretation and dissemination of what occurred in the past, which may include real or 
perceived injustices (Boulding, 1978: 49; Parent, 2012: 30-31; Wilmer, 1998: 106-108). As 
negative perceptions are continuously (re-) processed and disseminated through stories, 
books, rituals, media and so forth, conflicts become entrenched and are subject to escalation 
(Parent, 2012: 30-31; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34-35; Worthington, 2006: 262). Over time, 
events impact and become part of the identity of those involved (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34-
35). Through such processes, a conflict perpetuates itself, rooting in the psyche and behavior 
of those engaged, which makes resolving the conflict increasingly more difficult. 
Deconstructive perceptions and behavior are often produced by distrust and fear of an 
adversary (Parent, 2012: 31-35). Fear and distrust are natural byproducts of (prolonged) 
exposure to conflict, and their perpetuation deepens and solidifies negative perceptions of the 
“other” (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354; Parent, 2012: 30-31; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34). Fear and 
distrust thereby taint referents’ interpretation of existing conflict circumstances, including the 
perceived value of a given relationship and an opponent’s intentions (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354; 
Parent, 2012: 30-36; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34). Consequently, referents often overlook or 
misinterpret their adversary’s positive qualities or actions, instead magnifying negative 
attributes (R. Fisher, 2001b: 32-33; Lederach, 1995: 17-18; Parent, 2012: 34; Worthington, 
2006: 127-128). Daniel Bar-Tal (2000: 352-353) hypothesizes that these distorted tendencies 
are a result of referents selectively processing (conflict-related) inputs in an effort to simplify 
complex relationships for the sake of minimizing uncertainty and increasing their perceived 
understanding of existing circumstances. Despite the counter-intuitive nature of selective 
processing, referents believe they have the capacity to understand a complex situation and 
predict the future, albeit subjectively, when they simplify inputs (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-353). In 
short, referents are under the impression that they are objectively rationalizing, although their 
judgment is clouded by fear, fixation on past experiences, anger and incorrect or incomplete 
observations or beliefs. 
Providing supplementary insight into the narrow and subjective cognitive processing 
common in such deconstructive relations, Ronald Fisher (2001b) interjects: 
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Among the most pervasive cognitive errors that individuals, and 
thereby groups, involved in destructive conflict make are misattributions 
about the characteristics and motives of the other side. Attribution is the 
process by which we infer causation about the behavior of another actor, 
and these judgments are critical, because they tend to guide both our 
immediate reaction and our future behavior toward that actor (R. Fisher, 
2001b: 32). 
Fisher’s quote identifies the conflict-perpetuating cognitive reductionist processing as 
“attribution” while correspondingly emphasizing its deconstructive nature. 
When attribution evolves, in-group identity strengthens as a means of coping with the 
(perceived) outside threat that the “other” represents, a processes which inevitably impacts 
relational quality (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354). Since conflict continuation leads to entrenchment, 
referents cognitively prepare to protect their interest and endure the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000: 
352-354). Within this environment, corresponding inputs are continuously processed and re-
processed, stored and disseminated at the individual and collective levels, further reinforcing 
status quo relational patterns which are probable to generate a relational impasse (Bar-Tal, 
2000: 352-354; Wilmer, 1998: 106-108). At its extreme, referents comparatively define 
themselves as the direct opposite of their adversary, perceiving the “other” as evil or 
untrustworthy (Funk and Said, 2004: 8; Galtung, 2007: 19-20), or de-humanizing them and 
identifying them as an existential threat (Boulding, 1978: 53-54; Galtung, 2007: 19-20; 
Kelman, 2004: 120-121; Long and Brecke, 2003: 30; Parent, 2012: 37; Staub, 2003: 8-12). 
When the maxim is obtained, deployment of violence is likely. Herbert Kelman (2004: 
121) explains the increased propensity for violence occurs because “it becomes easier for each 
party to minimize guilt feelings for acts of violence and oppression against the other and to 
avoid seeing itself in the role of victimizer, rather than only the role of victim.” Clearly stated, 
the quote explains that attribution, at its extreme, makes the perpetration of violence justified 
and increasingly likely to be deployed by those engaged in a conflict. Due to these pervasive 
tendencies, alteration of the quality of the relationship is hypothesized essential to improve the 
long-term quality of a given relationship and circumvent violence (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 64; 
Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 13; Bar-Tal, 2000: 356-357; Lederach, 1995: 17-19). The 
interplay and depth of the highlighted processes in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations can be 
observed in human research studies, as introduced in chapter 2. 
To contextualize the existence of conflict between the United States and Iraq, we first 
address the issue of cognitive framing and its tendency of perpetuating deconstructive 
behavior. Research conducted by Wohl and Branscombe (2009) examines in-group 
forgiveness, where members of the same collective are asked to extend forgiveness to their 
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fellow members for the wrongdoing they have committed against an out-group member, the 
latter of whom is perceived to be an existential threat. Their research centered on U.S. citizens 
and their perceptions of U.S. soldiers’ activity in Iraq. The study found that U.S. respondents 
are more likely to forgive their compatriots for wrongdoing committed against Iraqis when 
exposed to references of 9/11 prior to completing the survey (Wohl and Branscombe, 2009: 
209-211). Wohl and Branscombe’s (2009: 211-213) findings demonstrate that in-group 
forgiveness has the propensity to increase popular endorsement of or justification for violence 
perpetrated, as demonstrated in the in-group acceptance or legitimization of wrongdoing 
against the out-group due to the (perceived) threat the out-group posed. Such perceptions 
affirm that individuals are apt to dismiss or justify wrongdoing committed by the in-group 
when the “other” is perceived in a negative context. 
In light of this basic understanding of how conflict influences individuals and societies, 
we simultaneously wish to emphasize that the end of combat operations and the removal of 
military forces does not constitute a transformation of a conflictual relationship, nor does it 
guarantee the construction of peaceful relations (Lambourne, 2004: 2). While these measures 
are indicative of the end of occupation and a termination of direct physical violence, conflict 
is not synonymous with armed confrontation, violence or war, as outlined below (Wilmer, 
1998: 105). Consequently, two issues should be considered when thinking about violent 
conflict and its impact on societal perceptions in the context of Iraq and U.S. relations. 
Firstly, the United States government should appreciate that most of its activities during 
the occupation were narrowly focused and largely imposed, and thereby constitutes structural 
violence, as illustrated in chapter one (Bowen, 2013: 11; Stover and others, 2005: 831-857). 
For instance, the U.S. applied pressure during the drafting of Iraq’s constitution, encouraged 
the establishment of a liberal democracy, and hastened the conduct of democratic elections, to 
name a few examples (Allawi, 2007: 9; Haass, 2009: 262-278; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 9). 
Such activities connote the marginalization of Iraqi needs and desires in exchange for 
promoting U.S. interests (establishing a new government and stabilizing Iraq to hasten U.S. 
military withdraw). Iraqis, as articulated elsewhere, view such policies as an imposition, 
hence violent and subjected to rejection or resistance (be it violent or passive). This suggests 
that not only was direct physical violence perpetrated, but also structural violence, which 
equally influences popular sentiment. Secondly, chapter two demonstrates that long-standing 
negative sentiment exists across these groups, and is likely to endure, given the trajectory of 
U.S. relations with Iraq and other countries in the Middle East (Funk and Said, 2004: 1-3). For 
these reasons, we argue that conflict resolution should be pursued. 
  
175 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, altering the quality of a relationship and social 
perceptions requires the U.S. embark on a complex campaign of sustained and palpable 
modification of behavior and perceptions aimed at changing years of mistrust and animosity 
between both societies (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249). This suggests, on the one hand, that policy 
changes are necessary. In particular, the combination of occupation, U.S. maltreatment of 
Arab/Muslims in places like Guantánamo Bay or Abu Ghraib, and the continual projection of 
military force and political influence in the Middle East understandably give the impression 
that the U.S. is at war with Islam and Arabs (Sageman, 2008: 73-175). However, U.S. leaders 
repeatedly discount the latter claim while pursuing policies, which contradict their rhetoric 
(Obama, 2009c; 2010b). Therefore, policy must be addressed. 
On the other hand, there are equally identity-based influencers of conflict in this instance. 
For example, we demonstrated above that there are cultural and religious elements, which 
influence the quality of bilateral relationships. These components must likewise be addressed, 
since they similarly influence the trajectory of a given relationship. 
Consolidated, conflict relationships incorporate cognitive, behavioral and affective 
components (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; Parent, 2012: 30-37). We wish to quickly acknowledge 
the existence of these components in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Concerning the 
cognitive component, negative sentiment exists on both sides of the relationship, as qualified 
in chapter 2. On the one hand, anti-American/occupation sentiment was high in Iraq prior to 
and throughout the duration of the occupation (ABC News and others, 2009: 3-20; 
Burkholder, 2004e; Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 
36; Oxford Research International, 2004: 3; 2005: 3-21; Program on International Policy 
Attitudes, 2006: 6). This sentiment included a high degree of distrust of the United States and 
its agents during the occupation (Abdallah, 2003: 65-66; Bowen, 2009: 73; DeYoung, 2007; 
Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 41; International 
Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 30-41; Kull, 2007: 5; 
University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University, 2006; Zogby, 2008). On the other 
hand, U.S. soldiers were generally suspicious of all Iraqis, classifying them as either 
insurgents or collaborators (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Among the general U.S. public, there has 
been prolonged and rampant negative opinion of Iraq trended by open source surveys over the 
past two decades (Gallup, 2014). 
In behavioral terms, the United States physically occupied Iraq, and Iraq’s population 
countered their presence with techniques ranging from street protests to physical resistance in 
the armed insurgency (Allawi, 2007: 158-243; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-62; Fattah and 
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Caso, 2009: 256; Fontan, 2006: 227-235; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Ucko, 2008: 344-345). 
Hence, both groups employed violence to achieve their objectives vis-à-vis the other (Alvord 
and others, 2003; Amnesty International, 2003: 5; Burkholder, 2004e; Calhoun, 2005: 94; 
Fontan, 2006: 220-227; Hicks and others, 2011: 12; Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5-60; Roth, 
2005: 10; Tripp, 2007: 292-293). On the one hand, Iraqis viewed violence appropriate to 
hasten the end of the U.S.-led occupation and their influence (ABC News and others, 2007: 
2). On the other hand, U.S. citizens judged the military invasion and occupation of Iraq 
essential to increase U.S. national security (Tripp, 2007: 272-273). 
Finally, concerning the affective component, disagreement between the two countries 
broadly existed over the political and social trajectory of Iraq. Most notably, the United States 
deemed it necessary to invade and occupy Iraq to transform Iraq politically (remove Hussein 
and install a democratic government) and socially (overturn Baʻath Party leadership and Sunni 
control of government) (Allawi, 2007: 459). However, it was demonstrated in chapter 2 that 
many Iraqis rebuffed these objectives and condemned the United States for overturning 
preexisting social-political structures (Ryan, 2010: 66). The policy, thus, increased animosity 
toward the United States, whom Iraqis blame for the conditions endured and the contemporary 
predicament Iraq finds itself in. Amalgamated, all three components of a deep conflict 
relationship are present which reinforces the need for resolving or transforming the conflict. 
Although we have proved the existence of a protracted conflict relationship, the literature 
on conflict resolution does not discuss U.S.-Iraq relations in particular, but rather concentrates 
attention at the regional level. Accordingly, it is necessary to reference macro level theory 
when considering conflict resolution at the micro level. Contemplating the depth of the cross-
cultural conflict relationship at the macro level, Funk and Said (2004) construct a pessimistic 
image of bilateral relations between the United States and Arab/Muslim countries of the 
Middle East. Due to its relevance, their assessment is quoted at length. They surmise: 
As distasteful as crude enemy images may appear to the moderate 
and largely apolitical majorities in both cultural regions, the 
preoccupation of image-makers and sensationalists with instances of 
confrontation and cultural divergence has fostered widespread attitudes 
of distrust and resignation to the seeming “inevitability” of conflict 
stemming from irreconcilable differences. These attitudes have become 
increasingly compelling to many in the wake of two Persian Gulf wars, 
the attacks of September 11, and the escalation of Israeli-Palestinian 
violence that followed the breakdown of the Oslo [peace] process. As a 
result, competition and violence are taken for granted as part of the 
natural state of things, rather than regarded as problems worthy of fact-
finding and soul-searching investigation. All who would seek to 
understand conflict between Middle Eastern Muslims and the West must 
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therefore face widespread and powerful perceptions that “our reality” and 
“their reality” cannot meet, and that authentic security is to be found in 
cultural retrenchment combined with vigorous efforts to repress, repel, or 
convert the adversary (Funk and Said, 2004: 7). 
Their quote reiterates that cross-cultural conflict in this instance is deeply rooted within both 
societies, founded upon historical experience and alternative goals. Depth of the conflict 
within society is equally witnessed in the manner in which the “other” is depicted. 
The authors, for instance, articulate that Manichean perspectives of the “other” are 
mutually embraced. Manichean perspectives complicate conflict resolution because: 
conventional discourse on “Islam and the West” is deeply laden with 
presuppositions of irreconcilable “otherness,” and tends to reinforce the 
idea that “we” cannot work with “them” until “they” become like “us.” 
“Islam” and “the West” are regarded as exclusive, static categories; 
cultural and religious factors are obstacles to peacemaking, not resources. 
A “clash” is inevitable, and can only be managed (Funk and Said, 2004: 
22). 
The quote illustrates how said sentiment undermines the quality of relations. In such 
circumstances, scholars recommend conflict resolution be pursued to alter discursive 
narratives, perceptions and behavior, whereby the predominant and (deep) rooted nature of the 
conflict relationship can be altered over time. 
Advocating conflict resolution at the macro level, Funk and Said (2004: 22-23) 
prescriptively suggest efforts be made to “counteract misperceptions and double standards” 
that exist within both referent groups (among governments, societies and scholarship). Here 
the authors are suggesting a twofold, interrelated approach. One the one hand, cross-cultural 
misconceptions needs to be addressed. These include, for example, addressing the popular 
inaccuracy that all Muslims are violent radicals. On the other hand, rhetoric and actions have 
to parallel one another. For instance, the United States should more clearly articulate its 
objectives in the Middle East, and, thereafter, ensure that stated policy goals are reinforced by 
actions which adhere to those articulated objectives (Funk and Said, 2004: 22-23). In this 
manner, action would corroborate rhetoric, thereby surmounting one of the Arab/Muslim 
complaints (duplicity) emphasized and providing an environment where trust can be earned. 
This macro level assessment parallels our micro level assessment noted earlier. 
Hence, many scholars recommend implementing conflict resolution to manage conflict 
continuation or escalation by deconstructing negative psychological, behavior and social 
components and their effects (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 12-17; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359; 
Hartwick and Barki, 2002: 5; Kriesberg, 2001: 60-61; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 6-7, 35-
62; Worthington, 2006: 9-16). The minimal objective, in context, should be the neutralization 
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of arguments favoring the use of coercion and violence vis-à-vis the other (Funk and Said, 
2004: 1-23). Reference to conflict resolution in the U.S. and Iraq context, however, presents 
three fundamental theoretical dilemmas that must be contemplated and addressed. First, the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq exacerbated criticism of conflict resolution as a theory and 
practice (Johansen, 2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). The critiques proffered will 
be briefly analyzed below. Second, there are imperative theoretical and epistemological 
divergences within the field of conflict resolution in the West that require clarification 
(Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 30; Reimann, 2004: 2). Several differences within Western 
theory are examined in this chapter and the next. Lastly, theoretical and practical divergences 
across cultures are suggested to exist, and these must equally be qualified to determine how 
interstate conflict resolution might be pursued across these cultures (Avruch, 2003: 2; Briggs, 
2003: 287-306; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006: 53-54; Reimann, 2004: 11). Cross-cultural 
comparisons are examined in the forthcoming chapters 5 and 6 of this research. 
Returning our focus to the first dilemma, the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq had negative 
implications on contemporary conflict resolution and peacebuilding discourse (Johansen, 
2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). Since conflict resolution has been closely 
associated with practices such as the international proliferation of democratic governance and 
humanitarian intervention, both of which fall under rubric of peacebuilding, the George W. 
Bush administration’s commandeering of corresponding objectives to justify the 2003 
invasion and occupation of Iraq had profound implications on how the discipline and practice 
is appraised (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). Most importantly, the militarization of state 
building and the proliferation of democracy in Iraq discredited peacebuilding within 
scholarship and among the international community (Johansen, 2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 3). According to Ramsbotham and others (2011: 6), critical scholarly discourse 
can be reduced to three critiques which hypothesize conflict resolution: (1) is impotent for 
resolving conflict (the Realist critique); (2) its practices are implemented in an uncritical, 
unbalanced and unjust manner (the Marxist critique); and (3) it is inapplicable or 
inappropriate across cultures because its theories and practices are predominantly perceived as 
Western in style and approach. While these criticisms have merit, and should be 
contemplated, they are not irrefutable. 
In my opinion, U.S. operations in Iraq fall victim to critique number two. The United 
States implemented its reconstruction and peacebuilding strategies in Iraq in an uncritical, 
unjust and unbalanced manner, as outlined in chapter 1. Among other faults, the policy was 
imposed, culturally insensitive and ineffective due to the high degree of popular rejection of 
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the program, an approach I strongly criticize and discourage. However, the objectives of 
proliferating democracy, human rights and other associated peacebuilding goals, I believe, 
were included into the Bush administration’s list of justifications because the WMD-terror 
arguments failed to garner sufficient popular support. Therefore, I would argue that 
peacebuilding objectives were secondary to the removal of Saddam Hussein, and the Bush 
administration was less concerned with pursuing peacebuilding as a theory and practice, and 
more interested in exploiting the theory to advance U.S. geopolitical interests and garner 
international support. While my assumption might explain the administration’s limited 
attention given to peacebuilding in Iraq, it is not designed to justify U.S. actions or deflect 
warranted criticism. Instead, I wish simply to highlight that I conjecture U.S. prioritization of 
peacebuilding was limited in nature, as associated principles and practices were simply 
enticing justifications for garnering support for the deposing of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, I 
have mixed opinions about the applicability of critique number two in context. 
The third critique of conflict resolution following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, introduced 
above, likewise has merit. Conflict resolution, as practiced in the West, is not always 
applicable or acceptable in other cultures. Chapter five demonstrates that some scholars 
emphatically insist that Western approaches to conflict resolution are inapplicable in 
Arab/Muslim culture. Nonetheless, Arab/Muslim and Western conflict resolution practices at 
the intrastate and interstate levels, it will be demonstrated actually share many objectives, 
principles and tools for advancing resolution. Further cross-cultural compatibility will also be 
demonstrated in chapter six when we examine opinion among a convenience sample of 
laypersons from the United States and Iraq. Nonetheless, the findings outlined in forthcoming 
chapters do not suggest that a Western approach to conflict resolution should be prioritized or 
imposed. Contrary, we argue that cross-cultural approaches share more commonalities at the 
intrastate and interstate level than is commonly accredited, and we believe that symmetrical 
adaptations of existing theory and practice can be blended to produce mutually acceptable 
techniques when implementing conflict resolution across cultures. This point will be 
highlighted in the Conclusions and Recommendations chapter. Therefore, we believe that 
cultures practice conflict resolution differently, and these divergences should be measured and 
respected. 
Finally, concerning the first scholarly critique, Ramsbotham and others (2011: 4, 269) 
convincingly argue that conflict resolution theory and practices remain viable for altering 
contemporary deconstructive conflict relations at the intrastate and interstate levels when 
implemented appropriately. Acceptable implementation requires accommodative actions, 
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including taking into consideration the needs and desires of stakeholders and exercising 
cultural sensitivity (denoted in the previous critique) (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 60-61, 
236). We similarly maintain that conflict resolution, despite its flaws, many of which are 
outlined throughout this part of the thesis, retains the potential to transform the way societies 
and governments interact, and hence can alter the quality of relations. 
Maintaining the position that conflict resolution is viable at the intrastate and interstate 
levels, our analysis, takes into consideration the critiques of imbalance (critique 2) and 
inappropriateness (critique 3) just described. To minimize the risk that our call for conflict 
resolution falls victim to these critiques, we conduct a comparison of scholarly understanding 
of conflict resolution across Arab/Muslim and Western culture at the macro level in chapter 
five. To measure the appropriateness of theory at the micro level, we qualify how conflict 
resolution is conceptualized in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations among a small sample of 
citizens from each country in chapter six. In this manner, we do not limit analysis to Western 
scholarship, but comparatively analyze conceptualizations of conflict resolution among 
scholars and at the micro level to identify cross-cultural convergences and divergences. 
With the necessity of U.S.-Iraq conflict resolution contextualized and several critiques 
introduced, our investigation now turns to more deeply analyzing how Western scholars 
conceptualize conflict. The following section defines the term conflict, examines its elements, 
and examines behavior and effects of the phenomenon. Then we examine conflict resolution. 
3.2 Conceptualizing conflict 
Analyzing how conflict is conceptualized from a Western perspective is theoretically 
necessary for two reasons. First, our exploration of scholarly literature in the English 
language, broadly referred to hereafter as “Western,” underscores violent conflict relations 
have adverse physical, social and cognitive effects on referents, which need to be addressed 
(Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4). Second, conflicts are perceived and managed differently across 
cultures (Lederach, 1995: 9-10). Thus, the provision of a Western definition facilitates later 
juxtaposing of Western and Arab/Muslim understanding of terminology. Moreover, a 
definition is valuable in any cross-cultural treatment since the manner in which conflict is 
conceptualized influences how conflict resolution is conceptualized (Avruch, 2002: 2). 
We begin our analysis by noting the term “conflict” as applied in Western academic 
literature is conceptually ambiguous (Aubert, 1963: 26; Lederach, 1995: 74; Rosoux, 2009: 
543; Schmidt and Kochan, 1972: 359; Wilmer, 1998: 102). In political science, for instance, 
conflict is sometimes used as a synonym of war between societies or countries (Galtung, 
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1969: 167; Wilmer, 1998: 103, 105). Others scholars criticize that conflict is often applied as 
an antonym of cooperation (Aubert, 1963: 29; Deutsch, 2005: 2; Schmidt and Kochan, 1972: 
359; Vasquez, 2009: 83-84). Concerning the latter, Morton Deutsch (2005: 2-3) laments 
“conflict” and “competition” are theoretically interchanged, a misnomer he attributes to the 
influences of the field of social psychology during the 1920s and 1930s, and the adaptation of 
theories posited by Charles Darwin, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. Similarly, Schmidt and 
Kochan (1972: 361) opine that the term conflict is erroneously utilized as a synonym of 
competition, while further interjecting that it is a value laden (customarily negative) concept 
absent qualitative reference to behavioral typology (violent or nonviolent). Combined, 
scholarship widely rejects narrow conceptualizations of conflict as war, an antonym of 
cooperation, or as synonymous with competition. 
Taking the denoted critiques into consideration, definitions found in Western conflict and 
conflict resolution literature demarcate conflict, foremost, as a natural type of relationship in 
which referents are engaged in an incompatibility or clash (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 5; R. 
Cohen, 2004: 179-180; Deutsch, 2005: 2; Galtung, 2007: 15; Lederach, 1995: 9; Mason, 
1993: 14-15; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7-8; Vasquez, 2009: 83-84; Wallensteen, 2003: 
16). The incompatibility or clash is usually rooted in competition for limited resources and/or 
manifests due to unfulfilled needs or grievances (Irani, 1999: 2-3; Irani and Funk, 2000: 30; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 17-21; Swanström and Weissmann, 2005: 7-8; Wilmer, 1998: 
102-103). Avruch (2002: 2), therefore, summarizes that a conflict is a combination of 
competition and referents’ perceptions of the relationship and their adversary. The insights 
proffered here not only emphasize that referents are engaged in a competition or dispute, but 
highlight the interplay of perceptions and objectives held by referents engaged in a conflict 
relationship. Nevertheless, reference to, or the existence of, a clash or incompatibility, as 
elucidated hitherto, does not indicate behavioral typology according to the Western 
understanding (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9; Deutsch, 2005: 1; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 
1-4; Mason, 1993: 14-15; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7-8; Vasquez, 2009: 25). 
Nonetheless, behavior is a fundamental component of conflict and, therefore, must be 
factored into a definition. Producing a simple framework for classifying behavioral typology, 
the literature suggests that a conflict can incorporate constructive or destructive behavior 
(Deutsch, 2005: 2; Marsella, 2005: 653; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 8; Svensson, 2013: 
415). Its typology is qualitatively determined by the typology of interaction utilized by those 
engaged in the incompatible relationship (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9; Deutsch, 2005: 1; 
Lederach, 1995: 18; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 126-127). Interactive typology can be 
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simplistically depicted on a spectrum ranging from nonviolent (or constructive) to violent (or 
destructive) behavior (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 8, 126). 
At the destructive end of the conflict behavioral spectrum, referents deploy violence 
(physical, structural, and cultural) and coercive behavior to pursue goals or to address/express 
grievances vis-à-vis their relational counterpart (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). At the other extreme 
of the spectrum, they utilize specific techniques, such as negotiation or rewards, to affect a 
mutually satisfactory nonviolent arrangement or compromise as a means of negotiating or 
resolving the incompatibility (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9; Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). While 
simplistic, this dichotomous framework is useful for classifying conflict relationships as 
constructive or destructive. If violent behavior predominates, the relationship is defined as 
deconstructive (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). Conversely, if constructive behavior predominates, 
the conflict is referred to as nonviolent (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). Through this dichotomy, we 
observe that a conflict relationship can incorporate non-violent and/or violent behavior 
(Deutsch, 2005: 26). Our attention now turns to explaining how behavioral typology is 
selected by referents engaged in a conflict. 
Louis Kriesberg creates a model that contains three practices that actors utilize when 
engaged in a conflict relationship to achieve their goals (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9). 
According to Kriesberg, responses include persuasion, reward or coercion (Bercovitch and 
others, 2009: 9). The model defines the noted concepts using the following terms: first, 
persuasion nonviolently appropriates cognitive reasoning to alter opinions or change goals 
among adversaries; second, rewards tender perceptible incentives to influence the behavior or 
goals of an adversary; and third, coercion deploys violence, or the threat of violence, to 
precipitate desired changes to the status quo (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9). While the first 
two actions are deemed non-violent, the latter is violent. 
When referents select to deploy violence, it can manifest in several manners. Johan 
Galtung (1998: 4-5) identifies three types of violence: physical, structural and cultural. 
Physical violence is overt and its manifestation results in death, maiming or damage to the 
physical body, psyche and spirit. Structural violence is obscurely perpetrated through 
institutionalized structures, governance and societal norms marginalizing and oppressing 
others (Galtung, 1998: 5-7; Reimann, 2004: 9). For example, structural violence can manifest 
in the form of alienation, exploitation or repression of particular individuals or groups 
(Galtung, 1998: 5-7). By comparison, cultural violence delineates the normalization and social 
justification, and at its extreme the glorification, of violence through practices including 
patriarchy, patriotism or nationalism (Galtung, 1998: 5-6; Reimann, 2004: 9). Cultural 
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violence, thus, incorporates ideologies that can be manipulated and propagated to justify the 
projection of violence onto others (Galtung, 1998: 5-6). All forms of violence are destructive 
in some capacity and, therefore, deconstructive for relationships and those exposed. To 
summarize our analysis hitherto, conflict is depicted as a clash or incompatibility, which can 
include constructive or deconstructive behavior determined by referent behavior. 
Upon this theoretical foundation, four additional Western theories associated with conflict 
can be deduced from the literature. We include these into our assessment due to their 
relevance when making cross-cultural comparisons later. Abridged, Western scholars are 
suggested to perceive conflict as: universal; able to produce positive benefits; resolvable; and 
as having an impact limited to those referents immediately involved (Irani, 1999). Each 
assertion is critically examined in turn to determine its applicability in Western theory. 
First, it is suggested that Western scholars perceive conflict as universal. Confirming the 
theory, Kenneth Boulding (1978: 132) articulates, “Conflict is a universal phenomenon in 
social systems; it exists within the individual, within the family, in all organizations, between 
individuals, between organizations, between states, and so on.” According to Boulding, 
conflict is ordinary and inevitable at all levels. This hypothesis is shared in both the natural 
(Aureli and de Waal, 2000: 3), political and social sciences (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 3; 
Boulding, 1978: 132; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 1-3; Lederach, 1995: 9; Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 7), as well as among military analysts (Dunlap, 2013: 137). Hence, Western 
scholars generally perceive conflict is normal. 
Second, some Western scholars suggest that conflict can generate positive outcomes 
(Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Galtung, 1998: 3-4; Irani, 1999: 3; Lederach, 1995: 17; Reimann, 
2004: 9-10). For instance, conflict is perceived as a vehicle for producing positive social 
changes, such as increased suffrage; a theory prompting Lederach (1995: 17) to state that 
conflict is (sometimes) necessary. The conceptualization of conflict as natural and having the 
potential to generate positive outcomes explains why some Western scholars hypothesize that 
conflict per se should not be eschewed, but its violent manifestations neutralized (Bercovitch 
and others, 2009: 3; Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Galtung, 2007: 19; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 
3-4; Lederach, 1995: 17; Reimann, 2004: 9-10). Thus, some Western scholars prioritize the 
neutralization of violent interaction rather than eliminating conflict because they view conflict 
as a catalyst for positive change (Lederach, 1995: 16; Spangler, 2003). Consequently, some 
Western scholars view conflict as having a potential to produce positive benefits. 
Third, Western scholars are suggested to perceive conflicts are resolvable (Irani, 1999: 2). 
With this mindset, resolution practitioners analyze a violent conflict relationship to identify 
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structural, cognitive and discursive elements that precipitate incompatibility (Bar-Tal, 2000: 
352-356; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 8-15). Once identified, it is believed that these 
elements can be manipulated, changed or managed to alter the quality of a relationship (Bar-
Tal, 2000: 356-359). For example, if misunderstanding among adversaries is a key instigator 
of the conflict, a third party can take up a mediating role to increase mutual understanding 
(Kelman, 2004: 112). Nonetheless, other scholars hypothesize that not all conflicts are subject 
to resolution and are thereby intractable (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 61, 377; Rosoux, 
2009: 557-559). Thus, some Western scholars perceive conflicts are resolvable while others 
recognize they can become intractable. 
Finally, Western scholars are suggested to conceptualize conflict as a struggle, or 
incompatibility, limited to those referents directly involved (Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Irani, 
1999: 3-4). The perception that conflict is restricted in its effects and referents has theoretical 
and practical implications since it confines conflict resolution to those immediately engaged 
(Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Irani, 1999: 3-4). However, containment of resolution to immediate 
referents is contentious in Western literature, as other scholars and practitioners recognize the 
systemic nature of conflict and advocate resolution be focused on a wider spectrum than those 
immediately engaged (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 65; Stover and others, 2005: 852-853). Namely, 
the conflict resolution and conflict transformation schools—as introduced in section 3.3 of the 
present chapter—conceptualize conflict as systemic in nature and implement resolution 
strategies accordingly (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 62; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352; Lederach, 1995: 18). 
Amalgamated, the Western conceptualizations presented broadly identify conflict as a 
universal, complex, incompatible social-political relationship that can manifest in numerous 
ways (economic, social and political), among diverse referents (individuals, groups, societies), 
utilizing multiple typologies of interaction (violent or nonviolent). Conflict, according to the 
literature examined, is also sometimes viewed as capable of producing positive effects, while 
its violent manifestation should be curtailed or eliminated. With conflict defined, we revisit 
the components of a conflict and how the phenomenon can produce negative effects. The 
insight provided aids in the understanding of how conflicts evolve, factors which impacts how 
resolution is conceptualized and implemented. 
3.2.1 Elements of a conflict 
Conflicts are complex, unpredictable and subject to escalation and de-escalation since they 
are in a constant state of flux (Lederach, 1995: 15; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12-13; 
Wilmer, 1998: 105). Nonetheless, subsequent to the development of a conflictual relationship 
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at the societal level, engaged referents are expected to consolidate around issues and pursue 
their interests with “hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour” (Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 11). When time elapses and hostile attitudes and behavior, noted in the quote, persist, 
referents can become entrenched in their conflict ideology, behavior and position, and these 
outcomes can cause conflict relationships to become protracted and destructive (Ramsbotham 
and others, 2011: 11). Under prolonged conditions, the conflictual relationship is expected to 
deepen hostile perceptions within society, and those attitudes are subject to be disseminated 
(Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 11). Nevertheless, for the moment, our interests remain 
centered on the factors that produce a conflict. 
The literature broadly identifies internal and external factors which produce a 
deconstructive conflict, albeit whose implications can be influenced by other environmental 
factors including third party intervention, a change in the relative status of one or more of the 
referents engaged, or a change in referent motivations and/or objectives (Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 13). Awareness of relational complexities and their interplay are essential to 
understanding the manner in which referents are presumed to interact while engaged in a 
conflict, and how (de)constructive behavior feeds back into conflict discourse (Bar-Siman-
Tov, 2004: 69-71; Bar-Tal, 2000: 351-354). Since our research focus is on U.S.-Iraq relations, 
our interests remain centered on conflict relationships at the intrastate and interstate levels. 
Designing a framework, social psychologist Herbert Kelman theorizes that four elements 
amalgamate to produce a conflict at the higher levels between two adversarial groups 
(Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). First, one or both of those engaged in a conflict must envisage that 
they have a unique collective identity (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). Second, one or both must 
perceive they have a legitimate grievance or that they are experiencing unfair conditions under 
the status quo (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). Third, one or both referents must believe that the 
“other” is the source of their grievance (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). Lastly, one or both of those 
who perceive they have been wronged, must perceive that they possess the capacity to induce 
change in the “other” to minimize the perceived injustices committed against them (Kriesberg, 
2004: 90-91). When these circumstances coincide, a conflict has developed (Kriesberg, 2004: 
90-91). While each element is observable in the U.S.-Iraq relationship, as alluded to in the 
first part of this thesis, alternative, and more simplified, theoretical models exist and are 
introduced to provide a wide theoretical framework. 
For instance, Bercovitch and others (2009: 8) and Hartwick and Barki (2002: 5) identify 
three attitudinal dimensions which produce conflict. The dimensions include: 
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(a) the cognitive, (b) the affective, and (c) the behavioural. The 
cognitive dimension refers to the parties’ beliefs and ideas about their 
environment [including the relationship]; the affective dimension refers 
to the parties’ feelings and emotions and the behavioural dimension 
refers to their specific readiness to respond (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 
8). 
Although these dimensions were introduced in the first section of the present chapter, and 
contextualized in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations, the manner in which they interrelate, and the 
techniques utilized, determines the quality and typology of the relationship (Bercovitch and 
others, 2009: 8). 
Correspondingly, Johan Galtung (2007: 17, 22) defines the three conflict-producing 
elements as “conflict attitude”, “conflict behavior” and “conflict contradiction,” depicting 
them on a “conflict triangle.” Ramsbotham and others (2011: 10-11) abridge Galtung’s 
conceptualization stating: 
Contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which 
includes the actual or perceived ʽincompatibility of goals’ between the 
conflict parties […] In a symmetrical relationship, the contradiction is 
defined by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between 
them. […] Attitude includes the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions 
of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in 
violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the 
other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, 
bitterness and hatred. Attitude covers emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) 
and conative (desire, will) elements. […] Behaviour is the third 
component. It can involve cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying 
conciliation or hostility (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 10-11). 
According to Galtung’s conceptualization, as articulated in the quote, a full-scale conflict has 
manifested when these three elements concur (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 10-11)57. 
The commonality among the three frameworks introduced is their recognition of the inter-
relation and interaction of the components of attitude, belief and behavioral, which not only 
influence conflict typology, but simultaneously has a qualitative impact on social perceptions. 
Moreover, recognizing the elements of attitude, belief and behavior has theoretical and 
practical implications on how conflictual relationships can be altered, as these elements are 
hypothesized fundamental entry points and targets whereby a conflict can be managed or 
resolved, as detailed below (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 12-13). We next revisit conflict 
                                                          
 
57 Constructive theoreticians, such as Duffield, interject that “conflict is not a breakdown in essentially peaceful 
social systems or a temporary abnormality, but is instead rooted in the structures, practices and conditions of 
social existence” (Jackson, 2009: 181). They depict conflict as containing “three broad elements […]: the 
construction and manipulation of identity; the co-constitution of structures and agents; and the construction of 
society-wide conflict discourses” (Jackson, 2009: 177). 
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behavior to reiterate that referents have options outside of violence when engaged in a conflict 
relationship, before we examine the negative effects of a deconstructive conflict. 
3.2.2 Conflict behavioral typologies 
It was explained previously that conflicts are classified as constructive or deconstructive 
depending on the quality of referents’ perceptions and behavior. This subsection explains how 
referents engaged in a conflict relationship select interactive typology through complex 
evaluative processes, including assessment of stakeholders’ strengths and weaknesses. 
Through evaluation, referents engaged in a conflict decide which strategy to incorporate. As 
emphasized elsewhere, the behavioral typology selected and deployed subsequently 
determines whether a conflict becomes constructive or deconstructive. These patterns can be 
self-reinforcing. 
John Vasquez (2009: 84) hypothesizes that three interrelated and dichotomous factors 
determine conflict relationship typology. He identifies the elements as: (1) agreement vs. 
disagreement; (2) positive vs. negative behaviors; and (3) friendship vs. hostility. The 
systemic interplay between the components listed influences cognitive, attitudinal and 
behavioral patterns within a given relationship (Vasquez, 2009: 84). Demonstrating 
qualitative dynamics, Vasquez (2009: 84-86) suggests that bargaining and conciliatory 
behavior encourages constructive relationships among referents since actions reinforce amity 
through cooperation and the proliferation of trust over time. Contrary, disagreement and 
(perceived) deconstructive tendencies encourage negative relational patterns because repeat 
deconstructive interaction deepens suspicion, hostility and grievances (Vasquez, 2009: 84-86). 
The theoretical value of the behavioral model is its 1) articulation of the fluidity and 
complexity of relationships, and 2) its illustration of how behavioral and attitudinal typology 
constructively or destructively feedback while influencing the quality of a relationship. 
Other models exist, although they emphasize similar patterns. Anthony Marsella (2005: 
653), for example, explains that similar evaluative processes influence the probability of 
violence being used in a conflict relationship. According to Marsella (2005: 653), 
deconstructive behavior is most probable when referents perceive: they are engaged in an 
existential relationship; the other is threatening; the status quo is unjust or humiliating; 
themselves as moral or superior; that all nonviolent interactive options have been exhausted; 
and they possess the capability to perpetrate violence. When fulfilled, these self-explanatory 
inputs are thus hypothesized to lead referents to utilize violence because the (perceived) threat 
is deemed significant, necessary, and/or simply because they have the capability or no 
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alternative options. Overall, both frameworks illustrates that referents undertake complex, 
calculated evaluations of multiple inputs when selecting the practices they determine most 
effective and applicable to achieve their desired ends within the conflictual relationship 
(Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). At the same time, the models emphasize that inputs are self-
perpetuating across referents. For instance, if the threat or perpetration of violence is instituted 
by one referent, their counterpart is probable to respond accordingly. 
Once a conflict manifests, deconstructive interaction risks further convolute and 
exacerbating preexisting cognitive, effective and behavioral elements of those engaged in the 
relationship by systematically feeding adverse sentiment and grievances back into the 
relationship cycle (Bar-Tal, 2000: 361-362; Galtung, 1998: 5-6; Parent, 2012: 30-37; Rifkind 
and Picco, 2014: 49; Vasquez, 2009: 84-86; Wilmer, 1998: 105-108). Within this deleterious 
cyclical process, conflict behavior begets analogous behavior (creating a conflict spiral) 
(Galtung, 2004: 78; Parent, 2012: 32; Vasquez, 2009: 84-86). If a conflict proceeds to its 
deconstructive extreme where adversaries are perceived as existential threats, there is a risk of 
generating proactive hostility and physical violence (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 23; Bar-Tal, 
2000: 356-359; Boulding, 1978: 53-54; Long and Brecke, 2003: 30; Parent, 2012: 33-34; 
Staub, 2003). Such processes increase the likelihood of conflict continuation or escalation, 
while the perpetration of violence increases the costs of the conflict. 
3.2.3 Negative effects of violent conflict 
Regardless of whether violent conflict manifests in its physical, structural or cultural form, 
scholars agree it produces deconstructive or destructive consequences. Deconstructive 
consequences include physical, cognitive, emotional and spiritual suffering on individuals and 
collectives exposed (Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 3-4; Marsella, 2005: 652; Wilmer, 1998: 
105). Violence likewise has deleterious systemic effects on the structures, societies and 
environments exposed (Galtung, 2007: 21; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 3-4; Wilmer, 1998: 
105). In short, the effects of violence on humans are detrimental and tenacious in physical and 
psychological terms (Wilmer, 1998: 105-106). Chapter 2, for example, demonstrated the 
human and psychological toll the 2003 war and occupation had on the United States and Iraq. 
Our focus, nonetheless, centers on the cognitive and social effects experienced, as they are 
equally theoretically and practically relevant when contemplating U.S.-Iraq relations. 
Concerning the psychological impact, Wilmer (1998: 105) tersely states: “When conflicts turn 
violent, grievances come to include not only the strategic issues articulated before the onset of 
violence, but also grievances arising from the physical, emotional, and psychological 
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experience of violence itself.” As Wilmer explains, the conflict is no longer couched on the 
original differences and grievances that initiated the struggle, and instead multiply to include 
the grievances and harms perpetrated during violent interaction. The accumulation of issues 
complicates resolution because it expands the issues at stake, and as outlined above, generates 
cognitive and behavioral tendency that can feed back into the conflict cycle. 
Following the manifestation of violence in a conflictual relationship, the literature 
provides several options by which individuals can respond to (perceived) transgression. 
Simplistically articulated, those transgressed against can: (sub-) consciously deny or 
psychologically suppress the wrongdoing (Long and Brecke, 2003: 29; Montville, 1999: 325); 
they can take revenge; hold a grudge; resolve the conflict and/or seek forgiveness 
(Worthington, 2006: 9). Scholars perceive the first four responses are harmful to stakeholders 
and the quality of a given relationship due to their repressive, deconstructive and/or violent 
nature (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 70; Worthington, 2006: 9-16). For example, recalling the 
conflict behavioral typological frameworks noted earlier (3.2.2), violent interaction 
convolutes and exacerbates preexisting conflictual relationships by systematically feeding 
adverse sentiment and grievances back into the relationship cycle (Bar-Tal, 2000: 361-362; 
Galtung, 1998: 5-6; Parent, 2012: 30-37; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49; Vasquez, 2009: 84-86; 
Wilmer, 1998: 105-108). Among the options presented, therefore, seeking to resolve a conflict 
or pursue forgiveness are the preferred approaches to circumvent the continuation of violent 
behavior, whereby harm is reduced and effects are managed. The remaining sections of this 
chapter explore conflict resolution as the ideal option, as conceptualized by Western scholars. 
3.3 Conceptualizing conflict resolution 
Since conflict is conceived and managed differently within and across cultures, measures 
to resolve or manage conflict are likewise conceptualized and practiced differently (Lederach, 
1995: 38-43). In the Western fields of international relations and conflict studies, scholars use 
diverging terminology to articulate theory and processes of reducing or eliminating violent 
conflictual relationships and its outcome. Ramsbotham and others (2011) broadly refer to 
such practices as conflict resolution. Other scholars, such as Paffenholz (2009), refer to them 
as peacebuilding practices. Both terms are used interchangeably throughout this text. 
We launch our exploration of conflict resolution by first examining the three Western 
schools of thought that concentrate on managing or resolving conflict at the intrastate and 
interstate levels. The three recognized peacebuilding approaches at the higher levels include: 
conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation (Paffenholz, 2009: 3; 
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Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 29). These terms are commonly utilized to reference both the 
schools of thought and the ideology and processes they embrace. Each school of thought is 
examined in turn. 
While it is beyond the scope of the thesis to detail the history of the three schools or 
theories associated with them, we believe it is important to provide a basic overview for 
analytical purposes. Examination is especially valuable to demonstrate theoretical and 
etymological overlap across the schools of thought (Botes, 2003; Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 30-32). We should also note that the three schools have largely originated in North 
American and continue to be heavily influenced by scholars, theories and practices from this 
origination (Lederach, 1995: 5). These roots, naturally, produce theoretical and practical 
problems, notably the inaccurate assumptions that theory and practices are universally 
applicable, and that associated theories and practices can be transposed onto other cultures 
(Lederach, 1995: 5-6). This critique was noted in subsection one. Nevertheless, although we 
explore Western theory, and construct a framework around it for comparative purposes, we do 
not believe that the theory and practices articulated herein are the only tools available or that 
they should be uncritically transferred or imposed onto other cultures. 
3.3.1 Conflict management 
Brad Spangler (2003) identifies conflict management as a process implemented when 
conflicts have become intractable. Conflict management is, therefore, generally applied to 
deep-rooted deconstructive relationships that are frequently the result of an incompatibility in 
“fundamental values and/or non-negotiable human needs” (Spangler, 2003). Accordingly, 
values and needs have created a conflict that has proven resilient and efforts are made to 
control the intensity and violent nature of the conflict. The objective is, thus, to transform 
deconstructive manifestations of conflict energies to constructive behavior, with its practices 
framed around the theory that conflicts adhere to patterns of escalation and de-escalation that 
can be managed (Lederach, 1995: 16). In short, the objective of conflict management is to 
reduce violence and negative effects of an ongoing conflict. The process does not deal with 
the “underlying causes” of the conflict, so a conflict that has been managed continues to exist 
and is thereby subject to continuation or escalation (Kelman, 2004: 119; Spangler, 2003). 
Peter Wallensteen (2007: 50) similarly conceptualizes conflict management as focused 
“on the armed aspect of the conflict: bringing the fighting to an end, limiting the spread of the 
conflict and, thus, containing it.” Wallensteen’s definition, as noted, emphasizes the reduction 
or arresting of violence. Concurrently, Swanström and Weissmann (2005: 25) suggest conflict 
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management “limit[s], mitigate[s] and/or contain[s] a conflict without necessar[ily] solving 
it”. Due to its limited nature, as denoted in the previous quotes, some scholars define conflict 
management as a perpetual process of controlling violence and its effects on referents (Miller, 
2005: 23). Using alternative lexicon, Reimann (2004: 8) preferences the term conflict 
settlement, defining it as an “outcome oriented strategies for achieving sustainable win-win 
solutions and/or putting an end to direct violence, without necessarily addressing the 
underlying conflict causes.” Whether scholars define the practice conflict settlement, as 
Reimann chooses, or conflict management, they agree that the process does not deal with root 
causes of a conflict, but contrary reduces or arrests its violent expression. 
Since attention is centered on reducing violence, conflict management predominantly 
utilizes structural techniques that target elite decision makers. For instance, it commonly 
includes the proctoring of mutual agreements between governments (Miller, 2005: 23). 
Agreements can include negotiated ceasefires or truces (Paffenholz, 2009: 3; Reimann, 2004: 
9, 16; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 44). These processes are frequently Track 158 approaches 
focused at political, social or military elites centered on ending the violence (Kelman, 2004: 
119; Paffenholz, 2009: 3; Reimann, 2004: 8-9). Additional techniques utilized to manage a 
conflict include the dispatching of peacekeeping forces to oversee implementation of a 
ceasefire or to create a buffer between belligerents (Spangler, 2003). 
Due to its narrow focus some scholars chastise conflict management as insufficient for 
two broad reasons. On the one hand, as repeatedly emphasized, the root causes of the conflict 
are not managed (Paffenholz, 2009: 3; Lederach, 1995: 17). It is, thus, a short-term solution 
since grievances and conflict causes persist. On the other hand, the management process is 
criticized for centering on elites and decision-makers and not society at large (Paffenholz, 
2009: 3). The limited approach, therefore, fails to address the concerns and interests of society 
at large. This can be problematic for long-term stability. 
3.3.2 Conflict resolution 
Conflict resolution is an ambiguous term utilized in scholarly literature (Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 31; Reimann, 2004: 2; Wallensteen, 2007: 50), which can signify three things 
(Miller, 2005: 25). The term can denote “a result, and an identified field of academic study as 
                                                          
 
58 Track I diplomacy operates at the structural level (Paffenholz, 2009: 3; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 29; 
Reimann, 2004: 4-5). It is a top-down approach implemented at the official level, targeting the political elite and 
governing institutional bodies using tools which include arbitration, negotiation and peace-keeping (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 11-12; Paffenholz, 2009: 3; Reimann, 2004: 4-5). Ramsbotham and others (2011: 14) define the 
approach as “elite peacemaking” since it is centered on the higher levels of governing and social frameworks. 
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well as an activity which persons and communities engage every day without ever using the 
term” (Miller, 2005: 25). As the quote emphasizes, the term conflict resolution can refer to a 
discipline, a process of altering a conflict, and the outcome of that process (Hermann, 2004: 
46; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31). We first concentrate on the discipline before 
examining how scholars of the discipline conceptualize conflict and how conflicts are thought 
altered. 
Conflict resolution as a discipline, or field of study, emerged in the 1950s for the purpose 
of understanding and resolving violent conflict between and within societies (Ramsbotham 
and others, 2011: 4, 35; Reimann, 2004: 3). The discipline consisted of researchers who 
appropriated theoretical and practical input from other research disciplines (Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 4, 35; Reimann, 2004: 3). Among its influences, contemporary conflict 
resolution combines theory and practice from disciplines including psychology, sociology, 
peace studies and international law (Reimann, 2004: 3). Accordingly, conflict resolution 
combines theory and practices designed for resolving conflict at the inter-personal, group, 
intrastate and interstate levels (detailed in 3.4.1) (Miller, 2005: 25). Some of these theories are 
criticized when they are transferred from the lower levels onto the higher levels. For instance, 
some scholars advocate forgiveness be applied at the intrastate and interstate level, although 
other scholars criticize transference is inapplicable and theoretically impractical among a 
collective, and contradictorily is better suited for individuals and small groups. Theoretical 
dissension on the issue of forgiveness is detailed in chapter 4, section 3.11. 
Further dissension within the field of conflict resolution is observable when examining 
how scholars conceptualize conflict, since some theorize conflict is positive while others 
perceive conflict as negative (discussed in 5.2). Among the former, Reimann (2004: 9-10), for 
instance, suggests conflict resolution scholars perceive conflict is natural and potentially 
positive. Consequently, the objective of these scholars is not to eliminate conflict but to 
manage violence and encourage non-violent accommodation while resolving issues and 
meeting needs. Among the latter, Spangler (2003) contradicts Reimann insisting: “‘Conflict 
resolution’ implies that conflict is bad, and is therefore something that should be ended.” 
Supporting Reimann’s theory, Lederach (1995: 16) similarly states that some conflict 
resolution scholars depict conflict as detrimental. 
There is also dissention among scholars about the duration of conflict resolution. On one 
hand, conflict resolution scholars sometimes conceptualized conflict as “a short-term 
phenomenon that can be ‘resolved’ permanently through mediation or other intervention 
processes” (Spangler, 2003). According to Spangler’s theory, conflict resolution is a 
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temporary or finite process. On the other hand, some scholars argue conflict resolution, as a 
process, is infinite since relationships are continuously changing and being re-evaluated 
(Auerbach, 2004: 153). Foregoing a discussion that resolves whether most scholars associated 
with the field of conflict resolution perceive conflict is positive or negative, or capable of 
being permanently resolved, most concur that managing a conflict is insufficient for securing 
a long-term solution (Spangler, 2003). They, consequently, suggest that more needs to be 
done to address the root causes of a conflict to secure peace by resolving conflict issues. 
Emphasizing its derivation, Spangler (2003) summarizes conflict resolution scholars and 
practitioners generally perceive conflict as durable and rooted in “non-negotiable issues such 
as fundamental human needs, intolerable moral differences, or high-stakes distributional 
issues regarding essential resources, such as money, water, or land.” The competition to fulfill 
needs or correct moral differences, as denoted in the quote, gives the impression that referents 
are engage in a competition for scant resources. Because conflict is theorized as rooted in 
needs, conflict resolution scholars argue that stakeholders’ needs should be identified and 
addressed when resolving a conflict. 
Concerning overall objectives of the resolution approach, scholars agree that conflict 
resolution theories and practices seek to terminate violence between referents engaged in 
conflict while resolving the underlying issues (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4, 75; Botes, 2003; 
Lederach, 1995: 16; Paffenholz, 2009: 4; Ross, 2004: 201). By addressing the structural and 
cultural roots of a conflict, and pursuing a mutually satisfactory resolution, it is believed that 
constructive relationships can be established over time (Miller, 2005: 26; Reimann, 2004: 9; 
Wallensteen, 2007: 8). Stated clearly, conflict resolution is a process that centers on the 
“interests, needs, perspectives, and continued existence” of the referents at the unofficial level 
(Miller, 2005: 26). Practices utilized to achieve these quoted objectives include Track II59 
approaches, which include workshops, peace education and capacity building (Burgess and 
Burgess, 2010; Paffenholz, 2009: 4-10). Many of these tools are implemented by NGOs that 
operate at the local, national and international levels (Paffenholz, 2009: 4). 
While conflict resolution processes are broader and deeper than conflict management, a 
group of scholars criticize the practice as shallow. For instance, it is argued that conflict 
resolution fails to address long-term structural and relational issues (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 
1995: 16). In particular, it is hypothesized that conflict resolution neglects to transform the 
                                                          
 
59 Track II diplomacy targets academics, religious leaders and persons involved in business (Hinds and Oliver, 
2009: 42; Paffenholz, 2009: 4; Reimann, 2004: 5). Track II are unofficial processes that utilize particular 
techniques, such as problem-solving workshops, to forge greater awareness and understanding beyond governing 
elites (Paffenholz, 2009: 4; Reimann, 2004: 5; Ropers, 2003: 1). 
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relationship through the adjustment of how referents perceive and interact with one another 
(Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 16). Moreover, it is suggested that approaching resolution at 
the official or unofficial level is insufficient for transforming societal perceptions (Lederach, 
1995: 18). The identified shortcomings have led to the development of the third school of 
theory and practice: conflict transformation. 
3.3.3 Conflict transformation 
The third Western peacebuilding school of thought is conflict transformation. This 
approach was developed in the 1990s, following John Paul Lederach and others’ theory and 
practices (Botes, 2003). As denoted, scholars associated with the conflict transformation 
school of thought perceive conflict resolution and conflict management as insufficient for 
qualitatively altering relationships or institutionalizing long-term positive changes among 
former adversaries (Bar-Tal, 2000: 351-354; Botes, 2003; Kelman, 2004: 115; Kriesberg, 
2001: 61; Lederach, 1995: 17; Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 4-7; Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 31-32; Reimann, 2004: 8-9). Accordingly, they recommend that social relationships, 
behavior and opinions be altered to deepen the degree of change experienced when changing 
deconstructive conflictual relationships (Bar-Tal, 2000: 351-354; Botes, 2003; Ramsbotham 
and others, 2011: 31-32). 
Explaining its theoretical and practical basis, Lederach (1995: 18) suggests conflict 
transformation is both prescriptive and descriptive. Conflict transformation is identified as an 
analytical approach that perceives conflict as a natural occurrence that effects, and is affected 
by, referents engaged (Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 7; Spangler, 2003). Its objective is to 
address deconstructive conflict aspects through the transformation of “self-images, 
relationships, and social structures” (Botes, 2003). Altering perceptions, structures and 
behavior, as noted in the quote, is considered the most appropriate foundation where upon 
amicable relations can be established and solidified (Avruch, 2010: 39; Botes, 2003; 
Lederach, 1995: 18; Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 7; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32; 
Spangler, 2003). Conflict transformation is, consequently, determined a deeper approach than 
resolution or management. 
The depth of change articulated by scholars is noticeable in definitions provided for the 
process. For instance, Miller (2005: 26) suggests conflict transformation changes “the general 
context or framing of the situation, the contending parties, the issues at stake, the processes or 
procedures governing the predicament, or the structures affecting any of the aforementioned.” 
Miller’s description clearly articulates the depth and breadth transformation desires. 
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Comparatively, Reimann (2004: 10) defines conflict transformation as “outcome, process and 
structure oriented long-term peacebuilding efforts, which aim to truly overcome revealed 
forms of direct, cultural and structural violence.” Conflict transformation, as quoted, addresses 
issues, changes attitudes, and operates to neutralize and eliminate all forms of violence 
(Reimann, 2004: 13). These elements are managed through a “fair, respectful and inclusive 
process as a way of life and envisions outcome as a commitment to increasing justice, seeking 
truth, and healing relationships” (Lederach, 1995: 22). Lederach’s quote emphasizes 
fundamental peacebuilding principles, which are examined in chapter four. 
The process of reconfiguring deconstructive structural, cognitive, effective and behavioral 
nuances to constructive ones is, unsurprisingly, referred to as conflict transformation (Botes, 
2003; Lederach, 1995: 17; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32). According to theory, 
conflict transformation as a process is necessitated because: “In any situation of intense 
conflict, there is a tendency among disputants to become trapped inside their own stories of 
threatened identity, justified fear, and unjustifiable suffering” (Funk and Said, 2004: 2). To 
reverse the impact of such stories, and release disputants from the deconstructive conflict and 
its effects noted in the quotation, change must occur at the structural, social and individual 
levels (Botes, 2003). 
Therefore, conflict transformation, as a peacebuilding strategy, is broadly summarized in 
structural and social terms as the (re)construction of institutional, infrastructural, and social 
bonds (de la Rey and McKay, 2006: 143; Reimann, 2004: 10-13). Through structural and 
attitudinal changes made at multiple levels, conflict transformation develops, roots and 
solidifies positive, sustainable relationships by modifying mutual structures, perceptions and 
behavior (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32; Reimann, 2004: 10-13). Alteration is 
operationalized in a manner that considers present relations and their desired future trajectory, 
while recognizing the dynamic interplay between the two (Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 8-9). 
Stated differently, conflict transformation theory is rooted in the realization that relationships 
change and are dynamic, so conflict transformation must be adaptive and flexible. During 
implementation, care is taken to effectuate transformation in a culturally sensitive manner 
(Paffenholz, 2009: 5; Reimann, 2004: 11-13; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 86). Emphasis on 
cultural sensitivity addresses critique number three proffered subsequent to the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq by scholars, noted in section 3.1 of the present chapter. 
Combined, the conflict transformation approach is presented as superior to the other 
schools of thought in that it is a holistic approach whose outcomes are deeper and more 
sustainable since they are constructed upon alterations made to structures, behavior and 
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perceptions among society and its members (Reimann, 2004: 10-11). To achieve its 
objectives, conflict transformation is conceptualized as an inclusive approach that 
incorporates Track III60 strategies to address conflict causes and effects among a wide swath 
of society (Paffenholz, 2009: 5; Reimann, 2004: 11-13). The theoretical and practical 
advantage of including society is that amicable relations become sustainable since more 
individuals are directly involved and affected by the transformation process (Lederach, 1995: 
8-19). By comparison, other scholars advocate conflict resolution be pursued utilizing all 
three Tracks: official, unofficial and societal (Reimann, 2004: 11-13). 
While Lederach (1995), among others, advocates the transformation approach, there is an 
ongoing debate in the literature about when a bottom-up strategy should be introduced 
(Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 222). Hermann (2004: 46-48) questions whether it should be 
introduced first, simultaneously, or subsequent to a structural approach. Providing a potential 
solution to this dilemma, Ramsbotham and others (2011: 222) suggest conflict resolution 
should be administered structurally first to safeguard conditions which will ensure the desired 
societal transformation later. By comparison, Lederach (1995: 8-19) embraces implementing 
transformation at the structural and social levels simultaneous. 
By way of concluding our analysis of conflict transformation, and introducing other 
important concepts defined below, Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennink (2004) propose 
specific conditions that indicate when conflict transformation is necessary. They suggest: 
when the societies involved in a conflict evolve widely shared 
beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and emotions that support adherence to the 
conflictive goals, maintain the conflict, de-legitimize the opponent, and 
thus negate the possibility of peaceful resolution and prevent the 
development of peaceful relations (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 13). 
When the degree of deconstructive perceptions and behavior become predominant in society, 
as the quote emphasizes, conflict transformation is determined necessary because of the 
increased probability of conflict continuation or escalation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 64; Bar-
Tal and Bennink, 2004: 13; Bar-Tal, 2000: 356-357; Lederach, 1995: 17-19). Reference to 
altering conflict perpetuating beliefs and attitudes, prompts us to temporarily digress from our 
discussion on the three schools of thought, to define two additional terms: cognitive 
transformation and reconciliation. By their nature, both terms are intertwined with conflict 
transformation, in that they are associated with deep and sustainable improvements between 
                                                          
 
60 Track III diplomacy is focused at the societal level (Paffenholz, 2009: 5). It enhances social understanding and 
cohesion (among and between social groupings) while expanding and rooting transformation among the 
population (Lederach, 1995: 8-19; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 29). 
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belligerents. Subsequent to defining these two terms, our attention will return to the three 
schools of thought so that we can position ourselves within the theory analyzed above. 
3.3.3.1 Cognitive transformation 
 Since conflict alters relationships, perceptions, behavior and structural aspects, parties 
engaged are expected to feel threatened and reflexively become suspicious of or aggressive 
against those perceived to represent a threat (Lederach, 1995: 18). These deconstructive 
tendencies need to be reversed to secure and stabilize constructive relationships to counter 
(the justification of) violence. Altering perceptions and behavior requires cognitive 
transformation (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356-357). Its theory is rooted in the assumption that humans 
can circumvent deconstructive relational tendencies, at all levels, by (re-) learning how to 
approach conflict in a creative and positive manner (Boulding, 1978: 62; Lederach, 1995: 17-
19; Mead, 1940: 402-405). Parent (2012: 27) goes one step further arguing cognitive 
transformation “allows the victim’s pain to be acknowledged and for the latter to apologize.” 
Hence, altering cognition and behavior is believed an avenue of circumventing conflict, while 
allowing transformation of the relationship to occur, perhaps to the point of forgiveness. 
Scholars use diverse terminology when referencing the phenomenon. Anatol Rapoport, for 
example, conceptualizes similar processes as second-order learning, “which requires a 
willingness and capacity for challenging assumptions” (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 48)61. 
Challenging assumptions, as referenced in the quote, indicates there is an alteration of 
perspectives. Comparatively, John Paul Lederach (1995: 18) defines the process of changing 
attitudes and behavior as “transformation.” Other scholars simplify comparable processes as a 
“coming to terms with” what has occurred during the conflict (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; 
Kelman, 2004: 113; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1035). Despite the lexicon deployed, a 
simple framework is available in the literature that classifies which changes are determined 
necessary. 
In simplistic terms, cognitive transformation consists of an alteration, or reframing, of a 
referent’s (mis-) perceptions about: a) their environment; b) “self,” and; c) the “other” (Bar-
Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 3-4). 
Changes made to the three elements are projected to alter perceptions and behavior (Adelman, 
2005: 287-307; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-75; Long and Brecke, 2003: 36; Shriver, 1995: 
114). Thus, cognitive transformation, as utilized hereafter, broadly refers to a process of 
                                                          
 
61 Comparatively, according to Anatol Rapoport, first-order learning is mechanistically implemented according 
to prior experience and social-cultural norms with minimal critical evaluation and creativity (Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 48). 
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counteracting deconstructive cognitive and behavioral dispositions that attribute to de-
escalation or termination of violent perceptions and behavior (Jackson, 2009: 177; Kriesberg, 
2004: 82; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 2-3; Lederach, 1995: 18). Beliefs necessitating 
deconstruction, among others, include: the perceived justness of one’s goals; over-emphasis 
of personal and/or national security; a positive self-image; the belief of one’s own 
victimhood; and a de-legitimization of the other (Bar-Tal, 2000: 354-355; Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 12). While space does not permit an analysis of these factors individually, their 
influencing capacity on interactive conflict typology is noteworthy (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 
74), and was referred to in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Each perception, nevertheless, is 
hypothesized to negatively impact on the quality of a given relationship, and at their extreme, 
can justify the use of violence against an adversary. 
Accordingly, cognitive transformation reverses deconstructive cognitive factors over time, 
thereby changing opinions and approaches whereupon amicable relations can be forged. 
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 74) emphasizes the importance of these changes when he 
writes: “Only a mutual change of these beliefs, which are the cognitive foundation of the 
conflict, may enable the forming of new goals and beliefs, which may in turn justify and 
rationalize the need of maintaining and consolidating peaceful relations with the former 
enemy.” The quote illustrates how cognitive transformation instills new beliefs and goals, 
which aid in the creation of a constructive relationship. While it is clear that changes are 
necessary, the question becomes: to what degree does such transformation have to occur? 
Providing one solution, Herbert Kelman (2004: 119-121) suggests that the degree of 
transformation sought should ensure “that the other is not a threat to one’s own identity.” 
However, the concept of non-threatening is relatively vague, because threats will vary from 
one relationship to the next. Other scholars offer more insight into the intended degree of 
transformation. Three benchmarks of successive cognitive transformation can be extracted 
from the literature. They include: 1) legitimizing the adversary; 2) enhancing self-awareness; 
and 3) behavioral alteration whereby referents approach the relationship in a nonviolent or 
constructive manner (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356; Kaufman, 2006: 212; Ross, 2004: 200; Rouhana, 
2004: 35). These interrelated objectives are analyzed in greater detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
First, legitimizing the “other” is an essential component of conflict transformation. Bargal 
and Sivan (2004: 130-134) suggest legitimization means accepting the adversary as human (at 
minimum) or an equal (maximally), regardless if they have perpetrated violence or 
wrongdoing (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 20; Saunders, 2009: 381). 
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Its objective is thus to reverse the tendency of seeing the other as subhuman, radically 
different or threatening. In short, legitimization is conceptualized as the cultivation of an 
objective humanistic perception of an adversary (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-74; Rouhana, 
2004: 41). Through humanization and legitimization, accommodation of the “other,” their 
needs and desires are facilitated (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-74; Rouhana, 2004: 41). Other 
scholars refer to legitimization and humanization as extending “mutual recognition” to an 
adversary (Bar-On, 2005: 17). Once extended, there is an increased chance of creating 
constructive relationships. 
The literature accentuates the challenges entailed in legitimizing the other (Bar-On, 2005: 
14; Buckeye, 2010: 43), while underscoring its necessity to counter violent interaction 
whereby accommodation can manifest (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357; Bercovitch and others, 2009: 544; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 87-95; Parent, 2012: 37). Rothman, for example, suggests that one 
fundamental component of legitimization is the separation of the wrongdoer from the wrongs 
they have committed (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 45). Extending recognition in such cases 
is a challenging but necessary process, since people engaged in conflict experience difficulties 
separating the individual as a human from the inhumane acts they may have perpetrated. 
Without re-conceptualization of the “other,” deconstructive cognitive and behavioral patterns 
are expected to continue (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Long and Brecke, 2003: 30). Therefore, 
difficult as it may be, mutual recognition and acceptance is essential to creating amity. 
The second cognitive transformation benchmark found in the literature is the enhancement 
of self-awareness. Enhanced self-awareness is a prerequisite because the manner in which an 
individual (or group) perceives themselves, qualitatively influences cognitive and interactive 
predispositions within a given relationship (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 32; Boulding, 1978: 
15; Staub, 2003). For example, adversaries engaged in a violent conflictual relationship are 
prone to identify themselves as a “victim” rather than a “perpetrator” of violence (Bar-Tal, 
2000: 354; R. Fisher, 2001b: 33; Kriesberg, 2004: 102; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12; 
Staub, 2003: 12). The common tendency is thus to blame the other for wrongdoing and to 
emphasize the wrongs the other has committed, while perceiving oneself as the innocent 
victim. Such subjective inclinations are biased and counterproductive to advancing amicable 
relations (Bar-Tal, 2000: 354; R. Fisher, 2001b: 33; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12; Staub, 
2003: 12). This proclivity to demonize and blame is reversed when objective self-awareness is 
cultivated (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 32; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 3-4). 
Improving self-awareness requires the propagation of objectivity where an unbiased 
perception of the “in-group” and/or “self” can be cultivated (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 20). 
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In this context, cognitive transformation necessitates that conflict parties recognize the 
contributions that the “in-group” or “self” have made to a conflictual relationship, and/or 
accept/share responsibility for the deconstructive quality of the relationship (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 20-23; Maoz, 2004: 225-237; Rouhana, 2004: 41). Therefore, transformation 
of self-awareness may necessitate the “in-group” recognize and accept that they have likewise 
perpetrated wrongdoing and produced grievances, which has equally impacted on the quality 
of the relationship (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-77; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15-20; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 96; Rouhana, 2004: 41). Many times, both referents engaged in a conflict are 
guilty of wrongdoing, and recognition of that culpability engenders perceptive changes toward 
“self” and the “other”. When fault is mutually shared, there should be an increased likelihood 
of neutralizing deconstructive prejudices. Combined, enhanced self-awareness is suggested to 
counteract ideology and behavior that occasions relational impasses and restricts 
accommodative perceptions and behavior (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; R. Fisher, 2001b: 33; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 102; Staub, 2003: 13-19). Counter-balancing (existential) deconstructive 
conflict discourses (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359; Kelman, 2004: 121; Maoz, 2004: 225-237), thus 
neutralizes: a) the tendency to perceive the “other” in negative terms; and/or b) perceive “self” 
as innocent victim and the other as the guilty party (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359; Kelman, 2004: 
121; Ross, 2004: 208). 
As the re-formulation of cognitive perceptions are forged through adversaries’ 
acknowledgment of the “other” and objective perceptions of “self” and “other” are attained, 
transformations, as articulated hitherto, produces a third cognitive transformation benchmark: 
altering how the relationship itself is perceived, and which behavioral typology is selected 
(Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359). More 
specifically, as cognitive transformation progresses, adversaries are expected to alter their 
perception of the relationship (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; Hermann, 2004: 46; Kaufman, 2006: 
202; Maoz, 2004: 229). Primarily, referents should discontinue perceiving themselves 
engaged in an existential conflictual relationship (broadly defined as perpetually 
counterproductive or dangerous), and come to recognize that development of a constructive 
relationship offers stakeholders mutual benefit, defined here as an outcome that is determined 
acceptable by both parties involved (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15-23; Kaufman, 2006: 206-
210; Long and Brecke, 2003: 35-36). By perceiving value in the development and 
maintenance of a constructive relationship, former adversaries become increasingly prone to 
nonviolent interaction (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 23; Long and Brecke, 2003: 35-36). 
Rather than seeing deconstructive behavior as the only option, they become aware of the 
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benefits that a constructive relationship would produce and adopt alternative techniques of 
interaction. 
Consequently, when cognitive transformation progresses, changes are expected to 
augment constructive interactive behavior, including practices such as dialogue or cooperation 
(Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-On, 2005: 10-11; Lederach, 1995: 12-13). Because the other is 
now legitimized, is no longer perceived as threatening, and the relationship is discerned to 
offer benefits, continued changes in perceptions and behavior are projected. Transformation, 
in this frame, is partly expected since trust will be cultivated during a period of positive 
interaction (Bar-On, 2005: 10-11; R. Cohen, 2004). As outlined in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, 
constructive interfacing usually contributes to the production of cyclical interactive and 
cognitive patterns, and generates positive cognitive and behavioral feedback (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
2004: 66-77; Head, 2012: 33-41; Kelman, 2004: 118-119; Ropers, 2003: 7). Hence, it is 
through the amalgamation of cognitive (and behavioral) transformation, as outlined in this 
subsection, which conflictual relationships are restructured and constructive relations 
sustained. When these changes become broad or deep enough, reconciliation becomes a 
potential outcome. 
3.3.3.2 Reconciliation 
At its zenith, peacebuilding processes embraced by the conflict transformation approach 
pursues reconciliation (Kelman, 2004: 119; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32, 246). The 
English word “reconciliation” derives from the Latin term reconcilare. Reconcilare is formed 
by combining the Latin prefix re- “again” and concilare, which means to “make friendly,” or 
“to bring together again” (Harper, 2001). Cambridge Learner’s Dictionary (2014) defines 
reconciliation as “a process in which two people or groups of people become friendly again 
after they have argued; or the process of making two opposite beliefs, ideas or situations 
agree.” Cambridge’s definition is generally representative of scholars’ conceptualizations. 
Natural scientists, for instance, define reconciliation as a common practice utilized by 
primates to repair disturbed relationships in the aftermath of conflict (de Waal, 1993: 113). 
The processes involved, nevertheless, fluctuate across the animal kingdom and are determined 
by factors such as species, environment, culture and age (de Waal, 2000: 24; 1993: 113). 
Chimpanzees, for instance, have been observed performing rituals including kissing or 
embracing following conflict within the group (de Waal and van Roosmalen, 1979: 56). Frans 
B.M. de Waal and Angeline van Roosmalen (1979: 60-65) suggest that these rituals decrease 
social tension by defusing conflict situations and restoring harmony. 
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Although the term reconciliation is utilized across multiple disciplines (Adelman, 2005: 
287; Avruch, 2010: 39), we concentrate on fractured social relations subsequent to (violent) 
conflict between two societies or countries. In this frame, contemporary conflict resolution 
literature attests that there is no accepted definition of reconciliation (Adelman, 2005: 287-
307; Avruch, 2010: 39; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4; Bloomfield and others, 2003: 12; Hermann, 
2004: 41; Skaar, 2013: 64-65). Accordingly, Tamar Hermann (2004: 41) posits that 
reconciliation is “little more than a buzzword,” and an “under-theorized” field of research 
(Long and Brecke, 2003: 147). The question becomes: why is reconciliation an ambiguous 
term within the conflict resolution literature? 
There are multiple explanations for reconciliation’s conceptual ambiguity within conflict 
resolution (Hermann, 2004: 41-47; Rouhana, 2004: 34). Foremost, the term is used to describe 
both a process and an outcome (Bloomfield, 2006: 6; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; Skaar, 2013: 65). 
Next, Sarkin (2008: 14) underscores the subjective nature of the term, noting that different 
societies and cultures uniquely conceptualize reconciliation. Since its processes and outcomes 
vary, the manner in which it is conceptualized contrast. Moreover, reconciliation, as 
conceptualized in conflict resolution literature, is convoluted by the numerous disciplines 
attributing to theory and practices (Bloomfield, 2006: 4-10). Although Terrence Buckeye 
(2010: 5) claims “John [Paul] Lederach laid the foundation for current studies of 
reconciliation with his 1997 book, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies,” numerous scholars from various fields have since expanded upon Lederach’s 
conceptual framework at all levels. 
The coalescence of disciplines is problematic because theories originating in theology, 
psychology, sociology, political science and economics, which prioritize different referents 
(individuals, couples, groups, societies and states) and tools, are frequently accompanied by 
the avocation of diverging outcomes, all of whose techniques and objectives are sometimes 
intermingled (Bloomfield, 2006: 4-10). Consequently, theories and practices established by 
disciplines centered on interpersonal or group relationships are not always applicable for 
resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels (Bloomfield, 2006: 4-10). For instance, 
theory and practices implemented to advance reconciliation among a married couple is 
inapplicable for promoting reconciliation between two countries62. 
                                                          
 
62 Further demonstrating how diverging disciplines can influence conceptualization, some scholars apply 
terminology from supplementary disciplines to elucidate their understanding of reconciliation in the field of 
politics. For instance, Christopher Coyne (2007: 78), an economics professor, advances an economic-based 
lexicon where terms such as “incentives” and “opportunity costs” are suggested to illustrate the conditions and 
challenges of reconciling referents at the societal level. Coyne (2007: 78) also utilizes related vocabulary, 
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Equally impeding theoretical agreement, Adelman (2005: 287-307) creates a framework 
containing four types of reconciliation. He includes the “Restorative,” “Revolutionary,” 
“Counter-Revolutionary” and “Liberal Reconciliation” forms. According to Adelman (2005: 
287-307), each approach is viable for a specific type of conflict that is determined by the 
nature of the polity involved. While a theoretical attempt to differentiate and clarify 
reconciliation, the definition Adelman (2005: 287-288) provides for reconciliation vaguely 
states it is “the restoration of fractured relationships” across these typologies. In this frame, 
Adelman simply complicates theory by creating four various types of reconciliation which 
essentially share the same objective. 
Forsaking an exhaustive exploration of reconciliation, definitions extracted from the 
literature are generally vague. For instance, some scholars claim it (re-) builds trust through 
cooperation (Kelman, 2004: 119-120; Worthington, 2006: 197). Similarly, William Long and 
Peter Brecke (2003: 1) define reconciliation as a process of “mutually conciliatory 
accommodation between former antagonists” which reduces the probability of future violence 
by renovating relationships. Long and Brecke’s definition is equally vague and could be 
generally applied to a process of conflict resolution. What differentiates reconciliation from 
conflict resolution, however, is the degree to which relationships are restored. 
A cursory review of the literature on reconciliation suggests that restoration of a positive 
relationship is the ultimate goal (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; R. Fisher, 2001b: 26; Kelman, 
2004: 119-120; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 246). There is debate over the degree of 
reconciliation that should be expected. Hamber (2007: 122), for instance, summarizes: 
“Genuine reconciliation is not about the outcome of ‘harmony,’ as many fear, or cheap 
forgiveness, but a multifaceted and complex process that includes accounting for past crimes.” 
Therefore, Hamber intertwines reconciliation with a balance of principle of justice and 
accountability. As explained, reconciliation does not require forgiveness in Hamber’s 
understanding, but rather something more constructive than nonviolent coexistence. 
By comparison, Elin Skaar (2013: 65) depicts reconciliation on a sliding scale, with 
coexistence on one side, and healing and harmony established through mercy and forgiveness, 
on the other. Accordingly, the process functions at multiple levels (interpersonal or societal) 
and can be implemented from the top-down or the bottom-up (Skaar, 2013: 66). Providing 
insight, the author emphasizes that “reconciliation requires mutuality,” suggesting that both 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
including “bankruptcy,” which he describes a situation where reconciliation proves problematic or unachievable. 
By conceptualizing reconciliation in economic terms, the author posits that its overall processes are easier to 
apply and understand by laypersons (or those outside of scholarship) (C. Coyne, 2007: 3). 
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parties are fundamental participants in the process (Skaar, 2013: 66). After all, not every 
conflictual relationship can be transformed to produce reconciliation (Skaar, 2013: 66) since 
referents may not be open to it in certain contexts. 
Due to the complexities and ambiguities alluded to above, Jeremy Sarkin (2008: 14) 
hypothesizes that it is impossible to construct one all-encompassing definition of 
reconciliation that would obtain general acceptance. Notwithstanding this challenge, I believe 
it is essential to provide a basic definition for theoretical purposes. Thus, reconciliation, as 
used herein, is defined as the “long-term process of overcoming hostility and mistrust between 
divided peoples,” whereby transformation is rooted and expressed among former adversaries 
and constructive, amicable relations at the societal level are solidified (Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 32). In short, reconciliation is “the ultimate goal” of conflict resolution or 
transformation (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 246). Nonetheless, it is believed that 
reconciliation can be obtained without necessitating the act of forgiveness (Sarkin, 2008: 17-
21; Skaar, 2013: 12). In the remainder of this thesis, I will sometimes refer to reconciliation as 
deep, or a deepening of, conflict resolution. 
With terminology clarified, processes explained, and the fields of peacebuilding 
introduced, I now position myself within contemporary conflict resolution discourse before 
highlighting several fundamental objectives of conflict resolution in the context of intrastate 
and interstate relations. 
3.3.4 Positioning the research approach 
As denoted, the terms conflict management, resolution and transformation are terms that 
frequently differentiate practices and depths of intervention, although there is some theoretical 
and practical overlap. John Paul Lederach insists these terms be appropriately differentiated 
due to the vast differences he perceives in approaches (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 9). 
More specifically: 
Lederach […] downgrades conflict resolution in comparison with 
conflict transformation on the grounds that it is content-centered rather 
than relationship-centered, aims at immediate agreement rather than 
long-term process, and is committed only to de-escalation rather than 
also including escalation to pursue positive change (Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 9)63. 
However, I disagree with Lederach’s differentiation as denoted in the quote. 
                                                          
 
63 Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 4) similarly segregates terminology, stating: “although conflict resolution terminates a 
conflict, it does not necessarily stabilize the peace or prevent the emergence of a new conflict in the future, 
which may even lead to renewed violence.” The limited approach to conflict resolution was outlined above. 
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One reason why I disagree with rigid differentiation is because conflict resolution, 
management and transformation are sometimes interchangeably referred to in the literature 
(Botes, 2003; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 30; Swanström and Weissmann, 2005: 24). 
Bercovitch (2005), for example, combines lexicon and theory when he writes: 
Successful conflict management in the context of intractable conflicts 
implies achieving some transformation in (1) the basic structure of a 
conflict (e.g., change in incompatible goals and relations), (2) the issue 
structure (e.g., change in salience of issues), or (3) actor transformation 
(e.g., change of leadership) (Bercovitch, 2005: 106). 
In the quote, Bercovitch overlaps theory and terminology, suggesting conflict management 
incorporates conflict transformation, which in Lederach’s differentiated framework is 
theoretically and discursively inappropriate and inapplicable. However, because scholars 
intertwine concepts and practices when articulating their theory, as demonstrated, it becomes 
problematic to differentiate. 
Another reason I feel that differentiation is problematic, is because I perceive that there is 
greater theoretical and practical value in combining terms and theories rather than isolating 
them. As Ramsbotham and others (2011: 9) convincingly argue, conflict resolution and 
conflict transformation are linguistically diverse manners of speaking about the same 
theoretical and practical processes at varying depths. They, consequently, present conflict 
resolution as a scale with “‘conflict settlement’ at one end of the spectrum and ʻconflict 
transformation’ at the other” (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 10). According to their 
conceptual framework, conflict settlement is a peacemaking process effectuating an 
agreement that temporarily reduces or eliminates violent interaction among adversaries 
(Avruch, 2010: 39; Kelman, 2004: 119; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32). This 
definition falls somewhere near the discipline of conflict management, as articulated in 
section 3.3.1. By comparison, conflict transformation reframes structural, cognitive and 
behavioral aspects, as Lederach advocates, leading to profound alterations within the 
relationship that root transformation (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 9), as articulated in 
3.3.3. The elastic framework has the advantage in that it neatly integrates all Western theories 
and practices under the rubric conflict resolution. 
Hence, the elastic framework of conflict resolution combines conflict management, 
conflict resolution and conflict transformation as complimentary practices (Botes, 2003; 
Reimann, 2004: 8-15; Swanström and Weissmann, 2005: 28). Accordingly, the three 
approaches can be singly applied or combined depending on needs and circumstances within a 
given relationship (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 29). 
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Accordingly, peacebuilding practices can be tailored and harmonized to increase the viability 
of resolution by targeting different levels and depths simultaneously as needs and conditions 
require (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 29). Moreover, 
amalgamation of approaches that target the structural and societal levels concurrently is 
suggested able to increase the probability of conflict resolution becoming rooted through 
broad application (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27; R. Fisher, 2001b: 26-28). Combining the 
three Western theories under the rubric of conflict resolution, thus, creates a holistic approach. 
For these reasons, I select to adhere to Ramsbotham and others’ (2011) broad 
understanding of conflict resolution as a sliding scale. I favor the approach for three reasons. 
First, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation are best understood 
and applied in combination rather than independently (Reimann, 2004: 12). Secondly, by 
utilizing a wide conceptual framework, it is possible to synthesize inter-related Western 
theories and practices running the gamut from conflict management to conflict transformation 
(Reimann, 2004: 12). Finally, a wide framework of analysis allows for a holistic comparison 
of conflict resolution across cultures at the theoretical and practical levels, which is a 
fundamental objective of my research. In particular, a wider framework ensures that all 
Western conflict resolution theory and practices are represented when making comparisons 
with the Arab/Muslim understanding of the process and practice, as conducted in chapters five 
and six. 
With this in mind, hereafter, the term conflict resolution broadly refers to a 
multidisciplinary (for example, political science, peace studies, international relations, 
strategic studies) conglomeration of theories and practices utilized for the purpose of 
mitigating or eliminating violent conflict at multiple levels (interpersonal, group, intrastate 
and interstate). When administered as a verb, it delineates a process that includes all tools and 
theories applicable for managing, resolving or transforming conflict. The potential outcomes 
of such processes range from conflict termination to reconciliation depending on the referents, 
needs and circumstances encountered. 
3.3.5 Objectives of conflict resolution in context 
With conflict and conflict resolution detailed, and in consideration of the wide theoretical 
framework I have selected, it is fundamental to establish some general objectives of conflict 
resolution at the interstate level. Constructed upon the examined understanding of conflict and 
its elements, particularly the interplay of human response, perceptions, environmental 
conditions, and experiences which impact on the development and continuation of conflictual 
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relationships (Bar-Tal, 2000: 351-365), we argue that a process of conflict resolution should 
ideally accomplish several things. It should: address root causes (Kelman, 2004: 111-114; 
Reimann, 2004: 11), grievances (Auerbach, 2004: 149), empower individuals or collectives 
(Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 21; Reimann, 2004: 11), and alter or transform relationships to 
some degree (Botes, 2003). These issues are addressed in turn and are repeatedly referenced 
throughout the remainder of the thesis. 
To begin, conflict resolution, in its broad sense, should identify and address core 
incompatibilities, or root causes, of conflict to manage or terminate a prolongation of 
deconstructive behavior (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 5; Galtung, 1998: 4-8; Lederach and 
Maiese, 2003: 4; Reimann, 2004: 11). Within each case, root causes are expected to be 
multiple including structural, cultural, and/or economic issues or needs (Lederach and Maiese, 
2003: 4; Reimann, 2004: 13). Addressing roots requires an objective, balanced and mutual 
investigation of, and dialogue into, which issues are producing the conflict (Head, 2012: 41). 
Once identified, efforts should be made to address the root causes of the conflict in a manner 
that satisfies the interests and needs of stakeholders. Nonetheless, conflicts and their causes 
are not static and will expand and mutate throughout the duration of the (conflict) relationship 
(Galtung, 1969: 102; Reimann, 2004: 4; Swanström and Weissmann, 2005: 9). Thus, issues 
that are deemed the root causes of a given conflict are expected to change over time since the 
relationship progressively alters. Fluidity thereby requires regular evaluations to ensure 
changing needs and objectives are factored into the equation as time passes. 
Next, due to their salience, conflict resolution requires grievances be addressed 
(Auerbach, 2004: 149; Lederach, 1995: 14). The necessity of addressing grievances is 
obvious. Ronald Fisher (2001b: 26), for example, succinctly admonishes that wrongs 
committed “by one generation become the basis for retributive, vengeful atrocities perpetrated 
by the next generations.” Here Fisher is underscoring the pervasive and influential nature of 
grievances on the quality of relationships, and their propensity for being transmitted through 
and across generations. As noted in section 3.2.3 of the present chapter, violent conflicts 
produce real and perceived grievances and injustices that are discerned as inexcusable and 
unacceptable (Kriesberg, 2004: 83-84; Worthington, 2006: 7-8). In some instances, these 
(perceived) grievances increase adversaries’ distrust and hatred of the “other” and occasion 
conflict-propagating thoughts and behavior, that are then disseminated throughout society 
(Bar-Tal, 2000: 361-362). Grievances, therefore, need to be addressed to aid in the 
transformation of the adversaries and the quality of the relationship. 
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Then, conflict resolution should empower (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 14-21; Reimann, 
2004: 11). Harold Saunders posits that the empowerment of individuals or groups involved in 
a conflictual relationship is vital for resolving deconstructive conflict (Hermann, 2004: 40). In 
terms of objectives, Lederach (1995: 21) suggests empowerment should create “mutuality” 
and “community” whereby interaction and cooperation nurtures constructive relationships. 
Empowerment, as emphasized by Lederach, is defined as the act of extending political or 
social power (or voice) to (comparatively weaker or marginalized) individuals and groups 
regardless of their distinguishing characteristics (race, socioeconomic status, ethnicity), to 
create a symmetrical and just social/political arrangement. Empowerment affords stakeholders 
an opportunity to have both their grievances articulated and needs addressed (Adelman, 2005: 
287-307; Botes, 2003; Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 176; Reimann, 
2004: 11). Needs, as applied herein, likewise incorporate an accommodation of individuals’ 
input on how, when, and under which conditions conflict resolution occurs (Botes, 2003; 
Stover and others, 2005: 835). The latter is essential because parties will have to determine a 
mutually satisfactory approach and common objectives when resolving conflict (Bar-On, 
2004: 251; 2005: 9; Bloomfield and others, 2003: 12-16; Rosoux, 2009: 559; Sarkin, 2008; 
Stover and others, 2005: 834-836; Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3). This form of empowerment 
addresses the criticisms of conflict resolution outlined in section 3.1. 
Thereafter, and inseparably linked to empowerment in social-political terms, a process of 
conflict resolution should be inclusive since the inclusion of most relevant stakeholders, 
regardless of their ethnic, political, social preference, is essential to achieve and root conflict 
resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3; Rifkind and Picco, 
2014: 49). The importance of inclusion as a complementary component of empowerment are 
noteworthy since, in its absence, conflict resolution will have minimal and/or short-term 
effects, and the process will be subject to rejection, setback and failure due to limited popular 
endorsement (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 30; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49). For example, by 
limiting inclusion, there is a risk that “spoilers,” broadly defined here as referents who seek to 
undermine the conflict resolution process, will derail a process from dissatisfaction and 
marginalization (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49). Reversely, inclusion allows for all 
stakeholders to be brought into the resolution process, which reduces the probability of 
outright popular rejection and limits opportunities spoilers can monopolize upon to derail the 
process. 
Lastly, and linked to the above, the literature advocates social inclusion when resolving 
conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels (Shriver, 1995: 91). Lipschultz, for example, 
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asserts: “Relationships among people, among individuals, are the fundamental basis of the 
state; restoring only the institutions of the state (and the economy) will not restore those 
relationships rent by years of violence and war” (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 17). Restating 
their quote, structural methodologies frequently included into conflict management are 
insufficient for addressing societal grievances and needs. As a result, Harold Saunders 
emphasizes the importance of establishing a “human dimension” in conflict resolution theory 
at the intrastate and interstate levels (Hermann, 2004: 40). Saunders notes that a conflict is not 
simply a dispute between institutions and representatives of a country, but simultaneously 
incorporates the respective communities whom must likewise be included in any resolution 
process for its realization (Hermann, 2004: 40). Social inclusion is so fundamental to success, 
scholars hypothesizing that without social involvement, a conflictual relationship will not 
experience an adequate depth of transformation and the conflict will remain subject to 
continuation or escalation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 11-13; R. 
Cohen, 2004: 179; R. Fisher, 2001b: 25; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 23, 48, 211; Shriver, 1995: 
6-9). These five interconnected components are emphasized when resolving conflict at the 
intrastate and interstate level, further underscoring the need to amalgamate structural and 
societal level approaches when resolving conflict at these levels. 
3.4 An analytical framework of conflict resolution 
With our broad theoretical understanding of conflict resolution articulated, attention turns 
to elucidating a practical understanding of conflict resolution as a process. Louis Kriesberg, 
whom is generally recognized to adhere to the conflict resolution school of thought, provides 
a concise framework beneficial due to its simplification of a complex process. He divides 
conflict resolution into three elements: who is being reconciled, how reconciliation is pursued, 
and to what degree it is accomplished (R. Fisher, 2001b: 27). Utilizing Kriesberg’s 
terminology, the first contains the “units” or referents involved in the process. The second is 
defined as the “dimension” or techniques (for instance, reparations and apologies) applied to 
advance a process. The third element is the “degree” to which resolution is pursued and 
achieved (qualifying the outcome) (R. Fisher, 2001b: 27). Each component is explored in the 
following subsections. 
3.4.1 Units or levels 
As indicated, scholars across theoretical disciplines conceptualize conflict resolution 
divergently and focus their theories on numerable referents (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 
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35-61). For instance, religious scholars, such as Doherty and others (2011), focus on resolving 
conflict among individuals or couples. Comparatively, social-psychological scholars, such as 
Kelman (2004) or Kriesberg (2004), apply their theories to resolve conflict at the societal 
level. For theoretical purposes, and due to the disparate nature of the fields and theories 
involved, this text condenses referents to four broad categories: individual; group; societal and 
international. These are brusquely defined below. 
3.4.1.1 Individual 
At the lowest level, conflict resolution is administered to transform conflicts among 
individuals. For instance, a married couple can be reconciled following an argument or 
separation (Worthington, 2006). At this level, social and psychological attributes of the 
conflict are of theoretical and practical importance, for instance how a conflict affects 
individual cognition and welfare (Worthington, 2006). Techniques for advancing conflict 
resolution at the individual level include counseling and/or individual psychological or 
religious-based therapy (Worthington, 2006: 203-253). While theories and practices 
associated with the individual level center primarily on interpersonal relationships, theories 
originally developed at this level have been transposed onto conflict resolution at the higher 
levels (Bloomfield, 2006: 4-10). For instance, references are sometimes made to social 
practices of forgiveness and healing, as explored in greater detail in chapter 4, section 3.11. 
3.4.1.2 Group 
Scholars in a range of disciplines including sociology and business management argue that 
groups can and should resolve conflicts among and between members (Rahim, 2002: 207; 
Worthington, 2006: 256-271). For instance, business management literature emphasizes 
conflict among coworkers negatively affects employees’ overall productiveness (Rahim, 
2002: 210). Management literature recommends the introduction of tools and practices, 
including lectures or instructional videos that educate employees on the importance of 
teamwork and impart conflict resolution techniques (Rahim, 2002: 226). Maintaining the 
present example, managers can also function as intermediaries and/or be charged with 
imparting knowledge of techniques, such as negotiations, to increase harmony in the 
workplace and minimize the counterproductive effects of conflict among coworkers (Rahim, 
2002: 210-226). 
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3.4.1.3 Societal-National 
Scholars hypothesize that conflict resolution at the societal (or intrastate) level is possible 
and necessary following (violent) conflict (Hamid, 1983: 320; Kelman, 2004: 115; Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 147-158; Oberg, 2007: 80). Mohammad Beshir Hamid (1983: 320) summarizes 
that the roots of “[i]nternal conflict or confrontation [at the state level] mainly arises from the 
tensions of identity and national integration, from the monopoly of power, in one form or 
another, by one party or ethnic group, or from the breakdown, or the lack, of institutionalised 
forums for power politics.” The proliferation of these deconstructive internal processes 
identified in the quote have generated increased instances of violent intrastate conflicts since 
the 1980s (Lia, 2005: 25; Long and Brecke, 2003: 6). The trend has subsequently fostered 
research and augmented the practical application of conflict resolution at the societal level, 
including international intervention under the rubric of human security denoted in chapter 2, 
section 1.5 (Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Long and Brecke, 2003: 5-6). As highlighted 
previously in this chapter, representatives of the United States and Britain offered 
international intervention and state-building as excuses for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
(Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 230-233). 
At the societal level, conflict resolution practices have generally manifested in the form of 
national reconciliation programs, as implemented in countries including Chile, Rwanda and 
Uganda (Hayner, 1994: 599-600)64. The examples provided are societal-based arrangements 
sometimes implemented in transitional justice programs, designed to transform social 
relations following intrastate conflict while transitioning society into new social and political 
structures. Among the list of national reconciliation programs implemented to date, the high-
profile Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (1995-2003) in South Africa has 
received a great deal of scholarly attention and is frequently presented as one example of a 
successful conflict resolution program at the societal level (Hayner, 1994: 625-626). The 
South Africa program was designed to transform perceptions among diverse members of 
society, as well as between society and government, mixing practices including truth 
commissions, amnesty and traditional justice mechanisms, following the end of apartheid 
(Long and Brecke, 2003: 59-60; Skaar, 2013: 78-79). Hence, the process was implemented 
following a change in government and objectively sought to restore social relations and faith 
in the governing framework as politics and society underwent a transition to a new social and 
governing framework. 
                                                          
 
64 For a general overview of these national reconciliation programs, see Hayner (1994). 
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Nonetheless, scholars continue to debate the relative utility of the TRC. Some negatively 
assess the program claiming that it failed to bridge existing gaps between the perpetrators and 
victims involved (Chapman, 2007: 52-53; Gibson, 2002: 540-541, 553-554; Rothfield, 2008: 
16-20; Sarkin, 2008: 20-22). Contrary, others argue it is premature to make meaningful 
assessments (Verdoolaege, 2005: 197). While it is impossible to examine the successes and 
failures of national reconciliation in South Africa, similar societal-based reconciliation 
programs have been implemented elsewhere. 
3.4.1.4 International/Interstate 
David Bloomfield (2006: 5) and Louis Kriesberg (2004: 82) suggest that conflict 
resolution within international relations discourse has been on the increase over the past few 
decades. However, theorization at the interstate level is limited and replete with contention. 
Bloomfield (2006: 10), among others (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 72; Long and Brecke, 2003: 
154), laments that theory and practice at the higher levels have been inspired by “the thinking, 
vocabulary, and approach” at the individual level and is frequently inapplicable. Hermann 
(2004: 47), therefore, cautions that “transferability from the small-group level to the larger 
ones” is problematic. The futile theoretical and practical attempts to transpose conflict 
resolution from the lower to the higher levels, as noted in the quote, and the relative lack of 
theory at the interstate level, prompt scholars to call for increased research at the interstate 
level (Long and Brecke, 2003: 147), and to reassess theory and practices developed at the 
lower levels and transferred to the higher levels (Bloomfield, 2006: 10). 
Despite existing theoretical inconsistencies, scholars hypothesize conflict resolution to 
some degree is possible between two countries (Mendeloff, 2004: 264; Rosoux, 2009: 556-
558). One critique found in the literature proposes that citizens in the affected countries would 
have to subscribe to membership of an “international society” in order for conflict resolution 
to occur at the interstate level (Long and Brecke, 2003: 75-76). Long and Brecke test the 
theory. 
When exploring the potential of interstate conflict resolution, Long and Brecke (2003) 
apply Hedley Bull’s definition of international society, which states: 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of 
states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a 
society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the 
working of common institutions (Long and Brecke, 2003: 76). 
As denoted in the quote, international society consists of diverse communities sharing 
interests and values at the higher level. When inhabitants subscribe to parallel notions of rules 
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and association, it is argued there is an increased chance that interstate conflicts can be 
resolved or transformed, framed around these commonalities. 
Accordingly, Long and Brecke (2003: 114) conclude that identification with international 
society is limited and quantitatively different from that found among national societies. They 
also find that conflict resolution at the interstate level is conditioned on the perceived utility 
and/or possibility of administering particular techniques such as truth telling or offering 
forgiveness across societies (Long and Brecke, 2003: 119). When practices can be agreed 
upon, resolution is more probable. Ultimately, the authors conclude that while certain 
challenges exist, conflict resolution between two countries is possible (Long and Brecke, 
2003: 119). Other scholars from the conflict management and conflict resolution school of 
thought likewise believe interstate conflicts can be resolved (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 336, 
354-355; Kriesberg, 2001: 60). 
In fact, there has been an increasing degree of acceptance of conflict resolution theory and 
practice at the interstate level and the trend is expected to continue (Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 269-291). Creating further appeal, there are several historical instances of successful, 
intrastate conflict resolution programs. For example, Germany has conducted one of the most 
sustained efforts in contemporary history (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 354-355; Ross, 2004: 
203). Since the 1950s, consecutive German governments have made, or continue to make, 
efforts to improve Germany’s relationship with neighboring countries, namely France and 
Poland following World War II (1939-1949) (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 334-355). Germany’s 
conciliatory actions have enhanced the quality of bilateral relations with France and Poland, 
and are confirmation of how two countries can transform their relationship over an extended 
period of time (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 354-355; Long and Brecke, 2003: 115). 
To provide a more detailed understanding of how conflict resolution is most effectively 
accomplished between states, the following subsections explore guidelines extracted from 
Long and Brecke’s (2003) research. The guidelines they propose are valuable when 
contemplating conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq. 
3.4.1.4.1 General viability 
In their seminal work, War and Reconciliation, William Long and Peter Brecke (2003) 
explore (deep) conflict resolution through “reconciliation events” at the intrastate (post-civil 
war) and interstate (post-war) levels to qualify how and why these events have succeeded in 
the past. The authors “define a reconciliation event as one that includes the following 
elements: direct physical contact or proximity between opponents, usually senior 
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representatives of respective factions; a public ceremony accompanied by substantial publicity 
or media attention that relays the event to the wider national society; and ritualistic or 
symbolic behavior that indicates the parties consider the dispute resolved and that more 
amicable relations are expected to follow” (Long and Brecke, 2003: 6). Their study examines 
“reconciliation events” because: 1) it is less problematic to identify a reconciliation event as 
opposed to reconciliation since the latter occurs cognitively in the minds of individuals; and 2) 
because a “reconciliation event” naturally instigates and illustrates a move toward (deep) 
conflict resolution (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Long and Brecke, 2003: 7). According to this 
criterion, conflict resolution is generally measured at the structural level, although elements of 
social inclusion are also present. 
Querying whether “societal forgiveness or costly signaling” models function best for 
altering intrastate or interstate conflicts, Long and Brecke’s (2003: 111) study explores 
multiple cases of civil and interstate wars followed by reconciliation events. Societal 
forgiveness implies a degree of transformation and possible reconciliation while the costly 
signally model, defined below, and signifies particular structural components that indicate a 
degree of commitment to resolution. By way of summary, the authors conclude there are 
empirical and epistemological differences between the approaches at the two levels (Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 111). Most importantly, they determine that the forgiveness model, which 
broadly extends forgiveness among former belligerents, is better suited to transform intrastate 
relations rather than interstate (Long and Brecke, 2003: 114). The utility of forgiveness at the 
societal level is obvious, because groups forming society are obliged to coexist (Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 111-114). By comparison, extending forgiveness at the interstate level is 
problematic since there may be geographic distances and thereby less perceived urgency. 
Nevertheless, Long and Brecke (2003: 114) determine that conflict resolution at the 
international level is possible, with its probability being increased by two factors. First, it is 
more probable when adversaries share geographic proximity (Long and Brecke, 2003: 114-
118). For instance, neighboring countries have greater incentive and opportunity to pursue 
conflict resolution because proximity increases the importance of, and the possibilities for, 
positive interaction (Long and Brecke, 2003: 114-118). Second, conflict resolution at the 
international level functions better when “effective bargaining” is utilized (Long and Brecke, 
2003: 118; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 20). For this reason, Long and Brecke (2003: 18-
23) create a model for effective bargaining called the “costly signaling model,” which they 
hypothesize increases the chances of conflict resolution between two countries. The model’s 
precepts are outlined below. 
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3.4.1.4.2 Costly signaling model 
To successfully transform conflictual relations between two countries, Long and Brecke’s 
(2003: 20, 111-116) “costly signaling model” contains four elements for successful negotiated 
bargaining. These elements are: costly, novelty, voluntary, and irrevocable (Long and Brecke, 
2003: 111-116). Each concept is explained in turn. 
First, the authors stress the importance of vulnerability as a component of conflict 
resolution at the interstate level, defined as the “costly” nature of a reconciliation act (Long 
and Brecke, 2003: 18-20). Vulnerability underscores that the country demonstrating interest in 
improving relations is incurring risk and is subject to exploitation (Long and Brecke, 2003: 
18). The authors summarize: 
[A] reconciliation event (and the reconciliation it symbolizes) is a 
costly (or potentially costly) signal that the other party is likely to 
interpret as a genuine offer to improve relations and thus may break a 
deadlocked conflictual situation. Because of associated costs of backing 
away from the event, it may also buttress initial attempts of the parties at 
cooperative interaction (Long and Brecke, 2003: 18). 
As noted in the quote, the utility of deliberately making oneself vulnerable vis-à-vis the other 
demonstrates a genuine eagerness and commitment to improve relations. The importance of 
the costly nature is so valuable that the authors hypothesize the higher the risk, the greater the 
payoff in terms of degree of resolution achieved (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Long and Brecke, 
2003: 20). 
Risk is inevitable in conflict resolution because success hinges on adversaries’ mutual 
willingness to resolve a conflict and effect simultaneous change (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 74; 
Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 37). Ideally, action by one adversary should provoke a 
reciprocal response (Long and Brecke, 2003: 20). However, reciprocity is not guaranteed. 
Adversaries, therefore, take appreciable risk when proposing or implementing conflict 
resolution, since one referent may not alter their attitude or behavior despite those rendered by 
their adversary (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 74; Jönsson and Aggestam, 
2009: 37; Kriesberg, 2004: 96-97; Long and Brecke, 2003: 20; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 
185). 
The second component of successful conflict resolution between states is novelty. Novelty 
is defined as a radical and unexpected break with former behavioral patterns (Adelman, 2005: 
287-307; Long and Brecke, 2003: 20). A profound qualitative alteration in behavior, it is 
suggested, fosters cognitive re-assessment of the “other” since it reduces perceptions of threat, 
can build trust and visibly exhibits interest in altering conflictual relations (Adelman, 2005: 
287-307; Head, 2012: 33-38; Long and Brecke, 2003: 20-30). In essence, a novel change 
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demonstrated by an adversary challenges previously held perceptions of the “other” and thus 
demands re-evaluation. 
Thirdly, a “reconciliation event” must be seen as voluntary or not coerced (Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 30-36). More precisely, the event must occur absent pressure from intervening 
or mediating third parties. The voluntary character of the action demonstrates an observable 
change in the cognitive and performance capacities of the initiating actor, thereby illustrating 
that the “other” is both capable of change and prepared to behave differently (Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 30-36). In short, the voluntary nature of an act increases the perception that 
transformation is possible and the initiator is both capable and willing to change. 
Finally, Long and Brecke (2003: 20) suggest that a reconciliation event must be 
irrevocable, or cannot be reversed once it has been extended. The authors provide the example 
of Egypt’s President Anwar al-Sadat’s actions in the 1970s, a period of heightened political 
tension and violence between Egypt and Israel (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Long and Brecke, 
2003: 84-91). At this time, Sadat publicly proclaimed his willingness to establish peace with 
Israel before Egypt’s parliament (Long and Brecke, 2003: 84-91; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 
53). Through his proclamation and associated efforts to ensure its implementation, Sadat 
placed himself outside of the will of Egypt’s public and Arab leaders throughout the Middle 
East who adamantly refused to recognize the state of Israel (Long and Brecke, 2003: 84-91). 
Sadat’s statement, and his later visit to Jerusalem to speak before the parliament of Israel, was 
thus “irrevocable because once Sadat proclaimed his serious intentions toward reconciliation, 
he put too much at stake to back away from the attempt” (Long and Brecke, 2003: 90). In a 
nutshell, the quote highlights it was impossible for Sadat to reverse his decision, because his 
demonstrated commitment to establishing peace with Israel could not be rescinded. 
Irrevocable actions illustrate an initiator’s commitment, willingness and determination to 
transform the conflictual relationship, and reinforce the vulnerable and costly nature of the 
reconciliation event (Long and Brecke, 2003: 20). In instances where these combined precepts 
are observed, Long and Brecke (2003: 153) assert that costly signaling can transform bilateral 
relations between two countries. Nonetheless, they caution “there is no free lunch: to make 
credible and effective signals capable of furthering peacemaking and peacekeeping requires 
that the parties voluntarily and irrevocably make novel and costly concessions” (Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 153). Their quote accentuates that all four points should act in unison to 
demonstrate commitment, and that the effort requires sacrifice. In conclusion, we believe that 
conflict resolution between two countries is possible, and that the principles ascribed to the 
  
217 
 
costly signaling model are indispensable in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations due to their 
recognized potential for altering relations between two states. 
3.4.2 Dimensions (or tools) 
Transitioning our analysis back to Kriesberg’s concise framework of conflict resolution, 
the second element in his simple framework of conflict resolution is the dimensions, or 
tools/techniques utilized, to promote transformation of a conflictual relationship (R. Fisher, 
2001b: 26-27). Numerous tools are available at the social and international level, with the 
literature emphasizing positive and negative attributes of each (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 
29-34; Hermann, 2004: 41). For the sake of space, these include acts such as the payment of 
reparations, provision of an apology and the utilization of truth commissions (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 29-34). For a non-exhaustive list of tools identified during the course of this 
research, see Appendix 1. The techniques articulated therein frequently overlap, reinforce or 
compliment each other (Lederach, 1995: 14). 
Nevertheless, the literature underscores that conflict resolution mechanisms, and their 
potential combinations, vary across the spectrum of cultures, conflicts and referents 
(Bloomfield and others, 2003: 12; Rosoux, 2009: 559). Divergence is a result of the 
diversities found across the spectrum of conflict inputs, including diverse referents, 
perceptions of history, the intensity of the conflict, and requirement or objectives pursued by 
referents. As a result of diversity, the literature recommends conflict resolution processes be 
conceptually and pragmatically customized to meet the needs of affected stakeholders (Bar-
On, 2004: 251; 2005: 9; Bloomfield and others, 2003: 12-16; Rosoux, 2009: 559; Sarkin, 
2008; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836; Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3). Customized 
approaches imply practices and tools cannot be carbon-copied wholesale since two conflicts 
are never precisely similar (Bar-On, 2005: 9; Bekdash, 2009; Crocker, 2003: 42; Hinds and 
Oliver, 2009: 3; Keranen, 2014: 127; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 211-212; Sarkin, 2008: 27). 
Most importantly, mechanisms should not be imposed (Rosoux, 2009: 553). 
To ensure the appropriateness of practices in context, Stover and others (2005: 834-836) 
recommend that stakeholders’ opinions be qualified to determine which issues and techniques 
are mutually acceptable. Consultation is necessary because intervening third parties and/or 
indigenous actors frequently construct conflicting perceptions of conflict and conflict 
resolution (Hellmüller, 2013). Non-consultation, therefore, increases the probability of a 
resolution process failing or having limited utility since extensive participation or acceptance 
of the program and its mechanisms will likely be marginal (Dunlap, 2013: 135-136; Kennedy, 
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2013: 75-76; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836). Stated another way, in the absence of popular 
support for principles and practices, the perceived legitimacy of a program and its 
mechanisms will be minimal because intentions, tools and objectives will be continuously 
questioned or rejected by society (Stover and others, 2005: 834-836). Local ownership of the 
program is, thus, fundamental and essential (Alamir, 2013: 247; Dunlap, 2013: 135-136; 
Flavin, 2013: 187, 247; Kennedy, 2013: 75-76; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836). 
In the same vein, and to ensure the widest approach possible, other scholars recommend 
increasing the flexibility and popular acceptance of a resolution program by combining and 
balancing practices (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 75, 154; Sarkin, 2008: 20-23; Snyder and 
Vinjamuri, 2004: 16, 33-34), and/or implementing them at multiple levels (Alamir, 2013: 
258). For instance, Timor–Leste utilized a truth and reconciliation commission in tandem with 
international tribunals, thereby combining and balancing both distributive and retributive 
justice (Sarkin, 2008: 23). Mixing techniques and tools is praised for its ability to meet 
diverse needs and appeal to a wider section of society. A wide breadth and depth, it is 
suggested, increases popular acceptance, meets a range of needs, and augments the overall 
potentiality of the resolution program as the process incorporates and affects more 
stakeholders. 
3.4.3 Degree 
The last element of conflict resolution according to Louis Kriesberg’s concise framework 
is degree, or the qualification of referent commitment to a conflict resolution process and/or 
the depth to which referents/the relationship have/has transformed (outcome) (R. Fisher, 
2001b: 27). Scholars acknowledge that the degree of resolution achieved will inevitably vary 
since referents, commitment, environment, and other relational intricacies affect the potential 
outcome of a conflict resolution process (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Avruch, 2002: 3; 
Kriesberg, 2001: 60). For instance, stakeholders may inconsistently commit themselves to the 
program, ranging from disinterest to absolute commitment, for innumerable reasons 
(Kriesberg, 2001: 60). Due to these intricacies, acts of resolution may not always be 
reciprocated or effectively implemented (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 37; Kriesberg, 2004: 
97). Qualities such as lack of sincerity and poor implementation naturally undermine the 
degree to which resolution or transformation can be expected (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 
37; Kriesberg, 2004: 97). 
In terms of qualitatively assessing a program, it is believed that the efficaciousness of a 
program can be assessed (Hermann, 2004: 46-47). Gardner Feldman’s (2008: 6-19) research 
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on “German-Polish Reconciliation” suggests corresponding parameters for measuring 
commitment and outcome of conflict resolution among countries at the structural level. For 
instance, the establishment and qualitative functionality of joint (governmental or societal) 
organizations or institutions and exchanges provide parameters by which commitment and 
outcome can be measured (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 11-16). Specifically, Gardner Feldman 
(2008: 16) argues that the more institutionalized and integrated institutions are, the greater the 
depth of commitment and the greater the expected outcome of the resolution process. For 
example, regular bilateral exchanges of representatives and/or meetings of joint institutions 
illustrate a commitment to the process. Similarly, the style and substance of official 
statements is argued to be indicative of the degree to which relations have improved and the 
likelihood of a continuation of a resolution process (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 5-8). According 
to Gardner Feldman (2008: 16-17), the less confrontational and more conciliatory a leader’s 
language is, the higher the degree of resolution achieved and the more probable continued 
conciliatory behavior would endure. 
Secondly, the frequency and timing of interaction also provides insight into referents’ 
commitment to, and the depth of conflict resolution achieved (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 16). 
For instance, if bilateral visits occur frequently, they illustrate a high degree of transformation 
and a resolute determination to maintain the conflict resolution process (Gardner Feldman, 
2008: 16-17). Contrary, the fewer the visits the more indicative circumstances are of a limited 
commitment to the process. Lastly, Gardner Feldman (2008: 19) argues that while any 
conflict resolution process evolves, disagreements between referents will inevitably emerge. 
The qualitative manner in which these divergences are dealt with is equally indicative of 
participants’ dedication to improving the relationship (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 19). For 
instance, referents might publicly minimize the disagreements’ long-term effects, thereby 
affirming their (mutual) commitment to the relationship and the resilience of the process 
(Gardner Feldman, 2008: 6-19). Although her precepts offer potential insight into the degree 
of conflict resolution, they are not perfect parameters. 
Associated with the element of degree, the literature is replete with diverging perceptions 
of the overall capacity of conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4). Capacity and outcome 
are examined in the following subsections. 
3.4.3.1 Capacity 
The capacity of conflict resolution varies according to scholars. For instance, scholars 
disagree whether conflict resolution is necessary for, or capable of, resolving all conflicts 
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(Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4). Conceptual divergence on this point is influenced by the perceived 
utility of conflict resolution; with some hypothesizing potentiality is premised on prevailing 
conflict conditions (such as timing or duration) rather than the potentiality of conflict 
resolution as a practice (Rosoux, 2009: 557-559). 
For instance, Worthington (2006: 247-248) argues that conflict resolution is necessary and 
possible in all instances to prevent or minimize conflict since cognitive re-framing is required 
because a conflict inevitably produces wounds and grievances, regardless of its intensity or 
duration. Accordingly, all conflicts are subject to resolution. However, Worthington’s council 
is theoretically applicable, but not practically, as he does not address instances where 
referents may not be inclined to participate. In certain cases, referents simply may not wish to 
reconcile (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 17-18). When disinterest prevails, conflict resolution 
is impossible, since referents are not committed to the process. Nonetheless, such constraints 
do not reflect on the overall utility of conflict resolution as a discipline or practice, but rather 
on referent interests or commitment. 
By comparison, Rosoux (2009: 557-559) suggests that not all conflicts are malleable to 
conflict resolution, and therefore, resolution is not always applicable or capable of success. 
Those conflicts falling beyond its scope can be classified as intractable. In instances of 
intractability, referents might desire to resolve their conflict, but be limited by conflict 
complexity or root causes that prove insurmountable to achieve resolution. Thus, while 
conflict resolution might be preferred in some instances, mutually acceptable resolution may 
not be possible because referents uncompromisingly adhere to non-negotiable objectives. In 
this case, mitigating factors undermine a potential process of conflict resolution, but do not 
necessarily reflect poorly on the process itself. 
For these reasons, Ramsbotham and others (2011: 377-380) argue that qualities, including 
the identity of the referents, their history and culture are influential determinants for if, when 
and how conflict resolution can be introduced or pursued. The utilization of such evaluations 
makes it possible to determine conflict conditions whereupon particularities can be evaluated, 
such as the degree of commitment of referents and the issues at stake, prior to estimating the 
relative utility of conflict resolution in a given relationship. Rather than determining conflict 
resolution is viable in all cases, the latter approach advocates comprehensive evaluation of 
each conflictual relationship to determine the applicability of conflict resolution according to 
particularities within a given relationship. When circumstances are congenial, a process of 
conflict resolution can be implemented. 
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3 4.3.2 Expected outcome 
Related to capacity, theoretical divergence abounds in the literature over which outcomes 
(or degree) can be expected from a process of conflict resolution (Hermann, 2004: 46-47). 
Western literature categorizes potential outcomes of a successful conflict resolution process in 
dichotomous terms: non-violent coexistence (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 36-37; Ross, 
2004: 201) or stable peace (Kelman, 2004: 112-113). On the one hand, Rosoux (2009: 553-
559) and Gardner Feldman (2008: 2) argue that non-violent coexistence is more probable 
subsequent to resolution since adversaries could maintain irreconcilable differences. Angela 
Nyawira Khaminwa (2003) defines coexistence as “a state in which two or more groups are 
living together while respecting their differences and resolving their conflicts nonviolently.” 
Stated differently, nonviolent coexistence is the condition where adversaries do not deploy 
violence against each other but persist in their negative views of one another (Bloomfield and 
others, 2003: 19; Booth, 2007: 449; Kriesberg, 2004: 102). Resolution at this degree falls at or 
near conflict management on our broad conflict resolution spectrum, temporarily preventing 
violent interaction (Khaminwa, 2003; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32). 
On the other hand, critics argue that non-violent coexistence is a minimal and shallow 
outcome since it only produces “negative peace” (Galtung, 1969: 183), defined as “the 
absence of turmoil, tension, conflict, and war” (Boulding, 1978: 3), because grievances and 
animosity remain despite the arresting of physical violence. John Paul Lederach (1995: 17), 
among others, argues that conflict resolution should surpass the establishment of non-violent 
coexistence and result in conflict transformation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 62; Galtung, 1969: 
183-186; Gopin, 2001; Parent, 2012: 28; Rigby, 2001). Boulding (1978: 13) similarly 
contends that conflict resolution should at minimum produce stable peace, defined as “a 
situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the 
calculations of any of the people involved.” According to Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 62), stable 
peace is achieved when adversaries are “satisfied with the peace agreement and after the 
underlying structural-institutional, cognitive, and emotional conditions of a protracted conflict 
have been transformed to the mutual satisfaction” of those referents involved. Conditions 
identified in the quote, produce stable peace and imply that cognitive, behavioral and effective 
changes occur, which in turn creates conditions congenial to the establishment of positive 
peace. In this frame, the outcome of conflict resolution can produce reconciliation. 
Within the theoretical debate, Rosoux (2009: 553-559) suggests that conflict resolution 
outcomes are indeterminable. She argues that factors such as referents’ willingness to 
participate in the process, or the duration and intensity of the conflict, impact upon the 
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outcome and are subject to variation (Rosoux, 2009: 553-559). Hence, ascribing standard 
outcomes to conflict resolution is challenging since each conflict differs in typology and 
complexity (Rosoux, 2009: 553-559). We select to adopt the latter approach, since we 
believed that referents themselves should determine if, and to what degree, resolution is 
pursued (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 377-380). By adopting a flexible position, all 
possibilities are viable depending upon the needs and desires of affected stakeholders, and by 
default, accommodations are made according to diverse conflict circumstances (duration). 
Hence, while our framework accommodates outcomes of conflict resolution ranging from 
non-violent coexistence to reconciliation, we simultaneously believe principles, tools and 
objectives should be determined by the affected referents instead of scholars or policymakers. 
By way of conclusion, we have provided a general overview of Western scholarly 
conceptualization of conflict and conflict resolution. The next chapter continues our analysis 
of conflict resolution as conceptualized by Western scholars by introducing principles, 
approaches and problems. Combined, chapters 3 and 4 provide a framework by which a cross-
cultural comparative analysis of Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution can be 
conducted in chapter 5, to identify convergences and divergences in cultural approaches of 
conflict resolution across Western/U.S. and Middle Eastern/Iraq cultures. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of Western understanding of conflict resolution by 
defining conflict resolution-associated terms and concepts as elucidated in English language 
literature. From among the diverse perspectives, a broad conceptual framework was 
constructed for resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels. This framework will be 
enhanced in chapter 4 when we examine Western principles, approaches and problems. Once 
the Western approach has been delineated, chapter 5 articulates our comparative analysis of 
Arab/Muslim perceptions of conflict resolution. Findings extracted are utilized in the third 
part of our research to qualify a sample of Iraqi and U.S. citizens’ conceptualizations and 
bilateral support for conflict resolution in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations to introduce 
laypersons’ opinion into theoretical discourse. 
Nonetheless, the primary objective of chapter three was to analyze conflict and conflict 
resolution as articulated by Western scholars in the English language. During our review of 
the literature, I incorporated a broad framework whose lexicon, principles and practices of 
conflict resolution can later be comparatively analyzed across Western and Arab/Muslim 
cultures. The theoretical framework selected accommodates a broad understanding of Western 
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conflict resolution practices and is necessary for two reasons. On the one hand, it allows us to 
qualify convergences and divergences as articulated by scholars within and across 
Arab/Muslim and Western cultures, by reducing the impact of theoretical divergences found 
across the three Western schools of thought: conflict management, resolution and 
transformation. On the other hand, the framework accommodates comparisons of laypersons’ 
opinion at the micro level, which is conducted in the final part of this research. 
Chapter three opened by reiterating and contextualizing contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations 
in consideration of the historical analysis provided in the first part of our thesis. Because U.S. 
representatives sometimes portrayed the 2003 invasion as a necessary intervention, and a 
means of proliferating democracy and/or an exercise of peacebuilding and state-building—
practices associated with conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels—these 
associations increased criticism of contemporary conflict resolution in both theoretical and 
practical terms. Nevertheless, it was demonstrated that scholars continue to believe that 
conflict resolution remains a viable process for altering deconstructive relationships when 
implemented in an objective, accommodating and inclusive manner. Among other things, the 
latter recommendations suggest that techniques, timing and practices should be agreed upon 
by all relevant stakeholders and not be imposed, whereby consultation ensures practices 
applicable and acceptable techniques for resolving conflict are utilized across cultures. 
Afterward, we re-examined the existence of a conflictual relationship between the United 
States and Iraq by exploring the cognitive, behavioral and effective elements present in 
context. We illustrated the U.S.-Iraq relationship is replete with suspicion and distrust, the use 
of violence, and the belief that violent interaction is necessary or inevitable to secure 
diverging interests. Necessity of conflict resolution in the case of United States and Iraq 
relations is warranted because the two countries have been engaged in a protracted 
deconstructive relationship that produced bilateral animosity and grievances (Hypothesis 1, 
confirmed in the previous part of the research). Their existence, in addition to the historical 
trend of conflict, indicates the potential for conflict continuation or escalation is high. Further 
supporting my assertion, I borrow and reformulate macro level theory and the argument 
conflict resolution between Arab/Muslims and the West is necessary to reinforce micro level 
assumptions.  
Subsequently, we defined and analyzed conflict resolution and recurrent lexicon 
associated with its theory and practice for the purpose of rooting research in contemporary 
scholarly discourse and to provide benchmarks whereupon cross-cultural comparisons will be 
conducted later. The first term analyzed was conflict. It was demonstrated that scholars 
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perceive conflict as an ambiguous term with multiple meanings across diverse disciplines. 
Nonetheless, conflict at the societal and state level, was defined as an incompatibility or clash 
whose typology can be constructive or destructive depending on the typology of interaction 
utilized by affected referents. Constructive practices includes, among others, dialogue, while 
deconstructive practices includes coercion or physical violence. Additional attributes 
delineated above include the perception of conflict as natural and capable of producing 
positive benefits. Likewise, Western scholars frequently perceive that conflicts are resolvable 
and direct conflict resolution techniques toward those immediately involved. These are 
beneficial parameters when we later explore conflict resolution from the perspective of 
Arab/Muslim scholars. 
Upon this theoretical foundation, the elements of a conflict were examined. Combined, 
Western scholars widely consent that conflict contains cognitive, effective and behavioral 
elements that influence, and are influenced by, conflict. The qualitative composition of 
elements and their systemic interaction influence both perceptions and behavior vis-à-vis a 
conflict adversary. After examining the elements, conflict behavior was classified. Scholars 
generally depict conflictual relationships in dichotomous terms: either constructive or 
deconstructive depending on cognitive, behavioral and discursive nuances associated with a 
given relationship. When constructive behavior predominates, the conflict is deemed 
constructive. Contrary, when deconstructive behavior predominates, the conflict is defined as 
deconstructive. 
We then explained how relationship typologies are established through perceptions and 
behavioral patterns which have the potential to self-perpetuate conflict typology. For example, 
nonviolent perceptions and behavior increase the likelihood of referents maintaining 
constructive interaction, while violent actions and perceptions tend to produce further 
deconstructive behavior. As a result of these elements, and the negative physical and 
psychological effects that violent interactions produce, scholars recommend that 
deconstructive conflicts be resolved and the relationship transformed to undermine a 
continuation or escalation of the conflict. 
Logically, the next term explored was conflict resolution, or the theory and practice of 
altering a deconstructive conflictual relationship. At this point, the three schools of 
peacebuilding were introduced: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation. Each school of thought conceptualizes conflict differently, and establishes 
objectives accordingly. Conflict management restrains physical violence but does not address 
the roots of conflict. Its processes are centered at the structural level and thereby do not 
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include society. By comparison, conflict resolution seeks to resolve conflict and address the 
root causes using a Track II (unofficial) approach. It aims to prevent the use of violence while 
addressing the needs and roots of the conflict. Finally, conflict transformation objectively 
seeks to alter the structural, behavioral, cognitive and effective elements of a deconstructive 
conflict where the discursive nature of relationships are altered at the Track III level 
concentrating on society. Its processes are spread wider and deeper into society, modifying 
structural, cognitive and behavioral aspects of the conflict to solidify positive relations 
through transformation. 
Next, cognitive transformation was introduced as an associated concept of conflict 
transformation. Cognitive transformation is defined as the process of altering the cognitive, 
effective and behavioral aspects of referents involved in a conflictual relationship. Its 
objectives include alterations of collective understanding and behavior including a 
legitimization of the other, enhanced self-awareness and changes in behavioral typology. As 
these issues are managed during cognitive transformation, they have a systemic effect on the 
relationship cycle and its quality. Theoretically, the alteration of cognitive, behavioral and 
effective elements nurtures and solidifies long-term constructive relations. One of the many 
values of the conflict transformation approach is its emphasis on cultural sensitivity, 
suggesting the program is adapted to the interests and needs of affected stakeholders. 
At its extreme, conflict transformation, and successful cognitive transformation can 
produce reconciliation. Reconciliation as used herein is defined as a prolonged process of 
conflict transformation where the cognitive, effective and behavior changes are rooted among 
former adversaries and constructive relations are stabilized. Reconciliation is thus the 
maximum possible outcome of a deep conflict resolution process. The term signifies that a 
constructive relationship has progressed beyond peaceful coexistence to include the absence 
of negative sentiment among adversaries, or positive peace. 
Combined, our analysis of the three Western schools of peacebuilding demonstrates 
parallels in theory and practice. Moreover, scholars sometimes use terminology that blurs the 
boundaries between disciplines. To create a representative framework, I adopt a holistic 
understanding of conflict resolution where these examined theories can be amalgamated. 
Accordingly, the theoretical framework borrowed accommodates conflict management, 
conflict resolution and conflict transformation simultaneously. Correspondingly, conflict 
resolution, as referred to hereafter, encompasses all efforts to manage conflict on one end of 
the resolution spectrum and reconciliation at the other. The framework not only permits the 
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use of a wider array of theory from the three schools of thought, but also holistically 
encapsulates Western theory whereupon cross-cultural comparisons can be made later. 
Adding dimension to the theoretical framework, four fundamental objectives of conflict 
resolution were introduced. Among them, it is suggested that conflict resolution address root 
causes and grievances associated with a conflict, empower referents and transform 
relationships. Addressing root cause and grievances, and transforming the relationship refers 
to adjustments in the structural quality of a relationship, elements deemed essential during 
relational and/or cognitive transformation. Empowerment emphasizes the process be inclusive 
to ensure the widest possible representation of stakeholders. Combined, these 
recommendations help us to condense the objective of conflict resolution to four broad 
objectives, which are theorized to increase the probability of conflict resolution reaching 
broadly and deeply into the affected societies. 
Subsequent to outlining essential terminology and associated processes, Kriesberg’s 
concise analytical framework of conflict resolution was introduced. His framework 
simplistically reduces a complex process into three components: the units, dimensions and 
degree. Accordingly, the units represent the referents engaged in a resolution process. Units 
range from individuals, to groups, societies and countries. While each unit frequently receives 
independent attention by scholars of various disciplines, there is fundamental theoretical and 
practical overlapping across units. For instance, it was noted that some concepts, such as 
forgiveness, designed at the individual level have been transferred to the collective levels. 
Several theory and concepts are further explored in chapter 4. 
Due to the context of the present research, additional focus was placed on resolving 
conflict at the interstate level. While contentious, some scholars suggest that countries can 
undergo a process of bilateral conflict resolution following a violent conflict. As a means of 
advancing conflict resolution at the interstate level, Long and Brecke’s (2003) costly signal 
model was introduced. The model posits that referents moving toward conflict resolution 
should utilize particular strategies, including making reconciliation gestures that are costly, 
novel, voluntary, and irreversible. Combined, it is argued that such qualities increase the 
likelihood of a reconciliation event being accepted by an adversary. The components of their 
model are considered valuable and will be mentioned in the research conclusion. 
The second component of Kriesberg’s concise framework of conflict resolution examined 
was dimensions. Dimensions are the tools used to transform deconstructive relations. These 
include, among others, truth commissions, apologies or reparations. To determine the most 
appropriate practices in context, scholars recommend that stakeholders engage in dialogue 
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about which techniques are appropriate as each conflict and referent combination will hold 
diverging needs and goals. Through consultation and dialogue, the most appropriate practices 
can be determined to tailor the program accordingly. At the same time, scholars also 
recommend that tools and approaches be mixed to increase the breadth and depth of a conflict 
resolution process among affected stakeholders. By balancing the spectrum of acceptable 
techniques and levels of approach, more stakeholders’ needs and desires can be met. As a 
result, the effects of a program can more deeply permeate society. 
The third component of Kriesberg’s concise model is degree. Degree qualifies the changes 
referents experience by assessing the past, the present and future trajectory of a given 
relationship. In terms of resolution between states, scholars suggest a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of phenomenon, for example calculating the number and scope of joint 
institutions or the quality of bilateral rhetoric, to determine the trajectory of a given 
relationship. In this context, resilience and determination to adhere to a conflict resolution 
process is demonstrated through events such as joint meetings or positive rhetoric during 
periods of contention. Reversely, a lack of commitment to the process is evidenced by 
infrequent interaction or deconstructive rhetoric. Combined, the denoted qualitative elements, 
among others, provide insight into the (potential) quality of the relationship and the degree to 
which transformation has occurred. 
Nevertheless, within the discourse on degree, there is a qualified debate among Western 
scholars as to the overall utility and expected outcome of conflict resolution processes. On the 
one hand, some scholars suggest only violent conflicts need to be resolved, while others 
suggest that all conflicts should undergo a process. We select to leave the decision to pursue 
conflict resolution to the relevant stakeholders. It is, after all, they whom will have to 
determine whether, how and to what depth conflict resolution is pursued. Absent their 
participation or needs being met, a resolution process is subject to rejection and failure. 
Lastly, we addressed the potential outcomes of a hypothetical conflict resolution process. 
Western literature projects that conflict resolution can produce an outcome ranging from non-
violent coexistence to reconciliation. On the one hand, referents coexist absent violent 
interaction but continue in their negative perceptions. This amounts to negative peace. On the 
other hand, referents live in conditions of positive peace, absent physical, structural and 
cultural violence. As mentioned earlier, we do not advocate one outcome over another, since it 
is believed that referents themselves should determine ultimate objectives. By adopting a 
flexible position, all possibilities across the Western peacebuilding disciplines and theory are 
viable depending upon the needs and desires of affected stakeholders. 
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Hitherto, our research has illustrated the existence of a deconstructive conflictual 
relationship between the United States and Iraq, and provided a basic understanding of 
conflict resolution as a theorized and practiced from a Western perspective. Now our attention 
turns to adding flesh to our Western conflict resolution framework as conceptualized by 
scholars in the English language. The next chapter qualifies core principles, approaches and 
problems of conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate level as articulated in the 
respective literature. The combination provides additional insight into how conflict resolution 
is conceptualized and practiced, while demarcating additional benchmarks whereupon a cross-
cultural comparative analysis can be executed.  
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Chapter 4 Conflict Resolution in the West: 
Principles, Approaches and Problems 
 
The present chapter continues our analysis of conflict resolution as conceptualized in 
Western English language literature. Our objective is to explore the literature to extract 
principles, practices and problems to enhance our conceptual framework. It respectively 
qualifies several prerequisites for introducing conflict resolution, three principled approaches 
and multiple precautions and problems associated with the theory and practice. Many of these 
insights are beneficial when making cross-cultural comparisons of conceptualizations of 
conflict resolution between scholarly and laypersons in forthcoming chapters. 
We begin our analysis by introducing Bar-Siman-Tov’s prerequisites for conflict 
resolution. It should be noted that Bar-Siman-Tov adheres to the conflict transformation 
school of thought and his prerequisites, therefore, are subject to contention. His prerequisites 
include: conflict termination; mutual satisfaction with the peace arrangement; viable 
structures and institutions; a climate conducive to resolution; domestic support for the 
program; legitimate and accountable leaders and/or facilitators; developing shared identities 
and integration among stakeholders; accommodation of the other; and education and public 
events. While conceptually broad and reemphasizing theory outlined in the previous chapter, 
Bar-Siman-Tov’s overlapping and mutually reinforcing prerequisites provide insight into the 
conditions Western scholars perceive should be present for a process of conflict resolution to 
begin at the intrastate and interstate levels. 
Following the introduction of prerequisites, this chapter explores three mainstream 
approaches to conflict resolution found in the literature to extract principles. These include the 
structural, social-psychological and spiritual approaches that are broadly based on the three 
schools of peacebuilding outlined in the previous chapter. The structural approach is 
implemented from the top-down to restore relationships at the higher or official level. It can 
be generally classified as a conflict management strategy. The social-psychological approach 
prioritizes a bottom-up strategy targeting individuals and groups at the societal level. It is a 
conflict resolution strategy. Finally, the spiritual approach (which likewise adheres a bottom-
up strategy) objectively seeks to achieve positive peace by broadening and deepening a 
process of conflict resolution through the incorporation of certain principles, including 
forgiveness and healing, to strengthen societal relations following violent conflict. The 
spiritual approach falls under the rubric of conflict transformation. During the qualification of 
these approaches, several overlapping principles and practices are highlighted. 
  
230 
 
Thereafter, eleven precautions and problems extracted from the literature are introduced. 
Each emphasizes intricacies and weaknesses associated with a conflict resolution process. For 
instance, there is overwhelming agreement that conflict resolution’s processes cannot be 
hastily implemented or imposed. Instead, the process should be slowly implemented and 
tailored to the needs of affected stakeholders. Once again, some points reiterate theory 
introduced in chapter three while underscoring contention in Western conflict resolution 
discourse. In addition, we denote that scholars disagree over the applicability of certain 
principles, namely forgiveness and healing, at the higher levels. Some argue that these theory 
and practices are better suited at the individual level and are inapplicable at higher levels. 
Combined, the precautions and problems outlined ground theory and expectations by 
reinforcing the inherent challenges and difficulties of resolving or transforming deconstructive 
relationships. They also provide additional benchmarks whereupon cultural comparisons can 
be made in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter four concludes with a review of the principles guiding conflict resolution as 
extracted from our analysis of Western theory. Among others, these include truth, justice, 
legitimacy and forgiveness. The recount of principles is useful for reiterating their analytical 
importance since they are revisited during our cross-cultural comparisons in chapter five when 
conflict resolution from an Arab/Muslim perspective is examined. 
4.1. Requirements for implementation 
The English language resources examined for the present research express diverging 
opinions concerning when and how conflict resolution can or should be introduced at the 
intrastate and interstate levels (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 26). When agreement can be 
reached on prerequisites, disagreement abounds over the sequential order prerequisites should 
be satisfied (Hermann, 2004: 46-47). Forsaking a comprehensive analysis of all of the 
possible prerequisites and their suggested order, we elect to introduce Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 
75) shortlist of ten interrelated requirements for advancing conflict resolution at the intrastate 
and interstate levels for simplification purposes. Once prerequisites have been attained, he 
suggests that transformation has an increased probability of success. 
Prior to analyzing theoretical requirements, three issues need to be denoted. First, Bar-
Siman-Tov (2004: 4, 75) is an adherent to conflict transformation theory and believes that 
conflict resolution should be differentiated from conflict transformation. However, since we 
adopt Ramsbotham and others (2011: 10) broad framework of conflict resolution for 
conceptual purposes, we reference a wider set of prerequisites to accommodate theoretical 
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input from a variety of sources (Rosoux, 2009: 553). Albeit, there is dissension in the 
literature over certain prerequisites, as denoted below. Second, his final two “prerequisites” 
are better classified as tools, or dimensions in Kriesberg’s terminology, rather than 
circumstances or relational conditions that indicate a process of conflict resolution can begin. 
While Bar-Siman-Tov’s latter two prerequisites are included below to respect his theory, we 
classify them as tools as opposed to prerequisites. Lastly, I believe that all of the prerequisites 
analyzed are theoretically valuable for conceptual purposes, although I contend that referents 
alone should determine the timing and techniques of advancing conflict resolution, and hence 
prerequisites are practically less valuable since they are expected to diverge from one conflict 
to the next. Nevertheless, Bar-Siman-Tov’s (2004: 75) shortlisted requirements are 
theoretically valuable for making cross-cultural comparisons later. 
4.1.1 Pre-/Post-conflict termination 
Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 72-75) argues that a conflict should be terminated before conflict 
resolution is implemented. However, the prerequisite of conflict termination generates 
dissension in the literature, with disagreement abounding over whether a process should begin 
prior to, or subsequent to, the termination of a conflict (Hermann, 2004: 46-47). Within this 
debate, the literature can be classified into two categories. On one hand, some contend that 
resolution can begin prior to conflict termination (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 72-75; Kriesberg, 
2003: 332; Reimann, 2004: 5; Ross, 2004: 201). For example, Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma 
Bennink (2004: 26) claim that conflict resolution commences when adversaries begin to 
change their perceptions of the other. Perceptive change, they argue, often precede conflict 
termination. They further posit that perceptive changes have the added value of advancing 
conflict termination (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 26). Amalgamated, efforts toward resolution 
build trust among adversaries when implemented prior to conflict termination, which in turn 
nurtures conflict termination, resolution and transformation (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 26). 
On the other hand, others hypothesize that conflict termination must precede conflict 
resolution (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 138; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; Bar-Tal, 2000: 361; 
Kelman, 2004: 114; Long and Brecke, 2003: 11; Rosoux, 2009: 553). For instance, Bar-
Siman-Tov (2004: 76-77) recommends that time be allowed to elapse between conflict 
termination and the implementation of conflict resolution. The waiting period allows for trust 
to be established between the referents, making them malleable to resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
2004: 76-77). Similarly, Valerie Rosoux (2009: 553) argues that without peaceful coexistence, 
cognitive transformation is improbable, an assertion supported by others (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
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2004: 76-77; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 248-249; Stover and others, 2005: 834). The 
crux of this hypothesis is that the briefer the period between conflict termination and the 
introduction of resolution, the greater popular resistance will be to the process as stakeholders 
are less probable to desire or support resolution (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 249; Rosoux, 
2009: 553). The absence of support or openness to the program undermines the potentiality of 
a conflict resolution process. 
William Zartman (2000: 228-229; 2003) likewise espouses prerequisites for conflict 
resolution through his theory of conflict ripeness. Zartman (2000: 228-229) defines ripeness 
when “(two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) 
perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for 
resolution.” Maintaining Zartman’s (2003: 228) terminology, the quote suggests that 
adversaries reach a “mutually hurting stalemate” (MHS), defined as a referent’s recognition 
that it is no longer in their best interest to continue the conflict. Once a MHS has been 
reached, referents are susceptible, or open, to a process of conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
2004: 76; Brahm, 2003; Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 71; Zartman, 2000; 2003: 228). Moreover, 
Ronald Fisher (2001a: 21) suggests that ripe moments can be created through innovative 
maneuvering of the referents and circumstances during third party intervention. In both 
instances, the challenge is for astute referents and/or intervening third parties to create, or 
recognize, and monopolize upon ripe moments (Zartman, 2003: 245). These “ripe” conditions 
are expected to vary and could manifest at various stages of the conflict. 
4.1.2 Mutual satisfaction with the peace agreement 
Related to the above, the literature emphasizes the importance of mutual satisfaction with 
the peace agreement for successful conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 64; Hinds and 
Oliver, 2009: 12; Lederach, 1995: 14; Mitchell, 2002: 10; Reychler, 2002: 30; Rouhana, 2004: 
41; Wallensteen, 2007: 38-39). Mutual satisfaction suggests the conflict has been terminated 
in the short-term. Without mutual satisfaction with the peace agreement, it is surmised that 
outstanding conflict issues will hamper a resolution process (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 64-66). 
Ideally, satisfaction should not be limited to the structural level, but should expand to include 
widespread popular support (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 65). The emphasis on popular support 
clearly represents the conflict resolution or transformation schools of thought, while the 
conflict management school of thought would remain centered on mutual satisfaction at the 
higher levels. 
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4.1.3 Structures and institutions 
As part of a conflict resolution process, referents are encouraged to manufacture a 
common definition of, and a desire for, peaceful relations, and then simultaneously act to 
normalize them (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15; Bar-Tal, 
2000: 358; Hermann, 2004: 46; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 33). Normalization is especially 
important at the structural level, since it guides and institutionalizes the overall political 
objective, but is equally relevant at all levels. To this end, Christopher Coyne (2007: 78) 
recommends adversaries develop rules for controlling non-conflictive interaction “that 
simultaneously signal a break from the past and a credible commitment that those rules will 
be followed in the future” (his emphasis). Upon Coyne’s (2007: 78) theoretical foundation, 
conflict resolution or transformation can progress according to the objectives and guidelines 
established by the referents and gradually become institutionalized. Establishment and 
institutionalization may require reforming existing institutions or creating new ones, 
whereupon constructive principles and practices can be promoted and institutionalized. 
Institutionalization occurs as a conflict resolution program is built into social and political 
structures of adversaries. Structures and institutions can be organized in numerous manners 
and can operate at the societal or structural levels (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75-76; Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 17, 33; Long and Brecke, 2003: 37-76; Rosoux, 2009: 544). For example, 
structures or institutions can be constructed jointly or independently, and can be imparted with 
the capacity to perform a variety of functions including the provision of oversight and 
guidance, or they can be tasked with implementing select aspects of a program, including the 
distribution of reparations or the rewriting of textbooks (Rosoux, 2009 544)65. Such 
frameworks can be preexisting, bolstered or newly established, and include civil or religious 
organizations (student unions, clergy); nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs), such as judicial courts; or regional and internationally 
recognized organizations (African Union or the United Nations) (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75-
76; Long and Brecke, 2003: 37-76; Rosoux, 2009: 544). Institutionalization of these 
frameworks ensures both constructive interaction and the longevity of a program. 
                                                          
 
65 Another equally important task emphasized by the literature is post-war reconstruction (Stover and others, 
2005: 835-836). In this frame, Stover and others (2005: 835-836) recommending that conflict resolution process 
“be accompanied by programs that promote political reconstruction of a legitimate and capable state.” Post-war 
reconstruction, as noted in the quote, is necessary to re-institutionalize a functioning social and political 
infrastructure so a legitimate government can be founded to operate and provide for the needs of its citizens. 
Such projects could likewise be institutionalized into bilateral frameworks. 
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Ideally, the institutionalization of cooperative structures and associated practices create a 
framework whose constructive and robust interaction serves to establish and pursue common 
objectives and collective benefit (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66-68; Bar-Tal, 2000: 362; C. 
Coyne, 2007: 1-4; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3, 10; Kriesberg, 2004: 99-100). Constructive 
interaction, of this magnitude, manufactures a self-reinforcing cycle that strengthens mutual 
confidence, builds trust and augments amity (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66-75; Horstkotte, 2009). 
Such experiences, in turn, reframe cognitive perceptions, further increasing constructive 
behavior and transforming perceptions (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66-68; Bar-Tal, 2000: 362; C. 
Coyne, 2007: 1-4; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-10; Kriesberg, 2004: 99-100). Combined, the 
institutionalization of structures and practices that advance conflict resolution guarantees 
interaction, provides a venue where concerns and disagreements can be jointly communicated 
and issues resolved in a cooperative, constructive manner (Horstkotte, 2009; Rosoux, 2009: 
544). In short, through development of structures and practices, and their institutionalization, 
the foundation of new relational patterns is established and highly probable to endure 
(Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 74-77; Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-362). 
However, care has to be taken when establishing institutions and objectives. Most 
importantly, it is necessary to ensure actors/institutions share goals and do not work in 
overlapping or cross-purposes (Alamir, 2013: 253). In such cases, resources could be 
squandered or conflicting goals advanced. Such self-defeating qualities undermine the overall 
peacebuilding program, and risks institutionalizing policies subject to failure. Well-considered 
and well-designed structures and institutions should also be established with coordination and 
communication between them. It is likewise recommended that the program and its objectives 
are regularly reviewed and adapted to meet inevitable changing needs (Alamir, 2013: 253). 
4.1.4 Climate/Environment 
Building constructive relationships requires an environment conducive to a process of 
conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 17-20). Bar-Siman-
Tov (2004: 75) refers to this element as “climate” which identifies both local and international 
environments. Several noteworthy factors must be considered when evaluating if a climate is 
conducive to a process of conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75-76). In particular, 
there should be no internal or external support for a continuation of conflict (provided to one 
or more of the adversaries), or powerful internal or external spoilers, since their activity 
decreases the probability of resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75-76). Other influential 
environmental factors outlined below include the internal and external support structures 
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(subsection 4.1.5), and the existence of leaders that are accountable (subsection 4.1.6) (Bar-
Siman-Tov, 2004: 75)66. These components are essential to instigating and buttressing a 
conflict resolution program because they can facilitate and augment program legitimacy. 
4.1.5 Domestic support 
Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 75) and Stover and others (2005: 834-836) emphasize the 
importance of obtaining domestic support for resolving a conflict at the intrastate and 
interstate levels. The quality of support must be sufficiently robust to persuade a majority of 
the population to embrace the processes, which is compulsory to minimize any existing 
opposition to the process (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75). The literature accentuates that absent 
popular willingness and commitment (at the structural and societal levels), conflict resolution 
becomes increasingly improbable (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259; Bar-Siman-Tov, 
2004: 70; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836). Without 
domestic support, the process will be unable to acquire a sufficient degree of public 
legitimacy or the depth of societal transformation determined necessary to sustain the program 
(Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 70; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 
2004: 18; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836). Succinctly, the higher the degree of popular 
disapproval or disinterest, the higher the probability that conflict resolution processes will not 
take root, will stall, be rejected or abandoned. 
4.1.6 Leaders/facilitators 
Leaders or facilitators, as mentioned in 4.1.4, are essential to instigating and promoting 
conflict resolution. Western literature recommends that conflict resolution programs be 
headed by (a) respectable, determined leader(s) who is/are accountable for developing and 
maintaining constructive relations with the “other” (Bargal and Sivan, 2004 131-143; Bar-
Siman-Tov, 2004: 5, 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27-28; Feste, 2011: 9-11; Gardner 
Feldman, 2008: 9-19). Their significance is emphasized; with the literature suggesting leaders 
are invaluable for both acquiring and generating popular support among their constituents and 
                                                          
 
66 It is argued that the likelihood of conflict resolution’s success is higher if there are no conflict sponsors that 
promote the continuation of the conflict (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75-76). For example, Mohammad Beshir Hamid 
(1983: 322) posits that “Ethiopia, the Congo, and Chad” supported Southern Sudan’s opposition movements and 
thereby complicated conflict resolution between Southern and Northern Sudan in the mid-1960s. Similarly, Scott 
Snyder (2003: 33) illustrates how the United States has influenced relations between North and South Korea 
since the 1950s through its repeat intervention. Finally, Joseph Alpher (1994: 233-240) argues that the Israel-
United States relationship influences the quality of relations Israel has with its neighbors (such as Lebanon). The 
latter we demonstrated in chapter 2 creates Arab/Muslim animosity toward the United States. 
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perhaps among those of the adversary (Bargal and Sivan, 2004 131-143; Bar-Siman-Tov, 
2004: 5, 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27-28; Feste, 2011: 9-11; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-
19). The quality of leadership (such as its measure of respectability), and their power of 
influence (Do they have the capacity to minimize existing opposition to the resolution 
process?), must thereby be sufficient enough to foster, and then monopolize upon, 
constituents’ interests and needs to foment popular support (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 131, 
142-143; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Bar-Tal, 2000: 354; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-19). 
Aggregated, influential and accountable leadership that demonstrates a genuine dedication to 
the program is thought capable of garnering support among the in-group and out-group 
(Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 142-143; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-19). 
Within the discourse, the literature notes three historical manners in which conflict 
resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels has been introduced: internally (Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 18-22); externally (by a third party) (Long and Brecke, 2003: 116); or in 
combination (Long and Brecke, 2003: 62-63). Hence, leaders and facilitators of conflict 
resolution can include individual politicians, NGOs, or grassroots efforts operating at all 
levels of society or governance. They can be indigenous or external. Examples and brief 
descriptions of the three manners of instigation are provided respectively. 
Foremost, post-World War II Germany’s conflict resolution initiatives began 
endogenously when a few representatives from Germany (for instance Willie Brandt) made 
concerted efforts to improve interstate relations with their geographic neighbors despite public 
uncertainty about the endeavor (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 2-10; Long and Brecke, 2003: 97-
113). In this instance, the presence of respected, popular leadership added legitimacy and 
momentum to the processes by mustering support on all sides over time (Gardner Feldman, 
2008: 2-10; Long and Brecke, 2003: 97-113). For example, Willie Brandt was respected 
among constituents in Germany and other countries, so his actions were able to garner popular 
support for the program. Nonetheless, domestic initiators could also include social 
movements, social elites (or business persons), organizations (NGOs, IGOs), or grassroots 
movements (Long and Brecke, 2003: 152). These can span Track I, II, and III, although each 
approach possesses varying degrees of strength and influence, and all are expected to adhere 
to best practices associated with leadership. 
Secondly, third parties can exogenously instigate conflict resolution (Deutsch, 2005: 16-
18; R. Fisher, 2001a: 4-9). For instance, the United States brokered the Dayton Accords 
(1995) that ended the Bosnia War (1991-1995) and began a process of national reconciliation 
between Muslim, Croat and Serb populations in Bosnia (Keranen, 2014: 132; Malek, 2005; 
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Ramsbotham and others 2011: 202). In many instances, third parties are valuable resources, 
and are likely to include individuals and/or institutions with expertise in conflict resolution. 
They can assist referents by establishing lines of communication or facilitating meetings, 
building capacity and augmenting trust among belligerents (Ramsbotham and others 2011: 
181). While functioning in this capacity, and detail below in section 4.3.6, Western scholars 
propose that intervening third parties “facilitate” the process rather than dictate its principles, 
objectives or choice of mechanisms (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 23-166; R. Fisher, 2001a: 
1-21; Lederach, 1995: 56). 
Lastly, a program can be launched endogenously and exogenously to advance conflict 
resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels (Long and Brecke, 2003: 62-63). For instance, 
President Rafael Callejas of Honduras was pressured in the 1990s to begin a resolution 
process by both his constituents (internal) and the United States (external) (Long and Brecke, 
2003: 62-63). Pressure from both directions caused Callejas to adopt a process he had initially 
been hesitant to implement. Thus, a combination of actors can exert influence on political 
leaders or local constituents to pursue conflict resolution, yet these actors will equally have to 
be accepted as legitimate third parties (Long and Brecke, 2003: 62-63). There is considerable 
risk with pressuring, especially when the pressure is applied externally, since it can cause 
superficial or improperly planned and implemented pursuits that are apt to abandonment, 
rejection and failure (denoted in 4.3.9). 
4.1.7 Shared identities and integration 
Identity-based conflict is challenging to transform by comparison to needs-based conflict 
(Burgess and Burgess, 2010). Therefore, some scholars argue that the development of shared 
identities, buttressed by an advanced degree of integration among referents, is indispensable 
for constructing and rooting conflict transformation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Kriesberg, 
2004: 94; Lederach, 1995: 9). As noted in chapter 3, the effects of transformation are ideally 
expressed in cognitive, behavioral and effective changes whereby perceptions and behavior 
are modified, differences are bridged, commonalities established and trust fostered (Bar-Tal 
and Bennink, 2004: 18; Lederach, 1995: 18). When perceptions of “self” and “other” are 
reframed through cognitive transformation, commonalities will emerge (Adelman, 2005: 287-
307; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-75; Long and Brecke, 2003: 36; Shriver, 1995: 114). Upon 
cognitive reframing, constructive relations can be nurtured. 
The model referenced here implies that shared identities are easier to integrate and unify 
as commonality constructs a foundation whereupon congenial perceptions and behavior can 
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be constructed upon (Kriesberg, 2004: 94; Lederach, 1995: 9). Transformation thus instigates 
those modifications and constructive ties. When modifications in the relationship are pursued 
and experienced, they should be institutionalized, for instance by creating social, economic 
and/or political cooperation through techniques such as the construction of joint institutions or 
joint ventures, permitting referents to regularly work together to achieve mutually beneficial 
outcomes and resolve issues (Kriesberg, 2004: 94). Nevertheless, reference to the construction 
of “commonalities” does not suggest radical changes to identity, but rather changes should be 
sufficient enough for constructing peaceful coexistence at minimum (Kriesberg, 2004: 84). 
4.1.8 Accommodating goals and mutual benefit 
Denoting another component of cognitive transformation, Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 75) 
suggests that referents must adapt their objectives to ensure that each adversary’s existence 
and goals can be accommodated. Adaption of objectives is especially necessary in needs-
based conflict where scarce resources are at issue, but equally relevant in identity-based 
conflict where annihilation of the other might be an objective. Subsequent to parties adjusting 
their objectives so that the “other” is nonviolently accommodated, dialogue, compromise and 
mutually beneficial goals can be negotiated (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75). Upon determining 
common or accommodative objectives, constructive perceptions and behavior can be 
established and institutionalized around the pursuit of those goals (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; 
Rosoux, 2009: 544). When goals are shared and/or mutually beneficial, the probability of 
mutual acceptance of objectives, and the other, is increased, in conjunction with the chances 
that conflict resolution will be willfully pursued (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75). 
4.1.9 Education aimed at transformation 
Education, broadly defined here as intellectual, moral or social instruction, in the frame of 
conflict resolution has multiple values. For instance, it can be utilized to impart knowledge to 
individuals, communities or representatives about (obscure) injustices or provide insight into 
how more just societies can be created and managed (Lederach, 1995: 12). It can likewise be 
utilized to elicit the needs and desires of affected stakeholders, whereby perceptions, behavior 
and structures can be reformulated within a given environment or relationship to advance 
relational symmetry, justice and peace (Lederach, 1995: 12-13). In short, education through 
the lens of conflict transformation is designed to increase awareness of injustices, needs and 
desires, and advance structural, perceptive and behavioral alterations to limit physical, 
structural and cultural violence. 
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Education is not limited the practice of experts imparting knowledge, but likewise 
includes processes whereby a given community or society provides knowledge or is elicited to 
acquire insight (Lederach, 1995: 26). In fact, Lederach (1995: 26-29) emphasizes the 
importance of utilizing and building upon conflict transformation practices that exist within a 
given community. Rather than imposing foreign teaching and techniques, local knowledge 
should be harnessed, whereby local ownership and the applicability of techniques and theory 
are assured. Therefore, indigenous practices should be appropriately taught and deployed 
within a given community for the purposes for which they were designed. In essence, cultural 
needs and differences must be recognized and considered when sharing or imparting 
knowledge in general, and when practicing of conflict resolution in particular (Lederach, 
1995: 26-29). 
Similarly, Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 68-75) recommends that educational practices be 
designed and implemented, to impart “new beliefs and values that can support” conflict 
transformation. Educational practices, when designed to impart knowledge, should teach, 
expand, institutionalize and root constructive beliefs and values at all levels of society (Bar-
Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31). Among the accepted practices, peace 
education is commonly recognized. Peace education is a peacebuilding practice designed to 
stimulate non-violent perceptions and behavior through the establishment of a curriculum 
where values and techniques can be imparted to students of all ages (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 
75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31; Hinds and Oliver, 2009; Jackson, 2009: 183; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 226; Stover and others, 2005: 853). While education is 
essentially a dimension, or tool, for achieving conflict resolution, its addition here reinforces 
the importance of pursuing cognitive transformation at all levels, of empowering indigenous 
actors, rooting and deepening conflict resolution knowledge, practices and skills within 
society (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 68-75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31). 
4.1.10 Public events and ceremonies 
Cultures have unique techniques for dealing with violence, such as expressing grief or 
triumph, and these activities are fundamental to conflict resolution (Estrada-Hollenback, 
2001: 75). For instance, Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 75) suggests that “public events such as 
ceremonies and parades” can be held to reinforce collective unity and generate popular 
support for conflict resolution. Such activities are hypothesized to root transformation in the 
target community, impart ownership and give the community a stake in the outcome, since the 
event or ceremony is most likely familiar, generally accepted, and can incorporate a large 
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number of participants (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 75). Providing an example, Long and 
Brecke (2003: 57) reference the traditional healing ceremonies of Mozambique that purify and 
appease past transgressions by local leaders in rural communities. While events and 
ceremonies are also better classified as tools for advancing conflict resolution, their reference 
reinforces the importance of collective support and participation, and they provide the 
community with a physical demonstration of the program and its effects (Estrada-Hollenback, 
2001: 75; Long and Brecke, 2003: 57). It will be noted in chapter 5, that such ceremonies are 
an essential component of conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim culture. 
4.2 Three Western approaches to conflict resolution 
Subsequent to the exploration of prerequisites for a conflict resolution program, focus now 
transfers to extracting principles that guide conflict resolution in the Western approach. The 
following analysis refers to the three Western peacebuilding schools of thought introduced in 
chapter 3: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Throughout 
this section, we continue to examine English language literature to extract the basic principles 
and objectives embraced by these approaches. In many instances, the principles mentioned 
will reiterate those inadvertently outlined hitherto. 
Figure 4 Rosoux’s (2009) Approaches to Conflict Resolution 
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relationship between parties: 
 
Collective Healing and Forgiveness 
 
Figure 4 cites Rosoux’s (2009: 545) illustration of the three approaches to conflict resolution, noting 
their function and objectives. 
 
Valerie Rosoux (2009) claims there are three prominent approaches of conflict resolution 
found in Western theory. Among them are the structural, social-psychological and spiritual 
approaches (Rosoux, 2009: 545). Each respective approach advocates four primary principles, 
some of which intersect with those found in other approaches. Consequently, we can reduce 
associated principles to six: justice, truth, regard, security, mercy and peace. See Figure 4 for 
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an overview of the three conflict resolution approaches and their function, as outlined by 
Rosoux (2009). 
The first approach is top-down, or “structural.” Scholars who favor the structural approach 
prioritize managing or resolving conflict among social and political elites, or Track 1, which 
establishes constructive formal relations through institutional interaction and structural 
interdependence (Bargal and Sivan, 2004; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Gardner Feldman, 2008). 
The structural approach falls somewhere between the conflict management and conflict 
resolution schools of thought. The second approach is the bottom-up or “social-
psychological” approach (Rosoux, 2009: 545). Its advocates argue that the individuals 
creating society are indispensable for rooting and proliferating conflict resolution (Bar-On, 
2004; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004; Kriesberg, 2004). It is essentially a Track II approach and 
falls under the rubric of conflict resolution. Finally, other scholars add a third category, the 
“spiritual” approach (Hermann, 2004: 45; Rosoux, 2009: 545). The spiritual approach 
parallels the social-psychological practice but pursues deep conflict resolution by emphasizing 
the principles of forgiveness and reconciliation (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 19; Lederach, 
1997). Scholars generally perceive the spiritual approach accommodates Track III approaches, 
although others suggest it could involve Track I, II and III simultaneously (Paffenholz, 2009: 
5; Reimann, 2004: 11-13). 
It should be cautioned that the classifications are not concrete since other scholars utilize 
diverging terminology to identify similar approaches (Amstutz, 2005: 99-100), and this 
practice obscures categorization. Moreover, as denoted in the previous chapter, some scholars 
suggest combining approaches to make a program more holistic which likewise obscures 
categorization (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 23; Kriesberg, 2001: 61; Rosoux, 2009: 552-533). 
Nevertheless, as noted in chapter 3, section 4.2, combining tools and approaches increases the 
popular appeal and capacity because more people are involved, additional needs are met, 
which increases the popular support and legitimacy of a given program. 
The three primary approaches and their respective four principles are outlined in the 
following subsections. Our introduction of the three approaches ensures that we maintain a 
wide framework while exploring conflict resolution principles. Rather than limiting our 
attention to the Western structural approach alone, which has frequently been the case when 
Arab/Muslim scholars compare and critically analyze Western approaches, this text extends 
consideration to the social-psychological and spiritual approaches as well. The wide 
framework we utilize, therefore, permits a more representative comparison of Western theory 
with Arab/Muslim theory whereby parallels and divergences can be better articulated. 
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Moreover, introducing the three approaches provides a range of alternatives for pursuing 
conflict resolution that can be tailored to the needs and objectives of affected stakeholders. 
When it is decided that focus should be limited to the governing structures and 
representatives, the structural approach can be applied. Contrary, when deep conflict 
resolution is sought, the spiritual approach can be applied. Equally important, these 
approaches can be mixed to increase the depth and breadth of a program. Whether 
implemented individually or combined, there is latitude whereby affected stakeholders can 
select which approach or approaches most appropriately serves their needs and interests. 
4.2.1 Structural Approach 
Structural approaches to conflict resolution center on increasing formal constructive 
political, economic and security cooperation among former belligerents as a means of 
transforming perspectives, establishing interdependence and improving trust (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 15-17; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-17; Hermann, 
2004: 48; Rosoux, 2009: 545). It is achieved by altering cognitive perceptions and behavioral 
patterns among social/political elites so that formal relations between institutions and 
representatives are improved (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15-17; Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 23-24). By concentrating efforts at the structural level, it is argued that conflict 
resolution can occur more rapidly and be rooted in the political and social framework of 
representatives, institutions and structures (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 1-
17). The effects of the structural process are thereafter projected to filter from official 
structures into respective societies (the general public) over a period of time (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 15-17; Dwyer, 1999; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-17; Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 210). The structural approach can generally be categorized as falling under the conflict 
management school of thought, although structural strategies are commonly bundled into 
other approaches, and references to a resolution of the conflict and even elements of 
transformation might be noted in the literature associated with the structural approach. 
Critics, nonetheless, posit that while valuable, the structural approach marginalizes the 
needs of those individuals making up society at large, thereby relegating the participation and 
interests of the masses (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 11-13). However, it was noted that 
marginalization of society is projected to have negative implications on a conflict resolution 
process. Albeit, top-down advocates retort that the structural approach is more realistic by 
comparison to other approaches, since it is difficult to transform collective cognitive and 
behavioral aspects of a group or society as a whole, and when possible, scholars suggest that 
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obtaining social transformation requires stable structural relations to create a congenial 
environment for administering bottom-up approaches (Dwyer, 1999; Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 210). Concisely, it is argued that the structural approach provides the stable conditions 
necessary for improving relations at lower levels. 
Gardner Feldman (1999: 334-354; 2008: 3-19) is one adherent of the structural approach 
and provides a conceptual framework from which the process can be analyzed. She asserts 
that there are four (principled) dimensions to a conflict resolution process at the structural 
level: history, leadership, institutions and international context. The degree of attention, 
resources and devotion attributed to these elements, she argues, influence the degree or quality 
of transformation (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 334-354; 2008: 3-19). Each element is examined 
respectively. 
4.2.1.1 History 
Gardner Feldman (2008: 3-9) divides the dimension of “history”67 into three stages: “past 
as stimulus,” “acknowledgement of grievances,” and “past as present.” The referenced stages 
represent a natural or logical progression of how historical events are perceived, processed 
and resolved over time (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 3-9). Systematically, her “past as stimulus” 
stage begins when an inimical relationship influenced by a moral desire to alter a conflictual 
relationship through constructive interaction (an expression of a desire to reconcile through, 
for instance, dialogue) (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 3-6). When the adversaries engage in 
constructive behavior over time, referents progress to a “grievance stage” where they convert 
the “affective, moral component into pragmatic and material needs and formal political 
commitment” (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 4). Simply stated, during the second stage, referents 
refer to and discuss the past in public through “treaties, agreements, statements, symbolic acts 
that acknowledged past misdeeds, memorialized historical events or asserted a fresh start in 
relations compared to [those of the] past,” events which are symbolic gestures of conflict 
resolution (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 6). As pragmatic and tangible efforts manifest and 
transpire, they provide opportunities to address and fulfill existing needs (for instance, the 
need to discuss wrongdoing or to discover the truth) while demonstrating that both referents 
possess the potential and will to change (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 3-6). If processes continue, 
referents are drawn closer together through their constructive and cooperative behavior 
(Gardner Feldman, 2008: 3-6). 
                                                          
 
67 Montville (1999: 331) likewise adds History as an essential component to conflict resolution, illustrating an 
overlap of the structural and psychological-social approaches to reconciliation. 
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In the last stage of history, “past as present” two events occur. These include: 
(1) debates about the past, which can be divisive but necessary to 
authenticate the relationship; and (2) affirmative commitments in joint 
efforts to confront the past [occur]. The past is neither forgotten nor 
represents a mere footnote; rather it is a “productive irritant” to be 
confronted constantly (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 6). 
As noted in the quote, debates will inevitably emerge about past events and the constructive 
management of those debates demonstrates a) the degree of change that has occurred, and b) a 
commitment to proceeding with the resolution process. Moreover, the author argues that at the 
latter stage, historical events remain in the present, they are not forgotten, but become 
enduring elements in the public and political realm, persisting until all outstanding 
contentious points are resolved to mutual satisfaction (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 6-9). The past 
is, therefore, not forgotten but encountered and discussed repeatedly until a satisfactory 
resolution is produced. Overall, the process incorporates salient principles including the 
disclosure of truth, the meeting of needs, the building of trust, dialogue and joint problem 
solving (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 3-9), to name a few. 
4.2.1.2 Leadership 
Gardner Feldman’s (2008: 9-11) second dimension, “leadership,” is posited as an 
influential factor for the success of conflict resolution (and is a reiteration of section 4.1.6).  
She argues that leadership must be “visionary, willing to overcome domestic opposition, and 
capable of creating leadership duos, often based on personal chemistry with political leaders 
in the other country, and often spanning ideological lines” (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9). The 
quote depicts leaders as essential catalysts of a process, taking on the role of a facilitator, 
spokesperson and representative for the advancement of conflict resolution at home and 
abroad (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 28; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-11). If leadership succeeds in 
obtaining legitimacy and support among their constituents, and perhaps promoting it among 
those of the adversary, Gardner Feldman (2008: 9-11) argues the process is more probable to 
advance. In this instance, numerous principles, including honesty, mutual acceptance and 
accountability, can be deduced. 
However, other scholars caution that responsibility should be collective and not placed on 
a single individual or institution. Sarkin (2008: 22-23), for example, insists one leader or 
institution should not be charged with overseeing and implementing a conflict resolution 
process. Rather responsibility should be shared and diversified among numerous stakeholders, 
including governmental members and the general public, since the latter are prime 
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determiners for the viability of the overall process (Sarkin, 2008: 22-23). Accordingly, 
responsibility and ownership of the program are distributed rather than being isolated. 
4.2.1.3 Institutions 
Gardner Feldman’s (2008: 11-17) third dimension, “institutions” are designed to conjoin 
former adversaries through the construction of a shared framework that functionally addresses 
preexisting and future problems while buttressing cooperation (as noted in section 4.1.3). 
Institutions come in a variety of forms, including societal organizations, inter-governmental, 
or non-governmental types, which can comprise joint projects, such as partner cities, 
economic and education cooperation or professional exchanges (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 11-
17; Hermann, 2004: 46). Institutions and programs can be (re-) formed, founded and managed 
at both the structural and societal levels and can possess diverse mandates and specializations, 
including operating in the fields of political, defense, economic, and legal affairs (Gardner 
Feldman, 2008: 11-17). Singularly or jointly constructed, scholars argue that institutions 
provide venues where interdependence can be rooted and institutionalized, contentious issues 
voiced and addressed, interaction promoted, and trust built, (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 11-17; 
Ross, 2004: 197-223). These outcomes are suggested to advance the cultivation of 
constructive and robust relationships. 
4.2.1.4 International Context 
Gardner Feldman’s (2008: 17-18) final dimension, “international context,” refers to the 
broader environment in which relationships exist at the national and international levels 
(outlined in section 4.1.4). Logically, an environment can have a positive or negative impact 
on the progression and depth of conflict resolution (Auerbach, 2004: 163; Bercovitch and 
others, 2009: 7). Where local, regional or international actors’ (non-) interaction produces an 
environment conducive to resolution, for instance through the encouragement and facilitation 
of constructive relationships between referents, a conflict resolution process can proceed 
unhindered by interveners or spoilers (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 17-18). Contrary, if outside 
interveners continue to influence one or all of the referents involved to maintain the conflict, 
thereby spoiling the process, there is a high probability that the transformation process will be 
undermined (Bar-Tal, 2000: 361; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 17-18; Hamid, 1983: 320). Ideally, 
the local and international environment will be congenial to conflict resolution. 
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4.2.2 Social-Psychological Approach 
The next recognized Western approach to conflict resolution is the social-psychological 
(Rosoux, 2009: 545). It is implemented from the bottom-up, centering on the societies 
involved in intrastate or interstate conflict (Bloomfield, 2006: 28). Its maximum objective is 
to establish positive peace (Bloomfield, 2006: 28) while, at minimum, it pursues non-violent 
coexistence, which is defined as negative peace (Kriesberg, 2001: 61). To accomplish its 
goals, attention is centered on transforming the “cognitive and emotional aspects” among a 
majority of referents in each affected society (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 62; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352). 
The social-psychological approach can be categorized under the conflict resolution paradigm, 
but it is prone to contain elements of conflict transformation. 
Critics of conflict resolution argue that the approach is too broadly applied to achieve 
significant results (Dwyer, 1999). More specifically, it is perceived impossible to meet the 
multitude of needs and desires represented within a given society (Dwyer, 1999). Thus, 
although the social-psychological approach targets society as a whole, it is impossible for it to 
reach everyone (denoted in 4.3.2 below). Nonetheless, advocates of the approach emphasize 
that absent popular support for conflict resolution, and their involvement, its potentiality will 
be marginal at best (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18). As mentioned earlier, the lack of social 
support or involvement is expected to marginalize the effects of conflict resolution through 
the absence of depth and legitimacy. 
Louis Kriesberg (2004: 83) is one adherent of the social-psychological approach. He 
suggests truth, justice, regard and security are the main components/principles of a conflict 
resolution process (Kriesberg, 2004: 83). 
4.2.2.1 Truth 
Kriesberg (2004: 83) defines “truth” as “the development of shared beliefs about what 
happened in the past and what is happening currently in the relations between different sides.” 
Rephrased, truth refers to the (construction of a) common understanding of historical events 
among referents. In general terms, truth is conceptualized as wrongdoers acknowledging 
responsibility for their actions/crimes and being held accountable (Kelman, 2004: 122-124; 
Rouhana, 2004: 36-37). Truth is advanced through various techniques including truth 
commissions or judicial trials where verdicts and sentencing are transparent (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 28-34; Kriesberg, 2004: 98-100; Rouhana, 2004: 36-37). Through these 
measures, and others, an official version of what occurred can be produced and a semblance 
of justice provided. 
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There are, nevertheless, multiple challenges to pursuing and obtaining the truth. For 
example, acknowledgment and acceptance of responsibility is not always forthcoming 
because perpetrators of wrongdoing may not willfully admit their culpability. Likewise, truth 
is subjective, so those involved are expected to express several version of what occurred, a 
probability which implies that its pursuit has divisive potentiality (Lederach, 1997; Lerche, 
2000; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 254-255). Diverse versions of the truth will, inevitably, 
have to be consolidated to mutual satisfaction. Another problem is that when truth is pursued 
excessively, it can fracture society as opposed to unite it (Skaar, 2013: 75). In this case, 
pursuit of the truth becomes counterproductive, since it creates divisions or exacerbates 
preexisting fissures. Finally, while scholars underscore the importance of truth for changing 
perceptions and transforming relationships (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 
2004: 29; Kelman, 2004: 122-124; Rosoux, 2009: 550), there is general consensus in the 
literature that uncovering truth is only one element in a conflict resolution process, and alone 
is insufficient for altering cognitive, effectual and behavioral aspects fundamental to the 
establishment of constructive relationships (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Rosoux, 2009: 555). 
4.2.2.2 Justice 
Scholars suggest that humans perceive injustice far more readily than they perceive justice 
(Boulding, 1978: 71-72). Consequently, the principle of justice is an essential aspect of 
conflict resolution. In fact, following violent interaction at the intrastate or interstate levels, 
justice is often demanded by those adversely affected, so that order and balance are restored to 
the political and social systems (Anderlini and others, 2004: 1-2; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; 
Rouhana, 2004: 36). By (re-) introducing justice into the post-conflict structural, it is though 
that legitimacy and faith in a country’s social, political and judicial systems can be restored 
(Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; Steele, 2008: 1-3). It is likewise suggested an important means 
of reconstructing the past, or the truth (Boulding, 1978: 71-86; Steele, 2008: 3).  
The relative utility of justice for conflict resolution is highlighted in the literature 
(Hamber, 2007: 122). For example, Montville (1999: 321) outlines five contributions that 
justice makes toward the achievement of conflict resolution. First, it exposes the individual 
perpetrators and their guilt and holds them accountable (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Montville, 
1999: 321). Hence, justice identifies the wrongdoing committed and those responsible for its 
perpetration, and then punishes them to eliminate impunity. Second, justice documents and 
records the truth for public record (Montville, 1999: 321). Documentation creates a historical 
record of injustices, perpetrators and punishment, which contribute to dissemination and 
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preservation of justice and the truth. Third, it acknowledges the transgressions committed 
against victims (Montville, 1999: 321). The act, in essence, recognizes the suffering of 
victims as a consequence of the transgressions perpetrated. Fourth, it disassembles the 
institutions that advanced, or supported, the conflict or the perpetration of violence (Adelman, 
2005: 287-307; Montville, 1999: 321). For instance, if state institutions and representatives 
were involved in the justification or perpetration of violence, they should be exposed, replaced 
or reconstructed to prevent a repetition of events. Restructuring also restores faith in the social 
and political representatives and structures (Adelman, 2005: 287-307). Lastly, justice operates 
as a deterrent for future perpetrators by demonstrating that transgressions are subject to 
consequences (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Montville, 1999: 321; Triponel, 2007: 282). 
Combined, justice, functions to acknowledge and document the past, secures balance and faith 
in the system, and discourages a replication of events. 
With this in mind, there are diverging means of pursuing justice. Ramsbotham and others 
(2011: 249-250) emphasize that justice can be pursued using vengeance, amnesia or the use of 
legal practices. We briefly explore each in turn. Firstly, and least desirable from a conflict 
resolution standpoint, referents can seek personal revenge that reciprocates violence (R. 
Cohen, 2004: 178; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250; Steele, 2008: 7). Retributive behavior 
implies that the conflict continues or escalates (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250). While 
utilization of violence is one means of exacting justice, it undermines the possibility of 
resolving a conflict. 
The second means of pursuing justice implements a “forgive and forget” approach to 
forego continued conflict behavior and physical violence (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 
250). When forgiving and/or forgetting are applied, stakeholders effectively disregard or 
suppress the episode and its implications for the sake of moving forward and advancing 
constructive relations (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250). While forgetting minimizes 
deconstructive behavior, it is criticized, as outlined in section 4.3.11, for its tendency of 
marginalizing victims’ needs and interests (Rothfield, 2008: 16-20). In short, events and their 
consequences are suppressed rather than constructively managed. 
Lastly, justice can be pursued through the punishment of perpetrators. As noted, 
punishment is often demand by victims to restore balance to, and faith in, the system 
(Anderlini and others, 2004: 1). If justice is pursued on this front, it can be implemented in 
two manners: restorative or retributive. On the one hand, retributive (or distributive) justice is 
designed to punish wrongdoing, for instance human rights violations (Anderlini and others, 
2004: 2; Avruch, 2010: 36). These punishments are usually handed down through a judicial 
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system, whether traditional or otherwise, that determines equitable and fair punishment by 
comparison to the wrong(s) committed (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 66). Under the retributive 
framework, perpetrators can be punished through tools including fines, serving jail or prison 
sentences, or performing community services (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 66). 
The benefits of retributive justice are several. Most importantly, the public prosecution of 
perpetrators of wrongdoing helps to bridge relational divisions by first acknowledging 
misconduct and then punishing its perpetration (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2). 
Acknowledgment and punishment were acknowledged above. Nevertheless, among numerous 
complications, critics argue that retributive justice is violent since coercion and force are used 
to deter or punish certain individuals/groups and their actions (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; 
Avruch, 2010: 36; Galtung, 2001: 12; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 13). In this instance, the 
pursuit of justice creates new injustices since others suffer from the penalties imposed by its 
processes (judicial verdicts), thereby becoming a means of punishment or a tool of violence, 
which some suggest could protract the conflict and generate additional grievance (Boulding, 
1978: 86; Deutsch, 2005: 13-14). Such outcomes can sabotage the pursuit of constructive 
post-conflict relations and compromise institutional legitimacy, as punishment appears to be 
favored (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; Avruch, 2010: 36; Galtung, 2001: 12; Snyder and 
Vinjamuri, 2004: 13; Skaar, 2013: 61). Hence, there is a risk that retributive justice can be 
perceived as violent, and its pursuit could compromise conflict resolution. 
On the other hand, and in direct response to the weaknesses of retributive justice just 
outlined, restorative techniques can be implemented (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Anderlini and 
others, 2004: 2; Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Marshall, 1999: 6-7). Tony Marshall (1999: 5) 
defines restorative justice as “a problem-solving approach to crime which involves the parties 
themselves, and the community generally, in an active relationship with statutory agencies.” 
Thus, retributive justice is a practice that permits relevant stakeholders to determine how 
justice should be administered. Marshall (1999: 5) goes on to emphasize that the term does 
not refer to a particular set of practices, “but a set of principles which may orientate the 
general practice of any agency or group in relation to crime.” Restorative justice is, therefore, 
a vague term used to identify any non-violent approach to justice designed to acknowledge 
wrongdoing. 
By comparison, other scholars offer alternative definitions of restorative justice. 
Humphrey (2005: 203-220), for example, surmises that restorative justice seeks to heal 
individuals and society following violent conflict. Similarly, Anderlini and others (2004: 2) 
define restorative justice as “a systematic means of addressing wrongdoings that emphasizes 
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the healing of wounds and rebuilding of relationships.” In short, the quote emphasizes that 
wrongdoers are not punished but subject to penance through alternative forms (Marshall, 
1999: 6-7; Rosoux, 2009: 549-558). Through non-violent responses, wounds are healed and 
constructive relationships established, as emphasized in Humphrey and Marshall’s quotes. 
In simple terms, restorative justice utilizes mechanisms which protect the rights and well-
being of the wrongdoer, ultimately restoring that individual back to society rather than 
punishing or isolating them (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Galtung, 2001: 8-13; Marshall, 1999: 
2-11; Worthington, 2006: 247-248). Examples of restorative justice techniques include having 
the offender temporarily work for the victim, his family, or the community; or having them 
pay financial restitution or attend counseling as a means of reprimand (Anderlini and others, 
2004: 2; Marshall, 1999: 11). Other possibilities available include the use of traditional 
ceremonies68 (Sarkin, 2008: 23), truth commissions (Rosoux, 2009: 549) and apologies (R. 
Fisher, 2001b: 27; Gibney and Roxstrom, 2001: 913; Parent, 2012: 28; Shriver, 1995: 138). In 
these instances, there is no punishment per se, but symbolic acts of restitution are expected. 
Naturally, there are guidelines that scholars recommend that restorative justice programs 
adhere. Eric Stover and others (2005: 835-836) outline three essential principles when 
implementing restorative justice in post-war societies. They argue that: 1) “implementing 
authorities” be considered “both legitimate and impartial”; 2) “a genuine process of 
consultation with those most affected by the violence” occur; and 3) “measures must be 
accompanied by programs that promote political reconstruction of a legitimate and capable 
state, economic and social reconstruction, freedom of movement, security and the rule of law, 
access to accurate and unbiased information, educational reform, and cross-ethnic 
engagement” (Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). Overall, the guidelines mentioned by Stover 
and others reiterate the importance of legitimacy, impartiality, consultation, reconstruction 
and institutionalization of post-conflict changes. Within this frame, restorative justice offers 
multiple benefits. Inter alia, it is argued to enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of a 
resolution program and tools; it provides a degree of closure (Liddick and Gagnon, 2009: 80); 
and it can be implemented through preexisting social and/or governing structures to ensure 
                                                          
 
68 For example, Rwanda used the gacaca, which means grass(roots), or people’s trial, to supplement modern 
techniques following the April 1994 genocide (Gloppen, 2005: 25; Sarkin, 2008: 24). Buckeye (2010: 46) 
defines gacaca as “literally grassroots, community-based justice mechanisms that combine aspects of restorative 
and retributive justice to promote reconciliation within the community. Prisoners are brought before a gacaca 
tribunal in the community where they were alleged to have committed their crime (Buckeye, 2010: 46). An 
innovative aspect of the gacaca tribunals is the confession procedure, a process where prisoners who confess 
receives greatly reduced sentences (Buckeye, 2010: 46). 
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impunity does not persist or reoccur (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; Humphrey, 2005: 203-
220; Montville, 1999: 320-333). 
In closing, there is one salient problem associated with the application of justice. Most 
notably, justice is relative, since adversaries may perceive it in different ways (Bar-Siman-
Tov, 2004: 66). The relative nature of justice presents two obvious problems. On the one 
hand, identifying what constitutes injustices may be problematic because stakeholders might 
be unable to agree on its tenets (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12). Achieving agreement is 
further complicated by the fact that all referents involved in a conflict perceive that injustices 
have been committed against them, and are probable to overlook or excuse the injustices 
perpetrated by the in-group against the other (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12). In instances 
of diverse conceptualizations, adversaries will have to negotiate parameters for defining 
justice and identifying what constitutes an injustice. 
On the other hand, the relative nature of justice likewise creates problems when 
determining mutually acceptable tools for pursuing justice (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66). In this 
case, referents will likewise have to establish consensus on how justice can be pursued. 
Ideally, scholars recommend that justice and forgiveness be balanced (R. Cohen, 2004: 178; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250-251), since “the passage from negative to positive peace 
runs through justice” (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 251). The quote suggests that pursuit of 
justice will have to be weighed according to stakeholders’ interests and needs, to ensure the 
act of implementing justice meets needs but simultaneously does not become perceived as 
violent, which ultimately undermines the pursuit of peace. 
4.2.2.3 Regard 
Kriesberg’s (2004: 84) third component of conflict resolution is “regard.” Regard is 
defined as the recognition of an adversary’s “humanity and identity.” Simply articulated, 
regard alludes to acknowledgment and accommodation of the other (Kelman, 2004: 122; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 84). Regard can be expressed through recognition of the other or nonviolent 
coexistence, at one end of the spectrum, and reconciliation, or positive peace, at the other 
(Kriesberg, 2004: 84). In some instances, achieving regard may necessitate cognitive 
transformation (3.3.3.1) (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-362; Hermann, 2004: 45), or reframing, 
conditions that are influenced by conflict specifics, such as the duration and intensity of the 
conflict (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Kriesberg, 2001: 60). Once the “other” has been 
accommodated, efforts can be redoubled to improve the quality of the relationship and 
institutionalize those cognitive changes. Regard can be advanced through various tools 
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including dialogue, official recognition, education, an apology, and/or the extension of 
forgiveness, to name a few (Kriesberg, 2004: 84). 
4.2.2.4 Security 
Kriesberg’s (2004: 85) final principle is “security.” Security, as conceptualized by 
Kriesberg, delineates the quality of the environment in which referents interact and coexist, 
and parallels section 4.1.4. At minimum, security suggests that referents do not feel physically 
threatened by their adversary (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; Kriesberg, 2004: 85). Absent 
threat, referents can begin to constructively interact and transform their perceptions of the 
“other”, building a relationship within a secure environment (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 85). Louis Kriesberg (2004: 85) acknowledges that the downfall of his 
narrow conceptualization is that it is minimalistic, as focusing strictly on the absence of 
mutual threat qualifies as negative peace. In such instances, peaceful coexistence is the most 
probable outcome. Nonetheless, when conditions permit, positive peace is advocated—which, 
among other things, includes the absence of structural violence (Galtung, 1969: 183-184; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 85). Security can be promoted via structural interfacing including economic 
or military cooperation, which can be reinforced through tools comprising of cultural 
exchanges or joint institutions at both the structural and societal levels (Kriesberg, 2004: 85). 
4.2.3 Spiritual Approach 
The final Western approach to conflict resolution is the spiritual approach. It advocates 
conflict transformation be implemented to stabilize long-term constructive relationships. The 
reason for the depth and breadth advocated is embedded in the manner in which conflict 
transformation scholars perceive conflict. Worthington (2006: 267), for instance, asserts: 
“When conflict has resulted in hurts being inflicted on group members, people need to heal 
from those hurts in order to move past the hurts and live in peace.” The quote suggests that 
healing is necessary following conflict, a hypothesis supported by other scholars (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 19; Lederach, 1997). Similarly, Johan Galtung (1998: 65) uses a simplified 
formula: “Reconciliation = Closure + Healing, closure in the sense of not reopening 
hostilities, healing in the sense of being rehabilitated.” Achieving reconciliation, as 
conceptualized by Galtung, is, however, challenging and controversial at the higher levels. 
The depth referenced implies conflict transformation, and perhaps reconciliation, as the 
ultimate objective of the spiritual approach (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 19; Lederach, 1997).  
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In general, the spiritual approach emulates the social-psychological approach in that its 
primary referents are individuals and societies (Rosoux, 2009: 545). The spiritual differs in 
that it aspires for a deeper outcome of healing and forgiveness. Albeit, as detailed in section 
4.3.11 of this chapter, the incorporation of forgiveness in conflict resolution discourse at the 
societal and international levels engenders significant scholarly debate (Bloomfield, 2006: 12-
29; Wohl and Branscombe, 2009: 195). Postponing discussion on dissention for the moment, 
John Paul Lederach (1997) is a persuasive advocate of the spiritual approach to conflict 
resolution. Lederach (1997) classifies truth, justice, mercy and peace as the four primary 
components of deep conflict resolution69. 
4.2.3.1 Truth 
There are obvious parallels between how truth is conceptualized by the spiritual and 
social-psychological approaches. Lederach (1997) defines “truth” as an objective exploration 
of what transpired in the conflict: who was involved, what happened and so forth. The 
importance of truth in these instances is discernible, with the author suggesting that the 
emergence of truth is the first step toward conflict transformation. However, the pursuit of 
truth is problematic. Truth is subjective, which implies that all stakeholders will have their 
own, and sometimes competing, versions (Kriesberg, 2004: 83; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham 
and others, 2011: 254-255; Rouhana, 2004: 42-43; Worthington, 2006: 262). To surmount 
inevitable divergences, reciprocal open dialogue is counseled to facilitate expression of the 
varied accounts (Head, 2012: 41; Lederach, 1997). Through dialogue, Lederach (1997) 
suggests that the adversaries can work through and construct a common truth that balances the 
versions. 
In this frame, Lederach (1997) cautions that the jointly constructed truth that emerges 
should not be accusatory. Accusations are counterproductive and divisive, so truth should be 
constructed around a version of events that unites the adversaries rather than divides them 
(Lederach, 1997). Truth is, therefore, not simply concerned about recounting events from the 
past, but it becomes the foundation for establishing amicable relations in the present and 
future (Adelman, 2005: 287-307). After all, it is upon the truth that is constructed that 
relationships will be reformulated and managed. 
                                                          
 
69 Correspondingly, Long and Brecke (2003: 28-31) offer a “forgiveness model” which parallels Lederach’s 
framework. It likewise has four components: acknowledging harm or truth telling; forgiveness of the wrongdoer 
and not the wrong by reframing the perception of one’s own identity and how the other is perceived; foregoing 
the desire for revenge; and establishing a new more peaceful relationship (Long and Brecke, 2003: 28-31). Due 
to their similarities, only Lederach’s (1997) framework is explored. 
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4.2.3.2 Justice 
The principle of “justice” aims at correcting wrongs of the past, by dealing with both 
injustices and the root causes of the conflict, whereby transformation can advance (Lederach, 
1997; Liddick and Gagnon, 2009: 45-72; Montville, 1999: 321). Paralleling the social-
psychological approach, justice holds perpetrators accountable, addresses root causes, and 
provides some form of compensation to the victims (Lederach, 1997). Through a systematic 
pursuit of justice, deconstructive structural and discursive elements are also countered, which 
should aid in the development of constructive perceptions, behavior and structures that 
undermine the potentiality of a repetition of the cycle of violence or oppression (Lederach, 
1997; Rouhana, 2004: 37). Justice is therefore broad, and may even require that former social 
and political structures (laws, court systems, governing framework) be restructured or 
rehabilitated to augment their capacity and legitimacy (Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Lerche, 
2000; Long and Brecke, 2003: 149). While the holistic approach advocated by those who 
adhere to the spiritual approach is complex, Lederach (1997) and Montville (1999: 318) 
assure peace cannot be obtained without the administration of justice. In this light, Lederach 
(1995: 14) bluntly warns that when justice no longer guides conflict resolution, its actors, 
processes and objectives should be called into question. 
4.2.3.3 Mercy 
Lederach (1995: 20; 1997) describes “mercy” as a “new beginning” in the relationship. 
Mercy suggests the relationship transforms from one based on accusations motivated by past 
wrongdoing and enmity, to a relationship of amity and forgiveness in pursuit of a collective 
future (Lederach, 1997). This conceptualization implies the principles of compassion, amnesty 
and forgiveness (Lederach, 1995: 20). Unsurprisingly, Lederach describes mercy with 
expressions such as “steadfast” and “eternal grace” signifying the influence of Christianity on 
his theory. These nuances similarly imply healing (outlined in section 4.3.11). Once mercy 
has been extended through forgiveness and healing, the relationship moves into positive peace 
(Lederach, 1997; Worthington, 2006: 7-9). In this manner, depth and longevity of 
transformation is emphasized in both theory and practice. 
References to justice and mercy, however, are seemingly contradictory components. 
Lederach (1995: 20-21; 1997) and Gopin (2001: 88) acknowledge the existence of paradoxes 
in the spiritual approach when they denote the contradictions between the principles of truth, 
justice and mercy, recognizing that the pursuit of one principle seemingly undermines the 
others. In this context, the pursuit of justice and mercy are subject to discord since mercy 
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suggests forgiveness, while justice demands retribution. To overcome these inevitable 
incompatibilities, scholars advocate all components be represented and balanced within the 
program (Gopin, 2001: 88; Lederach, 1995: 20-21; 1997). Through balance, harmony can be 
established and the impact of the contradictions minimized. 
4.2.3.4 Peace 
Lederach’s (1997) final component is “peace,” which he conceptualizes as a complex 
amalgamation of principles including individual welfare, security and respect. Peace is 
depicted as a state where referents coexist in a safe and cooperative manner. Within this 
frame, threats to individuals have been removed and respect is expressed, partly mirroring the 
social-psychological components of regard and security. Nevertheless, Lederach’s (1997) 
understanding of peace shifts the scale from nonviolent coexistence towards positive peace 
because mercy and forgiveness are advocated. 
Interestingly, the principle of peace is paradoxically conceived of as both a precursor of 
and a successor to the components of truth, justice and mercy (Lederach, 1997). On the one 
hand, without peace, Lederach (1997) assures that the emergence of truth, justice and mercy 
will be undermined. On the other hand, he argues peace is a byproduct of the implementation 
of truth, justice and mercy, with their manifestation assisting in the production of amicable 
relations (Lederach, 1997). Here, Lederach is emphasizing the interconnection and mutually 
reinforcing aspects of conflict resolution principles and practices. Under ideal conditions, 
Lederach’s reference to peace implies positive peace, or harmonious nonviolent relations. 
4.3 Precautions and problems 
With Western conceptualizations of prerequisites for conflict resolution elucidated, and an 
exploration of principled approaches complete, we redirect our attention to fundamental 
challenges associated with a process of conflict resolution. The following subsection details 
eleven interrelated precautions and problems found in Western literature that must be 
considered when designing and implementing resolution programs. Challenges articulated are 
partially explained by the complexity of dealing with (conflictual) relationships (Rosoux, 
2009: 558-559). The precautions and problems analyzed insinuate that conflict resolution: is 
reactionary; is limited in scope; must be appropriately timed; is a long process; requires 
legitimacy; should be facilitated; is subject to setbacks; has a limited capacity; is subject to 
false reconciliation; is subject to exploitation, and; incorporates theories, including 
forgiveness and healing, which are controversial. Amalgamated, the precautions and problems 
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presented complete our analysis of conflict resolution as conceptualized by Western scholars 
in the English language. Inclusion of these weaknesses into our framework underscores the 
problems and challenges associated with resolving conflicts at the higher levels. 
4.3.1 Reactionary rather than proactive 
While scholars, such as Humphrey (2005: 203-220), proclaim that, “[t]he primary aim of 
reconciliation is to prevent conflict rather than to address its causes,” this assessment is only 
partially accurate. Since conflict resolution, at any degree or level, is implemented ex post 
facto, it only prevents violence from recurring since (violent) conflict has already occurred 
(Lerche, 2000). Lerche (2000) acknowledges that conflict resolution, as a practice, is 
reactionary rather than proactive. Succinctly, conflict and violence are present, or have 
previously occurred, when resolution is introduced. All three theoretical approaches to 
peacebuilding are implemented subsequent to a conflict and thereby fail to actively prevent 
conflict. 
4.3.2 Limited scope 
Despite which level or approach is utilized when implementing conflict resolution, its 
scope is limited. Clearly stated, conflict resolution processes cannot permeate entire societies 
(Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Kriesberg, 2001: 60; Lerche, 2000). This warning emphasizes 
that not every stakeholder who endures a conflict, whether classified as perpetrator, victim or 
bystander, will be exposed to resolution or transformation measures (Humphrey, 2005: 203-
220; Kriesberg, 2001: 60; Lerche, 2000). Inevitably portions of society will be alienated or 
marginalized since attention is generally directed toward those who have been most involved 
or affected (Humphrey, 2005: 203-220). While limited scope is expected when structural 
approaches are applied, spiritual approaches will equally be unable to reach every member of 
a given society. Absolute inclusion is effectively impossible at the higher levels. 
Included in the quantity of unaffected, or non-included, referents are those stakeholders 
who do not wish to cooperate, and may even preference conflict continuation (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 17; Bloomfield, 2006: 6-7; Hayner, 2002: 157-161; Lerche, 2000; Rothfield, 
2008: 19-20). Disinterest or refusal to participate in conflict resolution can manifest for 
multiple reasons, including distrust or hatred of the “other” (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 17; 
Bloomfield, 2006: 6-7; Hayner, 2002: 157-161; Lerche, 2000; Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). 
Reluctance is generally the result of deep wounds or an uncongenial environment that 
undermines the appeal of resolution (Rosoux, 2009: 559). In such circumstances, the pursuit 
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of conflict resolution may have to be postponed until attitudes or circumstances have changed, 
whereby a latter pursuit might allow more individuals to become involved in the process 
while the influence of potential spoilers is correspondingly reduced. 
4.3.3 Scheduling 
As just noted, scholars emphasize that conflict resolution should not be hastily pursued 
and must be properly timed (Rosoux, 2009: 559; Ross, 2004: 216). Proceeding cautiously is 
especially warranted when a majority of society and/or leadership do not support conciliation, 
because under these pervasive conditions, successful implementation will be complicated or 
outright improbable (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 137). For these reasons, it is suggested that a 
period of time be observed between conflict termination and the initiation of conflict 
resolution (Worthington, 2006: 203). Observing a waiting period allows for wounds to heal, 
losses to be mourned and opinions to soften, whereby referents might become increasingly 
amenable to non-conflictive interaction and conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; 
Rosoux, 2009: 553; Worthington, 2006: 203). Contrariwise, an abrupt pursuit of conflict 
resolution is suggested to have an increased probability of being perceived as premature, 
illegitimate and inappropriate since stakeholders are not cognitively prepared (Rosoux, 2009: 
559). Assessments should be periodically made to gauge openness, and the scheduling of a 
process should be the prerogative of affected stakeholders rather than external parties. 
4.3.4 Lengthy and complex process 
Scholars universally consent that conflict resolution is a long, arduous process (Bar-Tal 
and Bennink, 2004: 23; Bloomfield, 2006: 7; Botes, 2003; Flavin, 2013: 177). Its duration is 
predicated on the time necessary for transforming relationships, especially cognitive, effective 
and behavioral aspects, building trust, and institutionalizing those changes within a given 
relationship. Due to the degree and complexities of changes sometimes required, Kriesberg 
(2003: 331) asserts a process could take generations before resolution or transformation 
occurs. Therefore, those contemplating or engaged in the process need to be patient and 
persistent, persevering in their endeavor to develop and institutionalize constructive 
relationships. 
 Therefore, it is impossible to establish time frames because of the intricacy of 
relationships and their fluctuant nature over time (Botes, 2003; Kriesberg, 2004: 96). Since 
(conflict) relations are complex and highly individualized, a process of conflict resolution will 
have to take into account the referents, preferred tools and the amount of support and 
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commitment volunteered (Crocker, 2003: 42; Reimann, 2004: 4; Rosoux, 2009: 559). Each 
conflict will have to be approached differently, and will require diverging periods of time to 
resolve, and an extensive amount of consideration, consultation and planning needs to be 
devoted to the designing and implementation of a program (Crocker, 2003: 42; Reimann, 
2004: 4; Rosoux, 2009: 559). Simultaneously, a program should be flexible, since the quality 
of the relationship is expected to experience fluctuation over time, which likewise suggests 
practices and timing will have to undergo periodic evaluations to determine which, if any, 
changes are necessary or expected (Rosoux, 2009: 559). As a consequence of these elements, 
it is impossible to set time frames, but referents should be certain that the pursuit of conflict 
resolution is time consuming and complicated. 
4.3.5 Legitimacy 
The literature underscores the significance of a conflict resolution process and its 
implementers being perceived as legitimate by affected stakeholders (Stover and others, 2005: 
835). Obtaining a sufficient degree of legitimacy among the general population and/or leaders 
requires certain conditions be fulfilled. First, stakeholders can only pursue resolution as a 
result of a conscious decision (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76; Lerche, 2000; Rosoux, 2009: 
553). There is general consensus in the literature that an internal or external actor cannot 
impose a process because it may not meet the needs or desires of affected stakeholders 
(Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 73-76; Hayner, 2002; Kelman, 2004: 112; Rosoux, 2009: 553; 
Stover and others, 2005: 834-858). Absent general support, a (forced) program is subject to 
failure partly due to the lack of legitimacy. Similarly, the initiator, be they local 
representatives or intervening third parties, will have to be perceived as legitimate by the 
affected population(s) as popular sentiment is expected to be projected onto the program 
itself. 
That said, not all scholars agree that internal or external parties cannot pressure referents 
into conflict resolution. Kelman (2004: 117), for instance, advises that third parties can often 
impose a conflict settlement whereupon conflict resolution can be fabricated. However, the 
literature suggests that while conflict settlement might reduce violence, resolution or 
transformation will require popular support, perseverance and legitimacy to successfully 
address needs and alter the quality of the long-term relationship. Imposing conflict resolution 
following a settlement, therefore, will be challenged, as these qualities may be absent and 
difficult to manufacture. 
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Obtaining legitimacy also requires stakeholders’ needs be met. When stakeholders’ needs 
and grievances remain unchecked and/or unfulfilled, including popular interests concerning 
timing and techniques associated with the process, the probability that a conflict resolution 
process will be rejected increases (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76; Kelman, 2004: 112; Stover 
and others, 2005: 834-858). To compensate, scholars recommend allowing internal forces 
dictate when and how conflict resolution is pursued (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 132-143; 
Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 73-76; Rosoux, 2009: 533; Stover and others, 2005: 834-858). 
Under such circumstances, stakeholders can reach a mutually acceptable arrangement that is 
more likely to be perceived as legitimate and acceptable by both parties (Estrada-Hollenback, 
2001: 73; R. Fisher, 2001a: 4-7; Lerche, 2000; Maoz, 2004: 233; Rosoux, 2009: 553). In this 
manner, stakeholders maintain ownership, while the program is perceived as legitimate, and is 
more likely to be pursued and/or maintained (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 132-143; Estrada-
Hollenback, 2001: 73-76; Rosoux, 2009: 533; Stover and others, 2005: 834-858). 
One final warning concerning legitimacy in peacebuilding relates to the perceived 
commitment of an intervening third party. Military analysts suggest that citizens in a host 
country recognize that intervening third parties will inevitably limit their commitment in 
terms of time frames, a reality that can undermine third party legitimacy among the 
populations they are assisting (Flavin, 2013: 164). Recognition of the short-term commitment 
of intervening peace builders can, therefore, produce popular reluctance to buy into the 
program (Flavin, 2013: 164). To overcome this obstacle, it is recommended that local 
ownership be assured, and indigenous capacity building occurs, to ensure indigenous buy-in 
and long-term success (Alamir, 2013: 247; Flavin, 2013: 187, 247). Through these measures, 
the local population acquires complete control of the program, including being imparted with 
the knowledge and capacity necessary to implement the program, whereby legitimacy and 
sustainability resides in local structures rather than the intervening third party. 
4.3.6 Facilitation and neutrality 
In certain instances, as just mentioned, third party involvement is useful for advancing 
conflict resolution (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 391). According to the literature, the entry 
of a third party into a given conflict naturally changes conflict dynamics (Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 21). Nonetheless, two recommendations, or admonishments, can be extracted 
from the literature regarding third party intervention. Firstly, the third party will need to 
possess the authority and legitimacy to guide referents toward conflict resolution. Secondly, 
Western scholars emphasize that a third party should be neutral. 
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Concerning the former, the literature accentuates that third parties be responsible, 
“implementing authorities” who are viewed “as both legitimate and impartial” by referents 
(Fisher, 2001a: 19-20; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 216; Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). 
Ronald Fisher (2001a: 19-20), for instance, perceives impartiality and legitimacy of a third 
party are necessary to increase the probability of adversaries accepting their intervention and 
any brokered arrangements produced during their facilitation. Concerning the latter, if third 
parties are perceived as biased, as opposed to neutral, the legitimacy and sincerity of their 
efforts will be persistently questioned by referents (R. Fisher, 2001a: 19-20; Stover and 
others, 2005: 835-836). Thus, absent neutrality and legitimacy, there will be a general 
deficiency of trust in the third party, as well as their actions and the overall conflict resolution 
process they endorse (R. Fisher, 2001a: 19-20; Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). 
As an associated component of neutrality, Mica Estrada-Hollenback (2001: 76) warns that 
third parties should not impose labels, such as identifying a “victim” or “perpetrator,” when 
intervening because assigning labels will be perceived by referents as a passing of judgment 
and/or a taking of sides. In such instances, a third party’s “neutrality” is compromised 
(Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76). Moreover, judgments and labels are determined 
counterproductive to because they encourage stakeholders to defend themselves against 
perceived accusations or judgments, which can protract the conflict and undermine facilitation 
through biasness (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76; R. Fisher, 2001a: 19-20)70. Labels, therefore, 
should be avoided as they undermine third party neutrality and cultivate dissension. 
Nevertheless, being perceived as neutral is not always possible. Ramsbotham and others 
(2011: 216) warn that in the case of intense conflict, “no intervener will be seen as impartial.” 
Contrary, they suggest that one side or the other will inevitably perceive any intervener as 
taking sides. Perceptions of bias are anticipated because of the cognitive and behavioral 
influences and experiences endured when engaged in conflict, namely referents become 
rooted in their patterns of suspicious thought and behavior. Similarly, Rifkind and Picco 
(2014: 35) note that belligerents seldom perceive third parties who become involved as 
neutral. Contrary, the tendency is to dismiss interveners as biased. Perceptions of a third party 
as biased can be problematic for implementing a sustainable resolution program, because one 
or more referents are likely to express dissatisfaction with the outcome or consider the process 
illegitimate (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 216; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 35). 
                                                          
 
70 For further information on third party intervention in conflict resolution, see Fisher (2001a). For a concise 
overview of inside-partial and outside-partial mediators and their advantages and disadvantages, see Svensson 
and Lindgren (2013). 
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Nevertheless, not all Western scholars believe that partiality can be detrimental to conflict 
resolution. Ronald Fisher (2001a: 20) suggests that a biased third party might be acceptable to 
referents if the mediator carries sufficient influence to broker mutually acceptable terms. This 
suggests the intervener possess a sufficient degree of trust and authority to influence 
stakeholders (Feste, 2011: 3-6). At the extreme, Raymond Cohen (2004: 180) argues that third 
parties should not be viewed as “neutral observers but as agents that crucially affect the 
definition of a dispute and the behavior of the disputants.” Here, Cohen emphasizes that third 
party neutrality is of less importance as their capacity to affect change in the disputants. 
Cohen’s theory challenges the generally accepted role of an intervening third party, since 
most Western scholars recommend third parties “facilitate” conflict resolution, defined here as 
assisting or enabling referents, rather than dictating its implementation, structure and 
processes (Lederach, 1995: 56; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32). For instance, a third party 
can provide financial or intellectual resources to aid in the construction of joint institutions 
(political, economic), or they could facilitate dialogue to ascertain the needs and desires of 
affected stakeholders (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 163; Fisher, 2001a: 5). While facilitation 
is possible at all levels, and actors of all types (independent, state, regional or international 
actors) can become engaged, facilitation also demands that the referents themselves must 
ultimately decide to pursue resolution, approve the facilitation of the third party, in addition to 
agree to the terms of the program (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 163; Rosoux, 2009: 559; 
Stover and others, 2005: 857; Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3). A similar warning concerning 
facilitation is that third parties not present themselves as “experts” with ready-made solutions 
(Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3). Adherence to this recommendation, it is argued, ensures the 
third party is perceived as a necessary and legitimate facilitator, and not director of the 
resolution process endowed with solutions (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 163; Stover and 
others, 2005: 857). 
By way of conclusion, Morton Deutsch (2005: 15-18) denotes four necessary skill sets 
that a third party should possess. His recommendations parallel several points outlined above, 
but are, nonetheless, quoted at length: 
Third parties (mediators, conciliators, process consultants, therapists, 
counselors, etc.) who are called upon to provide assistance in a conflict 
require four kinds of skills if they are to have the flexibility required to 
deal with the diverse situations mediators face. The first set of skills are 
those related to the third party’s establishing an effective working 
relationship with each of the conflicting parties so that they will trust the 
third party, communicate freely with her, and be responsive to her 
suggestions regarding an orderly process for negotiations. The second are 
those related to establishing a cooperative problem-solving attitude 
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among the conflicting parties toward their conflict [...] Third are the 
skills involved in developing a creative group process and group decision 
making. Such a process clarifies the nature of the problems that the 
conflicting parties are confronting (reframing their conflicting positions 
into a joint problem to be solved), helps to expand the range of 
alternatives that are perceived to be available, facilitates realistic 
assessment of their feasibility as well as desirability, and facilitates the 
implementation of agreed-upon solutions. And, fourth, it is often helpful 
for the third party to have considerable substantive knowledge about the 
issues around which the conflict centers. Substantive knowledge could 
enable the mediator to see possible solutions that might not occur to the 
conflicting parties and it would permit her to help them assess proposed 
solutions more realistically (Deutsch, 2005: 16). 
According to the quote, third parties should possess the capacity to work effectively with 
relevant stakeholders; be able to garner cooperation; be able to guide referents through 
dialogue and negotiations to identify and resolve issues; and be familiar with the intricacies of 
the conflict and its stakeholders. The latter component is generally best fulfilled by inside-
partial mediators, who are apt to possess an increased degree of understanding of the conflict 
particularities and the referents involved, compared to outside-partial mediators (Svensson 
and Lindgren, 2013: 701-704). Deutsch (2005: 17-18) explains that, because third parties will 
differ in the quality of the skills they possess, facilitator’s/intervener’s should correspond to 
the given circumstances and needs of stakeholders involved. Hence, depending on the 
circumstances, the situation may call for a facilitator or an intervener. 
4.3.7 Setbacks 
A conflict resolution process is subject to (inevitable) setbacks (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 
18; Kelman, 2004: 87-113). In short, setback is normal as circumstances and referents evolve 
over a period of time. The manifestation of setbacks can produce stagnation or regression in 
the nurturing of constructive relationships if not managed appropriately (Gardner Feldman, 
2008: 15-19). Nevertheless, setbacks are not necessarily detrimental. Contrary, if referents 
remain persistent and committed to transforming relations, and persevere in the conflict 
resolution program, it is possible to minimize or reverse stagnation or a regressive trajectory 
(Gardner Feldman, 2008: 15-19). For instance, Gardner Feldman (2008: 15) illustrates how 
reconciliation between Germany and Poland stalled between 2005 and 2007 due to bilateral 
contention over negotiations between Germany and Russia for the construction of an oil 
pipeline. Despite the setback, the German-Poland process remained resilient and ultimately 
recovered. Reversal was possible due to the persistent determination of leadership on both 
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sides of the relationship, who persevered in their determination to improve bilateral relations 
(Gardner Feldman, 2008: 15). 
Setbacks, and other impediments, occur for multiple reasons, including a shift in public or 
leaders’ opinions (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 144), or weak institutional capacity (absence of 
know-how) (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 15-19). Similarly, referents may become dissatisfied 
with the resolution process (Kelman, 2004: 113), or reluctant to abide by the terms of the 
settlement (Kriesberg, 2004: 87). Concerning the latter, a referent could perceive that 
circumstances have shifted to their favor and they now possess the capacity to overturn 
objectionable conditions under the status quo (Kriesberg, 2004: 87; Wohl and Branscombe, 
2009: 193-194). Influenced by these pervasive perceptions, the actor might be tempted to take 
advantage of a strategic opportunity to increase personal benefits, which can reinstitute the 
conflict (Kriesberg, 2004: 87; Wohl and Branscombe, 2009: 193-194). Whatever the catalyst, 
when resolution stalls or is terminated, there is an increased probability that the conflict will 
resume or escalate. 
Another explanation for the recurrence of conflict following the implementation of a 
conflict resolution process is provided by Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004: 12-13) and Bar-Siman-
Tov (2004: 4-5) who theorize that conflict resolution at the intrastate level is often directed at 
the structural level, and/or minimally applied within a society. In such instances, conflict 
resolution does not extend beyond structural peacemaking and, therefore, will have marginal 
impact at the societal level (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 12-13). Absent societal inclusion, or 
popular acceptance of the process, popular dissatisfaction could mount and produce backlash 
or outright rejection of a resolution process (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 12-13). There is also 
increasing likelihood that the program will be perceived as unwelcome or illegitimate. 
In general, poorly lead, designed or timed programs, and those absent popular support, 
will lack the durability and scope to produce and institutionalize sustainable resolution or be 
able to build constructive relationships (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4-5; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 
2004: 12-13). Said another way, “[h]ow grievances - both strategic and emotional are 
reconciled at one point in time determines the probability and shape of subsequent conflicts” 
(Wilmer, 1998: 105). Hence, the quote underscores there is an obvious risk that poorly 
designed and implemented programs will produce minimal results because it will fail to 
transform relations or permeate society. For example, when conflict resolution neglects the 
needs and opinions of the societies involved, inevitable future differences between the two 
belligerents will exacerbate the quality of relations, as the degree of resolution was fragile at 
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best (Kriesberg, 2004: 94). In this case, setbacks aggravate underlying and unresolved issues, 
rekindling deconstructive perceptions and behavior. 
4.3.8 Limited capacity 
Rosoux (2009: 558-559) admonishes a program of conflict resolution not be idealized as a 
“magical solution” which effortlessly converts conflict relations into amicable ones. Similarly, 
Kriesberg (2004: 96-97) lucidly warns that, “Not every action taken with the ostensible 
purpose of moving the reconciliation process forward actually does so.” Due to its limited 
capacity, as expressed by Kriesberg, it is advised practitioners be cognizant of conflict 
particularities, including the referents involved and the duration and intensity of the conflict, 
to determine objectives and realistic expectation (Rosoux, 2009: 559). For instance, not all 
conflicts are susceptible to reconciliation, and may only be open to conflict management or 
peaceful coexistence. Awareness of conflict particularities, and the referents involved are 
fundamental for establishing realistic goals and selecting appropriate and applicable means to 
meet existing needs and achieve desired objectives. 
There are, nonetheless, practices that can augment the capacity of a process. Among them, 
it is suggested that mixing techniques increases the appeal and utility of conflict resolution, 
whereby scope and capacity are widened (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 75, 154; Sarkin, 2008: 
20-23; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 16, 33-34). Other recommendations include identifying 
and addressing root causes (Kelman, 2004: 111-114; Reimann, 2004: 11); addressing 
grievances (Auerbach, 2004: 149); empowering weaker stakeholders (Botes, 2003; Hinds and 
Oliver, 2009: 3-30; Lederach, 1995: 21; Reimann, 2004: 11; Stover and others, 2005: 835); 
and creating an inclusive program that involves relevant stakeholders in the design and 
implementation of the process (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-30; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49). 
This combination of recommendations has been emphasized. 
4.3.9 “False Reconciliation” 
Associated with the warning above, the literature cautions that it is plausible for 
adversaries to falsely or prematurely believe their relationship has been reconciled, whereby 
the implementation of a conflict resolution program is scaled back or terminated (Hamber, 
2007: 119). Michael Ignatieff defines the condition as “false reconciliation” because referents 
“indulge in the illusion that they had put the past behind them” (Hamber, 2007: 119). Under 
Ignatieff’s false reconciliation, defined by the quote, conciliatory activity is precipitately 
relaxed or halted, and adversaries coexist under the pretense that the relationship has entered a 
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constructive phase (Hamber, 2007: 119). However, their “papered over” grievances, defined 
as issues that have not been properly addressed, will (re-) emerge when future divergences 
surface between the two referents (Hamber, 2007: 119-122). When these inevitable disparities 
manifest (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 19), their expression has the potential of escalating into 
renewed conflict because the divisiveness encountered reopens old wounds and grievances 
(Hamber, 2007: 119-122). Succinctly, a once dormant conflict is resurrected. 
Providing additional insight into the phenomenon, Ignatieff surmises that “false 
reconciliation” is more probable in asymmetrical relationships, especially in cases where 
disproportionate power advantages allows a referent, usually the one responsible for 
committing injustices and likely the most powerful of the pair, to impose a “forgive and forget 
attitude” on their weaker adversary (Hamber, 2007: 119). Such policy is problematic because 
it has an increased probability of generating failure or outright rejection by the weaker party 
who does not buy into the program (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76; Head, 2012: 41). Caution 
is, therefore, advised when resolving conflicts involving asymmetric relations, as the program 
could perpetuate inequality in the relationship (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76; Head, 2012: 
41). Accordingly, efforts should be made to create a symmetrical relationship, thereby 
ensuring the weaker party is empowered and can express their interests and needs and have 
them addressed71. Engaged parties should have insight into the referents and conflict history, 
and should establish relational parity to ensure power is balanced. Simultaneously, care must 
be taken when evaluating the progression of the relationships so that resolution is not 
prematurely relaxed. 
4.3.10 Exploitation 
Sarkin (2008: 16) warns that political leaders can misuse and/or manipulate conflict 
resolution as a means of attaining domestic popular support or to trap a relational counterpart. 
In these instances, conflict resolution is fraudulently exploited to advance individual goals, 
whereupon the initiator has limited or no intentions of altering their behavior or advancing a 
constructive relationship (Sarkin, 2008: 16). Insincerity is problematic and a real challenge for 
referents. 
In his discourse on exploitation, Sarkin (2008: 16) questions how referents can be 
confident of the genuineness of a particular reconciliation gesture or proposal. Most scholars 
                                                          
 
71 Nonetheless, Zartman (2009: 325-326) asserts that all relationships are asymmetrical since even hypothetical 
equals are never absolutely certain of their position vis-à-vis their adversary. Hence it is recommended that care 
be taken, while being cognizant that achieving perfect congruity in relationships is implausible 
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surmise that uncertainty is inevitable since it is impossible to know the precise intentions of 
referents (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 9; Long and Brecke, 2003: 19-20; Sarkin, 2008: 16). 
Consequently, only sustained behavior over time can authenticate one’s commitment to the 
process (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 9; Long and Brecke, 2003: 19-20; Sarkin, 2008: 16). 
Nonetheless, there is some criterion that could be applied to evaluate the sincerity of 
intentions. 
Recalling Long and Brecke’s (2003: 19-20) “costly signaling” model (chapter 3, section 
4.1.4.2), the four criteria established hypothetically minimize concern about exploitation. In 
particular, the qualities of a novel, costly and irrevocable “reconciliation event” provides 
some credence to an initiator’s intention when the principles are observed. Nevertheless, the 
costly signaling model does not completely eliminate the risk of exploitation (Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 19-20). Hence, while particular actions may add credibility to an initiator’s 
actions, there is an inevitable risk of exploitation. 
4.3.11 Forgiveness and healing 
The last precaution and problem addressed revolves around the principles of forgiveness 
and healing, which produces a significant quantity of debate in Western conflict resolution 
literature (Bloomfield, 2006: 23-25). The inclusion of these principles into theory and practice 
at the higher levels is premised on their perceived value for the social and psychological 
welfare of individuals and collectives exposed to, or suffering from, harm/grievances as a 
result of (violent) conflict (Worthington, 2006: 7-9). Literature associated with this theoretical 
debate can be dichotomously divided into advocates or detractors. Most advocates adhere to 
the conflict transformation approach of peacebuilding. Each position is articulated below. 
4.3.11.1 Advocates 
Some argue that forgiveness and/or healing are fundamental components for, or 
prerequisites of, “effective” conflict transformation (Avruch, 2010: 40; Gopin, 2001: 87; 
Lederach, 1995: 21; Maamri, 2010: 142-146; Parent, 2012: 30-37; Shriver, 1995: 6; Wohl and 
Branscombe, 2009: 193-194; Worthington, 2006: 7-9). Marc Gopin (2001: 87) suggests 
forgiveness is an “age-old practice that appears in numerous religious traditions across the 
globe.” The quote emphasizes both the historic tradition of the practice and the religious 
connotations associated with the term. Before examining the theoretical debate, we will first 
define forgiveness. 
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Avruch (2010: 40) defines forgiveness as “the relinquishment of the desire for 
vengeance.” Avruch’s narrow conceptualization implies that the impulse to retaliate is 
inhibited. Similarly, and at the emotive level, Everett Worthington (2006: 17) defines 
“[e]motional forgiveness” as the “replacing of  negative, unforgiving stressful emotions 
with positive, other-oriented emotions” by an individual who has, or perceives to have been, 
wronged. According to the two definitions, the act of forgiveness implies that past 
wrongdoing and deconstructive convictions no longer taint contemporary perceptions of the 
adversary, and the desire for revenge has been forsaken. 
The relative value of offering forgiveness is suggested the psychological benefit provided 
to stakeholders (Worthington, 2006: 17). In short, forgiving is considered to be a healthy 
response, at the interpersonal and collective levels, whereupon a congenial relationship can be 
constructed, since it implies cognitive transformation is experienced (Worthington, 2006: 17). 
Albeit, some scholars consider forgiveness most applicable at the individual or group level, 
while others suggest that the principle and practice is equally applicable at the intrastate and 
interstate levels (Kira and others, 2009: 388; Long and Brecke, 2003: 115; Shriver, 1995: 6). 
For example, Long and Brecke (2003: 115), advocate forgiveness at the intrastate level, 
determining that civil war adversaries “may have greater motivation and preexisting 
institutional mechanisms to forgive as a means of settlement” as a result of “the longevity, 
intimacy, vulnerability, and inescapability associated with the relationship.” Due to the 
relational conditions denoted, the authors posit that forgiveness can be, and has been, 
extended in cases of intrastate conflict (Long and Brecke, 2003: 115). According to the latter 
interpretations, forgiveness is a fundamental transformative practice for advancing resolution 
in interpersonal relationships as well as societal relations. 
 From this point, the question becomes to what degree forgiveness should be extended. 
Shriver (1995: 176) warns that forgiveness should not be perceived at its theoretical extreme. 
He defines the concept as such: “never forgetting the past, but seeking to overcome it, to 
transform its meaning through the creation of a new future” (Shriver, 1995: 176). Concisely, 
Shriver (1995: 7) does not believe that exercising forgiveness suggests a “forgive and forget 
attitude,” nor requires referents “to abandon primary concern for the crimes of an enemy.” 
Instead, he argues, “[f]orgiveness begins with a remembering and a moral judgment of wrong, 
injustice, and injury” (Shriver, 1995: 7). In these instances described by Shriver, forgiveness 
does not eliminate justice, but moderates and balances justice with forgiveness (Bar-Siman-
Tov, 2004: 5; Kriesberg, 2004: 84; Lederach, 1997). Succinctly, integration of the principles 
of justice and forgiveness is expected to add equilibrium to a conflict resolution process, as 
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opposed to imbalance that preferences punishment, on one hand, or amnesia, on the other 
hand.  
There is, nonetheless, some hesitancy among scholars as some who advocate forgiveness 
in theory, acknowledge that extending mercy may not always be applicable in its ideal form 
(Auerbach, 2004: 157; Galtung, 2001: 4; Worthington, 2006: 199). Louis Kriesberg (2004: 
84), for example, maintains that although forgiveness is essential for achieving positive peace, 
it should not morally oblige conflicting referents to “forgive” or “adore” the other. Instead, 
referents may only be willing to resolve a conflict to the point of achieving peaceful 
coexistence, an outcome that must be accommodated (Dwyer, 1999; Kriesberg, 2004: 84). 
According to this tempered approach, forgiveness is advantageous, even if it is shallow, 
although the principle’s promotion or achievement may not always be applicable at its 
extreme (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Auerbach, 2004: 153-163; Dwyer, 1999; Kriesberg, 2004: 
84; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 258). Its implementation should, therefore, be dependent 
on conflict circumstances and the interests of stakeholders. 
Under ideal conditions, once forgiveness has been extended, scholars argue that 
adversaries can move into a healing process (Long and Brecke, 2003: 28-31; Montville, 1999: 
332; Worthington, 2006: 257). Healing, as conceptualized here, is defined as a therapeutic 
recovery or restoration of emotional health. Healing is suggested a physical and psychological 
necessity since conflicts produce physical and emotional injury which needs to be managed 
(Avruch, 2010: 42; Worthington, 2006: 257-262). Healing is thus an outcome of the extension 
of forgiveness. 
Transcending mainstream discourse on the avocation of forgiveness, a few scholars 
suggest that healing and forgiveness alone are insufficient for transforming relationships 
(Halpern and Weinstein, 2004: 567-569). Halpern and Weinstein (2004: 567), for example, 
argue that empathy must likewise be displayed between conflict adversaries to ensure a re-
humanization of the “other”. The authors define empathy “as a process in which one person 
imagines the particular perspective of another person. This imaginative inquiry presupposes a 
sense of the other as a distinct individual” (Halpern and Weinstein, 2004: 568). To achieve the 
suggested alteration the quote emphasizes, three changes are expected. These are summarized 
as: (1) improving the perception of the “other” and marginalizing stereotypes; (2) showing a 
genuine interest and curiosity in the other; and (3) displaying empathy both emotionally and 
cognitively (Halpern and Weinstein, 2004: 568-569). Absent empathy being expressed in the 
manner delineated, it is hypothesized the transformation of perceptions will be inadequate to 
alter the quality of relations, even if forgiveness has been extended (Halpern and Weinstein, 
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2004: 567-569; Head, 2012: 38). According to their theory, the extension of empathy and 
forgiveness constitute genuine conflict transformation72. 
Forsaking exploration of the utility of empathy in conflict resolution, and redirecting our 
attention back to forgiveness and healing, scholars suggest forgiveness and healing can be 
obtained or extended through various mechanisms, for instance, an apology (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 29; R. Fisher, 2001b: 27; Shriver, 1995: 222-223; Worthington, 2006: 204), 
and/or through reparations to compensate those negatively affected (Long and Brecke, 2003: 
49-51; Shriver, 1995: 224-225; Worthington, 2006: 204). Regardless of their manifestation, 
the timing, degree and value of forgiveness and healing are expected to vary across referents 
and conflicts (Shriver, 1995: 226). Similar to other aspects of conflict resolution, referents 
should be consulted to determine the desired depth and appropriate mechanisms prior to 
implementation (Bar-On, 2004: 251; 2005: 9; Bloomfield and others, 2003: 12-16; Rosoux, 
2009: 559; Sarkin, 2008: 11-28; Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3). In this manner, forgiveness can 
be accepted or rejected as a component of conflict resolution by stakeholders. 
4.3.11.2 Detractors 
Reversely, other scholars question the theoretical and operational value of forgiveness and 
healing as principle components of conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels for 
multiple reasons. Foremost, they suggest that the introduction of interpersonal technique is 
idealistic and impractical (Bloomfield, 2006: 23-24; Dwyer, 1999; Rothfield, 2008: 15-16). 
Simply stated, while interpersonal healing may be possible following a conflict between a few 
individuals, given that single individuals or small groups can extend forgiveness more readily, 
its transference to the collective level is complicated, if not inconceivable (Mendeloff, 2004: 
364). Moreover, there will be individuals who have personally suffered from violence who 
will not support conflict resolution at any degree (Lerche, 2000; Rosoux, 2009: 557; 
Rothfield, 2008: 15-16). In these instances, reference to forgiveness and healing is 
unpalatable. 
Next, detractors criticize that the principle of forgiveness has a pejorative impact on how 
conflict resolution is conceptualized by experts and laypersons alike (Bloomfield, 2006: 25). 
Philipa Rothfield (2008: 15-16), for instance, persuasively argues that forgiveness is an 
“exceptional and extraordinary” concept laden with Christian nuances that are unappealing to 
some stakeholders. Many agree that healing and forgiveness carry connotations of the sacred, 
                                                          
 
72 For more information on empathy as a component of reconciliation, see Halpern and Weinstein (2004). 
Rifkind and Picco (2014: 34) likewise advocate empathy in conflict resolution. 
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especially in Christian, Islamic and Jewish cultures (Auerbach, 2004: 153; Bar-On, 2005: 6-7; 
Bloomfield, 2006: 24; Hermann, 2004: 45; Rothfield, 2008: 16-20). Accordingly, some 
referents may find the principle is inapplicable or undesirable due to personal, religious, 
cultural or aspirational differences. 
Illustrating the pejorative influence of forgiveness on South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Rothfield (2008: 16-20) argues that advancement of forgiveness 
in this case mandated Christian values be observed at the expense of the conflict’s victims. By 
insisting on the inclusion of forgiveness and institutionalizing it into the program’s structures, 
Rothfield criticizes that victims were denied an opportunity to pursue litigation, and/or were 
morally deprived of their right to remain bitter or unforgiving. Concisely, South Africans who 
had suffered under apartheid were implored to marginalize their personal experience as a 
victim so that national reconciliation could be promoted (Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). In these 
instances, forgiveness relegates individual needs for the advancement of collective interests 
(Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). Nevertheless, the overall value of forgiveness in this case appears to 
have been marginal when assessed through the perspective of society. In her analysis of the 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission utilizing hearings and focus groups, 
Audrey Chapman (2007: 51-53) found that participants rarely perceived forgiveness or 
reconciliation as priorities. Hence, although architects of the program, namely Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, promoted forgiveness, the public does not appear to have prioritized its 
achievement. 
Nevertheless, detractors insist that victims have a right to decide whether they wish to 
subjugate their own victimhood, and/or their existing grievances/needs, without being morally 
pressured to do so by those who insist on the inclusion of forgiveness as a principle of conflict 
resolution (Bloomfield, 2006: 1-25; Lerche, 2000; Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). At its extreme, 
there are additional arguments for why forgiveness should not be combined with conflict 
resolution. Most noteworthy, Howard Adelman (2005: 287-307) forcefully proclaims that 
victims should not extend forgiveness or recognition to perpetrators of gross human rights 
violations (such as genocide), since the act recognizes the “other” and the wrongdoing they 
have committed. Scholars justify this recommendation by accentuating that particular crimes 
do not warrant forgiveness (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Lerche, 2000). 
Adelman’s counsel partially reflects the inherent contradictions encompassing forgiveness 
and its variance with the provision of justice in post-conflict environments (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 19). On the one hand, justice seeks to correct past wrongs through 
“acknowledgment” and “rectification” (Kriesberg, 2004: 84; Lederach, 1997; Montville, 
  
271 
 
1999). Justice, therefore, generally includes some form of punishment or retribution, be it 
restorative or retributive. On the other hand, forgiveness is rooted in compassion and 
acceptance of the “other” in pursuit of a positive future relationship (through the extension of 
forgiveness and/or restorative justice) (Lederach, 1995: 20). Avocation of forgiveness is thus 
frequently interpreted to indicate that punishment for wrongdoing is forsaken or minimized, 
whereby justice and mercy compete (Lederach, 1997). This paradox was mentioned in section 
4.2.3.3. Once again, conflict transformation scholars advise principles to be balanced, as 
Lederach (1995: 20) indicates, since excessive emphasis on forgiveness compromises the 
pursuit of justice because both principles operate at cross-purposes. Contrary, over-emphasis 
of justice can be perceived as violent (Boulding, 1978: 86; Deutsch, 2005: 13-14). 
By way of conclusion, due to the degree of dissension within Western literature, it is 
unsurprising that consensus on the appropriateness of forgiveness is not forthcoming (Rosoux, 
2009: 545). As noted above, it is a religiously laden concept (Bar-On, 2005: 6-7), which 
detractors argue invokes a sense of idealism (Rosoux, 2009: 559) and/or a “forgive and 
forget” attitude that scholars and stakeholders often find unappealing or unacceptable 
(Bloomfield, 2006: 23-25; Rothfield, 2008: 559). In particular, Bloomfield (2006: 23-25) 
hypothesizes that popular ideals distort public opinion in two distinct manners. They either 
falsely increase popular expectations of the capacity of a conflict resolution process, or they 
can advance general skepticism of the process because it is deemed idealistic or inappropriate 
(Bloomfield, 2006: 23-25). In the former case, individuals expect too much from the program 
and are later disappointed, while in the latter they express disinterest because it does not 
appeal to their needs (Bloomfield, 2006: 13-16, 23-25). It is, consequently, argued that 
references to forgiveness and healing be discarded from conflict resolution discourse at the 
higher levels, an approach which is theorized to increase popular willingness to establish a 
shared constructive relationship unhindered by idealistic notions of the projected outcome 
(Bloomfield, 2006: 13-16; Lerche, 2000)73. Nonetheless, while forgiveness is clearly 
problematic at the higher levels, we select not to dismiss the principle and practice, and 
contrary maintain our wide theoretical framework. This arrangement affords referents the 
possibility to choose to include or reject its application, as they deem appropriate. 
                                                          
 
73 Bloomfield (2006: 13-16) proposes substituting the term reconciliation with coexistence. He argues that the 
latter does not contain the negative connotations associated with the former (Bloomfield, 2006: 13-16). Lacking 
a synonymous relationship to concepts such as love and forgiveness, coexistence is argued to offer a more 
appropriate description of what reconciliation objectively seeks to obtain, which in turn is argued acceptable by 
post-conflict parties (Bloomfield, 2006: 13-16). 
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4.4 Summary of guidelines and principles 
This section summarizes our analysis of conflict resolution as conceptualized by Western 
scholars. Since our attention shifts to comparatively analyzing Western and Middle Eastern 
approaches in the next chapter, it is important to recapitulate some of the guidelines and 
principles extracted from the present chapter. For the sake of space and to minimize 
repetition, theoretical highlights are only listed and are not exhaustive. 
The chapter opened with Bar-Siman-Tov’s (2004: 72-75) ten prerequisites for (deep) 
conflict resolution. They included: conflict termination (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 138; Bar-
Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; Bar-Tal, 2000: 361; Kelman, 2004: 114; Long and Brecke, 2003: 
11; Rosoux, 2009: 553); mutual satisfaction with the peace arrangement (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
2004: 62-75; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 12; Mitchell, 2002: 10; Reychler, 2002: 30; 
Wallensteen, 2007: 38-39); viable structures and institutions (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66-68; 
Bar-Tal, 2000: 362; C. Coyne, 2007: 1-4; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3, 10; Kriesberg, 2004: 99-
100); a climate conducive to conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Gardner Feldman, 
2008: 17-20); domestic support for the program (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259; Bar-
Siman-Tov, 2004: 70; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836); 
legitimate and accountable leaders and/or facilitators (Bargal and Sivan, 2004 131-143; Bar-
Siman-Tov, 2004: 5, 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27-28; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-19); 
shared identities and integration among stakeholders (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Kriesberg, 
2004: 94; Lederach, 1995: 9); accommodation of goals and mutual benefit (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
2004: 75; Rosoux, 2009: 544); education to advance transformation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 
75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31); and ceremonies or events to demonstrate and root 
transformation at the grassroots level (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 
75; Long and Brecke, 2003: 57). While there is a degree of dissension concerning some 
components, such as timing, order of implementation or whether a conflict must be terminated 
before conflict resolution can be implemented, a majority of the prerequisites examined are 
embraced in some form or fashion by most scholars. 
In addition to prerequisites, numerous principles can be extracted from our literature 
review. The most obvious are those denoted in the three principled approaches of conflict 
resolution, which simultaneously reinforce ideas denoted by Bar-Siman-Tov’s (2004: 75) 
prerequisites. Accumulated, these principles include truth, justice, security, leadership, regard, 
international context and institutions (R. Coyne, 2005: 15; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-18; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 83-85; Lederach, 1997). In addition, Lederach’s (1997) mercy and peace are 
equally important, although controversial, principles. 
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Nevertheless, the three approaches incorporate additional principles than those four 
suggested. For instance, Lederach’s (1997) principle of “justice” not only distributes justice, 
but also reforms the political and social structures that attributed to the conflict. Similarly, 
Gardner Feldman’s (2008: 3-9) component “history” contains salient principles including 
truth, the meeting of needs, and the building of trust through cooperation, dialogue and joint 
problem solving. Hence, the three Western approaches are not limited to the four component 
principles each broadly promulgates, but involve additional principles. 
Supplementary principles extracted from the present review also include Eric Stover and 
others (2005: 835-836) call for “implementing authorities” to be viewed “as both legitimate 
and impartial.” Additionally, they recommend “a genuine process of consultation with those 
most affected by the violence” (Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). As reiterated throughout 
the present chapter, the practices emphasized in the previous quotes increase popular support, 
while ensuring local ownership of the resolution program. Shortlisting further principles 
articulated, we identified the principles of respect (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 20; Calhoun, 
2005: 105; Donohue, 2009: 444; Funk and Said, 2004: 16; Head, 2012: 41; Lederach, 1997; 
Ropers, 2003: 2, 4; Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3); addressing root causes (Kelman, 2004: 111-
114; Reimann, 2004: 11); addressing grievances (Auerbach, 2004: 149); empowerment 
(Botes, 2003; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-30; Lederach, 1995: 21; Reimann, 2004: 11; Stover 
and others, 2005: 835); inclusiveness (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-30; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 
49); and facilitation (Lederach, 1995: 56; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32; Rosoux, 2009: 
559). Many of these principles were denoted in chapter 3. Finally, Long and Brecke’s (2003: 
35) costly signaling model suggests the principles of “vulnerability, novelty, voluntarism and 
irrevocability” should be observed when implementing a “reconciliation event” at the 
international level. The latter principles demonstrate willingness and capacity for change, 
while providing some indication of the genuine nature of the reconciliation act. 
The next chapter introduces the Arab/Muslim scholarly conceptualization of conflict and 
conflict resolution. While we examine Arab/Muslim understanding, theories and practices 
across cultures are juxtaposed to qualify theoretical and practical parallels and divergences. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The primary objective of chapter four was to expand our theoretical framework of conflict 
resolution as conceptualized in Western English language literature that began in chapter 
three. The present chapter examined several prerequisites for conflict resolution at the 
intrastate and interstate levels, introduced three principled approaches, as well as outlined 
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several precautions and problems associated with its theory and practice. Combining 
information deduced from our literature review in chapters three and four, we create a wide 
comparative framework whose lexicon, principles and practices span conflict management, 
conflict resolution and conflict transformation approaches to peacebuilding. The broad 
framework is valuable when comparing Western and Arab/Muslim approaches as cross-
cultural similarities and differences are better qualified. Unfortunately, most cross-cultural 
comparisons of Arab/Muslim understanding of conflict resolution conducted hitherto have 
been limited to the Western structural approach alone. Parting with this trend, our theoretical 
framework includes parameters extracted from these three Western approaches, which better 
represent the complexity of Western theory and practice. These benchmarks are later used in 
our comparative analysis of scholars’ conceptualization of conflict resolution and those of a 
sample of laypersons in the forthcoming chapters. 
Chapter four opened with the introduction of ten prerequisites recommended by Bar-
Siman-Tov prior to implementing (deep) conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate 
level. The first prerequisites concerned conflict termination, a requirement that garners 
contention among scholars. Some scholars argue that conflict termination is necessary before 
implementing conflict resolution, while others hold that resolution can begin before, and may 
actually advance, conflict termination. In the end, conflict particularities, including the 
duration and intensity of the conflict, in addition to stakeholders’ perception and behavior, 
determine when a resolution process may commence. 
Second, and linked to the first, scholars argue that mutual satisfaction with the peace 
arrangement is fundamental for pursuing conflict resolution. Without satisfaction amongst 
most affected stakeholders, it is suggested that a resolution process will be subject to rejection 
and failure. Mutual satisfaction implies that the conflict has been terminated, which naturally 
counters the notion that conflict resolution can begin prior to conflict termination. 
Third, scholars suggest that viable structures and institutions are essential for designing 
and establishing sustainable conflict resolution programs. Ideally, these will become 
institutionalized and normalized conflict within social and political structures. Structures and 
techniques can be established and utilized at all levels of government and society, and these 
can perform a variety of functions, and can operate independently or jointly in pursuit of 
collective goals and constructive relations. The value of institutions and structure are their 
advancement of cooperation, provision of a venue where interaction can occur, as well as the 
knowledge and change imparted, and trust built. 
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Fourth, the literature recognizes that there must be a climate conducive to resolution. At 
the extreme, if there are stakeholders (or third parties) who act as spoilers, at the local or 
international level, then conflict resolution will be hampered by their activity. Contrary, when 
the environment is congenial, a process is more likely to succeed. Two palpable options are 
recommended to increase the favorability of an environment. On the one hand, an inclusive 
process should be designed to bring potential spoilers into the resolution process. In this 
manner, their needs and desires can be voiced and met. On the other hand, when spoilers are 
unwilling to join a conflict resolution process, time should be allowed to elapse before 
implementing the process. Postponement allows for wounds to heal, positions to soften, and 
ideally opinions to change, which suggests that conflict resolution could be embraced and 
pursued at a later date. 
Fifth, it is suggested that there be sufficient domestic support for a conflict resolution 
program. Absent domestic support, a resolution program will not take root and will be subject 
to popular rejection. Popular rejection can occur due to unfulfilled needs or grievances, or 
disinterest in pursuing conflict resolution prompted by animosity or hatred. One suggested 
means of augmenting popular support is to consult stakeholders to determine program 
objectives, practices and timing. 
Sixth, conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels needs to be advanced and 
implemented by legitimate and accountable leaders and/or facilitators who can 
guide/command and promote the program. Leaders/initiators that possess such traits add 
credibility to the overall resolution process and augment popular support. A leader can assume 
multiple roles, including being a spokesperson or representative of the program, or function as 
an implementer or overseer of (portions of) the process itself. Nonetheless, some scholars 
caution that one individual or institution should not be charged with conflict resolution, but 
rather responsibility and duties should be distributed broadly. By diversifying responsibility, 
more actors become involved and responsibility for the program is not placed on one 
individual or group. 
Seventh, it is argued that shared identities and integration among stakeholders should be 
constructed. Shared identities, as referenced, do not indicate that overt similarities must be 
forged, but rather that referents transform to a sufficient degree that their identities allow for 
coexistence and cooperation with the other. In instances where the other is considered an 
existential threat to identity or needs, for example, establishing shared identities may require 
cognitive transformation. Nevertheless, stakeholders will ultimately have to decide to what 
degree they wish to alter their relationship, and hence to what extent they are prepared to 
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change. At minimum, changes should manifest to the degree that nonviolent coexistence can 
be achieved. 
Eighth, scholars suggest that the needs and desires of relevant stakeholders be 
accommodated and that mutual benefit be pursued. These recommendations are repeated 
throughout the literature in relation to many aspects of conflict resolution. Ensuring that needs 
and desires are met requires stakeholders be provided the opportunity, even empowered, to 
express and pursue their interests. Once articulated, compromises may be necessitated to 
reduce potential friction and establish equilibrium between the relative power balance and 
needs of referents. Once needs and desires have been established, efforts must be taken to 
ensure their fulfillment. The viability of conflict resolution rests on these issues being 
accommodated and met. 
The final two prerequisites provided by Bar-Siman-Tov are tools, or dimensions, of 
conflict resolution. They include educating affected stakeholders and the conducting of public 
events or ceremonies. Such mechanisms are designed to enhance popular awareness and root 
transformation through the involvement of the population. Their observation permits the 
resolution process to permeate into society and fosters local ownership. Combined, Bar-
Siman-Tov’s ten prerequisites serve as identifiers that circumstances are congenial for 
implementing conflict resolution. It is necessary for referents and/or third parties to 
independently evaluate associated factors when contemplating the introduction of a conflict 
resolution process to determine if circumstances are congenial and/or necessary in each 
context. 
Following examination of prerequisites, our attention moved to the three principled 
approaches of conflict resolution found in Western literature: the structural, social-
psychological and spiritual approaches and their associated principles. The three approaches 
broadly represent the three Western schools of peacebuilding: conflict management, conflict 
resolution and conflict termination respectively. While there are similarities across each 
approach, there are likewise differences in terms of the level at which the process is applied 
and the outcome expected. 
The structural approach utilizes top-down approaches to restore formal relationships at 
higher levels. Its referents are thereby limited to political and social elites, which parallels 
conflict management in many respects. While articulating the process, Gardner Feldman 
references the principles of history, leadership, institutions and international context as 
fundamental to a conflict resolution process. History entails the reconstruction of truth and a 
continuous process of working through events until outstanding issues are resolved to mutual 
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satisfaction. In this sense, the past is continuously processed until resolution is achieved. 
Leadership and institutions emphasize the principles of resilience, legitimacy, knowledge and 
commitment, as well as the development of institutions whereby change can be promoted, 
advanced, institutionalized and normalized. Finally, international context refers to the climate 
in which conflict resolution is pursued. It likewise emphasizes the prerequisite of a congenial 
environment, which implies, among other things, there are no spoilers or lack of resources to 
undermine the success of a resolution process. With these parameters in mind, the suggested 
weakness of structural approach is that it is limited primarily to the higher levels of 
government, which marginalizes public participation. 
Next, the social-psychological approach was introduced. It prioritizes a bottom-up strategy 
targeting individuals and groups at the societal level. In general terms, the approach adheres to 
conflict resolution. Kriesberg suggests that the fundamental guiding principles of this 
approach are: truth, justice, regard and security. Here it is possible to observe an overlap of 
principles, as truth centers on the development of a common account of what occurred, as 
observed in the structural approach. Justice utilizes retributive or restorative mechanisms to 
address wrongdoing, compensate those wronged and to deter a repetition of associated 
misconduct. Regard refers to the manner in which former adversaries interact. It aims at 
proliferating constructive perceptions and behavior with the minimum objective of achieving 
nonviolent coexistence. Lastly, security suggests the absence of threat, or that the relational 
climate is congenial for developing constructive relations. The component of security thus 
parallels the structural approach’s principle of international context. At minimum, referents 
should not feel threatened by their adversary because such perceptions undermine the 
development of trust, constructive perceptions and behavior. While the social-psychological 
approach is focused on society and seeks to address issues and needs of relevant stakeholders, 
it is criticized for not doing enough to transform the quality of relationships in the long-term. 
The last Western approach to conflict resolution explored was the spiritual approach, 
which falls under the rubric of conflict transformation. It objectively seeks to generate 
positive peace by broadening and deepening the process of conflict resolution through the 
incorporation of principles including forgiveness and healing. While articulating the approach, 
Lederach provides four principles including: truth, justice, mercy and peace. While truth and 
justice parallel those outlined in the social-psychological approach, mercy and peace add 
greater depth to the program. On the one hand, mercy is defined as the expression of 
forgiveness and healing, which are perceived as healthy for referents and congenial for 
rooting transformation. It is a principle influenced by religion. On the other hand, peace 
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defines the quality of the environment, relationship and interaction in which referents 
(harmoniously) coexist. Peace can be minimally conceptualized as nonviolent coexistence, 
although, ideally, positive peace is advocated. However, there are inherent contradictions 
between the principles included in Lederach’s approach, especially that between justice and 
mercy. For this reason, it is argued that principles and their pursuit must be balanced, since 
they are codependent. For instance, mercy should be pursued to the degree where it is not 
perceived as violent, wherein violence undermines the expression of justice. 
The three Western approaches, I believe, provide a range of principles and depth by which 
conflict resolution can be tailored to the needs and objectives of relevant stakeholders. When 
focus is desired to be limited to structural resolution, the structural approach can be applied. 
Contrary, when deep conflict resolution is sought, the spiritual approach can be applied. 
Moreover, these approaches can be combined to increase the depth and breadth of a conflict 
resolution program. Applied individually or in tandem, the inclusion of these approaches into 
our framework allows us to make broad comparisons of Western conceptualizations of 
conflict resolution with Arab/Muslim traditions. 
Following the review of principled approaches, attention transferred to articulating several 
precautions and problems extracted from Western conflict resolution literature. Each issue 
provides deeper insight into how conflict resolution is conceptualized by scholars, 
highlighting particular fallibilities. Several of these denoted qualities likewise emphasize 
principles and best practices that should be incorporated when considering, or implementing, 
conflict resolution. Our discussion highlighted eleven interrelated issues. 
Foremost, it was noted that the practice of conflict resolution is reactionary rather than 
proactive. Its implementation always follows a conflict and any wrongdoings associated with 
it. The process is, therefore, not proactive. While it may prevent conflict continuation or 
escalation, it has not prevented (violent) conflict. Stated differently, conflict resolution, in its 
broadest sense, is reactionary despite which approach (conflict management, conflict 
resolution or conflict transformation) is applied. 
Second, scholars suggest that conflict resolution’s scope is limited. Even under ideal 
conditions, individuals or groups will fall beyond the scope of the process. For example, while 
conflict transformation is implemented at the societal level, and depth and breadth is 
emphasized, its processes, while broad, will not touch everyone affected by the conflict. 
Inevitably, there will be outliers who have been (purposefully) excluded from the process. 
Exclusion may include those who were not interested in participation as well as those who 
  
279 
 
were not exposed. Hence, conflict resolution should not be conceptualized as a practice that 
permeates entire societies and unanimously alters their thoughts and behavior. 
Third, scholars do not agree on the appropriate timing of a process. In particular, there is 
disagreement about whether conflict resolution can precede conflict termination or if it must 
follow. Some scholars recommend that a conflict be terminated, and that time be allowed for 
wounds to heal and attitudes to become congenial to a process of conflict resolution, prior to 
implementation. Contrary, others argue that conflict resolution is designed to alter attitudes, 
and that its implementation hastens the conflict termination. One obvious solution is to permit 
stakeholders to decide when they wish to implement the process while continuously 
monitoring and probing the degree of interest expressed. 
The fourth precaution and problem denoted in the literature emphasizes that conflict 
resolution processes are time-consuming and lengthy. Programs, consequently, cannot be 
hastily designed and implemented in the hopes of advancing rapid resolution. Instead, those 
engaged in the process need to be patient and persistent, persevering in their endeavor to 
institutionalize constructive relationships. Moreover, it is likewise recommended that 
persistent evaluation of the program, including its objectives, mechanisms and time frames, be 
conducted to ensure necessary adjustments are made. In short, altering individuals and 
relationships requires time and endurance to effect, principles and practices are subject to 
variability, and the duration of time needed in each instance will contrast because of the 
fluidity and complexity of relationships. 
The fifth precaution noted was the importance of legitimacy of the process and actors 
involved among the affected populations. This observation has been noted elsewhere. In 
summary, absent legitimacy of the process or actors involved, the probability of success is 
minimal. 
Sixth, when third parties choose to intervene, whatever their form (country, NGO, IGO), 
most scholars suggest that they facilitate a process rather than dictate its precepts. Succinctly, 
interveners are cautioned to assist the parties in whatever capacity, while allowing 
stakeholders to determine timing, conditions and tools. At this time, we discussed third party 
neutrality, where scholars recommend interveners remain impartial, although some scholars 
prefer third parties who are partial. Both approaches offer advantages. For instance, neutral 
parties can more easily acquire acceptance by both parties engaged in a conflict. By 
comparison, a partial actor may not be viewed as neutral but comes equipped with increased 
knowledge of the conflict and the referents. Others recommend that third party skills be 
matched to the needs in a given context. Skills denoted include the ability to muster support 
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and the possession of understanding about conflict (parties involved, their history). By way of 
summary, most Western scholars prefer a third party to be a neutral assistant equipped with 
the appropriate skills to facilitate the process, while others are open to partial actors who have 
the authority to sway opinion and direct referents. 
Seventh, scholars acknowledge that there is a high probability of setbacks occurring 
during a resolution process. Setbacks manifest for multiple reasons ranging from a lack of 
commitment among stakeholders to inevitable problems and differences arising in the 
relationship over time. While these events can stall or terminate a process, they do not 
necessarily guarantee a failure of the program. Contrary, if referents remain committed and 
persistent in their efforts, setback can be temporal and have limited, short-term effects on the 
overall trajectory of the conflict resolution process. 
Eighth, some scholars warn that conflict resolution as a practice has a limited capacity. 
Distinctly, the literature emphasizes that conflict resolution is not a miraculous solution, but 
rather an intricate process for managing and altering complex relationships. In this sense, the 
process should not be conceptualized as theoretically or practically capable of altering all 
relationships or establishing positive peace. While observation of certain principles, such as 
inclusiveness and empowerment, can increase the depth and breadth of a process, and thereby 
augment capacity to some degree, it is recommended that scholars and laypersons be realistic 
about their overall expectations. In short, conflict resolution should not be presented as a fail-
safe, miraculous process that will inevitably transform every conflictual relationship. 
Ninth, false reconciliation was introduced. False reconciliation is defined as the 
phenomenon of referents incorrectly and prematurely concluding that a relationship has been 
transformed. However, future challenges between the parties will demonstrate the fallacy of 
those presumptions. Upon the manifestation of inevitable differences in a case of false 
reconciliation, referents will revert back to deconstructive perceptions and behavior, thereby 
exposing the reality that any transformation experienced was only superficial. Awareness of 
false reconciliation underscores that care must be taken when evaluating relationships and that 
conflict resolution practices not be prematurely relaxed. It was also suggested that false 
reconciliation is increasingly likely to occur when one party has been coerced into conflict 
resolution, a phenomenon that highlights the importance of symmetrically pursuing and 
applying conflict resolution, as well as accommodating all effective stakeholders through 
consultation and involvement as a means of empowering and balancing power across the 
parties engaged. 
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The tenth precaution denoted is the risk of conflict resolution being exploited for political 
advantage. In this instance, referents disingenuously proclaim interest in transforming 
relationships in order to ensnare their adversary and/or advance selfish interests. While abuse 
is problematic, it is impossible to verify the true intentions of an initiator, which indicates that 
risk is inherent in any conflict resolution process. There are, nonetheless, some tools offer a 
degree of reassurance. Notably, the concepts of novel and irreversible acts of conciliation may 
indicate a referent’s genuine interest. However, only time can verify genuine commitment. 
The final problem introduced was the polarizing concepts of forgiveness and healing. At 
one extreme, scholars recommend the inclusion of forgiveness and healing to transform 
conflict because of their social and psychological benefits. At the higher levels, these concepts 
are most likely to be advocated by those who adhere to the conflict transformation approach. 
Reversely, others criticize that their inclusion imposes unwanted or impractical objectives. 
Since they are religiously influenced and idealistic, many scholars eschew their reference at 
the higher levels. We recommend that referents be permitted to select the depth to which they 
wish to pursue resolution, and therefore allow for the inclusion of these principles. 
The chapter concluded with a summary of numerous principles extracted from the 
literature review. Among them are truth, justice and other principles found in the three 
Western approaches examined. In addition, vulnerability, reconciliation, legitimacy and 
forgiveness, to name a few, were also mentioned. Combined, the principles and practice 
elicited herein provide some benchmarks and measurements for delineating a holistic Western 
approach to conflict resolution, which includes components of conflict management, conflict 
resolution and conflict transformation. Many of the Western concepts, principles and practices 
extracted from the previous two chapters will now be compared across cultures as we examine 
the Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution in the next chapter. Our objective is 
to qualify cross-cultural convergences and divergences using our wide conceptual framework.
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Chapter 5 Arab/Muslim Conceptualization of 
Conflict Resolution 
 
Some Arab/Muslim scholars hypothesize that Western conceptualizations and practices of 
conflict resolution are inappropriate or inapplicable across cultures. However, comparative 
analyses conducted by Arab/Muslim scholars hitherto are based on narrow comparisons of 
Western structural approaches, and this practice minimizes or omits (aspects from) the social-
psychological and spiritual approaches. The objective of the present chapter is to 
comparatively analyze conflict resolution as articulated by Arab/Muslim scholars, in the 
English language, while comparing lexicon, principles and practices with our broad Western 
framework constructed in the previous two chapters. In this manner, we retest comparisons. 
As demonstrated below, the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches share 
increasing degrees of similarities with Arab/Muslim theory. Accordingly, our holistic 
comparison made below identifies additional parallels in theory and practices between 
Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution than generally 
acknowledged in the literature. Many of the findings extracted from this chapter are later 
tested when we explore laypersons’ opinion utilizing an online questionnaire (chapter six). 
Guiding the literature review herein, Hypothesis 2 states that Western and Arab/Muslim 
conceptualizations of conflict resolution as articulated in the respective literature will 
generally converge when our broad theoretical framework of conflict resolution is applied. 
Our testing begins by outlining Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict and conflict 
resolution while juxtaposing findings with Western understanding of associated concepts. We 
then comparatively analyze principles and practices to determine convergences and 
divergences across cultures. We determine there are striking degrees of theoretical and 
practical convergences between Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations that are 
frequently overlooked by previous researchers due to their narrow comparative framework. 
The contents of chapter five are organized as follows. The first section provides a basic 
overview of Arab/Muslim versus Western practices as extracted from the literature. Here it is 
demonstrated how historical, religious and cultural nuances unique to the Middle East, and 
some of which were denoted in chapters 1-2, affects Arab/Muslim understanding of concepts 
and principles associated with conflict resolution. In particular, unique characteristics, 
including strong familial or community ties, and Islamic principles and teachings, influence 
how concepts such as conflict, peace and resolution are understood, managed and practiced. 
Because of the profound influence these characteristics have on cultural traditions, scholars 
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accentuate collective interests and religion be accommodated when engaging in conflict 
resolution. 
The literature review conducted determines that Arab/Muslims perceive conflicts as 
normal, negative and potentially intractable, with such qualities implying that conflicts should 
be managed or transformed. Moreover, conflicts in the Arab/Muslim context are viewed as 
systemic, or affecting more than those directly involved, since the effects of a conflict are 
perceived to extend into the family and/or wider community. Because of the robust familial 
association and the view of conflicts as systemic, conflict resolution, broadly defined as the 
process of terminating or transforming a conflict, occurs at the community level rather than 
the individual or higher levels. For instance, a conflict limited to two individuals is perceived 
to have an impact on families or clans. Therefore, conflict resolution practices are 
implemented at the group level, as opposed to the lower level, to advance resolution and 
counter its effects among the community. 
Within this frame, and contrary to Western practices, Arab/Muslim culture prescribes 
conflict be terminated or resolved for the benefit of the community rather than those referents 
immediate engaged in an incompatibility. Thus, resolution is pursued, not to benefit 
individual referents immediately engaged, but rather to advance familial and community 
interests. The communal approach, therefore, not only affects the level at which conflict is 
managed or transformed, but also equally the manner in which a conflict is resolved. 
Nevertheless, following implementation of a conflict resolution process, a conflict is ideally 
transformed and peace established, but the Arab/Muslim tradition accommodates two 
potential outcomes: peaceful coexistence (or negative peace) and positive peace. 
Following the general outline of conflict and conflict resolution, attention centers on 
delineating guiding principles and tools, used in Arab/Muslim society, for advancing conflict 
resolution. Fundamental principles extracted from the literature include truth, justice and 
mercy, among others. By comparison, tools utilized to resolve a conflict include truth seeking, 
reparations and arbitration, to identify a few. At this juncture, we will illustrate that many 
principles and tools advocated by Arab/Muslim scholars have parallels in the West. 
Combined, the descriptive analysis below demonstrates that cross-cultural similarities exist 
across fundamental concepts, principles and techniques for pursuing conflict resolution. At 
the same time, there are, obvious discrepancies, noticeably the prioritization of religion and 
the level at which conflict resolution is applied. 
The chapter concludes with a review of one community-based technique of conflict 
resolution as practiced in Arab/Muslim societies: the sulh ritual. Since the sulh is unique to 
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Muslim culture, its processes are explained to demonstrate how resolution is advanced at the 
community level, and as a means of continuing our cross-cultural comparative analysis of 
tools and principles. This section includes the function of the sulh, the formation of a 
committee called the jaha, their activities to broker a termination of the conflict, discover the 
truth, determine the terms of resolution, and ultimately, efforts used to manage or resolve the 
conflict. Following this overview, several weaknesses of the sulh are elaborated. Some of its 
flaws include the leveraging capacity endowed onto the jaha, the inaccessibility of the sulh to 
outsiders, and its marginal utility for resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels. 
Our analysis of the sulh likewise reiterates similarities and divergences between 
Arab/Muslim and Western theories and practices of conflict resolution. Combined, cross-
cultural incompatibilities identified include the sulh’s religious influence and its concentration 
at the community level. These differences are expected, because they are cornerstones of 
conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition. By comparison, compatibility of principles 
are also present, namely truth, justice and restitution. In addition, there are likewise 
similarities in terms of tools utilized, such as the use of arbitration and dialogue. The 
comparisons and contrasts articulated throughout the present chapter demonstrate Western 
and Arab/Muslim approaches parallel one another when our wide Western framework is 
considered. This finding confirms Hypothesis 2. 
The chapter closes by highlight that there is no traditional mechanism for resolving 
conflict at the intrastate and interstate level in Arab/Muslim culture. This void presents a 
theoretical and practical dilemma when contemplating conflict resolution at the intrastate and 
interstate levels in this context. Clearly stated, the absence of a traditional mechanism 
introduces the problem of whether conflict resolution as practiced at the higher levels adhere 
to the same principles and practices as applied at the community level. While some scholars 
insist they do, we test this supposition. More specifically, several of the concepts, principles 
and practices articulated herein are later utilized to construct a questionnaire on conflict 
resolution at the interstate level in chapter 6. Prior to testing, we must first determine how 
Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize conflict resolution, while juxtaposing finding with our 
Western theoretical framework delineated. 
5.1 Cross-cultural comparative overview 
Arab/Muslim scholars and practitioners study conflict resolution from primarily two 
theoretical approaches (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74). On the one hand, some adopt a theological 
approach, analyzing sacred Islamic texts and traditions to scrutinize, extricate and develop 
  
286 
 
theory and practice. On the other hand, there is a tradition that comparatively analyzes 
Arab/Muslim approaches through a Western lens to articulate how conflict resolution is 
conceptualized and practiced in the Arab/Muslim tradition (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74). Since I am 
not educated in, or qualified to interpret, sacred Islamic texts, the literature reviewed below 
relies entirely upon the work of scholars who follow the latter analytical approach and 
produces works in the English language. I recognize that referencing the latter scholarly 
works is beneficial because it facilitates cross-cultural comparisons of theories and practices, 
since concepts and terminology are frequently borrowed or shared across cultures. 
Throughout the literature review below, several Arab/Muslim scholars’ theoretical 
contributions are instructive. In particular, George E. Irani, Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz 
Said provide frequently referenced essays concerning Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of 
conflict and conflict resolution in the English language. Their independent (Irani, 1999) and 
collaborative research (Funk and Said, 2004; Irani and Funk, 2000; Said and Funk, 2001), 
therefore, formulates the bulwark of our analysis in this chapter. Additionally, supplementary 
insight is acquired from alternative scholars including Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2000; 2001; 
2010), Doron Pely (2009) and others to demonstrate convergence and divergences between 
Arab/Muslim and Western conflict resolution theory when applicable. 
Our analysis begins with George Irani’s (1999) “Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle 
East Conflicts,” which provides a general comparison of Arab/Muslim and Western 
conceptualizations of conflict resolution. In his essay, the author suggests several salient 
factors influence how Arab/Muslims define and conceptualize terms including peace, conflict 
and conflict resolution (Irani, 1999: 1-2). Influential factors include the specific historical, 
cultural, geographic, religious and philosophical environment and experiences that are unique 
to the Middle East (Abdalla and others, 2002: 11; Irani, 1999: 1-2), some of which were 
highlighted in chapters one and two. Associated historical, social and cultural nuances 
likewise have a distinguishable effect on cross-cultural relations (Abdalla and others, 2002: 9-
13; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006: 53-54; Reimann, 2004: 11). 
Historical experiences and cultural divergences not only affect individual/collective 
behavior or the quality of bilateral interaction, they equally impact the way in which conflict 
is perceived, negotiated and resolved (Ashki, 2006: 15; Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Ramsbotham 
and others, 2011: 226; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 45). For instance, events such as colonialism 
and foreign occupation, taints contemporary perceptions of the “other” as articulated in 
chapter two (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 75). Concisely, Arab/Muslims are skeptical and suspicious of 
Western intervention and policies in the Middle East. 
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The impact of culture on how conflict and conflict resolution is conceptualized and 
practices is noted in the literature. For example, a seemingly trivial difference, such as the 
manner in which referents communicate (directly or indirectly), can facilitate 
misunderstanding and produce conflict and distrust across cultures (Ashki, 2006: 15; Gartzke 
and Gleditsch, 2006: 53-54; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 45). In terms of cultural typology, 
Ashki (2006: 13) classifies Arab/Muslim culture as a “traditional, high-context culture.” The 
classification broadly implies “hierarchy, community welfare, birth status, cooperation, 
historical interpretation, formality, indirect communication, and patriarchal and spiritual 
values” are significant social-identity markers informing the way that relationships are 
managed and transformed (Ashki, 2006: 13). The markers listed in the quote developed over 
the centuries, and many, as elaborated below, are hypothesized to contradict those found in 
Western culture. 
By comparison, Ashki (2006: 13) identifies Western culture as a “low-context culture” 
where “[i]ndividualism is emphasized over the traditional family; […] and communication is 
more direct and more verbal, versus the use of indirect body language.” In summary, Western 
culture prioritizes the individual and communicates in a direct manner, while Arab/Muslim 
culture preferences the community and communicates indirectly. Such conflicting nuances, 
among other influences, complicate communication and must be considered and 
accommodated when engaged in cross-cultural relationships for the purpose of minimizing 
misunderstanding and misinterpretation which can produce conflict (Ashki, 2006: 13). 
Comparable processes and nuances equally impact on how conflict resolution is 
conceptualized and practiced (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 73-74; Ashki, 2006: 13). 
Exacerbating suspicion, Western conflict resolution researchers and practitioners in the 
past have generally ignored cultural differences and nuances prior to the 1990’s, and rather 
imposed external models abroad (Avruch, 2003: 2). This means that Western practices 
disregard(ed) indigenous principles, practices and needs, while imposing their own theory and 
practices on other cultures. As a consequence, Arab/Muslim practices and opinions were 
marginalized, and best practices such as consultation and empowerment, were overlooked. 
This approach undermined popular acceptance of Western-initiated programs since, among 
other reasons, the techniques are suggested to have been inappropriate and undesirable 
(Avruch, 2003: 2). 
For these reasons, Arab/Muslim scholars generally conclude that Western practices are 
viewed with suspicion and/or are popularly unacceptable in Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-
Nimer, 2010: 75). While this hypothesis is reasonable, and scholars support their theories 
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through theoretical comparative analysis, we wish to re-analyze cross-cultural compatibility of 
scholarly conceptualizations using our wider Western framework. Since Arab/Muslim 
scholars hitherto have frequently failed to acknowledge fundamental aspects of the social-
psychological and spiritual approaches in their cross-cultural comparisons, the accuracy of 
their theoretical findings is questionable. Stated bluntly, their research has marginalized two 
of the three recognized Western approaches and theories associated with them. 
Nonetheless, not all scholars believe that cultural differences directly impact on the quality 
of interfacing. Contrary, some researchers suggest that the existence of culture incongruities 
do not guarantee incompatibilities or misunderstanding of interactive norms and practices 
across cultures (Rubinstein, 2003: 38). Instead, it is argued that referents engaged in a cross-
cultural relationship evaluate contextual and cultural differences, and when it is determined 
that incompatibilities exist, they frequently explore alternative and accommodating tactics to 
interact, other than conflict, to fulfill their needs (Rubinstein, 2003: 38). This hypothesis 
suggests that referents are capable of constructively navigating cultural diversities. According 
to this theory, cultural divergences do not guarantee incompatibility or conflict across 
cultures, nor does it invariably undermine a process of cross-cultural conflict resolution, since 
individuals are capable of constructively managing or navigating relationships in the face of 
cultural differences (Rubinstein, 2003: 38). Despite the capacity to negotiate cultural 
dissimilarities constructively, scholars representing the Western (Bar-On, 2005: 6-7; 
Rubinstein, 2003: 38) and Arab/Muslim (Irani, 1999: 2-10) traditions of conflict resolution 
recommend qualifying convergences and divergences when contemplating cross-cultural 
conflict resolution to minimize potential friction. 
Established upon the theoretical foundation that cultures interact in sometimes unique 
manners, but have the capacity to do so constructively, the following two subsections analyze 
two of the most recognized cross-cultural divergences denoted in Arab/Muslim literature that 
compares conflict and conflict resolution across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures: tribal 
identity and religion. Appreciating the importance and interplay of these elements in 
Arab/Muslim tradition is essential, since they are commonly suggested as two of the 
irreconcilable divergences across these respective cultures. 
5.1.1 Tribal-based identity 
Irani (1999: 1-2) argues that one of the most fundamental cross-cultural variances between 
Arab/Muslim and Western societies is the former’s robust patriarchal and tribal association. 
More specifically, it is generalize that inhabitants of predominantly Arab/Muslim countries 
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frequently identify themselves according to kinship or clan, rather than the Western tendency 
toward individualism or nationalism (Abdalla and others, 2002: 6-11; Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74; 
Al-Ramahi, 2008: 17-18; Irani, 1999: 9-10). Communal association in the Middle East is a 
long-standing tradition since historically “it was from the tribe that protection of interests was 
obtained” (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 3). As emphasized in the quote, reliance on the tribe is rooted in 
historical, collective experience, influence how historical and contemporary social 
relationships are conceptualized, function and are interpreted (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 1-17; Irani, 
1999: 6-13). 
Influenced by the tendency to identifying oneself with the family or community, conflicts 
between individuals in the Arab/Muslim tradition are automatically transferred and managed 
at the community (family or tribal) level (Abdalla and others, 2002: 43-44; Irani, 1999: 9-11). 
As noted in the previous paragraph, preference for managing relations at the family and tribal 
levels is a consequence of the established patriarch social structures and other cultural 
traditions that have developed in the Middle East (Abdalla and others, 2002: 26-28; Irani, 
1999: 11). Moreover, they are equally a product of the influence of Islam, because Muslims 
are considered a member of a body of believers, the ummah, which suggests the collective 
share responsibility for maintaining a moral, just and amiable society (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 85; 
Kalin, 2010: 25). According to Islam, incompatibilities between individuals are generally 
resolved utilizing intermediaries, such as family members or tribal elders (Al-Ramahi, 2008:4; 
Irani, 1999: 1-14). As a consequence, Irani (1999: 11) postulates that conflict resolution 
originates in: “local religious or political zaim (leaders).” Irani here emphasizes the 
importance of religious or community representatives in the Arab/Muslim context, who are 
responsible for managing or resolving a dispute and for disseminating conflict resolution into 
the community through their decisions and actions (Irani, 1999: 9-11; Said and Funk, 2001; 
Soliman, 2009). 
The actions and decisions of family representatives and community leaders in this 
capacity is equally designed to enforce tribal law in conjunction with established religious and 
social norms, which reinforces adherence to the communal approach (Irani, 1999: 9-11; Said 
and Funk, 2001; Soliman, 2009). Stated differently, tribal customs and laws are enforced as 
conflicts are resolved, and the actions of these elders or leaders reinforce cultural 
conceptualizations of how relationships within Arab/Muslim culture develop and are 
managed. Emphasizing the principle underpinnings of these practices, Al-Ramahi (2008) 
summarizes: 
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Tribal law is built upon two basic principles: (1) the principle of 
collective responsibility; and (2) the principle of retribution or 
compensation. The objective of tribal law is not merely to punish the 
offender but to restore the equilibrium between the offending and the 
offended families and tribes (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 3). 
Two noteworthy observations associated to conflict and conflict resolution can be extracted 
from Al-Ramahi’s observation. 
First, individuals in Arab/Muslim culture are both independently and collectively 
responsible for ensuring justice and peace within their community (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 3-18). 
According to this tradition, collective responsibility is observed whether the effects of 
accountability are constructive or deconstructive (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 5). On the one hand, a 
physical attack on one member of the group, for example, is interpreted as an attack on the 
collective (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 5). In this instance, the collective unites to protect its members 
and itself. On the other hand, wrongdoing committed by one member can initiate a demand 
for restitution from the collective (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 5). In the latter instance, a family or 
community becomes accountable for wrongdoing committed by one of its members (Al-
Ramahi, 2008: 3-18). Once again, the individual is embedded into the collective. 
Second, Al-Ramahi’s (2008: 3) quote highlights that referents can select how to deal with 
a conflict, choosing between retributive or conciliatory responses. While the option of 
retribution is present in Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2013: 483-484), and 
likewise observable in Western practices (R. Cohen, 2004: 178; Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 250; Steele, 2008: 7), Arab/Muslim culture and tradition, as it is in Western culture, 
recognize retribution will prolong a conflict despite its provision of a form of justice (Al-
Ramahi, 2008: 4-6). Deconstructive responses, therefore, are discouraged because they 
undermine collective harmony and welfare that is highly esteemed in Arab/Muslim tradition. 
Although retribution remains a viable response to those engaged in a conflict, the collective 
preference in Arab/Muslim tradition is for the conflict to be managed and/or transformed for 
the benefit of the collective (Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2013: 483-484; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4-6). 
The notable challenge in the retribution/conciliation dichotomy is to establish equilibrium 
between retributive justice, which may provide some satisfaction to the individual 
transgressed against, and the preservation of communal stability and welfare (Al-Ramahi, 
2008: 4-6). This conundrum is equally identified in Western theory (R. Cohen, 2004: 178; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250-251). 
With the importance and functioning of tribal identity highlighted, the durability of this 
complex traditional framework in Arab/Muslim culture has several explanations. Foremost, 
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principles and practices are/have been continuously taught to youth which are/have been 
observed across generations (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4). In this manner, customary practices are 
transferred from one generation to the next. Second, the traditional customs and practices of 
resolving conflict at the communal level, such as the use of zaim, reinforce group identity, 
tribal law, religious decrees and collective responsibility, which become self-perpetuating (Al-
Ramahi, 2008: 4). Stated simply, ties to the community are buttressed by tribal and religious 
norms that repeatedly center on the community. Finally, the longevity of these practices is 
explained by the limited infiltration of the institutions and authority of centralized governing 
structures, and the resilience of tribal identity in Arab/Muslim society (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18). 
These highlighted influences naturally guide which tools and objectives are utilized when 
resolving conflict. Notably, securing collective welfare and harmony is prioritized in 
Arab/Muslim culture, whereas Western practices are suggested to prioritize the benefit and 
well-being of an individual (Abdalla and others, 2002: 26-27; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2-19). In this 
frame, Al-Ramahi (2008) abridges: 
The Arab’s Islamic and tribal history places collective interest as the 
highest principle in a hierarchy of values in both dispute resolution and 
everyday dealings. The maintenance of relationships and the restoration 
of harmony is a duty on all members of the group as well as the third 
party intervener, whether he be a judge (a qadi), an arbitrator (a hakam) 
or a conciliator. Therefore, collective interests and sulh (amicable 
settlement) are the cores of any dispute resolution system in Islam in 
order to maintain the ties of family, brotherhood, and community (Al-
Ramahi, 2008: 2)- 
The quote clearly articulates the importance of community and Islam in the Arab/Muslim 
context when conceptualizing and implementing conflict resolution in its broadest sense. 
Said and Funk (2001) similarly emphasize Islamic and tribal nuances and collective 
welfare when conflict management or resolution is contemplated. However, they further insist 
that its processes should be attentive “to ‘face’-related issues (public status, shame, and 
reputation for generosity) and the achievement of restorative justice within a context of 
continuing relationship” (Said and Funk, 2001). The quote emphasizes that principles of 
honor, shame and restorative justice are essential to conflict resolution. These principles are 
examined below. 
Attention now turns to the second fundamental cultural divergence noted in Arab/Muslim 
critiques of Western conflict resolution theory and practice. It is the influence of religion on 
how conflicts and conflict resolution are conceptualized and practiced in Arab/Muslim 
societies. 
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5.1.2 Religion 
A second fundamental divergence between Western and Arab/Muslim cultural traditions 
emphasized in the literature is the significance of religion. Although religious interpretations 
and practices contrast (Abdalla and others, 2002: 50; Abu-Nimer, 2000: 220), the 
Arab/Muslim literature examined presents Islam as an inextricable component of 
Arab/Muslim culture and society (Abdalla and others, 2002: 9-13; Abu-Nimer, 2000: 246-247; 
2008: 3; Gulam, 2003: 3-7; Irani, 1999: 7; Safa, 2007: 5; Soliman, 2009). Within this frame, 
scholars assert that Islam has a deeply rooted tradition of conflict resolution (Abdalla and 
others, 2002: 49; Abu-Nimer, 2000: 246-247; Safa, 2007: 5; Soliman, 2009). The robust 
cultural association with religion implies Islam cannot be extracted from all aspects of daily 
life as understood and practiced in predominantly Muslim societies (Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 
1999: 7-10). Scholars support their hypothesis stating Islam regulates human’s relationship 
with Allah, in addition to human-to-human relationships (Abdalla and others, 2002: 25; 
Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 1999: 2-10). Accordingly, Islam is not exclusively perceived as 
guidelines for an interpersonal relationship with God, but also a set of parameters for 
managing daily affairs of the individual and the community (Abdalla and others, 2002: 25; Al-
Ramahi, 2008: 2). 
Most Arab/Muslim conflict resolution scholars emphasize Islam’s authority (tradition and 
law) in matters of conflict (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219-220; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2-7; Gulam, 2003: 
5). Two sacred manuscripts inform Muslim understanding (Abdalla and others, 2002: 62; 
Gulam, 2003: 5). “The main source of Islamic law (Shariah) is the Qu’ran, which, according 
to Muslims, is the embodiment of the Divine word that was revealed in stages to Prophet 
Muhammad […] by the Angel Gabriel.” (Gulam, 2003: 5). The Sunna is the second 
influential resource (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 7; Gulam, 2003: 5). “The Sunna refer[s] to the 
normative behaviour, decisions, actions, and tacit approvals and disapprovals of the Prophet. 
The Sunna was heard, witnessed, memorized, recorded, and transmitted from generation to 
generation” (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 7). Both Shariah and the Sunna, as defined in the quotes, 
provide guidelines for Arab/Muslim approaches of managing or resolving conflict.  
While theological and juridical divergences exist across Muslim cultures, Al-Ramahi 
(2008: 9-10) claims that all Muslim approaches recognize the Qu’ran and the Sunna are 
fundamental resources. Combined, Islamic sacred texts and teachings inspire Arab/Muslim 
conceptualizations of conflict, conflict resolution, peace and reconciliation (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 
220; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2; Ashki, 2006: 26-28; Gulam, 2003: 5). They likewise influence 
which resolution principles and practices have become institutionalized in contemporary 
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Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 220; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2; Ashki, 2006: 26-28; 
Gulam, 2003: 5). In instances where Islamic sources do not provide direct insight, religious 
scholars “resort to extrapolating and deducing from the” principles found in the Qu’ran and 
the Sunna (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 8). Hence, Islamic teachings and practices are fundamental to 
conflict resolution as conceptualized and practiced in Arab/Muslim culture, whether overtly 
presented or extrapolated through research and theological deliberation, as the quote denotes. 
The Arab/Muslim prioritization of religious-based principles and practices, according to 
scholars, therefore, produces a second major divergence articulated in the literature between 
Western and Arab/Muslim conflict resolution theories and practices (Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 
1999: 2-10). Contrary to Arab/Muslim tradition, scholars criticize that religion is omitted from 
most mainstreams Western approaches (Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 1999: 2-10). Its absence is at 
the higher levels is partially attributed to Western scholarly condemnation, as outlined in 
chapter 4, section 3.11 (Bloomfield, 2006: 23-24; Dwyer, 1999; Rothfield, 2008: 15-16). 
Summarizing their interpretation of the Western approach, Gulam (2003: 5-6) and Abu-Nimer 
(2010: 74) argue that individualistic Western theory and practices are dictated by regulations 
and punishments designed and enforced by a secular state, whom the law is understood to 
represent. Consequently, individuals in the West commit transgressions against state-
established laws and are punished according to those laws (Gulam, 2003: 5-6). Moreover, in 
cases of dispute management between parties in the West, for instance, both referents and 
third parties are encouraged to execute their duties in a manner beneficial and mutually 
acceptable to those directly involved (Irani, 1999: 2). Due to these tendencies, Al-Ramahi 
(2008: 2) tersely deduces: “Whereas, westerners know the primacy of law, the Arabs know 
the primacy of interpersonal relationships.” To summarize, Arab/Muslim scholars criticize 
that Western practices for prioritizing the principles of secularism, mutual benefit and 
individualism. 
By comparison, Arab/Muslim techniques combine legalistic and traditional (Islamic) 
techniques centered on communal interests (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74). Succinctly, in 
Arab/Muslim culture “the interests of the individual are protected only in so far as they do not 
come into conflict with the general interest” (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 9). Al-Ramahi’s quote 
demonstrates that conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim context is implemented to preserve 
harmony among the collective rather than to advance individual interests (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 
2, 9; Gulam, 2003: 5-6). Simultaneously, conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim tradition is 
implemented in the name of Allah because He has given the law (Gulam, 2003: 5). In 
arbitration, for example, Islamic law and local traditions guide and inform juridical 
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proceedings (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2-9). Combined, Islamic norms and practices, in conjunction 
with collective interests, are prioritized in Arab/Muslim approaches as opposed to secularism, 
the state and individualism. 
Therefore, the inclusion of religion is frequently cited as a primary theoretical and 
practical divergence between Arab/Muslim and Western conflict resolution theory and 
practice (Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 1999: 2-10). Among predominantly Muslim communities, 
conceptualizations of conflict and conflict resolution, and their management, are rooted in and 
guided by Islamic traditions and teachings, a component suggested absent in the West (Al-
Ramahi, 2008: 2-9; Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 1999: 2-10). Both Islam and cultural traditions 
and norms prioritize a communal approach that benefits the collective. However, as denoted 
in chapter 4, a spiritual approach to conflict resolution is available in the West, although 
Arab/Muslim comparative analyses frequently overlook these nuances. We have demonstrated 
that the spiritual approach, championed by scholars such as Lederach (1997) and Worthington 
(2006), embrace and incorporate religion and society when resolving conflict at the intrastate 
and interstate levels. 
Consequently, while the Western structural approach to conflict resolution does not 
accommodate religion or society, and is frequently implemented when resolving conflict at 
the higher levels, the spiritual approach theoretically parallels the Arab/Muslim approach. 
Hence, the frequently cited criticisms of the Western prioritization of secularism articulated 
by Arab/Muslim scholars, particularly the absence of societal interests and religion, are 
addressed when cross-cultural comparative analysis incorporates a wide Western framework. 
With two primary critiques of Western approaches to conflict resolution qualified and 
theoretically isolated, attention now turns to defining concepts and comparing Arab/Muslim 
literature with that articulated in our Western theoretical framework. 
5.2 Conceptualizing conflict 
Our cross-cultural comparative analysis continues by exploring how conflict is 
conceptualized in Arab/Muslim culture. Abdalla and others (2002: 26) define conflict as “a 
situation in a specific context in which two or more relatively independent disputant parties 
perceive mutually incompatible goals or interests.” The quoted perception of conflict as a 
relationship in which incompatibility between referents exists, mirrors Western theory 
examined in chapters three and four (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 5; R. Cohen, 2004: 179-
180; Deutsch, 2005: 2; Galtung, 2007: 15; Lederach, 1995: 9; Mason, 1993: 14-15; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7-8; Svensson, 2013: 415; Vasquez, 2009: 83-84; 
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Wallensteen, 2003: 16). Theoretical commonality is likewise observable in Abdalla and 
others’ (2002: 26) construction of a framework for understanding the phenomenon that 
corresponds to Western theory as articulated in chapter 3, section 2. In addition to 
conceptualizing conflict as containing an incompatibility, Abdalla and others likewise include 
components of behavior, attitudes and perceptions, in addition to the factors of location and 
identity of referents engaged. 
Abdalla and others’ (2002: 26) conceptual framework of conflict, therefore, shares 
complex and notable similarities with Western theory. On the one hand, consideration for the 
location of the conflict is valuable since this component impacts on form, or typology, of a 
given conflict (Abdalla and others, 2002: 26). Location, therefore, identifies at which level the 
conflict is occurring, which resources are involved, and, consequently, which measures will 
be necessary to manage or resolve the issue. On the other hand, their identification of referents 
draws attention to the actors involved, and/or who is affected by the conflict (Abdalla and 
others, 2002: 26). These components are equivalent to the units or levels of conflict resolution 
articulated by Kriesberg (3.4.1) or Galtung (1969: 170). The combined framework is 
theoretically relevant since they determine particularities such as the level, actors and intensity 
of a given conflict. 
Supplementary cross-cultural parallels in the conceptualization of conflict can be found 
when analyzing other Arab/Muslim scholars’ work. For instance, Sohail Hashmi suggests that 
“conflict is a natural phenomenon and it will always be part of the human reality” (Abu-
Nimer, 2001: 616). The perception of conflict as a natural phenomenon parallels Western 
theory advanced by John Paul Lederach (1995: 9) and others (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 3; 
Boulding, 1978: 132; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 1-3; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7). 
Furthermore, and alluded to in the previous paragraph, Arab/Muslim scholars perceive 
conflict occurs at multiple levels, which include the interpersonal, group, intrastate and 
interstate levels (Abdalla and others, 2002: 15-24). As noted in chapter 3, section 4.1, Western 
scholars similarly perceive conflict occurs at multiple levels. 
There is equally a degree of optimism shared by scholars across cultures when conflict is 
conceptualized. Although conflict is perceived as natural and inevitable in Arab/Muslim 
culture, and generally perceived as deconstructive, Arab/Muslim scholars optimistically 
propose “humans can learn to be peaceful and change their wrongdoing since they are born 
innocent and not evil” (Abu-Nimer, 2001: 616). Through alteration of deconstructive 
perceptions and behavior, the quote underscores the theory that conflict can be managed, 
reduced or avoided. The supposition that humans can circumvent conflict by relearning how 
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to constructively approach conflictual relationships finds its parallel in the works of Western 
scholars including Margaret Mead (1940), Kenneth Boulding (1978: 62) and John Paul 
Lederach (1995: 17-19). 
A final cross-cultural similarity deduced from the literature is that some Arab/Muslim 
scholars and practitioners recognize that conflicts are non-static and their typology varies 
across referents and circumstances (Abdalla and others, 2002: 136-137). As a result, it is 
argued that conflict resolution has to be flexible and adaptive to meet referent needs and 
conflict circumstances (Abdalla and others, 2002: 136-137). These Arab/Muslim 
conceptualizations parallel Western theory which depict conflict as fluid (Galtung, 1969: 102; 
Reimann, 2004: 4), and correspond to the Western theory that variation in conflict intensity 
and typology is not only common, but requires diverse responses (Bloomfield and others, 
2003: 75, 154; Sarkin, 2008: 20-23; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 16, 33-34). In basic 
comparative terms, hitherto, many aspects of the Arab/Muslim conceptualization of conflict 
are paralleled in Western theory as articulated in chapter three, section two. 
Despite these general similarities, Arab/Muslim scholars hypothesize that stark 
divergences exist in the way that conflict is conceptualized across these cultures. Providing 
direct cross-cultural contrasts, George Irani (1999: 2-4) summarizes four contradictions 
between Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict74, which were included into 
our literature review in chapter 3, section 2. Foremost, Arab/Muslim comparative critiques 
argue that Western scholars and laypersons perceive conflict as having a positive dimension 
(Abdalla and others, 2002: 94; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18-19; Irani, 1999: 1-4). More specifically, 
conflict can be perceived to produce positive benefits. The perception that conflict has a 
positive dimension is generally held across the conflict resolution and conflict transformation 
schools of thought, although not all Western scholars share this opinion. Of theoretical 
significance, Arab/Muslim scholars’ acknowledgement of Western scholars’ perception of 
conflict as being conceptualized as positive, is one of the few episodes a fundamental theory 
of the conflict transformation or conflict resolution schools of thought is referenced during 
comparisons. Although most Arab/Muslim scholars reduce Western practices to conflict 
management, or the structural approach, most scholars of the management school of thought 
do not conceptualize conflict as positive (see 3.3.1). 
                                                          
 
74 Irani (1999: 4) supports his hypothesis by providing findings elicited from a three-day workshop conducted at 
the Lebanese American University in April 1994. Participants of the workshop included lawyers, NGO workers, 
students and government officials (Irani, 1999: 2-4). 
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Nonetheless, the Western perception of conflict as having a positive dimension is 
suggested to contradict Arab/Muslim conceptualization, which is hesitant to associate conflict 
with positive attributes (Irani, 1999: 3; Irani and Funk, 2000: 6-8). Al-Ramahi (2008: 18), for 
example, asserts conflict is viewed as “negative, threatening and destructive to the normative 
order and needs to be settled quickly or be avoided.” Substantiating the claim that conflicts 
are perceived as deconstructive, Kalin (2010: 11) summarizes that “[w]ar, conflict, violence, 
injustice, discord, and the like are seen as general extensions of the general problem of evil.” 
Hence, the quote emphasizes that these interrelated conflict phenomena are considered 
deconstructive and rooted in evil. 
However, not all Arab/Muslim scholars share the perception that conflict is deconstructive 
or a byproduct of evil. Contradicting their colleagues, Abdalla and others (2002: 94-95) 
acknowledge that a conflict has the potential to produce positive benefits. For instance, the 
civil rights struggle in the United States in the 1960s expanded individual rights to the 
African-American community (Abdalla and others, 2002: 95). Hence, while most of the 
Arab/Muslim literature perceives conflict as negative, which contradicts Western theory 
(Bercovitch and others, 2009; Briggs, 2003; Galtung, 2007; Lederach and Maiese, 2003; 
Lederach, 1995; Reimann, 2004); there are some Arab/Muslim scholars who believe that 
conflict has the potentiality to produce positive benefits when violence can be managed. 
A second divergence in how conflict is conceptualized across these cultures is the 
suggestion that Western scholars frequently conceptualize conflict as a struggle or 
incompatibility strictly limited to those individuals, or groups, directly involved (Irani, 1999: 
1-4; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 57). As outlined in the previous section, the assumption is that 
Western scholars perceive conflict as affecting only those immediately engaged, and conflict 
is thereby managed or resolved by singularly targeting affected referents. However, in the 
Arab/Muslim context, conflict is conceptualized as a systemic phenomenon (Irani, 1999: 4; 
Irani and Funk, 2000: 14-17). More specifically, Arab/Muslim theory and practice does not 
treat conflict as limited to those directly involved, but perceives conflict broadly affects the 
family, community, and society, as outlined above (Gulam, 2003: 7; Irani, 1999: 14). In 
comparative terms, Irani (1999: 14) asserts, “the conceptual category of the individual does 
not have the same validity and importance as in Western cultures. The [Arab/Muslim] 
individual is enmeshed within his or her own group, sect, tribe, or millet” (Irani, 1999: 14). 
Due to the robust communal association emphasized in Irani’s quote, and outlined in section 
5.1.1, conflicts in the Middle East—even those limited to two individual—are inevitably 
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perceived as familial or clan feuds and managed or resolved accordingly (Gulam, 2003: 7; 
Irani, 1999: 14; Pely, 2009: 80). 
To recap, the explanation provided for conceptualizing conflict as a phenomenon which 
impacts the collective, emanates in the Arab/Muslim prioritization of Islam, tribal identity as 
well as the emphasis on collective harmony, responsibility and welfare (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2). 
Collective interest is further emphasized by the belief that harming an individual produces 
systemic effects (Pely, 2009: 82). For these reasons, conflict is conceptualized as a collective 
and systemic problem whose effects should be counteracted for the benefit of the community 
(Gulam, 2003: 7; Irani, 1999: 14; Pely, 2009: 82). Hyder Gulam (2003: 7) brusquely 
emphasizes the alleged cross-cultural divergence when he notes: “The good of the community 
is far more important than that of the individual.” As mentioned previously, the prioritization 
of the collective noted by Gulam contradicts Western structural theory, and the Arab/Muslim 
practice is self-reinforcing because it impacts the level and manner in which conflicts are 
managed and resolved (Gulam, 2003: 7; Irani, 1999: 14; Pely, 2009: 82). Nonetheless, we 
have demonstrated that the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches emphasize 
the inclusion of society when resolving conflict (see 4.2.2; 4.2.3). 
Third, it is suggested that Western scholars perceive that conflicts can be resolved (Irani, 
1999: 2-4; Pely, 2009: 86). Once again, the perception of conflict as being resolvable is rooted 
in the Western conflict resolution schools of thought, presenting a second instance of 
Arab/Muslim referral to Western theory outside the structural approach. However, aside from 
recognizing that conflict is perceived as positive and that conflicts can be resolved, other 
equally relevant theory from the resolution and management schools, such as their 
incorporation society and/or openness to religion, are overlooked by Arab/Muslim scholars. 
With this theoretical weakness in mind, Arab/Muslim scholars argue that conflicts can 
frequently only be managed as opposed to resolved (Irani, 1999: 2). 
Conceptualization of conflict as merely manageable has numerous theoretical and 
practical implications. For instance, Arab/Muslim scholars perceive that conflicts can become 
intractable (Irani and Funk, 2000: 6). Intractability occurs for multiple reasons, including an 
inability to identify or successfully manage the effects or root causes of a conflict (Irani and 
Funk, 2000: 5-11). In such instances, a conflict endures. Simultaneously, Arab/Muslim 
scholars believed that one conflict could be systemically linked to another, implying that 
successful resolution of the first conflict is codependent upon the resolution of a second (Irani 
and Funk, 2000: 6-7). These arguments are, however, are not alien to Western theory, 
especially conflict management (chapter 3, section 3.1), although scholars from other schools 
  
299 
 
of thought equally acknowledge these particularities; for instance Rosoux (2009: 558-559) 
and Crocker and others (2005: 84) acknowledge that conflict are complex and can be 
intractable. 
A final diverging cultural nuance influencing how conflict is perceived in Arab/Muslim 
society is the precept of honor (Irani, 1999: 2; Pely, 2009: 86; Steele, 2008: 4). Arab/Muslim 
societies place a significant amount of weight on individual and family honor (or its opposite 
shame), and it has a direct impact on individual and collective social standing (Irani, 1999: 2; 
Pely, 2009: 86; Steele, 2008: 4). More specifically, conflicts in Arab/Muslim culture is 
suggested to produce individual shame, and wrongdoing committed and/or experienced by 
one individual can shame their entire family or clan (Gulam, 2003: 7; Hassan, 2007: 3; Irani, 
1999: 2; Pely, 2009: 86). This portent necessitates conflict resolution be administered at the 
communal level rather than at the individual level since honor is collectively shared (Gulam, 
2003: 7; Hassan, 2007: 3; Irani, 1999: 2; Pely, 2009: 86). Respectively, conflict resolution 
principles and practices in Arab/Muslim culture have to take honor into account (Pely, 2009: 
86). By comparison, direct references to honor are largely absent from Western theory (Irani, 
1999: 2). Nevertheless, while the Western literature examined does not address honor 
forthright, I believe it is implied in principles including respect, mutually beneficial solutions, 
consultation and empowerment, to name a few. Nonetheless, honor functions in a unique 
manner in Arab/Muslim cultures, which emphasizes it must be considered and 
accommodated. 
By way of summary, Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize conflict as a non-static, natural, 
deconstructive phenomenon rooted in incompatibility between referents that occur at multiple 
levels, yet can be managed or averted through constructive practices. Since conflicts vary in 
nature, management or resolution requires flexible and adaptive approaches. These concepts 
have parallels in Western theory. Despite these basic similarities, cross-cultural divergences 
are suggested to exist. George Irani (1999: 2-4) theorizes there are four contradictions 
between Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict. First, Arab/Muslim 
scholars perceive conflict is negative and rooted in evil, and most suggest that conflict does 
not contain a positive dimension. However, all Arab/Muslim scholars do not perceive conflict 
as deconstructive or rooted in evil. 
 Second, it is suggested that Western scholars frequently conceptualize conflict as a 
struggle or incompatibility strictly limited to those individuals or groups directly involved. 
The conceptualization of conflict being limited to those immediately engaged contradicts the 
Arab/Muslim tendency of viewing it as a systemic phenomenon that affects the collective and 
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is managed or resolved at the collective level. Third, Arab/Muslim scholars suggest that 
Western scholars perceive that all conflicts can be resolved, whereas Arab/Muslim scholars 
perceive that conflicts are subject to intractable. However, Arab/Muslim assumptions of cross-
cultural incompatibility on the issue at hand, are derived from the conflict resolution school of 
thought, and overlook that some Western scholars perceive that a conflict can be intractable. 
Lastly, and a notable incompatibility, Arab/Muslim culture incorporates honor into conflict 
and conflict resolution discourse. This precept is not directly referenced in Western literature. 
From this comparison, we demonstrate that Arab/Muslim scholars sometimes 
acknowledge aspects of conflict resolution and/or conflict transformation theory. However, 
other important theories and practices found in these Western approaches are marginalized 
and dismissed. This theoretical weakness prompts Arab/Muslim scholars to inappropriately 
identify greater degrees of cross-cultural divergence than generally exists when conflict 
resolution and conflict transformation theories are holistically analyzed. Circumventing this 
weakness, our wide theoretical framework permits appears to reduce the number of cross-
cultural divergences identified by Arab/Muslim theoretical comparisons conducted hitherto. 
With conflict qualified from the Arab/Muslim perspective, and comparatively analyzed with 
our Western framework, we examine how conflicts are resolved according to Arab/Muslim 
scholars. 
5.3 Resolving conflict 
This section defines important conflict resolution terminology according to Arab/Muslim 
literature prior to our exploration of Arab/Muslim principles and practices. Our analysis of 
how conflicts are managed or resolved begins with Abdalla and others (2002: 94) emphasis 
that “[c]onflicts naturally cause negative feelings and emotions, which in turn may lead to 
taking actions that would make the conflict more intense.” The negative attitudes and 
experiences caused by conflict, and mentioned in the quote, are prone to perpetuate 
deconstructive behavior (Abdalla and others, 2002: 95-97). Such qualitative perceptions and 
interaction in conflict scenarios protracts or escalates a given conflict (Abdalla and others, 
2002: 95-97). To undermine comparable deconstructive tendencies, Arab/Muslim scholars 
recommend intervention to change the relational dynamics (Abu-Nimer, 2001; Irani, 1999, 
Said and Funk, 2001). Intervention to reverse deconstructive aspects of a relationship is 
broadly conceptualized as conflict resolution. 
Correspondingly, Irani (1999: 11) hypothesizes that a process of conflict resolution is 
necessary to resolve conflict because Arab/Muslim understanding of conflict presumes that 
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past injuries produce grievances that can “fester”. Festering, he suggests, sequentially 
instigates conflict continuation or escalation. While contemplating the endeavor of resolution, 
Bekdash (2009) emphasizes that conflicts are unique and thereby require individual 
techniques to advance resolution. It can, therefore, be deduced that conflict resolution is 
necessary to resolve conflict, and their processes will vary across conflicts. These 
conceptualizations are mirrored in Western theory outlined in chapter three, section two. 
Upon the theoretical foundation that conflicts should be managed or resolved, we explore 
terminology utilized by Arab/Muslim scholars. However, prior to reviewing the concepts of 
conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, reconciliation and peace, as 
articulated by Arab/Muslim scholars in the English language, I first suggest several reasons 
why care must be taken when comparatively analyzing the vocabulary deployed and/or 
attempting to classify Arab/Muslim literature into one of the three Western peacebuilding 
schools of thought. 
5.3.1 Terminology 
As denoted in chapter 3, there are three primary Western peacebuilding schools of 
thought: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Terms, theories 
and practices that parallel these schools of thought are observable in Arab/Muslim literature 
because the scholars referenced herein are educated in Western practices. In most instances, 
the Arab/Muslim scholars referenced are professors and practitioners based in the Western 
educational framework. However, despite their familiarity with Western theory and practice, 
and their use of associated terminology, it is challenging to categorize Arab/Muslim scholars 
into one of the three Western schools of thought. More importantly, I believe, it is 
inappropriate for me to do so for four reasons. 
Foremost, Arab/Muslim scholars reference and deploy terminology commonly used in the 
West, but its application in context is not centered on promoting a Western school of thought 
or technique. Instead, according to my interpretation, Arab/Muslim academics and 
practitioners harness the vocabulary at their disposal when analyzing conflict resolution from 
the Arab/Muslim perspective in the English language. In short, they are deploying the 
terminology available to them. Secondly, Arab/Muslim scholars commonly mix vocabulary, 
with a single author sometimes integrating the ideas of conflict management, resolution 
and/or transformation within a given text. Irani (1999), for instance, interchangeably refers to 
conflict resolution, conflict control, and conflict management in the same text. 
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Next, and theoretically debilitating, Arab/Muslim scholars, namely Abu-Nimer (2000, 
2001, 2008), Al-Marashi and Keskin (2008) and Irani and Funk (2000), reference the works 
of John Paul Lederach, while simultaneously failing to acknowledge fundamental aspects of 
his theoretical framework. As noted in section two of the present chapter, although it is 
recognized that conflict transformation believes that conflicts can be resolved, Arab/Muslim 
researchers who reference Lederach fail to acknowledge the importance that religion and 
society has in Lederach’s conflict transformation framework. References to Lederach’s work 
are instead generally footnoted, thereby omitting deep analysis. Consequently, Arab/Muslim 
comparative analyses generally compartmentalize all Western scholars regardless of the 
approach they associate themselves with, neatly into the structural approach. The single 
exception found during the present literature review is Abdalla and others (2002), who not 
only reference Lederach’s work, but also accurately depict conflict transformation as a 
religiously influenced approach for managing social relations. 
Finally, because Arab/Muslim scholars do not openly associate themselves with a given 
Western school of thought, I will refrain from (inaccurately) pigeonholing them into one of 
the three Western approaches. To depict Arab/Muslim theory as appropriately as humanly 
possible, I have attempted to maintain the vocabulary scholars utilize when articulating their 
theory. The vocabulary should, therefore, be taken at face value and not interpreted as 
reflecting adherence to a particular Western school of thought. We now briefly examine 
recurrent terminology, including: conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict 
transformation, reconciliation and peace. 
5.3.1.1 Conflict management 
Abdalla and others (2002: 38) define conflict management as “intervention [which] does 
not address the sources of conflict, but focuses on adjusting conflict behavior and addressing 
some conflict issues to the extent needed to ensure that parties will avoid hostile or violent 
behavior.” The quote emphasizes that conflict management does not deal with the root causes 
of a conflict but rather modifies behavior within a conflictual relationship. By comparison, 
Huda (2010b: 243) defines conflict management as “efforts to limit or contain conflict, 
particularly violent ones.” According to both conceptualizations, conflict management 
predominantly deals with the behavioral components of the conflict, seeking to reduce its 
intensity or the deployment of violence (Abdalla and others, 2002: 38; Huda, 2010a: 243). 
Conflict management does not deal with the underlying causes of a given conflict. This 
conceptualization of conflict management parallels the Western conflict management 
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approach that fails to deal with the structural and relational aspects of a conflict relationship, 
and instead centers on reducing or arresting violence (Avruch, 2010: 39; Kelman, 2004: 119; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32). 
5.3.1.2 Conflict resolution 
Unfortunately, most of the Arab/Muslim literature analyzed fails to provide a clear, 
precise definition of conflict resolution. The minimal attention given to defining or 
articulating the concept is partially justified by Safa (2007: 4), who suggests that tribal norms 
and practices are not always codified and rather exist in the oral tradition. In addition, others 
suggest that heterogeneity across Islamic cultural and religious practices have produced 
variations of traditions and standards (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2-19; Özçelik, 2007: 7). These 
theoretical discrepancies are magnified by the scarcity of research and literature (in the 
English language) on the topic (Özçelik, 2007: 7). Nonetheless, there are some scholars who 
provide a basic delineation of how the term is conceptualized. 
For instance, Abdalla and others (2002: 26) conceptualize conflict resolution as “a 
complex process, which requires collaborative efforts of various parties to reach a reasonable 
resolution or satisfactory outcome that suits the conflicting parties who are disputing over a 
particular issue.” The definition is broad and emphasizes the importance of resolving a 
conflict, and when possible, of achieving mutual satisfaction. Their conceptualization 
seemingly implies that resolution involves addressing root causes of the conflict, which 
mirrors Western understanding. One noteworthy cross-cultural difference, however, is that the 
authors are clear and adamant in their determination to prioritize Islamic values and collective 
needs when articulating conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim context (Abdalla and others, 
2002: 127). The importance of Islam in this instance was accentuated in section 5.1.2. 
By comparison, Huda (2010a: 243) defines conflict resolution as “efforts to address the 
underlying causes of a conflict by finding common interests and grander goals. These include 
fostering trust through reconciliation initiatives and strengthening institutions and process 
through which the parties engage one another.” Two characteristics are noteworthy in Huda’s 
quotation. First, addressing underlying causes and objectives are the focus of conflict 
resolution, which parallels Western conceptualizations. Secondly, there is also a reference to 
reconciliation, an outcome commonly associated with the conflict transformation tradition. 
Huda’s conceptualization, therefore, illustrates how Arab/Muslim scholars interchange 
vocabulary and concepts when articulating theory. In this instance, reconciliation is purposed 
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as a potential outcome of conflict resolution, demonstrating an overlap of Western conflict 
resolution and conflict transformation theory. 
Providing an alternative conceptualization, Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2001: 689) illustrates 
conflict resolution on a triangle whose points represent the head, heart and hand (defined as 
the 3Hs). The three elements are the target of a resolution process. Accordingly, conflict 
resolution is understood as the alteration of adversaries’ manner of thinking (head), their 
“emotional experience” (heart), and their deeds and actions (hand) (Abu-Nimer, 2001: 689). 
Abu-Nimer’s trilateral approach is comparable to the cognitive, effective and behavioral 
aspects of conflict transformation as conceptualized by Western scholars including Bar-Tal 
(2000: 356) and Kaufman (2006: 212). Consequently, conflict resolution, as defined by 
Arab/Muslim scholars analyzed herein, combine theory from the Western schools of conflict 
resolution and conflict transformation. 
By way of conclusion, further cross-cultural similarities and contrasts are evidenced in the 
perceived objectives of conflict resolution. Özçelik (2007: 9-12), for instance, summarizes 
that the primary objective of conflict resolution is to restore positive or constructive relations. 
Likewise, Al-Ramahi (2008: 19) theorizes conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim tradition is a 
practice of restoring social order by utilizing local/traditional norms and practices to guide, 
and sometimes pressure, referents engaged to resolve issues. Al-Ramahi’s observation 
reiterates the communal approach of Arab/Muslim practices and that fact that pressure can be 
applied on referents during its processes. Finally, according to Arab/Muslim literature, a 
process of conflict resolution can produce an outcome ranging from conflict settlement to 
reconciliation (Bekdash, 2009; Irani, 1999: 11). Combined, the goals and outcomes identified 
generally parallel the broad Western framework of conflict resolution, as constructed in this 
thesis, with local traditions and norms being emphasized by Arab/Muslim scholars. 
5.3.1.3 Conflict transformation 
The term conflict transformation is sometimes applied in Arab/Muslim literature, for 
example by Abu-Nimer (2000, 2001, 2008) and Bekdash (2009), but is never clearly defined. 
The overall utility of such a process is, nevertheless, recognized. Bekdash (2009), for 
instance, argues that absent conflict transformation “historic grievances and systemic 
injustices [remain] embedded in collective memory and narratives which often may lead to 
prolonged cycles of violence.” Bekdash’s quote emphasizes conflict transformation produces 
stable outcomes with long-term effects, a result manufactured by addressing grievances and 
structural injustices which advance cognitive transformation. 
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Correspondingly, Huda (2010b: 243) defines conflict transformation as a process that 
“address[es] structural roots of conflict by changing existing patterns of behavior and 
fostering a culture of nonviolent approaches.” Huda’s definition likewise centers of structural 
issues and cognitive transformation, similar to the manner in which Western scholars 
conceptualize conflict transformation. Reinforcing cross-cultural parallels, Abu-Nimer (2008: 
13) mentions the necessity of structural alterations, while Ashki (2006) alludes to the 
importance of individual, structural, or behavioral transformation when discussing conflict 
resolution. 
Alternatively, Abdalla and others (2002: 38) deduce conflict transformation is a process 
that “attempts to positively change parties’ relationship, conflict attitudes and behaviors. Here 
the purpose is to help parties to transform their relationship from a conflictual one to an 
amicable one, by addressing deep-rooted conflict sources and issues.” The quote emphasizes 
the depth of transformation and the objective of securing sustainable constructive relations. 
Combined, the numerous descriptions examined imply structural, attitudinal and behavioral 
alterations are the ultimate goals of conflict transformation. These conceptualizations imply 
deep relational and structural changes occur, whereby the solidification of peacebuilding is 
secured and sustainable, constructive relationships are established. Arab/Muslim utilization of 
the term conflict transformation, therefore, seemingly parallels the Western conceptualization 
as elucidated in chapter 3, section 3.3. 
Another critical parallel in how conflict transformation is articulated is found in the 
restrictive nature by which some scholars conceptualize outcomes. Most notably, Bekdash 
(2009) warns that forgiveness is not a requirement for achieving conflict transformation. 
Contrary, Bekdash insists that referents can undergo a degree of transformation absent the 
exercise of forgiveness. In such instances, nonviolent coexistence would appropriately 
describe the quality of the relationship. Western scholars, such as Louis Kriesberg (2004), 
share the conceptualization of conflict resolution outcomes as a sliding scale, where the 
degree of conflict transformation, or conflict resolution, achieved is determined by conflict 
circumstances and referents. Overall, the use of the term conflict transformation by 
Arab/Muslim scholars appears to be comparable to that articulated by Western scholars. 
5.3.1.4 Reconciliation 
Under ideal conditions, a process of conflict resolution can lead to a deep change in the 
quality of a conflictual relationship, referred to in the literature as reconciliation. Bekdash 
(2009) suggests that reconciliation is a restorative justice process that transforms 
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relationships. Its “aim” is “to form new relationships among divided groups by addressing 
historical grievances and systemic injustices while working toward future cooperation” 
(Bekdash, 2009). The definition provided mirrors that specified for a conflict transformation 
process, and parallels Ramsbotham and others’ (2011: 32) definition of reconciliation where 
structural, attitudinal and behavioral changes are forged. Similarly, Huda (2010b: 244) defines 
reconciliation as “the long-term process by which the parties to a violent conflict build trust, 
learn to live cooperatively, and create stable peace.” Both definitions correspond to Western 
understanding of reconciliation as a process that roots and stabilizes peace by transforming 
relationships (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; R. Fisher, 2001b: 26; Kelman, 2004: 119-120; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 246). Nonetheless, Abu-Nimer and Nasser (2013: 481-483) 
insist that Arab/Muslim literature on conflict resolution does not mandate forgiveness to 
achieve reconciliation. We equally demonstrated that some Western scholars believe 
reconciliation can be obtained without necessitating forgiveness (Sarkin, 2008: 17-21; Skaar, 
2013: 12). Therefore, there are numerous parallels in how the term reconciliation is 
conceptualized across cultures. 
5.3.1.5 Peace 
References to reconciliation naturally incorporate the term peace, which must be defined. 
In his exploration of the general concept of peace in Mesopotamia, Benjamin Foster (2007: 
70) determines that the term has multiple meanings. Among its uses, peace was historically 
perceived “as an internal state [of stability] within a unified group.” In this sense, communal 
stability equates peace. By comparison, other scholars emphasize the religious, legal and 
political precepts of the term (Kalin, 2010: 5-6). In the latter instances, Islam and its teachings 
are considered “peace,” and those who obey Islamic precepts are suggested to live in peace. 
These conceptualizations emphasize the importance of community and Islam in conflict 
resolution in Arab/Muslim communities, as articulated above. 
In social and political terms, the literature depicts peace as a natural, harmonious condition 
manifesting as a result of obedience to God (Abu-Nimer, 2008: 18; Foster, 2007: 71; Tibi, 
2002: 181). Peace, therefore, delineates an interpersonal, as well as a collective, forsaking of 
violence accompanied by obedience to God (Abu-Nimer, 2008: 18). At the same time, 
Arab/Muslim understanding of accommodates both positive and negative peace (Kalin, 2010: 
7-8). Positive peace depicts the prevalence of a morally and socially just society that is absent 
physical and structural violence (Kalin, 2010: 25). Comparatively, negative peace is broadly 
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conceptualized as peaceful coexistence, whereby adversaries nonviolently live in close 
proximity but maintain negative opinions of the “other” (Tibi, 2002: 181). 
The Arab/Muslim conceptualization of peace as containing a positive and negative 
dimension is comparable to positive and negative peace as articulated in the West by scholar 
such as Johan Galtung (1969: 183-184). Moreover, the establishment of peace as the ultimate 
objective of a conflict resolution process is equally similar. What is dissimilar is the 
conspicuous association of obedience to God as articulated in the works of scholars such as 
Said and Funk (2001) or Kalin (2010). Providing a direct comparison, Said and Funk (2001) 
summarize cross-cultural divergences stating: “the Western approach points to political 
pluralism, individual rights and consumerism as the substance of peace, the Islamic 
perspective affirm cultural pluralism, communal solidarity, social justice and faith.” Said and 
Funk’s quote emphasizes several contrasts between Arab/Muslim and Western approaches, 
namely individualism and the absence of religion in the Western tradition, and communal 
interest and faith in the Arab/Muslim tradition. These critiques were noted elsewhere. 
Following our brief comparative analysis of relevant concepts and lexicon, whereby many 
parallels and several divergences have been denoted, attention now turns to examining twelve 
principles and practices of conflict resolution as extracted from Arab/Muslim literature. As 
precepts are explored, we will continue to juxtapose theory vis-à-vis Western 
conceptualizations. 
5.3.2 Guiding principles and tools of conflict resolution 
Arab/Muslim literature has contradictory perspectives on the relative utility and 
compatibility of conflict resolution across Arab/Muslim and Western culture. On the one 
hand, Abdalla and others (2002: 6-13) argue Western theory is useful for both (re-) 
conceptualizing and enhancing Muslim conflict resolution theory and practice. Hence, rather 
than dismiss Western theory and practice wholesale, Abdalla and others believe that 
analyzing, extracting and adapting Western theory and practice is invaluable for buttressing 
Muslim conflict resolution traditions. As a result, they recommend that Arab/Muslims borrow 
and/or reformulate theory and practices by referencing Western approaches. One of the values 
of this practice is that it prevents a reinvention of theory, while permitting Arab/Muslims to 
dismiss those Western aspects or components that are inapplicable or inappropriate in context. 
Through theoretical and practical tailoring, it is argued that Western guidelines and insight 
can provide a template for improving Arab/Muslim traditional approaches, all the while 
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ensuring local applicability and ownership as changes and adaptions are made (Abdalla and 
others, 2002: 6-13). 
On the other hand, other Arab/Muslim scholars insist that the degree of cross-cultural 
differences influence Arab/Muslims to perceive that Western principles and practices are “a 
false panacea” and “insensitive” to local needs in the Arab/Muslim context (Irani, 1999: 1-2; 
Irani and Funk, 2000: 1-2). For instance, Irani and Funk (2000: 15) opine: “[Western 
approaches] are either too mechanistic or based on therapy-oriented formulas that do not 
correspond with the idiom of daily life.” According to this critique, individualistic and 
impersonal Western approaches do not function in Arab/Muslim culture. Similarly, Said and 
Funk (2001) criticize: “From a Muslim perspective, the Western approach puts too much faith 
in institutional formulas and the ‘invisible hand’ of competition, and too little emphasis on 
communal cooperation in the conscious pursuit of values.” Once again, these assumptions are 
rooted in narrow comparisons of Arab/Muslim practices with the Western structural approach, 
which we have demonstrated is unrepresentative of the field of peacebuilding as 
conceptualized by Western scholars. By way of summary, the latter group of Arab/Muslim 
scholars perceive Western theory and practice as excessively mechanistic, individualistic, 
lacking emphasis on the community and religious principles, and thereby inapplicable or 
undesirable in the context of Arab/Muslim culture (Irani, 1999: 10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 1-5; 
Marsella, 2005: 664; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 45; Safa, 2007: 14). 
Combined, scholars theorize that the level and practices utilized in conflict resolution in 
Arab/Muslim culture problematize applicability of Western conflict resolution practices at the 
intrastate and interstate levels in several manners (Irani, 1999: 1-14). Firstly, as noted, 
contemporary Arab/Muslim culture lacks a strong association to state citizenship, defined here 
as the practice of identifying one’s self as a member of a particular country, by comparison to 
that found in the West (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18; Irani, 1999: 9-14). Because Arab/Muslim 
identity markers gravitate around family or clan in most instances, conflict resolution at the 
interstate level is impacted by communal identity-association, and these tendencies dictate 
how traditional resolution mechanisms are utilized, namely their targeting of the community 
(Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18; Irani, 1999: 9-10). Accordingly, traditional conflict resolution as 
conceptualized by Arab/Muslim occurs primarily at the community level. 
Second, and perhaps, correspondingly, there is no traditional conflict resolution technique 
available at the intrastate and interstate levels in Arab/Muslim culture (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18; 
Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140-141; Irani, 1999: 9-14). Since resolution centers on the 
community, and there has traditionally been a weak association with a centralized state-
  
309 
 
governing framework, techniques for resolving conflict at the higher levels have not 
developed. Exacerbating this deficiency, the West has frequently imposed/utilized a structural 
approach to resolve conflicts at the higher levels in and between predominantly Arab/Muslim 
countries (Irani, 1999: 1-10). As detailed in chapter 3, a structural approach concentrates its 
processes on social and political elites, institutionalizing conflict termination or resolution 
within the state’s governing framework (Gardner Feldman, 2008). Such practices 
inadequately function in the Arab/Muslim context for reasons including popular rejection of 
the practices utilized, compounded by the limited social inclusion or infiltration of such 
practices as the influence of centralized structures are marginal at the micro level (Gellman 
and Vuinovich, 2008: 140-141; Irani, 1999: 9-10). Due to these divergences outlined, Irani 
(1999: 1-10) posits that Western (structural) resolution approaches are viewed as an 
imposition and alien to Arab/Muslim citizens. 
Equally suggested to undermine cross-cultural acceptance, Irani (1999) highlights 
additional failures of Western conflict resolution practices associated with intrastate and 
interstate conflicts in the Middle East. He explains: 
Peace treaties based solely on economic and political enticements, 
coercion or purely strategic considerations cannot last if they are not 
accompanied by a sincere, profound exploration of the underlying, 
emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow, and mistrust resulting from 
decades of warfare and unending cycles of victimization and vengeance. 
In order to bring peace to the Middle East, policymakers must foster and 
encourage a dialogue that takes into consideration indigenous rituals and 
processes of reconciliation (Irani, 1999: 1). 
Irani’s quote reinforces the notion that the Western structural approach is problematic in 
context, and introduces two contradictory cultural approaches when conflict resolution is 
conceptualized at the national and international levels in predominantly Arab/Muslim 
societies. 
Firstly, Irani (1999: 1) reiterates that structural conflict resolution does not address 
societal needs. Societal inclusion, it is argued, is necessary to root resolution and stabilize 
relationships in the context of Arab/Muslim culture (Irani, 1999: 1). However, as noted in 
chapters three and four, some Western scholars likewise criticize the limited nature of the 
structural approach (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 11-13). More specifically, the Western 
social-psychological (Kriesberg, 2001: 61; Rosoux, 2009: 545) and spiritual (Lederach, 1997) 
approaches condemn the singular implementation of a structural approach as shallow and 
incomplete. Like the Arab/Muslim approach, the social-psychological (4.2.2) and spiritual 
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approaches (4.2.3) advocate societal involvement in conflict resolution to varying degrees to 
deepen and broaden the viability and saturation of a resolution process. 
The second challenge denoted in Irani’s quote is that Western conflict resolution, as 
implemented in the Arab/Muslim context, frequently marginalizes indigenous concepts and 
practices (Irani, 1999: 1). However, condemnation of such culturally insensitive and violent 
policies is not limited to Arab/Muslim scholars. Simultaneously, marginalization of 
indigenous practices is equally condemned by numerous Western scholars (Lederach, 1995: 
55-62; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 339; Stover and others, 2005: 835). In fact, critics in 
both Arab (Irani, 1999: 1) and Western traditions (Lederach, 1995: 55-62; Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 339; Stover and others, 2005: 835) argue that affected stakeholders should be 
consulted and empowered when resolving conflict. For instance, they should be consulted 
about which principles and practices society deems applicable and acceptable in each context. 
Once identified, and agreed upon, relevant principles and practices should be accommodated 
to enhance social legitimacy, popular acceptance and the overall effectiveness of a given 
program (Irani, 1999: 1-14; Lederach, 1995: 55-62; Stover and others, 2005: 835). 
Providing a comparative overview of cross-cultural approaches as conceptualized by Said 
and Funk (2000), see Figure 5. Irani and Funk’s (2000: 29-30) table permits straightforward 
theoretical comparisons of both techniques and principles. For the sake of space, some of 
divergences are only noted in the table. Noteworthy is that a cursory comparison of the 
contents of the table demonstrates that many principles and techniques emphasized in the 
Arab/Muslim column are at least mentioned in the Western column. Simultaneously, it should 
be emphasized that Irani and Funk, like most other Arab/Muslim scholars, neatly condense 
Western peacebuilding approaches into the structural approach, thereby minimizing direct 
reference to the social-psychological and spiritual approaches. The prominent exception, 
however, is the reference to Westerners perceiving conflicts as resolvable and positive (Irani 
and Funk, 2000: 6), which falls under the rubric of conflict resolution and/or transformation. 
However, to their credit, in another collaborative essay, Funk and Said (2004) indirectly 
admit some principles and practices are shared across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures. In 
fact, some acknowledge that Western and Arab/Muslim traditions share specific values and 
techniques (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 233-262; Mogahed. 2006: 2; Pely, 2009: 86-87). Nevertheless, 
Funk and Said (2004) go on to emphasize the incompatible nature of both cultural approaches. 
Hence, despite admitting that Arab/Muslim and Western approaches are not always 
diametrically opposed, some Arab/Muslim scholars choose to emphasize the divergences and 
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incompatibilities as opposed to the similarities (Abdalla and others, 2002: 6-13; Funk and 
Said, 2004: 25; Mogahed, 2006: 2).  
Figure 5 Irani and Funk’s (2000) Cross-Cultural Comparisons 
Western/U.S.-Based Approaches 
Traditional Arab-Islamic Approaches to Conflict 
Resolution 
primacy of individual choice in the process; individuals 
are free agents 
mediation or arbitration services provided by formally 
certified professional facilitator 
ideal third party as a neutral, unaffiliated outsider 
 
legal system or individual participants themselves legitimize 
and guarantee the negotiation and settlement process 
 
third party relies on a secular idiom, with reference to 
personal anecdotes and experiences 
guidelines derived from a specialized field of study and 
practice 
 
process reflects a preoccupation with "win-win" scenarios 
 
process is future-oriented: history is a problem to overcome 
 
 
efforts are intended to empower individuals in relation to the 
legal system, gaining control over their problems while 
achieving greater efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
emphasis on utilitarian goals and on satisfaction of interests, 
needs, and/or rights of all individuals involved  
conflict resolution used to attain a fair deal in which 
interests, needs and rights of disputants are not 
compromised 
process typically ends with a formal written agreement 
 
communally oriented process; individuals are enmeshed in 
webs of relationships 
community legitimizes arbitration/mediation through respect 
for age, experience, status, and leadership in communal affairs 
preferred third party as an unbiased insider with ongoing 
connections to all parties 
community and village elders (the jaha) legitimize and 
guarantee the process of acknowledgment, apology, 
compensation, forgiveness, and reconciliation 
language and ritual of reconciliation draws freely on explicit 
religious ideals, texts, stories and examples 
precedence of local history and custom, encompassing 
relationships between kinship groups, and shared norms and 
values 
process manifests concern with cultivating the established 
"wisdom" gained through collective experience 
process is continuity-oriented: history is a source of stability 
and guidance that presents lessons for shaping a common 
future 
efforts are intended to empower individuals in relation to the 
legal system, gaining control over their problems while 
achieving greater efficiency 
efforts are intended to empower families and the community to 
participate directly in matters of common concern 
third parties promote direct, collaborative, step-by-step 
problem solving to isolate and confront discrete issues 
third parties emphasize the need to restore harmony and 
solidarity and secure cooperative relationships 
emphasis on honor, face, dignity, prestige, just compensation, 
and respect for individuals and groups 
intervention to prevent conflict escalation and disruption of 
communal symbiosis in a context of scarce resources 
 
process completed with a powerful ritual that includes sulh 
(settlement), musalaha (reconciliation), musafaha (exchange of 
handshakes), and mumalaha (breaking bread together) 
Figure 5 is Irani and Funk’s (2000: 29-30) table of comparisons. It provides a comprehensive comparative 
analysis of Western conflict resolution techniques with those available in Middle East/Arab communities. 
 
To (re-) qualify cross-cultural parallels in relation to observed principles using our wide 
Western framework, this section references Mohammed Abu-Nimer’s (2000: 233-262) essay, 
A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam, to extract some principles 
prioritized by Arab/Muslim scholars. In a reprint of his detailed analysis of conflict resolution, 
Abu-Nimer (2008: 4) concludes: “Islam yields a set of peacebuilding values that, if 
consistently and systematically applied, can transcend and govern all types and levels of 
conflict, values such as justice (adl), beneficence (ihsan), and wisdom (hikmah) which 
  
312 
 
constitute core principles in peacemaking strategies and framework.” In the quote, Abu-Nimer 
emphasizes that numerous principles influence Arab/Muslim conflict resolution traditions and 
practices, and these principles are applicable at all levels of conflict. To list a few, Abu-Nimer 
(2000: 233-262) includes: 
accountability 
deeds 
equality 
free will 
mercy 
peace and peace-making 
social empowerment 
universality and human dignity 
collective action and solidarity 
democracy75 
forgiveness  
justice and persuasion 
patience 
sacredness of human life  
truth 
 
While cursory reading of the principles suggests cross-cultural parallels, a selection of 
examples denoted in Abu-Nimer’s essay are detailed below to juxtapose cross-cultural 
approaches. 
The following subsections analyze the principles of: peacemaking and negotiations; truth; 
justice; arbitration; amnesty and forgiveness; empowerment and consultation; dialogue; third 
party intervention; deeds; collectively beneficial solutions; compensation/restitution; and 
flexibility. The relative importance of several of these principles is later tested at the interstate 
level in chapter six when general openness is qualified in our cross-cultural survey. 
5.3.2.1 Peacemaking and negotiations 
Abu-Nimer (2000: 231) suggests a process of conflict resolution begins with 
“[p]eacemaking and negotiation.” Peacemaking, or the act of establishing peaceful 
relationships subsequent to a conflict, is an essential step toward advancing conflict resolution 
in Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 231). Once (a temporary) peace has been 
established, negotiation, or discussion, of divisive issues is pursued. According to Abu-
Nimer’s conceptualization, conflict behavior is arrested prior to negotiations, however, it will 
later be demonstrated that according to other Arab/Muslim traditional practices, intervention 
can occur prior to the termination of violence (5.4.1). Nevertheless, negotiation is perceived as 
“more productive than avoidance of problems or the use of violence to resolve them” (Abu-
Nimer, 2000: 231). Thus, negotiation between conflict parties is preferred over the use of 
violence, the latter of which are perceived as counterproductive and violent. These 
                                                          
 
75 Abu-Nimer (2000: 256-257) cites the Shura (mutual consultation) model as an example of the democratic 
nature of Arab/Muslim society, suggesting the Shura is utilized to seek advice from constituents (or the umma) 
and is thereby democratic. Without the faith, support and trust of the community, Gellman and Vuinovich (2008: 
138) argue that local leadership will be unable to maintain their authority and will ultimately be replaced. 
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Arab/Muslim conceptualizations and practices mirror those articulated in chapters 3, section 
2.2 (constructive and deconstructive responses to conflict) and chapter 4, section 1.1 (timing). 
There is, however, dissention in the literature. Notably, Arab/Muslim scholars disagree 
how peacemaking and negotiations should be implemented. Demonstrating inconsistency, 
Abu-Nimer (2000: 231) suggests “[o]pen communication and face-to-face confrontation” are 
necessary components of negotiation. The preference for open and face-to-face 
communication is thought more productive since referents can directly express their positions 
and work together to resolve differences. The precepts raise two theoretical discrepancies, one 
of which is presented by Arab/Muslim scholars (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19), and the other by 
Western scholars (Ashki, 2006: 4). Concerning the former, Al-Ramahi (2008: 19) warns: 
“Face to face bargaining or negotiation could be perceived by the parties as antagonising the 
situation or as a humiliating act for the victim.” Recalling that Arab/Muslim culture prefers 
indirect communication (chapter 5, section 1), it is suggested that direct communicative 
approaches are not always appropriate (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19). Contrary, those practices could 
be offensive, producing shame among the parties and thereby undermining conflict resolution 
(Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19). Erring on the side of caution, consultation with affected referents, as 
underscored by Abu-Nimer (2000: 256), would be the most logical means of determining if 
referents are inclined to engage in face-to-face communication. Through consulting, affected 
stakeholders are given a voice to minimize or circumvent antagonistic or humiliating 
circumstances. 
Concerning the latter discrepancy associated with open and direct confrontation, open and 
direct confrontation seemingly contradicts Western conceptualizations of 
negotiations/dialogue (Abu-Nimer, 2008: 19). More specifically, conflict resolution literature 
in the West emphasizes adversaries should be provided an opportunity to express their needs 
and concerns utilizing non-confrontational practices, such as active listening (Irani, 1999: 3; 
Irani and Funk, 2000: 29-30). During active listening, referents are permitted to express 
opposing views in turn while the other is requested to listen silently (Irani, 1999: 3). In the 
West, such processes may transpire between the referents themselves or could be assisted by a 
neutral third party who specializes in mediation (Irani, 1999: 3). The theoretical value of such 
non-confrontational dialogue allows affected referents to 1) express their needs and fears, and 
2) increase their understanding and trust of the other (Irani, 1999: 3-5). Ideally, discussions 
will allow referents to mutually acknowledge the others’ needs and concerns, whereupon a 
negotiated arrangement, which is perceived mutually beneficial, can be pursued (Irani, 1999: 
3). However, this approach is not always accepted in Arab/Muslim cultures. 
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Contrary, Irani (1999: 4-5) contends that active listening is rejected in the Arab/Muslim 
context. He posits that Arab/Muslim culture perceives silence as weakness and 
disadvantageous since opinions and needs cannot be properly expressed or rebuttals offered in 
the context of dialogue and discussion. Instead, Arab/Muslim disputants engage one another 
in discussion and negotiation, frequently incorporating interruptions to express opposing 
views (Irani, 1999: 4-5). Active listening is, therefore, eschewed because it demonstrates 
weakness. What can be gleaned from our brief comparison is that while there is cross-cultural 
agreement on the need for peacemaking and discussion as principle a means of advancing 
conflict resolution, there are diverging opinions pertaining to how such practices should be 
implemented within and across cultures. In essence, peacemaking and dialogue are 
fundamental principles across cultures, but there are potential divergences in how they might 
be appropriately deployed. Establishing mutually acceptable techniques and guidelines upon 
the inception of peacebuilding and negotiations would reduce potential friction. 
5.3.2.2 Truth 
The next principle embraced by Arab/Muslim conflict resolution tradition is truth. Truth, 
or the establishment of a detailed account of what has occurred in the past, is determined 
essential to advancing conflict resolution (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 252; Ashki, 2006: 15; Bekdash, 
2009; Said and Funk, 2001). Articulating its function, Ashki (2006: 18) summarizes: “Striving 
for truth in Islamic dialogue utilizes proof, documentation from the Qu[’]ran and Hadith, and 
also allows for the exploration of personal experience and narrative.” Ashki here emphasizes 
that Arab/Muslim truth seeking is informed and guided by Islam and its teachings, a practice 
largely absent from Western approaches (Irani, 1999: 1-10; Said and Funk, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the value of truth in the Arab/Muslim context is obvious. Said and Funk 
(2001) proclaim truth “is regarded as a source of stability and guidance that provides lessons 
for shaping a common future for the society. Efforts aim to protect and empower families and 
the community as a whole to participate in a resolution process.” The authors here qualify 
truth as the foundation upon which constructive relationships are established. Simultaneously, 
it meets and protects the interests of those involved, but is not limited to those engaged in the 
conflict, but rather extending to community members. Finally, truth is suggested to empower 
through the investigation and communication of past events (Said and Funk, 2001). 
In terms of practices, truth in Arab/Muslim culture is pursued utilizing truth commissions, 
inquiries, trials and so forth (Bekdash, 2009). These mechanisms uncover, articulate and re-
evaluate the truth according to cultural and religious decrees, norms and traditions (Ashki, 
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2006: 15-18; Said and Funk, 2001). In this context, Arab/Muslim scholars likewise recognize 
that truth will have multiple versions that must be clarified and bridged to formulate a 
common understanding (Bekdash, 2009). Upon the foundation of truth, and subsequent to the 
provision of justice and restitution (forthcoming principles examined), it is hypothesized that 
deconstructive relationships can be restructured and reformulated into constructive ones (Abu-
Nimer, 2000: 237-239; Ashki, 2006: 15-20; Said and Funk, 2001). 
The general prioritization and characterization of truth as found in Arab/Muslim literature 
has its parallel among the theories and practices advocated by Western scholars, for example 
John Paul Lederach (1997) (4.2.3.1) or Louis Kriesberg (2004: 83) (4.2.2.1). In particular, 
Western literature advocates the pursuit of truth to acquire an understanding of both the root 
causes of a conflict and the establishment of an account about what occurred (Kelman, 2004: 
122-124; Lederach, 1997). Western scholars simultaneously recognize that numerous versions 
of the truth can be expected, so a common version will have to be established (Lederach, 
1997; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 254-255). Amalgamated, there are remarkable cross-
cultural similarities between how truth and its value to conflict resolution is conceptualized, as 
well as mechanisms for its pursuit. The most obvious divergence is the reference to Islam, 
which is largely absent from Western theory. 
5.3.2.3 Justice 
Islam advocates the pursuit of justice in the daily life of the Muslim believer (Abu-Nimer, 
2000: 234; 2010: 77; Ashki, 2006: 24-25; Bekdash, 2009; Foster, 2007: 70). Succinctly, Abu-
Nimer (2000: 234) claims: “Justice is an absolute and not a relative value, and it is the duty of 
the believer to seek justice and apply it.” As emphasized in the quote, Muslims are actively 
instructed to seek and apply justice at the individual and societal levels (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 
233-236; 2010: 77). When injustices are discovered, they should be made evident and 
countered for the benefit of those who have been transgressed against and for the greater good 
of the community (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 233-236). John Paul Lederach (1995) similarly 
advocates an active pursuit of justice to advance conflict resolution (4.2.3.2). 
Techniques of pursuing justice in the Arab/Muslim context include retributive and 
restorative techniques, such as tribunals and traditional ceremonies (Bekdash, 2009). When 
justice is distributed, conflicts are expected to transform (Bekdash, 2009). Overall, the 
importance of justice in the context of conflict resolution is obvious. According to Abu-Nimer 
(2000: 234), “Peace is the product of order and justice.” Hence, Arab/Muslim scholars 
directly link justice to peace (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 233-236; 2010: 77; Kalin, 2010: 8). 
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In cross-cultural comparative terms, there are multiple and obvious parallels. For example, 
it was demonstrated in chapter 4 that justice is emphasized in Western approaches by both 
social-psychological (Anderlini and others, 2004: 1-2; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; Montville, 1999: 
321) and spiritual scholars (Lederach, 1997). Another cross-cultural parallel is Lederach 
(1997), Montville (1999: 318) and Ramsbotham and others’ (2011: 249-250) intertwining of 
the principles and justice and peace for advancing and rooting conflict transformation. Finally, 
the utilization of restorative and retributive justice practices to resolve, or transform, a conflict 
is also observable in Western literature (Avruch, 2010: 36; Rosoux, 2009: 549). Combined, 
there is uniformity in how Arab/Muslim and Western scholars conceptualize the principle and 
practice of justice. The obvious difference is, once again, the overt emphasis of religion on the 
concept of justice, which are at best implied in the Western spiritual approach. 
5.3.2.4 Arbitration 
Abu-Nimer (2000: 247) suggests that arbitration can be implemented in Arab/Muslim 
culture as part of an informal communal procedure or through a formal Sharia court. In most 
instances, affected stakeholders are permitted to determine which procedure(s) appropriately 
satisfies their needs (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 247). In general terms, arbitration, as practiced in the 
Middle East, shares similarities with retributive judicial practices, including criminal 
proceedings (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 247; Özçelik, 2007: 8-10), which are legally binding 
(Özçelik, 2007: 8-9). However, there are several differences between Arab/Muslim and 
Western conceptualizations and practices of arbitration (Irani, 1999: 2-8). 
The foremost discrepancies, which are expected, are that juridical proceedings in 
Arab/Muslim communities emphasize the importance of Islam and largely operate at the 
community level (Irani, 1999: 7-8). Cultural differences in this regard prompt Arab/Muslim 
scholars to criticize Western arbitration for limiting (or eliminating) religion and for 
concentrating on resolving conflict at the individual, rather than the community, level (Irani, 
1999: 2-8). The points mentioned have been repeatedly referenced hitherto. Further cross-
cultural differences include the characteristics and role of the arbitrator (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 
233-262; Irani, 1999: 3-4; Özçelik, 2007: 13-14). In the West, arbitrators are expected to be 
seasoned, knowledgeable and educated in their profession, with the capacity to guide referents 
to a mutually beneficial arrangement (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74; Özçelik, 2007: 13-14). 
Alternatively, in Arab/Muslim communities, arbitrators consist of the upstanding, influential 
and esteemed males within a community (Özçelik, 2007: 13-14). The latter are not expected to 
be experienced or educated in legal proceedings or negotiations, but are instead recognized 
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and respected men who decide cases according to religious and traditional norms to restore 
order to the community (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74-75; Özçelik, 2007: 13-14). 
By way of summary, both Western and Arab/Muslim cultural approaches to conflict 
resolution deploy arbitration as a tool for advancing conflict resolution. However, there are 
cross-cultural divergences in how arbitration is implemented. Diverging characteristics, for 
instance, include the Arab/Muslim inclusion of religion and the Western preference for 
qualified arbitrators. Here, the principle and practice of arbitration is recognized across 
cultures, but there are cultural divergences in how the practice is appropriately applied. 
5.3.2.5 Amnesty/forgiveness 
Conceptually and practically, Arab/Muslim approaches to conflict resolution esteem the 
principles of amnesty, mercy and forgiveness (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 227-233, 248; Ashki, 2006: 
23; Soliman, 2009). According to the literature, the Qu’ran extols believers to exercise mercy 
and forgiveness in instances of conflict (Abdalla and others, 2002: 66; Abu-Nimer, 2000: 248; 
Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2013: 476-490; Soliman, 2009). The suggested value of these 
principles reside in their capacity to break cycles of violence and wrongdoing, while restoring 
collective harmony since transgressions are not reciprocated (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 248; 
Soliman, 2009). Techniques for extending mercy and forgiveness include amnesty or an 
apology (Irani, 1999: 14). An apology, for instance, is one component of a traditional 
reconciliation ceremony called the sulh, which is detailed in section 5.4 below. 
While forgiveness in Arab/Muslim culture is not clearly defined, it has noteworthy 
benefits (Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2013). Forgiveness is represented as an act of empowerment 
because those who have been transgressed against have the authority to decide whether to 
extend or withhold forgiveness (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 248; Bekdash, 2009; Soliman, 2009). 
Concisely, conflict resolution, in Arab/Muslim culture, does not mandate forgiveness, so 
stakeholders exercise a degree of free will and have the authority to decide whether it should 
be extended (Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2013: 480; Bekdash, 2009; Soliman, 2009). 
Within the frame of exercising mercy and forgiveness, Hisham Soliman (2009) articulates 
a “justice-compassion relationship.” Paralleling Lederach’s (1997) theory, the combination is 
hypothesized to advance resolution for the benefit of collective interests. Soliman writes: 
It is in the interest of the community and all its members to 
reintegrate the transgressors and wrongdoers through forgiveness; it is in 
everyone’s interest to restore or maintain the smooth interaction between 
victim and offender. Offenders should not be isolated or alienated from 
the community, as this would hurt both them and the community in the 
long run (Soliman, 2009). 
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Justice, compassion and forgiveness are therefore combined through restorative justice, as the 
quote indicates, a practice asserted to “alleviate human suffering and build peace” (Soliman, 
2009). Through the extension of mercy, Soliman suggests that suffering is ended and peace 
proliferated since transgressors are reintegrated back into society rather than being subjected 
to retributive justice. 
In total, there are multiple similarities in how amnesty and forgiveness are perceived and 
practiced in the Arab/Muslim and Western traditions. First, the Western spiritual approach 
advocates forgiveness, as outlined in chapter 4, section 2.3.3. Next, there are cross-cultural 
similarities in terms of the tools utilized to acquire and extend forgiveness, such as the use of 
amnesty or an apology (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 244; Irani, 1999: 14; Safa, 2007: 10). Likewise, the 
notion of empowerment in terms of extending forgiveness finds its equivalent among Western 
scholars who argue that while forgiveness is preferred, victims should be permitted to 
determine whether they wish to forgive, and how justice (restorative or retributive) is pursued 
(4.3.11) (Lerche, 2000; Rosoux, 2009: 557; Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). Lastly, Soliman (2009) 
argues that the admixture of justice and compassion “resembles that of restorative justice in 
the modern Western discourse, which aims to repair broken social relationships between 
offenders, victims, and their communities.” His quote emphasizes that the integration of 
justice and compassion, for the purpose of repairing relationships, is equally available in 
Western theory, as demonstrated in Lederach (1997) and Gopin’s (2001: 88) call to harmonize 
mercy and justice in conflict resolutions processes. 
5.3.2.6 Empowerment and inclusion 
As just mentioned, social empowerment and inclusion are esteemed principles and 
practices of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition (Abdalla and others, 2002: 59; 
Abu-Nimer, 2000: 237-239; 2010: 78, 86-87). The literature defines empowerment as 
“[s]truggling against oppression (zulm), assisting the poor, and pursuing equality among all 
humans [which] are core religious values emphasized throughout the Qu’ran and Hadith” 
(Abu-Nimer, 2000: 237). The benefits of empowerment, denoted in Abu-Nimer’s quote, are 
its potentiality to restore justice and equilibrium to an unjust and oppressive system. Abu-
Nimer (2010: 77) goes on to state, “[e]conomic and social empowerment are so important in 
Islam that they are even equated with worshipping God.” The quote accentuates the 
extraordinary value placed on empowerment in Arab/Muslim culture, while emphasizing their 
association with Islamic teaching. 
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Empowerment manifests in conflict resolution discourse in various manners, including 
empowering individuals to ensure justice is pursued and provided (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 233-
236), allowing referents to decide whether to extend forgiveness (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 248; 
Bekdash, 2009; Soliman, 2009), and through traditional mechanisms which provide society 
with an opportunity to voice their opinion. Concerning the latter, the Shura, or “mutual 
consultation”, is practiced at the community level in Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 
256). It is a social practice that is “based on the principle of free consultation and genuine 
dialogue, reflecting equality in thinking and expression of opinion” (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 256). 
The quote underscores that the Shura is accessible to all community members, and thereby 
empowers them by providing an opportunity for individual expression (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 
256-257). Shura is both an empowering and inclusive practice because voice is not limited to 
village elders or family representatives on this occasion, but is granted to all community 
members regardless of their status (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 256-257; 2010: 86-87). 
By comparison, empowerment and inclusiveness are equally noted in Western literature, 
as outlined in chapter 3, section 3.5. On the one hand, Western scholars advocate 
empowerment of individuals when resolving conflict (Hermann, 2004: 40). In the context of 
Western theory, referents are empowered through practices such as consultation, a practice 
that allows them to express their needs and desires, and which ensures a broad and long-term 
resolution is established (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 30; Lederach, 1995: 14-15; Rifkind and 
Picco, 2014: 49; Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). Lederach (1995: 15) likewise states that 
referents should be empowered to change the structural injustices that may exist. In cases 
where stakeholders are excluded or relations are asymmetrical, Western scholars hypothesize 
that a conflict resolution process is subject to rejection, setback and failure due to its 
restrictiveness in terms of depth and practices (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 30; Lederach, 1995: 
14-15; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49). 
5.3.2.7 Dialogue 
Miriam Sabirah Ashki (2006) claims dialogue is difficult to define across cultures because 
of linguistic differences. She supports this hypothesis noting the term dialogue “is often used 
incorrectly to describe forms of communication that are actually debates, negotiations, 
mediations, discussions” (Ashki, 2006: 4). Compounding confusion over lexicon just 
mentioned, Ashki emphasizes that forms of communication fluctuate. For instance: “A 
discussion may transform itself into constructive dialogue or escalate into a debate—or even 
an argument—and transition back to a dialogue” (Ashki, 2006: 18). Taking Ashki’s 
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combination of intricacies, as outlined in the quotes, into consideration, she broadly defines 
dialogue as a constructive, “transformative” discussion in which referents “search for 
common ground, with the possibility of combined solutions” (Ashki, 2006: 7). These 
parameters are mirrored in Western prioritization of the principles of dialogue and truth. 
During these discussions in pursuit of commonality and resolution, the author proclaims 
there are additional principles that must be observed in Arab/Muslim culture. Among them, 
Ashki (2006: 8) recommends that dialogue transpire in “a safe, neutral environment, which 
does not favor one individual or group over another.” Ashki’s quote suggests that neutrality 
and security are necessary preconditions for successful dialogue. 
In addition, while engaged in dialogue, Ashki (2006: 7) claims that referents are expected 
to listen “with compassion” and observe the principles “of understanding, respect, acceptance 
of differences.” The principles of compassion, understanding and so forth, mirror those 
advocated in the Western practices of active listening and dialogue. Combined, Arab/Muslim 
scholars denote that dialogue should incorporate principles including power symmetry (Ashki, 
2006: 8), a (re-) humanization of the other (Ashki, 2006: 10) and enhanced self-awareness 
(Ashki, 2006: 15). The latter principles are likewise emphasized in our broad understanding of 
conflict resolution as articulated in the West, including references to cognitive transformation 
and power symmetry (chapter 3, section 3.3.1; chapter 4, section 3.9). 
5.3.2.8 Third party intervention 
Abu-Nimer (2008: 19) asserts a third party is “an integral part of peacebuilding 
intervention” and their task “is mainly to facilitate communication, reduce tension, and assist 
in rebuilding relationships.” According to the quote, the third party is a facilitator that aids 
respondents on the path to conflict resolution. Western scholars similarly view third parties as 
essential components of conflict resolution, whose objective is equally to facilitate or direct 
improved relations (chapter 4, section 3.6). Nonetheless, dissenting views on the nature of the 
third party exist in Arab/Muslim literature. 
On the one hand, Al-Ramahi (2008: 17, 23) emphasizes that mediators and arbitrators 
should exercise neutrality in their actions and decisions. Hence, the third party should take on 
a facilitative role and guide referents through the conflict resolution process (Abdalla and 
others, 2002: 37-38; Abu-Nimer, 2008: 19; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 17, 23). However, Arab/Muslim 
scholars place distinguishing limitations on third party neutrality. In particular, Abdalla and 
others (2002: 113) proclaim that third parties can only be neutral “so long as Islam is neutral.” 
Since Islamic law and custom cannot be contradicted, third party neutrality is restricted, as 
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conflict resolution must adhere to Islamic principles and practices. For example, “if there is 
injustice, the mediator must stand for justice” (Abdalla and others, 2002: 113). As the quote 
summarizes, neutrality must be relinquished to uphold Islamic standards and to advance 
justice. 
On the other hand, some Arab/Muslim scholars reject third party neutrality as a practice 
(Abdalla and others, 2002: 113; Irani, 1999: 5; Irani and Funk, 2000: 7-8). There are several 
reasons for its rejection. Firstly, Irani (1999: 5) hypothesizes that “neutral facilitators” are 
perceived as either secretly biased, or their facilitative work is perceived as impractical, since 
the Arab/Muslim cultural preference is for assertive and resourceful interveners who can 
provide advice, solutions and persuade referents. Succinctly, there is a cultural preference for 
“inside-partial mediators” with knowledge and authority, as they are familiar with the 
disputing parties and are more inclined to possess a basic understanding of the referents, and 
can more readily interject themselves, obtaining trust, legitimacy and providing solutions 
(Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137; Svensson and Lindgren, 2013: 701-702). 
Moreover, Abu-Nimer (2010: 74) cautions that neutral facilitation can fortify the “status 
quo and preserv[e] asymmetric power relations.” Such counterproductive outcomes are 
especially probable where injustices are present but overlooked in the interest of maintaining 
neutrality. Associated practices not only counter Islamic principles but also are 
counterproductive to the pursuit of conflict resolution. In these instances, neutral third parties 
fail to address structural issues that produced, and potentially could prolong, the conflict 
(Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74). For those reasons, Arab/Muslim scholars advocate third parties depart 
with neutrality and advance resolution by proffering solutions to problems, or possibly even 
pressure referents into a just resolution utilizing their intimate knowledge of, and relationship 
with, the referents (Funk and Said, 2004; Irani, 1999: 5; Irani and Funk, 2000: 7-8). 
Amalgamated, there are similarities and divergences across and between Arab/Muslim and 
Western conceptualizations of third party intervention. On the one hand, avocation of the third 
party as a neutral facilitator corresponds with the theory of Western scholars, such as Ronald 
Fisher (2001a: 8, 19-20) and others (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 163; Stover and others, 
2005: 857), outlined in chapter 4, section 3.6. However, there are stark differences in that 
third party neutrality is subjugated when Islamic (or religious) teachings and practices are 
being violated, whereas most Western scholars emphasize that sides should not be taken, or 
judgment and labels passed. According to the Arab/Muslim approach, neutrality is trumped by 
the primacy of Islamic principles and the practices it endorses. 
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Nevertheless, there is dissension over the relative value and necessity of neutral 
facilitation within and across both cultural approaches. For instance, R. Cohen (2004: 180) 
embraces a more active approach for interveners, who should use their authority and resources 
to direct a process. In this case, facilitation and neutrality are subject to compromise. 
Likewise, some Arab/Muslim scholars argue that third parties should not be neutral 
facilitators, since neutrality is allegedly unacceptable in Arab/Muslim culture. Contradicting 
Arab/Muslim theory, Gellman and Vuinovich (2008: 137) argue that Western intervention as 
a third party in cases involving predominantly Arab/Muslim countries has historically resulted 
in failure because the third parties were perceived as biased outsiders. The explanation offered 
for this trend is that, despite efforts to maintain a semblance of neutrality, the intervening 
Western party was perceived as biased. This perception of biasness, they argue, undermined 
the conflict resolution process. Albeit, perhaps Gellman and Vuinovich (2008) are over-
emphasizing the importance of neutrality as a catalyst of past failure, and should instead 
contemplate the general perception of Western representatives as being perceived as 
illegitimate and untrustworthy brokers, which would ultimately produce comparable results. 
Aware of the limitations of the outsider-impartial approach, Western scholars, such as 
Raymond Cohen (2004: 180) and Morton Deutsch (2005: 16), expand the Western framework 
of third party intervention beyond the impartial outsider by suggesting one possess necessary 
skills and inside knowledge of the parties and conflict. Equally relevant, Western scholars 
insist that neutrality will be difficult to acquire or maintain in some instances (Ramsbotham 
and others, 2011: 216; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 35). Consequently, it appears some Western 
scholars would willfully marginalize impartiality for the benefit of promoting resolution. 
Consequently, while Western scholars prefer neutral facilitation, whether the intervener is an 
insider or outsider, some seemingly recognize that neutrality may not always be possible or 
advantageous. Arab/Muslim scholars are equally undecided on standards for third party 
intervention since some advocate neutrality while others criticize it. 
5.3.2.9 Deeds 
Deeds, defined as conscious, intentional actions, are more esteemed in Arab/Muslim 
culture than words, distinguished here as speech or rhetoric (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249; 2010: 
84)76. Emphasizing their significance, Abu-Nimer (2000) conjectures: 
Deeds are central in measuring the person’s obligation in meeting 
the[ir] responsibilities. Similarly, the emphasis on “actions and doing” is 
                                                          
 
76 Marsella (2005: 659) defines deeds as “non-verbal cues,” while words are defined as “verbal cues.” 
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central in peacebuilding, particularly when parties attempt to go beyond 
the dialogue and exchange of opinions. Believing in the importance of 
behavioral changes and implementation of values through specific 
actions is a central factor that promotes peacebuilding and change. 
Moving the other by persuasion and allowing him the free will to make a 
choice are two important principles in Islam (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249). 
The quote emphasizes that actions carry more weight than rhetoric, especially in the context 
of conflict resolution, as practiced in Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249; 2010: 84; 
Funk and Said, 2004: 22; Marsella, 2005: 659). Deeds reinforce words and demonstrate the 
capacity and willingness to change. 
Arab/Muslim elevation of deeds, as a principle and practice, accentuates that rhetoric 
alone is insufficient for transforming relationships, perceptions or reciprocal behavior (Abu-
Nimer, 2000: 249). Clearly stated, words must be reinforced by obvious and tangible action 
(Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249). In cross-cultural comparative terms, the behavioral aspect in 
conflict resolution is present in Western literature (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356; Kaufman, 2006: 212), 
notably as an aspect of cognitive transformation (3.3.3.1), in addition to scholarly emphasis 
on how behavioral typology tends to reinforce the quality of a given relationship (3.2). 
Likewise, Long and Brecke’s (2003: 18-20, 111-116) “costly signaling model” accentuates 
the behavioral aspect in the theory that “costly” and “novel” actions pays high conciliatory 
dividends because those actions demonstrate a determination and ability to change (3.4.1.4.2). 
Hence, both Arab/Muslim and Western scholars emphasize the importance of deeds in 
conflict resolution. 
5.3.2.10 Collective benefit 
As repeatedly mentioned throughout this chapter, the Arab/Muslim approach to conflict 
resolution is suggested to prioritize collective benefit, whereas Western culture embraces 
mutual benefit directed toward stakeholders immediately engaged in conflict (Irani, 1999: 2-
10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 20; Said and Funk, 2001). According to Arab/Muslim theory, 
collective identity and the influence of Islam demand communal interests trump the interest of 
individual stakeholders (Irani, 1999: 2-10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 20-21; Said and Funk, 2001). 
While Arab/Muslim comparative critiques fail to acknowledge that Western approaches to 
conflict resolution accommodates society, it was demonstrated that the social-psychological 
(4.2.2) and spiritual approaches (4.2.3) integrate the collective into their frameworks. 
When considering mutual benefit, some Arab/Muslim scholars argue that mutually 
beneficial outcomes are inappropriate in Arab/Muslim culture (Irani, 1999: 2-10; Irani and 
Funk, 2000: 20-21; Said and Funk, 2001). This assumption is rooted in the role of Islam and 
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the interplay of other principles, including truth and justice. To illustrate functionality in 
Arab/Muslim understanding, if a conflict is asymmetrical in nature and effect, according to 
Islamic conflict resolution tradition, the power-wielder may not be entitled to benefit from the 
resolution process (Said and Funk, 2001). Instead, Sharia law, and/or societal norms, may 
dictate the aggressor be penalized for their actions as a means of restoring justice, on the one 
hand, and honor to those subjected to wrongdoing in particular and society in general, on the 
other (Said and Funk, 2001). Hence, Islam and tradition may warrant some form of 
punishment in asymmetrical relations (Said and Funk, 2001); a practice that ensures mutually 
beneficial solutions is implausible in some instances, because few referents, be they aggressor 
or not, would elect to endure punishment. 
Arab/Muslim emphasis on establishing symmetry, as the example indicates, seemingly 
contradicts the Western preference for “win-win” resolution outcomes (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 
62-75; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 12; Mitchell, 2002: 10; Reychler, 2002: 30; Wallensteen, 
2007: 38-39). The Western prioritization of mutual benefit is argued invaluable in for 
advancing conflict resolution because it strengthens the probability of achieving a solution 
that is more likely to be accepted and upheld by stakeholders (Irani, 1999: 2-10; Irani and 
Funk, 2000: 20; Said and Funk, 2001). Nonetheless, the literature does not clarify how 
Arab/Muslim tradition manages asymmetrical relations and there is some dissention among 
Arab/Muslim scholarship. For example, some Arab/Muslim scholars note that traditional 
practices espouse “amicable resolution” (Abdalla and others, 2002: 30; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 12), 
which is argued capable of terminating dispute and undermining acts of vengeance (Tarabeih 
and others, 2009: 53). In these latter instances, mutually acceptable solutions appear to be 
tolerable, most likely under the condition that Islamic principles and practices are upheld.   
However, if the predominant opinions expressed by Arab/Muslim scholars on this topic 
are accepted as representative, we must concluded that there are distinct cross-cultural 
differences concerning the prioritization of communal interests and collective benefit at the 
lower levels. Contrary, when the social-psychological and spiritual approaches to conflict 
resolution are considered, and the level in which Western resolution is theorized and practiced 
is shifted to the intrastate or interstate levels, there are potential parallels across cultures. On 
the one hand, conflict transformation theory, for example, would recommend consultation of 
society when resolving intrastate and interstate conflict. Under these conditions, mutual 
satisfaction of the resolution would be promoted through the incorporation of popular opinion. 
On the other hand, it is unclear how, or if, mutual satisfaction functions at higher levels when 
Islamic values and asymmetrical relations are inserted into the same equation, since traditional 
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theories and practices at this level do not exist. It should, nevertheless, be recalled that Abu-
Nimer (2008: 4) insists that the principles and practices applied at the community level are 
applicable at all levels of conflict resolution. 
Ultimately, Arab/Muslim literature is vague regarding how Islamic values and principles, 
including both justice and mercy, are balanced in cases of asymmetrical relations at any level. 
The literature indicates that regardless of the disproportional nature of the outcome, 
prioritization of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition is placed predominantly on 
upholding Islamic and communal norms and the restoration of harmony and justice to the 
community (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12). We will acquire more insight into 
the effects of Arab/Muslim practices at the community level, in the next section, when we 
explore the sulh process and how collective interest frequently undermines mutual benefit. 
Nevertheless, some Arab/Muslim scholars refer to mutually beneficial solutions. I deduce that 
as long as Islamic values are upheld, the community will accept the resolution process as 
proportional and appropriate regardless of the outcome. That said, asymmetrical resolution 
arrangements are practiced in Western and Arab/Muslim culture to varying degrees, for 
instance retributive justice can be applied in both cultures as part of a conflict resolution 
program without being perceived as violent by society at large. In this latter instance, 
punishment is distributed, although Western scholars recommend that parity between mercy 
and justice be established (Gopin, 2001: 88; Lederach, 1995: 20-21). 
5.3.2.11 Compensation/restitution 
Another principle advocated by Arab/Muslim conflict resolution tradition is compensation 
to those who have suffered wrongdoing (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236; Bekdash, 2009). For 
instance: “Diyah (blood money), which obligates the family of the criminal offender to pay 
money to the victim’s family,” can be imposed (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236). According to the 
literature, compensation, such as Diyah introduced in the quote, serves several purposes (Abu-
Nimer, 2000: 236). First, it symbolically remunerates those who have suffered from 
wrongdoings committed by others (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236). Second, compensation restores 
dignity and honor to those who have endured transgression (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236). Finally, 
compensation or restitution penalizes those responsible for perpetrating transgressions, 
holding the wrongdoer(s) accountable for their actions through the provision of justice (Abu-
Nimer, 2000: 236; Bekdash, 2009). Thus, compensation in Arab/Muslim understanding 
functions to ensure justice and accountability, as well as restore honor. 
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Western approaches likewise utilize restitution (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 30; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 100; Rosoux, 2009: 546). For instance, Abu-Nimer (2000: 236) asserts 
restitution, as theorized and practiced in the Middle East, mirrors that advocated and deployed 
in the West. Restitution is thereby an intricate part of conflict resolution in both Arab/Muslim 
and Western traditions. 
5.3.2.12 Flexibility and adaptability 
One final characteristic extracted from Arab/Muslim conflict resolution literature is 
flexibility. Scholars recognize that elasticity is essential for adapting and accommodating 
diverse interests and needs when resolving conflictual relationships (Abdalla and others, 
2002: 134-135). Flexibility is, therefore, a component of Arab/Muslim conflict resolution 
practices. For example, many existing Arab/Muslim frameworks combine traditional and 
contemporary conflict resolution tools that can be utilized singularly or in tandem (Gellman 
and Vuinovich, 2008: 131-132; Gulam, 2003: 11; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 59). 
Demonstrating the flexibility of Muslim conflict resolution programs, Hyder Gulam (2003: 
11) declares there is a growing trend in predominantly Muslim countries throughout the world 
to create “hybrid” systems. Several countries in the Middle East, including Yemen, Jordan 
and Lebanon have created systems mentioned by Gulam (Safa, 2007: 4). 
Scholars argue that the broadening of traditional Arab/Muslim conflict resolution 
frameworks produces two fundamental advantages (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 130-132; 
Gulam, 2003: 11). Firstly, Arab/Muslim societies have adapted their justice systems in a 
manner that upholds the precepts of Islam while integrating non-traditional practices which 
increases the potentiality and appeal of conflict resolution (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 
130-132; Gulam, 2003: 11). Secondly, and related to the first, the synthesis of practices 
provided by the hybrid systems yields structural and practical flexibility since modern and 
traditional tools can be used in tandem or independently, depending on the demands of 
affected stakeholders (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 130-132; Gulam, 2003: 4). According to 
Magid Shihade, such hybrid systems are (cross-culturally) extremely accommodating since 
Arab/Muslims, Christians and Jews can utilize the range of tools to resolve conflict in a 
manner deemed acceptable to relevant stakeholders (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 130). 
In comparative terms, accommodation and fraternization of diverse principles and 
techniques are similarly emphasized in Western literature (chapter 3, section 4.2), where the 
practice is advanced as a technique of expanding viability and acceptability of a resolution 
process (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 75, 154; Sarkin, 2008: 20-23; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 
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2004: 16, 33-34). In the West, for instance, scholars acknowledge that each conflict is unique 
and requires diverse approaches to advance resolution (Bar-On, 2005; Bekdash, 2009; Hinds 
and Oliver, 2009; Rifkind and Picco, 2014; Sarkin, 2008). Moreover, some recommend 
consultation with stakeholders to ensure utilization of tools and accommodation of needs 
when designing and implementing conflict resolution (Stover and others, 2005: 835). 
Consultation is likewise emphasized in the Middle East where scholars correspondingly 
recommend external interveners consult with Arab/Muslim stakeholders to identify their 
needs and expectations in context (Irani, 1999: 1-2). Flexibility is, thus, observable in both 
Arab/Muslim and Western approaches. 
5.3.3 Cross-cultural comparative analysis of principles 
The comparative analysis provided in this section demonstrates that Arab/Muslim 
approach shares many concepts, principles and practices with our broad Western framework. 
Despite the high degree of commonalities articulated hitherto, some Arab/Muslim scholars 
contend that Western conflict resolution theories and practices are unacceptable or 
problematic in Arab/Muslim culture (Irani, 1999: 1-8; Irani and Funk, 2000: 1-20; Said and 
Funk, 2001). According to these critics, existing differences connote momentous theoretical 
and practical divergences (Irani and Funk, 2000: 1-20). In fact, the degree of divergence 
suggested by these scholars lead them to suggest that Western and Middle East theory and 
practices have contradictory purposes (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18; Bar-On, 2005: 6; Funk and Said, 
2004: 1; Irani, 1999: 2-10). However, I have demonstrated that Arab/Muslim comparative 
analyses hitherto frequently reduce Western conflict resolution to the structural approach, 
while simultaneously making direct references to Western conflict resolution/transformation 
schools of thought. However, aside from noting that Western scholars sometimes 
conceptualize conflict as positive and resolvable, deeper analyses of conflict resolution or 
conflict transformation theories are predominantly absent from cross-cultural comparisons 
made in Arab/Muslim literature. Considering the degree of homogeneity demonstrated in this 
chapter, I believe that preexisting comparative critiques overstate divergences due to their 
inappropriate reduction of Western theory to the structural approach alone. 
According to these faulty analyses, the most frequently cited cross-cultural discrepancies 
denoted in the literature are the Arab/Muslim prioritization of community and religion (Irani, 
1999: 2-10). Nevertheless, we have demonstrated that these components are accommodated 
when the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches are factored into the 
comparative equation. We briefly summarize each once more to reinforce our conclusion. 
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Foremost, the community level at which conflict resolution is promoted and practice in 
Arab/Muslim culture is suggested non-viable in Western conflict resolution (Abu-Nimer, 
2000: 219; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 128). However, the social-psychological and 
spiritual approaches accommodate society into their frameworks. Secondly, while religion is 
an inextricable component of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition, it is 
theoretically accommodated by the Western spiritual approach. While critics will argue that 
the issues then becomes one between Islam and Christianity, my later Conclusions and 
Recommendations chapter will argue that emphasis should be placed on the principles and 
norms as opposed to religious orthodoxies. In this manner, the principles and norms that are 
shared across these faiths can be prioritized while minimizing direct reference to religious 
dogma. 
With that said, there are some fundamental conceptual and practical differences. Among 
them, we highlighted that honor is esteemed in Arab/Muslim tradition, while not openly 
denoted in Western theory. Similarly, there are divergences in how certain tools are applied. 
For instance, dialogue and third party intervention are principles that are embraced across 
cultures, but their implementation is subject to variations according to some scholars. 
At the same time, there remains one contradiction that must be addressed in the context of 
our research. Due to Arab/Muslim concentration of conflict resolution at the group or familial 
level, there is no traditional mechanism available for dealing with conflict at the higher levels 
(Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 128). Partially as a result, conflict 
resolution tools and practices, has generally been imported or imposed, and largely favoring a 
Western structural approach, which Arab/Muslim scholars claim is an imposition or 
unacceptable in context (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137; Irani, 1999: 1-10). Imposition is 
equally perceived due to the false Western assumption that theories and practices are 
universally applicable (Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Flavin, 2013: 165). This supposition, and the 
imposition of external techniques, is naturally violent as it minimizes or eliminates inevitable 
cross-cultural dissimilarities while devaluing supplementary theories and practices that might 
otherwise be more appropriate in context (Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Flavin, 2013: 165; Irani, 
1999: 1-5). There are obvious repercussions for imposing foreign practices, which were noted 
in the general critique of conflict resolution, in chapter 5, section 1. 
In short, Western-advocated conflict resolution programs in the Middle East have 
repeatedly failed or been rejected by Arab/Muslim communities (Bar-On, 2005: 6-7; Funk 
and Said, 2004: 2; Irani, 1999: 1-10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 1-13; Said and Funk, 2001). This 
outcome is suggested to demonstrate that transferability is minimal. Incredulity is further 
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exacerbated by the qualified degree of Arab/Muslim suspicion of the West, which is a 
consequence of the deconstructive historical interaction, as traced in the first part of our thesis 
(Al-Ramahi, 2008: 21). Combined, inhabitants of the Middle East are either suspicious of or 
adverse to conflict resolution programs as promoted by countries in the West. These points 
emphasize the need for resolving conflict between Western and Middle Eastern culture, and 
simultaneously the necessity to uncover mutually acceptable means of practicing resolution. 
However, in light of Arab/Muslim perceptions of incompatibility, buttressed by animosity 
and distrust of the West, third parties/stakeholders engaging Arab/Muslim stakeholders in 
conflict resolution, whether intrastate or interstate, should respect cross-cultural diversity by 
querying and accommodating Arab/Muslim societies politically, culturally and religiously 
when designing and implementing resolution processes (Irani, 1999: 1). Accommodation 
requires that conflict resolution programs consider indigenous opinions and utilize local 
practices rather than supplanting them with external incompatible or unacceptable theory and 
practices (Irani, 1999: 1-2). Rephrased, scholars argue that theories and practices implemented 
in the Middle East should be cognizant of, and acclimatize to, local needs and particularities 
to acclimatize to the unique cultural, historical and religious nuances prevalent in the region. 
Simultaneously, Arab/Muslim scholars are calling for reform of their approaches. More 
specifically, the lack of theory and practices for resolving conflict at the higher levels, among 
other reasons, has led scholars to call for reform of how conflict resolution is theorized and 
practiced in the Arab/Muslim culture. The next subsection briefly summarizes these calls for 
reform and outlines some of the challenges they acknowledge hampers modification. 
5.3.4 Reform and revision 
Arab/Muslim scholars argue that traditional systems and practices need to be revised and 
expanded to increase their viability in contemporary social and political conditions. For 
example, Abu-Nimer (2008: 3) argues scholars and religious leaders need to (re-) evaluate and 
adapt Muslim traditional approaches at all levels. In his opinion, Islamic conflict resolution 
has not attained its fullest potential as further theory and alterations are imperative (Abu-
Nimer, 2008: 3). One significant practical void in traditional Arab/Muslim conflict resolution 
strategies, noted above, is the absence of theory and practices that can be operationalized at 
the intrastate and interstate levels (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 
128). This vacuum, Abu-Nimer (2000: 219) hypothesizes, could be filled by adapting and 
modifying practices from outside Arab/Muslim tradition. Adaptation of externally adopted 
theory and practices could, it is argued, could aid in the creation of a cross-culturally 
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accommodative process at the higher levels (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219; Gellman and Vuinovich, 
2008: 128). According to Abu-Nimer, adaptation and modification of external practices would 
circumvent the need for Islamic clerics, scholars and/or policymakers to reinvent conflict 
resolution to function at this level, since theory and tools could be cherry-picked from external 
sources and tailored to produce culturally, socially and politically applicable and acceptable 
techniques within the Muslim context. 
Similarly, reform is also called for at the societal level. By way of example, Huda (2010a: 
211) suggests that the traditional approach of using local arbiters, who are not educated in 
practices such as conflict analysis and negotiations, should be reconsidered and revised. 
Accordingly, valuable knowledge and skills could be imparted and institutionalized, a process 
that is argued capable of increasing the effectiveness of conflict resolution at the societal 
level. Among additional priorities identified, Huda (2010b: 217-221) stresses the need to 
promote general understanding of conflict resolution among religious and community leaders, 
and simultaneously provide them with the skills necessary for intervening in conflict. Skills 
thought beneficial include conflict mediation, negotiation, management and other expertise 
whereby conflict prevention, resolution and transformation can be dispersed into local 
leadership and thereafter the community (Huda, 2010b: 220). Nevertheless, implementing 
comparable reforms, at any level, are complicated by contemporary internal and external 
social, political, economic and historical factors that undermine the propensity for change. 
Among the hindrances to reform outlined in the literature, scholars suggest that prominent 
political and social practices, including authoritarian governing structures, the lack of 
accountability, the suppression of populations and their rights, the promotion of social and 
political nepotism and identity-base loyalties, undermine both implementation of existing 
peacebuilding processes and their potential to undergo alteration (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 76; 
Huda, 2010b: 212). To elaborate on one example, Abu-Nimer (2010: 76) suggests the 
educational system in many Arab/Muslim countries is insufficient for promoting 
peacebuilding, due to copious problems including the lack of “economic resources or 
deliberate political policy.” The quote emphasizes that the resources necessary to change or 
advance conflict resolution is absent or marginalized, while religious leaders and institutions 
essential to altering, developing and proliferating conflict resolution are frequently compelled 
by political leaders to promote the regime through corruption or pressure (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 
76). These circumstances undercut religious leaders’ duty to advance improvements that 
would benefit society. 
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Equally problematic, and related, religious (madrasa) educational frameworks are 
suggested to be outdated and in need of reform (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 76; Huda, 2010b: 212). 
However, in many instances, scholars contend that religious leaders are disinterested in 
relinquishing the status quo because change might undermine their authority and/or that of 
political leaders, or out of fear of change (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 76; Huda, 2010b: 212). These 
challenges compromise efforts to reform, at all levels. 
Despite the challenges noted, Huda (2010a: 210) optimistically suggests that the 
underdeveloped and heterogeneous nature of conflict resolution in the Islamic tradition 
presents opportunities. According to his optimistic perspective, Arab/Muslim theory and 
practice is ripe for change. However, like his colleagues, it is recognized that the greatest 
challenge is to convince politicians and religious leaders of its necessity. At the same time, it 
is cautioned that as adaptations of theory and practice are approved and implemented through 
reform, the process must adhere to Islamic principles and traditions, and that local 
stakeholders be engaged to direct developments (Huda, 2010b: 218). Accordingly, concepts 
and practices could be modified or established that accommodate and represent the societies 
they are designed to represent (Huda, 2010b: 218). In short, desired reforms are necessary at 
all levels, but adherence to Islam and local ownership must be assured. 
Subsequent to the review of concepts, principles, tools, and the call for reform, the next 
section explores one unique conflict resolution technique available in Arab/Muslim culture: 
the sulh. Outlining this traditional practice demonstrates how conflicts are resolved at the 
community level. At the same time, the overview reiterates cross-cultural parallels of many of 
the principles and practices. 
5.4 The sulh ceremony  
To contain violence and feud at the familial-clan level, Arab/Muslim communities use an 
informal traditional ritual called a sulh, which is often translated into English as “settlement” 
(Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 129-130; Irani, 1999: 2, 11-17; Özçelik, 
2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 80). According to the literature, the sulh is a two-thousand-year-old 
practice that remains a cornerstone of conflict resolution in the contemporary Middle East 
(Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 131), and is encouraged by the Qu’ran (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 
10). This traditional technique offers an alternative to, or can function in conjunction with, the 
Sharia judicial system in circumstances where formal arbitration is not desired/or is deemed 
insufficient (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 11; Pely, 2009: 80; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 53-54). 
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Historically, the sulh has fallen under the control of “chieftains (sheikhs), soothsayers and 
healers (kuhhān), and influential noblemen [who] played an indispensable role as arbiters in 
all disputes within the tribe or between rival tribes” (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4). Due to their 
elevated position in the community, the men denoted in the quote have wielded significant 
degrees of authority in matters of conflict. However, the relative value of verdicts rendered by 
these community representatives is subject to interpretation. While considered “final,” they 
are “not legally enforceable,” but contrary represent “an authoritative statement as to what the 
customary law was or should be and later of Islamic principles” (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4). Thus, 
verdicts proffered by community representatives during a sulh should be accepted and 
implemented, although, aside from indirect pressure exerted from the representatives and the 
community (detailed below), these individuals lack the capacity to enforce decisions. 
Despite these limitations, Al-Ramahi (2008: 11) insists that the sulh is usually preferred in 
Arab/Muslim culture over judicial practices because a “trial process is not regarded as an 
ultimate truth-finding mechanism that will lead to substantive justice.” Justification provided 
articulating the perceived weaknesses of judicial practices include that they “can be tainted 
and subverted by the imperfect nature of man, [and] therefore, it should be avoided when 
possible” (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 11). According to the quote, formal judicial practices are 
criticized because their primary actors (judges, arbitrators) are subject to bias and probable to 
impose decisions that oppress referents, which preserve the conflict (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 11). 
Broadening criticism, Tarabeih and others (2009: 54) add that formal judicial procedures are 
frequently time-consuming and unappealing. By comparison, a sulh offers a viable alternative 
and is considered superior since it is rooted in tradition. 
According to the literature, the overall objective of a sulh is to generate compromise, 
mediation and harmony for the benefit of the community (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 10-11; Gellman 
and Vuinovich, 2008: 136). To this end, the traditional practice espouses “an amicable 
resolution” among conflicting referents (Abdalla and others, 2002: 30; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 12), 
which is designed to terminate dispute and undermine acts of vengeance (Tarabeih and others, 
2009: 53). Amicability, as utilized here, suggests that the resolution is mutually acceptable to 
stakeholders and the community. In addition to terminating hostility, the sulh should also 
restore honor and dignity to those families involved in a conflict (Gellman and Vuinovich, 
2008: 128-130, 146; Irani, 1999: 11-17; Özçelik, 2007: 9-13; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 53-
54). Since honor and shame are fundamental components of identity and culture in the Middle 
East, as emphasized previously, these issues must likewise be addressed when resolving a 
conflict (Irani, 1999: 1, 10; Wyatt-Brown and Fontan, 2005). Because of its informal 
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structure, and emphasis on amicability and conciliation, the sulh is more appealing compared 
to judicial procedures. 
Nevertheless, there are reported variations in how a sulh is implemented across Muslim 
communities (Safa, 2007: 4) and which outcomes are expected. Concerning the latter, Irani 
(1999: 11-17) identifies two forms of sulh: a public and private version, although he denotes 
only minute differences between the two versions. The most obvious differences between the 
versions are that the public sulh can be performed in instances where wrongdoers have not 
been identified (Irani, 1999: 12). Contrariwise, a private sulh is viable only when both the 
wrongdoer(s) and their crime(s) have been disclosed (Irani, 1999: 12). Forsaking discussion 
on the vaguely articulated differences between the versions, the following subsections outline 
and analyze the basic steps of a sulh process. 
5.4.1 Steps of the sulh 
Mneesha Gellman and Mandi Vuinovich (2008: 136-138) summarize three primary steps 
of the sulh. These include the establishment of the “jaha” (a mediating body); the brokering of 
the “hodna” (or truce); and the “sulh” ceremony. The consecutive steps are traced below to 
illustrate the process and its guiding principles77. Our analysis begins with the establishment 
of the jaha. 
 In most instances, the jaha is formed after the family of an offender approaches a 
community elder, requesting their intervention in a conflict on their family’s behalf (Gellman 
and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 82). Impetuous for the offending 
family to approach community elders to resolve an outstanding conflict is not simply rooted in 
the desire to terminate the conflict, but to restore their family’s honor (Gellman and 
Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Pely, 2009: 82). Hence, family interest in resolving a conflict and 
restoring their honor is suggested to drive an individual to request jaha intervention. 
In extreme cases, a jaha can be organized independently, whereupon the jaha has the 
authority to approach an offender’s family unsolicited to make a formal request of pursuing 
conflict resolution, especially in cases where the body believes that the family should have 
already contacted them to mediate an ongoing conflict (Pely, 2009: 82-83). Thus, although the 
offending family normally requests jaha intervention, a jaha can be formed, and has the 
authority, to apply pressure on a reluctant family when it recognizes that conditions are 
deteriorating and a request for mediation is unlikely to be immediately forthcoming (Pely, 
                                                          
 
77 Pely (2009) provides a detailed account of the sulh ritual as it is practiced in Israel. 
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2009: 82-83). In these instances, community interest drives the jaha to intervene to terminate 
and resolve the conflict for the benefit of community interests (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 
136; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 82-83). 
Before examining the jaha’s function, it is imperative to denote the body’s composition. A 
jaha is composed of the upstanding—defined as honest, decent and moral—men from within 
the community (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 82; 
Tarabeih and others, 2009: 54-55). Its members are not neutral outsiders, but respected and 
recognized partial insiders whom have knowledge of the conflict particularities and the 
referents involved (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Pely, 2009: 
82). The significance of their composition is obvious, because the credibility and legitimacy 
of jaha members is rooted in their position within the community and through bonds of 
kinship (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19). Jaha members, however, are not expected to possess specific 
educational background, training, skills or even experience (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19; Tarabeih 
and others, 2009: 55), because their moral and social position within the community is deemed 
sufficient for mediating. 
To ensure its capacity to mediate, the size of a jaha committee is also flexible, and is 
generally determined by the severity of the conflict at hand (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 
136; Pely, 2009: 82). Flexibility in size and composition likewise ensures that the jaha 
possesses a degree of influence over conflicting parties (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; 
Pely, 2009: 82). Notably, jaha size must correspond to the degree of authority thought 
necessary to guide mediation or coerce referents into resolution should this be deemed 
necessary (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 82-83). After 
all, the jaha’s objective is not centered on promoting individual-family interests, but on the re-
establishment of familial dignity and social harmony (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19-20). Finally, its 
tenure is flexible and is dependent upon the complexity of the conflict. Consequently, a jaha’s 
function can last for a minimum of a day to a maxim of several years (Pely, 2009: 84). 
Returning our attention to the function of the jaha, subsequent to its establishment 
following a request by the offending family or spontaneous intervention, its first task is to 
acquire the offended family’s agreement to their mediation (Pely, 2009: 82). To obtain this 
endorsement, the jaha approaches the offended family and requests them to transfer 
responsibility for the conflict to the committee (Pely, 2009: 82). When forthcoming, 
acceptance of responsibility to the jaha symbolically transfers liability to the group, an act 
that is suggested to motivate the jaha to resolve the issue since it has assumed a stake in the 
conflict (Pely, 2009: 82). The literature suggests that not only is the burden of the conflict 
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symbolically transferred from the affected families and onto jaha members, but also the 
shame associated with the conflict (Pely, 2009: 82). 
Following assumption of responsibility, the next task of the jaha is to instill a hodna (or 
truce) to guarantee a (temporary) termination of violence between stakeholders (Gellman and 
Vuinovich, 2008: 137-138; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 83). Thus, in some instances, the 
process of conflict resolution at the community level begins before the conflict has actually 
been terminated (Pely, 2009: 82-83). Cross-cultural divergence is obvious here. Although 
some Western scholars hypothesize conflict resolution can hasten conflict termination (Bar-
Siman-Tov, 2004: 72; Kriesberg, 2003: 332; Reimann, 2004: 5), it was highlighted that 
numerous Western scholars believe that conflict termination should occur before a process of 
conflict resolution is undertaken (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 138; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; 
Bar-Tal, 2000: 361; Kelman, 2004: 114; Long and Brecke, 2003: 11; Rosoux, 2009: 553). 
Nevertheless, to reach agreement on a truce, jaha mediators utilize “shuttle diplomacy, 
akin to [Western] mediation” to negotiate a(n) (temporary) end to the conflict (Pely, 2009: 
83). In some instances, the progress of shuttle mediation may be buttressed by requiring the 
offending family to provide some form of immediate restitution to the victim’s family (Pely, 
2009: 83). The gesture functions as symbolic restitution proffered in remorse, and is likewise 
a valuable leveraging mechanism for encouraging the offended family to agree to a truce and 
pursue settlement (Pely, 2009: 83). 
Once a truce has been negotiated, the jaha commences its fact-finding mission (Gellman 
and Vuinovich, 2008: 137-138; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 52). Through 
consecutive, usually independent, meetings with affected referents and their families, the jaha 
reconstructs the truth about what occurred (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137-138; Özçelik, 
2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 83; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 52). The advantage of privately held 
meetings is that referents can recount events, and express themselves freely, to the jaha 
without escalating tensions or offending their counterparts (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 
137-138; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 83; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 52).  
Consequently, while performing its truth seeking duties, the jaha utilizes practices akin to 
nonviolent communication (Pely, 2009: 86-87). For instance, jaha members listen to, and then 
“reframe aggressive statements,” which “allow[s] the disputing clans to vent their emotions” 
without escalating tensions. The quote demonstrates the jaha censors and reformulates the 
quality of information exchanged between referents to deescalate tensions, and in this manner, 
provides a benign outlet for the expression of frustration and anger (Pely, 2009: 86). In 
addition to the principle of nonviolent communication, jaha work is also directed by the 
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principles of truth, the restoration of honor and dignity, and maintenance of confidentiality 
(Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136-138; Pely, 2009: 83-87; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 51-
54). Deploying its indirect approach, the jaha reconstructs events and determines facts about 
the conflict and its implications on stakeholders (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137-138; 
Pely, 2009: 83). These truths are later used to determine parameters for conflict resolution. 
Once events have been reconstructed and facts determined, the jaha negotiates with 
referents to identify an acceptable resolution to the conflict (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 
136-140; Pely, 2009: 83-87). During negotiations, the jaha has the authority to determine or 
negotiate “appropriate compensation” for wrongdoing committed, whose quality and quantity 
is concluded utilizing the information gleaned during fact-finding (Gellman and Vuinovich, 
2008: 138; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 86). Similarly, prior precedent may also be 
discussed to determine appropriate settlement arrangements (Pely, 2009: 86). Thus, the jaha 
usually negotiates settlements with referents, but it likewise possesses the authority to impose 
conditions, which can incorporate retributive or restorative justice practices, ranging from 
reparations to alternative forms of sanctioning, if deemed appropriate (Irani, 1999: 12). 
According to Arab/Muslim scholars, the incorporation of compensation or restitution 
“create[s] a climate for reconciliation” (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138). As emphasized 
above (5.3.2.11), and in the previous quote, compensation provides restitution and justice, 
while ensuring accountability and restoring honor. 
Following acceptance/determination of the agreement, a sulh ceremony is conducted 
(Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 85-86). The 
ceremony includes the families of the offended and the offender, and is performed before the 
community to publicly demonstrate that the conflict has been resolved (Gellman and 
Vuinovich, 2008: 138-140; Pely, 2009: 85-86). One component of the ceremony is a public 
handshake between former adversaries, which signifies a termination of hostilities and the 
establishment of a non-conflictive relationship (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138; Özçelik, 
2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 85). In some instances, reparations might also be paid publicly to 
restore honor to affected families (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-140; Tarabeih and 
others, 2009: 54). 
The final act of the sulh is a symbolic meal hosted by the offending family (Gellman and 
Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 85-86). The event again 
demonstrates conciliation between families, and is a pertinent tradition in Arab/Muslim 
culture (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 85-86), as 
sharing a meal symbolizes hospitality and friendship (Ashki, 2006: 19; Gellman and 
  
337 
 
Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 85-86). At the conclusion of a 
sulh process, Gellman and Vuinovich (2008: 138) summarize “honor” is restored and 
“forgiveness” granted, although this degree of conciliation is not guaranteed. 
In terms of outcome, Irani (1999: 12) asserts there are two possibilities: a total and a 
partial. A total sulh permanently ends the conflict with the stakeholders agreeing not to hold 
grudges against one another (Irani, 1999: 12). In its robust form, a definitive agreement is 
reached and the relationship is transformed with a pledge that everything will be forgiven 
(Irani, 1999: 12; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12). Referents subsequently approach their former 
adversary in a constructive manner (Irani, 1999: 12; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12). The inclusion of 
forgiveness and transformation among former adversaries corresponds with positive peace as 
articulated in the West (Galtung, 1969: 183-184; Kriesberg, 2004: 85). Comparatively, a sulh 
in its partial or conditional format terminates a conflict “according to conditions agreed upon 
during the settlement process” (Irani, 1999: 12). While the conditions denoted by Irani are 
negotiated by the jaha and affected stakeholders, forgiveness among referents is not expressed 
(Irani, 1999: 12). The partial sulh establishes negative peace, with referents consenting to non-
violently coexist, but not to forgive (Irani, 1999: 12). 
5.4.2 Weaknesses 
While a beneficial technique for resolving conflict, there are multiple weaknesses 
attributed to a sulh articulated in the literature (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140; Tarabeih 
and others, 2009: 55). We briefly examine eight of them. Foremost, the process does not 
address the “root causes of conflict” but restores harmony/order to the community (Gellman 
and Vuinovich, 2008: 140; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 55). While facts are found, restitution 
made and relationships improved to varying degrees, the process fails to challenge structural 
violence because it is not designed to alter preexisting social, political, or economic structures 
that produce the conflict, but rather seeks to terminate a conflict for the benefit of the greater 
community (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-141). Hence, in general terms, a sulh is a 
more akin to conflict management than resolution or transformation. 
Second, and linked to the first, a sulh minimally “recalibrates communities for peaceful 
coexistence” (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140). As denoted in the quote, while violent 
hostilities cease and relationships are symbolically restored, in some instances, the 
arrangement only produces negative peace (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139). 
Summarily, a sulh does not guarantee a complete transformation of the quality of the 
relationship (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139). As a consequence, resentment can 
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persist in instances where only nonviolent coexistence is produced, which can hypothetically 
lead to a continuation of conflict behavior in the future (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-
139; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 55). 
Third, while Al-Ramahi (2008: 11-12) criticizes arbitration for its vulnerability to bias, he 
likewise notes two advantages arbitration has over a sulh. First, arbitration can be utilized 
prior or subsequent to the development of a conflict (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 11-12). Thus, 
arbitration is proactive and can settle issues before a conflict develops. Alternatively, a sulh is 
reactive since it can only be implemented subsequent to the manifestation of a conflict (Al-
Ramahi, 2008: 12; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 55). A second advantage of arbitration over the 
sulh is that the disputing parties accept third party involvement and its decisions are binding 
(Al-Ramahi, 2008: 11-12; Pely, 2009: 86). By comparison, jaha members are not selected and 
its decisions are not formally binding (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 12; Pely, 2009: 86). Nonetheless, as 
mentioned, Pely (2009: 86) argues the decisions of a jaha can be indirectly imposed through 
pressure exerted by the community and its elders. For instance, when a family does not abide 
by the jaha’s decision, their reluctance can bring shame to the family (Pely, 2009: 86). This 
pressure thereby provides a degree of enforcement. 
The potential to pressure referents introduces a fourth weakness of a sulh process, namely 
the leveraging capacity wielded by the jaha and the community (Pely, 2009: 82-83). Jaha 
authority, on the one hand, is acquired by its members’ position within the community, while 
its actions are performed in the service of restoring community harmony and family honor, on 
the other hand (Pely, 2009: 82-83; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 59). The combination functions 
to pressures families to participate in a sulh, since rejection risks placing additional shame 
upon those involved (Pely, 2009: 82-83). Providing insight, Pely (2009: 83) claims “taking 
too long to authorize the Jaha to act may appear to be a sign of disrespect to the offender’s 
family.” Pely’s quote demonstrates that social pressure is indirectly applied on referents to 
force participation or adhere to the sulh since the interests of the community are considered 
more important than those of the individual or their families (Pely, 2009: 82-83, 86). 
Therefore, (indirect) pressure is applied to promote and enforce a sulh process. 
A sixth criticism leveled at the sulh is its gender bias (Pely, 2009: 82). More specifically, 
females are not permitted to serve as jaha representatives (Pely, 2009: 82). Since 
Arab/Muslim culture is patriarchal, positions of authority are reserved for males. Females are, 
however, allowed to interact with the jaha during its mediation processes (Pely, 2009: 82). 
This is problematic in context, as Arostegui (2013: 535) denotes, since women are essential to 
peacebuilding, as they frequently possess the influence necessary to proliferate peace within 
  
339 
 
their communities. While patriarchal tendencies found in predominately Arab/Muslim 
societies draws criticism (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003: 1-14; Mukhopadhyay and Singh, 2007), 
Lerche (2000) and Reimann (2004: 17) argue that gender bias likewise exists in Western 
conflict resolution strategies. 
Seventh, and relevant in the context of this research, the sulh is not open to individuals 
outside the community (Kilcullen, 2009: 169). While it is impossible for outsiders to 
participate in an official sulh process, Kilcullen (2009: 169) explains that some coalition 
military commanders in Iraq, who were aware of the sulh practice and its cultural importance, 
“emulated” certain aspects of its processes in an unofficial manner as a gesture of respect and 
goodwill toward communities under their jurisdiction (Kilcullen, 2009: 169). These unofficial 
acts engendered local appreciation and respect among Iraqis and their tribal representatives 
(Kilcullen, 2009: 169). For example, restitution and apologies were offered in the spirit of 
sulh to advance reconciliation between the occupying forces and the indigenous population. 
However, official sulh processes are not open to individuals outside the community. 
The final weakness of the sulh noted herein is that the mechanism, in its traditional form, 
is incapable of being utilized at the intrastate and interstate levels (Gellman and Vuinovich, 
2008: 140-141; Irani, 1999: 14; Kilcullen, 2009: 169). The sulh is specifically designed as a 
conflict resolution strategy at the community level, and has no efficacy at the higher levels. 
However, Arab/Muslim scholars petition that the sulh be adapted to function at higher levels 
(Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140-141). Adaptation requires qualified Muslim political and 
religious decision-makers to agree on its necessity, and then decide how the process could be 
adapted within the confines of Islamic principles and practices to function at the higher levels 
(Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140-141; Irani, 1999: 14). As noted in section 5.3.4, there are 
numerous impediments to securing the desired quality of reform, but scholars remain 
optimistic that change will eventually occur. 
5.4.3 Comparative analysis of principles and techniques 
To finalize our comparative analysis of Arab/Muslim and Western conflict resolution 
techniques, the sulh is a unique practice for moderating conflictive behavior and resolving 
conflict at the community level (Gerner, 2004: 86; Irani, 1999: 11-17; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; 
Pely, 2009: 80). Its primary goals of terminating conflict and transforming relations (Gerner, 
2004: 86; Pely, 2009: 86-87) are paralleled in Western theory. In addition to sharing 
objectives, cultures also share tools (Pely, 2009: 86-87). For example, mediation is used by 
the jaha to negotiate a truce and the terms of the resolution, as well as shuttle negotiations and 
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nonviolent communication (Pely, 2009: 86-87). These practices are equally applied in 
Western traditions (Pely, 2009: 86-87). 
Additional cross-cultural similarities are emphasized by Pely (2009), who summarizes: 
The fact-finding, deliberations and verdict stages [of the sulh] are 
more like arbitration, with touches of mediation. For example, although 
the Jaha determines the facts and decides the verdict (like arbitration), it 
will avoid coming up with a verdict that would not be acceptable to both 
disputants. Its goal is to generate a narrative that both sides can agree 
with (like mediation), as well as an acceptable verdict that both families 
will abide by. It will negotiate the verdict with a family that is 
dissatisfied with the verdict (Pely, 2009: 86). 
The quote emphasizes that Arab/Muslim practices during the sulh have equivalences in the 
West, and the mechanisms are driven by compatible principles, including the pursuit of truth, 
justice and mutual acceptance of an agreement. Once again, it should be recalled that 
embraced principles must follow the edicts of Islam and cultural traditions. Therefore, mutual 
benefit may not always be applicable in some instances (5.3.2.10). Nevertheless, our analysis 
demonstrates that many principles and practices utilized in the sulh are shared across cultures. 
That said dissimilarities between the sulh and most Western approaches are equally 
observable. Dissimilarities can be reduced to the level at which resolution is approached, the 
importance of religion, and the characteristics of third parties interveners. Firstly, the sulh is 
implemented at the community level (Gerner, 2004: 86) rather than being limited to those 
directly involved—with the latter being a practice suggested most common in the West (Irani, 
1999: 2-3; Irani and Funk, 2000: 29-30). Concentration at this level underscores that conflict 
resolution is traditionally conducted for the benefit of the community. However, as explained 
above, the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches accommodate the societal 
level, unlike the structural approach. 
Equally relevant, it was denoted that Arab/Muslim techniques for resolving conflict are 
absent at the higher levels (5.3.3), an actuality that prompts some scholars to call for an 
adaptation of existing traditional techniques to fill this practical void (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219; 
Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 128). By re-conceptualizing and adapting of existing theory 
and processes, Gellman and Vuinovich (2008: 139) argue that the sulh could be modified to 
accommodate conflict resolution at the higher levels. They partially base their conclusion on 
the fact that there is overlap between Western and Islamic principles and practices, whereupon 
cross-cultural compatibly at the higher levels could be established under the appropriate 
conditions and guidelines (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 142-144). As revealed (5.3.4), 
reform would require religious experts contemplate and design hybrid tools and practices that 
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could accommodate the higher level, adhere to local needs and religious traditions, in addition 
to accommodate external actors (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 142-144). Hence, while many 
principles and practices are shared across cultures, care would have to be taken when 
designing mechanisms for resolving conflict at the higher levels. 
The second broad cross-cultural difference between the sulh and Western practices 
concerns the roles of religion. More specifically, religious practices and traditions are 
fundamental to Arab/Muslim conflict resolution (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19). These elements are 
hypothesized absent from Western theory and practice (Irani, 1999: 1-10). However, we again 
reiterate that this assumption is made when comparing the Arab/Muslim practices with 
Western structural method alone. It has been demonstrated that the Western spiritual approach 
theoretically accommodates the influence of religion and offers an increased degree of cross-
cultural compatibility compared to the structural approach. The spiritual approach thus shares 
some commonality in terms of conceptualizations and practices, which suggests that this 
approach might be most effective for bridging existing differences. 
Lastly, there are cross-cultural discrepancies concerning the role of third party interveners. 
Foremost, the jaha are not neutral third parties, which contradicts the Western preference for 
neutral facilitation (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19; Funk and Said, 2004; Irani and Funk, 2000: 7-8). 
Instead, members of the jaha are partial, influential insiders recognized within the community 
(Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Pely, 2009: 82). Their authority is rooted in their social 
position (Pely, 2009: 82-83). Next, jaha members are unlikely to possess skills, unlike the 
training and experience preferred by Western counterparts (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19; Tarabeih 
and others, 2009: 55). Untrained and inexperienced mediators in the West would be 
considered unacceptable, although it was demonstrated that some Western scholars are open 
to inside partial mediation. 
Amalgamated, we conclude that Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict 
resolution, as articulated in the respective literature, generally converge when a broad Western 
understanding of conflict resolution is applied. Succinctly stated, we believe there are more 
similarities than differences when the Western structural, spiritual and social-psychological 
approaches are compared to Arab/Muslim principles and practices. It is, therefore, concluded 
that Hypothesis 2 is confirmed when my wide framework of comparative analysis is utilized. 
Nevertheless, while we have qualified more cross-cultural similarities than differences in 
terms of concepts, principles and tools, we do not wish to diminish the quality of divergences. 
Contrary, we emphasize that these divergences should be considered and respected. Our 
conclusion is simply that scholars frequently overstate cross-cultural divergences because of 
  
342 
 
the narrow comparative frameworks utilized. This is especially true when conflict resolution 
is contemplated at the higher levels. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The objective of the present chapter was to comparatively analyze conflict resolution, as 
articulated by Arab/Muslim scholars in the English language, to qualitatively measure its 
cross-cultural compatibility with our Western framework articulated. Our cross-cultural 
comparison is fundamental to counter scholarly criticism that conflict resolution is frequently 
implemented uncritically, while re-testing if Western theory and practices are radically 
different or inapplicable across cultures (noted in chapter five, section one). Concerning the 
latter, chapter five tests Hypothesis 2, which states that Western and Arab/Muslim 
conceptualizations of conflict resolution, as articulated in the respective literature, generally 
converge when a broad Western framework of conflict resolution is applied. Overall, our 
comparison demonstrates that there are copious lexical, theoretical and practical convergences 
across Arab/Muslim and Western cultures when comparisons incorporate the Western social-
psychological and spiritual approaches. 
Consequently, the theoretical advantage of our approach is its use of a framework that is 
wider than most when comparatively analyzing Western and Arab/Muslim theory. More 
specifically, we extend our comparisons beyond the Western structural approach, by 
integrating the social-psychological and spiritual approaches found in Western discourse. 
Despite Arab/Muslim scholars/practitioners’ occasional reference to Western theory 
associated with these schools of thought, for instance John Paul Lederach, they fail to justly 
articulate and contextualize any approach aside from the Western structural approach. The 
obvious theoretical exceptions, which are only mentioned to emphasize cross-cultural 
divergence, are the Arab/Muslim insistence that most Western scholars believe that a conflict 
can have a positive dimension and can be resolved. 
Aside from these references to conflict resolution and conflict transformation theories, no 
other theories or practices are deeply analyzed by Arab/Muslim comparisons. For example, 
the religious and/or social elements of these approaches are not mentioned. In short, 
Arab/Muslim literature written in the English language discount essential theory associated 
with the social-psychological and spiritual approaches through their crude reduction of 
Western theory to the structural approach. Such crude theoretical reductions diminish salient 
commonalities between Arab/Muslim and Western theory and practice. However, we re-
qualify the degree of cross-cultural commonality by comparing Arab/Muslim lexicon, 
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principles and practices with our broad Western framework, which includes the social-
psychological and spiritual approaches. In this manner, we are able to increase the number of 
similarities between Arab/Muslim and Western theory, by marginalizing several fundamental 
criticisms generally proffered by Arab/Muslim critiques. Accordingly, we challenge the 
theoretical assumption that Western and Arab/Muslim traditions of conflict resolution are 
incompatible or possess contradictory purposes. While this hypothesis stands when only the 
structural approach is considered, it is weakened when all three Western approaches are 
considered. 
The present chapter opened with a general overview of theoretical and practical 
differences between the Arab/Muslim and Western approaches according to Arab/Muslim 
scholars. The first section underscored how historical, religious and cultural nuances influence 
the way conflict, conflict resolution and peace are conceptualized and practiced by Arabs and 
Muslims. At this time, it was noted that Arab/Muslim culture is a “traditional” and “high 
context” culture, implying characteristics such as patriarchy, indirect communication and the 
prioritization of collective unity and interests over those of the individual. Among these 
divergences, we concentrated on how identity and religion influence the manner in which 
conflict resolution is conceptualized and practiced. Religion and identity were addressed 
because both points are commonly included in Arab/Muslim critical assessments of Western 
practices, and because such cultural norms are a consequence of the regional historical 
developments outlined in the first part of the thesis. 
In this context, it was first demonstrated that tribal/community based identity affects 
Arab/Muslim societal norms in numerous and complex manners. Most notably, conflict in the 
Arab/Muslim context is not limited to individuals directly involved, but is perceived to affect 
families or clans as a collective. Contrary, Western society is suggested to prioritize the 
individual. Since collective welfare is prioritized in Arab/Muslim culture, it has an impact on 
the means by which conflict resolution is conceptualized and practiced. Unsurprisingly, 
mechanisms for resolving conflict are implemented at the community level. Simultaneously, 
traditional principles utilized to advance conflict resolution have a well-established history 
and continue to be taught to children and observed across generations. The combination of 
traditions, religious decrees, principles and practices are self-reinforcing, ensuring that 
conflict continues to be managed or resolved at the community level. 
Traditional and religious norms likewise promote a balance between collective interests, 
justice and peace. For example, while Arab/Muslim culture accommodates retribution as a 
response to conflict, nonviolent resolution is preferred since communal welfare is prioritized 
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over the interests of the individuals/families immediately engaged in the conflict. Thus, 
conflicts are resolved for the benefit of the collective, while the interests of those engage in 
the conflict are relegated. As a consequence, Arab/Muslim implementation of conflict 
resolution at the community level is correctly noted as contradicting the Western structural 
approach. However, the social-psychological and spiritual approaches accommodate conflict 
resolution among communities or societies, a theoretical oversight found in most 
Arab/Muslim literature analyzed herein, since these Western approaches are usually 
marginalized during cross-cultural comparisons. 
Next, we established how Islam is an inextricable component of Arab/Muslim culture, and 
thereby of conflict resolution. Nonetheless, Islam, in combination with other cultural norms, 
prioritizes conflict resolution for the benefit of the collective, and delineates tools and 
principles of the process. Within Islamic teachings and practices, certain principles, including 
justice, truth and forgiveness, are emphasized as a means of restoring order to society and 
advancing justice. In cross-cultural comparative terms, religion is largely absent from the 
mainstream Western structural approach, while the Western spiritual approach theoretically 
accommodates religion in general, and religious principles, namely mercy and forgiveness, in 
particular. This actuality, however, is not acknowledged by most cross-cultural comparative 
analyses conducted hitherto. 
With religion and the level of approach addressed, focus then turned to defining relevant 
terms and concepts associated with conflict resolution theory and practice. Our comparative 
analysis of lexicon began with conflict. Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize conflict as a 
systemic, deconstructive, normal phenomenon, which can sometimes only be managed. Since 
conflicts are perceived to have a deconstructive and systemic nature, Arab/Muslim scholars 
suggest they be terminated or transformed at the collective level to prevent a continuation or 
escalation. While the degree of transformation possible depends on conflict particularities, for 
instance the referents and type of conflict, it was demonstrated that Arab/Muslim scholars 
perceive referents can circumvent conflict by (re-) learning to live in peace. In general terms, 
these conceptualizations of conflict correspond with those articulated in the Western literature 
review in chapters three and four. 
Deepening our analysis of conflict, we reviewed four cross-cultural differences commonly 
referenced in the Arab/Muslim literature. First, Western scholars are suggested to perceive 
conflict can have a positive dimension, a perception suggested absent among Arab/Muslim 
scholars. Our analysis, however, demonstrated there are discrepancies within the 
Arab/Muslim literature, since some Arab/Muslim scholars equally believe that conflict can 
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produce positive benefits. It was, nonetheless, noted in chapter three that many Western 
scholars perceive conflict has a (potentially) positive dimension, especially those that adhere 
to conflict resolution or conflict transformation schools of thought. 
Second, Western scholars are accused of perceiving conflict as limited to those directly 
involved, an unacceptable notion in Arab/Muslim culture since it contradicts the individual’s 
place within the community. Although the structural approach to conflict resolution in 
general, and Western culture in particular, is individualistic, and therefore frequently narrows 
focus onto those stakeholders immediately engaged, the social-psychological and spiritual 
approaches advocate the incorporation of society, including their interests and needs, when 
designing and implementing conflict resolution. Societal inclusion is, thus, accommodated by 
some Western approaches when conflict is being resolved or transformed at the intrastate and 
interstate levels. These scholars recognize that conflict impacts on society at large, and 
thereby requires social involvement and support to increase the changes that resolution will 
succeed. 
The third cross-cultural difference commonly referred by Arab/Muslim scholars when 
analyzing conflict, is that Western scholars frequently theorize that conflicts can be resolved. 
This conceptualization contradicts Arab/Muslim perceptions that conflict can be intractable 
and systemic. The assumption that most Western scholars perceive conflict can be resolved is 
rooted in the Western conflict resolution tradition, and its reference is one of the few times 
that a theory alternative to the Western structural approach is acknowledged in Arab/Muslim 
literature. Nevertheless, it was demonstrated that some Western scholars, such as Valerie 
Rosoux, acknowledge that conflicts can sometimes only be managed, and are thereby 
perceived as intractable. 
The final divergence in how conflict is conceptualized across cultures centers on honor 
and shame, both of which are essential components of Arab/Muslim culture, because honor 
impacts on identity and social status. Since conflict impacts on individual and family honor, it 
must be integrated when resolving conflict. By comparison, honor is not addressed forthright 
in Western conflict resolution literature, but I believe that its value is implied in principles 
such as regard. In this case, I concede that Western scholars do not forthright address honor, 
which therefore contradicts Arab/Muslim practice. 
To review how conflict is conceptualized across cultures, I believe that Arab/Muslim 
scholars can accurately state that there are significant cross-cultural divergences when crude 
and narrow comparisons are made with the Western structural approach alone. The structural 
approach marginalizes fundamental Arab/Muslim precepts such as society or religion. 
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However, at minimum, many differences are neutralized when a wide Western conflict 
resolution framework, which incorporates the social-psychological and spiritual approach, is 
utilized to make cross-cultural comparisons. Since the structural approach is not the only 
Western approach available, we believe that our wider framework provides a more 
appropriate structure by which to compare lexicon, principles and practices. 
The third section of our chapter began by analyzing terminology associated with 
resolution of conflict. It included the terms conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict 
transformation, reconciliation and peace. According to our literature review, conflict 
management appears to be understood as a minimal outcome of a resolution process where 
violent interaction is terminated, but root causes are not addressed and no transformation in 
perceptions or attitudes has taken place. Consequently, the Arab/Muslim conceptualization of 
conflict management shares many parallels with the Western conceptualization articulated in 
chapter three. 
The next concept analyzed was conflict resolution. While there are limited Arab/Muslim 
resources pertaining to the subject, and no precise definition of conflict resolution is available 
in the literature explored, three objectives are evident. Conflict resolution is designed to end a 
conflict, transform relations for the benefit of the community and restore honor of those 
involved. These objectives have their parallels in Western theory outlined in chapters three 
and four. Providing dimension to Arab/Muslim understanding of conflict resolution, Abu-
Nimer’s framework for conflict resolution was introduced. It depicts conflict resolution as 
consisting of three components: the head, hands and heart (3H). Abu-Nimer’s three 
components signify elements that must be transformed to advance conflict resolution. His 3H 
triangle corresponds to the Western conceptualization of cognitive transformation that 
contains a cognitive, behavioral and emotive aspect. Through transformation of the three 
aspects, both cultural approaches theorize that conflicts can be resolved and relationships 
altered to degrees that range from nonviolent coexistence to positive peace. In these instances, 
there are numerous similarities in how conflict resolution is conceptualized across 
Arab/Muslim and Western culture. 
While general conceptualizations of conflict resolution are shared, there are fundamental 
and important differences. For example, the characteristics and role of a mediator or third 
party sometimes contrast across cultures. On the one hand, Arab/Muslim tradition manages 
conflict within the community through elders and respected men whom have no specialized 
knowledge or skills in terms of conflict or its resolution. Moreover, inside-partial mediators 
function to terminate or resolve a conflict for the benefit of the community, while Islamic and 
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traditional norms guide their approach throughout the process. On the other hand, a Western 
approach preferences implementation by knowledgeable and experienced experts in the field. 
Equally problematic according to Arab/Muslim scholars, resolution in the West is usually 
implemented at the level at which the conflict has occurred. In this frame, and contrary to the 
Arab/Muslim approach, if two individuals were engaged in a conflict, attention in the West is 
centered on those immediately involved, whereas the Arab/Muslim approach to this same 
situation would resolve the issue at the family or community level. These are important 
theoretical differences, although their impact is marginalized when consideration is given to 
the social-psychological and spiritual approaches, and when conflict resolution is 
implemented at the intrastate and interstate levels. 
Because resolution is implemented at the familial or community level in Arab/Muslim 
tradition, conflict resolution at the individual, intrastate and interstate levels are relegated or 
nonexistent. More specifically, resolving conflict between individuals is accommodated at the 
group level, while alternatively, there are no traditional techniques of resolving conflict 
available to Arab/Muslim societies at the higher levels. The absence of practices for resolving 
intrastate and interstate conflict within the Arab/Muslim tradition makes it difficult to 
comparatively analyze approaches, and demonstrates a theoretical and practical void in 
Arab/Muslim resolution structures. The latter void prompts scholars to call for reform of 
traditional customs and practices, including a call to expand knowledge, tools and practices to 
enhance the Arab/Muslim conflict resolution framework. Although conflict resolution in the 
Arab/Muslim context is theorized and practiced at the group level, scholars insist that the 
same principles and practices are relevant at higher levels, while they advocate theoretical and 
practical reforms to improve traditional mechanisms at the group level and to expand practices 
into the higher levels. 
By comparison, conflict resolution in the West is applicable at four core levels: individual, 
group, intrastate and interstate. According to our wide framework, conflicts can be managed, 
resolved or transformed at all of these levels. The means and outcome, it is recommended, 
should be determined by conflict particularities, including the needs and interests of the 
stakeholders engaged. As such, Arab/Muslim tradition manages or resolves conflict at the 
group level alone, whereas Western practices can be implemented at multiple levels.   
Thereafter, conflict transformation and reconciliation were defined. While no clear 
definitions are available for either concept, a general understanding can be gleaned from the 
literature. Conflict transformation is articulated as a deep process that manages root causes of 
a conflict and changes behavior and perceptions of stakeholders. Arab/Muslim 
  
348 
 
conceptualizations emphasize the deep relational and structural changes necessary, whereupon 
the solidification of peacebuilding is secured and long-term constructive relationships 
established. The conceptualization echoes Western understanding noted in chapter three. 
By comparison, reconciliation is articulated as the formation of a new, stable, and 
cooperative relationship that manifests following structural, attitudinal and behavioral 
changes. Pursuing structural, attitudinal and behavioral alterations is a holistic approach that 
simultaneously addresses grievances and injustices to root amity. Nevertheless, Arab/Muslim 
references to reconciliation do not suggest that forgiveness is necessary, since positive or 
negative peace is accommodated. Reconciliation, as conceptualized in the Arab/Muslim 
literature, is thus comparable to that articulated in the West, as outlined in chapter three. 
Peace was the final concept defined in our review of conflict resolution lexicon. Although 
the term has multiple meanings in Arab/Muslim culture, conflict resolution scholars suggest 
peace is a state of harmony where God’s precepts are followed. Within this frame, peace is 
articulated as a sliding scale ranging from nonviolent coexistence to positive peace. On the 
one hand, positive peace depicts a just world where individuals obey Gods commands, 
forsake the use of violence and live in harmony. On the other hand, peaceful coexistence is 
when referents nonviolently live in close proximity. While Western scholars infrequently 
associated peace with religious faith, they depict peace in terms of a sliding scale. In this 
sense, both Arab/Muslim and Western scholars agree that peace can range from nonviolent 
coexistence to harmony, but Western conceptualizations generally minimize religion. 
Following our review of terminology, attention turned to qualifying and comparing some 
interconnected principles and practices advanced by Arab/Muslim scholars. The principles 
and practices outlined, among others, are hypothesized to be applicable at all levels of conflict 
resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition. During analysis, we juxtaposed these benchmarks to 
those examined in our Western framework. In this manner, it was possible to qualify many 
cross-cultural similarities and some divergences in theory and practice. 
The first principles and practices explored were peacemaking and negotiations. 
Peacemaking, or the act of ending violence, establishes a nonviolent environment where 
negotiations, or discussions, on divisive issues can be pursued to resolve the conflict. In the 
Arab/Muslim tradition, peacemaking practices are suggested to be the first steps toward 
resolving a conflict. Accordingly, cross-cultural perspectives converge in the general 
appreciation and acceptability of the principle. However, there are some cross-cultural 
divergences in terms of implementation. For instance, the West favors active listening while 
some Arab/Muslim scholars view such approaches as a sign of weakness. Discrepancies in 
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Arab/Muslim theory were also noted since some scholars advocate direct, face-to-face 
dialogue, while others suggest such measures could be perceived as offensive. Those holding 
the latter opinion contend that indirect approaches function better in Arab/Muslim society. 
Next, Arab/Muslim scholars view truth as an essential component of conflict resolution. 
Truth recounts the past for the purpose of acknowledging wrongs committed. It is thus 
utilized to direct justice. Islamic precepts heavily influence how truth is understood and 
practiced in the Arab/Muslim context. Nonetheless, aside from the direct reference to religion, 
the Arab/Muslim conceptualization of truth is comparable to that articulated in our review of 
Western practices, especially the social-psychological and spiritual approaches. 
Thereafter, justice was analyzed. It is an esteemed principle embedded in Islam, and is 
fundamental in Arab/Muslim day-to-day life. Acting justly is not only a command for 
Muslims in general, but identifying and responding to injustices is equally expected. As a 
social and spiritual value, justice is strongly associated with peace. In terms of conflict 
resolution, justice can be implemented in a restorative or retributive manner depending on 
conflict typology and stakeholders’ needs. In cross-cultural terms, there are many parallels 
across cultures, including the Western prioritization of justice, as well as means of 
implementation and its association with peace. 
Then, arbitration or retributive legal processes were explored. These can be conducted 
through a Sharia or contemporary judicial court systems, with referents frequently being 
permitted to choose. We concentrated primarily on the act of arbitration, which shares 
similarities across cultures, however, it was noted that some Arab/Muslim scholars do not 
believe that arbitration always produces just and sustainable outcomes. Instead, decision-
makers could pronounce fallible decisions, which risks aggravating or prolonging a conflict. 
Additional cross-cultural divergences manifest in the level at which arbitration is applied, the 
importance of Islam, and the qualities of the mediator. Hence, the principle is shared across 
cultures, while practices and associated parameters are subject to variation across cultures. 
The principles of amnesty and forgiveness were then analyzed. In essence, scholars 
emphasize that Islam and local cultural norms prefer violators be restored to the community, 
similar to the manner restorative justice is conceived in the West, as opposed to being 
subjected to retributive punishment. Scholars emphasize the need to balance justice with 
compassion, to ensure that justice is restored while harmonizing the practice with the 
expression of compassion. Therefore, amnesty and forgiveness are valuable measures to 
advance restoration of the individual. Interestingly, Arab/Muslim scholars articulate 
forgiveness as an act of empowerment because a victim has the authority to decide whether to 
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extend forgiveness. Although some Western scholars criticize amnesty and forgiveness as a 
component of conflict resolution at the higher levels, the spiritual approach embraces it when 
our broad Western framework is taken into consideration. By comparison, amnesty is 
practiced cross-culturally at all levels. 
Discussion of amnesty and forgiveness transitioned our attention to the principles of 
empowerment and consultation. Empowerment and consultation are suggested necessary to 
promote equality, justice and accommodation in the Arab/Muslim tradition. They broadly 
establish power symmetry and provide voice to effected stakeholders. Our review of Western 
theory likewise emphasizes the importance of empowerment, consultation and inclusiveness, 
recognizing their value for establishing and sustaining conflict resolution. 
The next principle and practice outlined was dialogue. While cross-cultural and 
intercultural divergence over how dialogue is appropriately defined or pursued exists, most 
Arab/Muslim and Western scholars agree that belligerents should come together to express 
their needs and desires in a symmetrical and respectful manner. Ultimately, the process should 
increase mutual understanding, which is expected to aid in the transformation of the 
relationship. Nevertheless, it was equally accentuated that while the principle is accepted 
across cultures, cultural differences in how dialogue is practiced are common. 
Afterward third party intervention was analyzed. While third parties are perceived 
favorably and utilized in both cultures, their functions are subject to divergences. For 
example, the Arab/Muslim approach is suggested to favor insider-partial interveners who have 
the capacity to influence and direct referents to achieve resolution. Contrary, in the West, 
neutral facilitation is usually prioritized, which indicate that facilitators impartially assist 
referents, the latter of which have absolute ownership and control over the process. 
Nevertheless, some Western scholars recognize the benefits of insider knowledge and close 
proximity to referents when engaging as a third party, and council that interveners should 
have intimate knowledge of the referents and conflict. A few simultaneously accept that third 
parties can pressure referents to resolve issues. 
Subsequently, the importance of the principle and practice of deeds, or behavior over 
rhetoric, was introduced. In the Arab/Muslim context, deeds are essential catalysts for a 
conflict resolution process. Actions substantiate rhetoric, demonstrating a capacity and 
determination to change the quality of a relationship in cognitive and behavioral terms. Hence, 
it is simply not enough to speak of change, but corresponding actions are required. A similar 
emphasis on deeds exists in the West, as articulated in Long and Brecke’s “costly signaling 
  
351 
 
model.” Long and Brecke’s model underscores the importance of action for instigating and 
maintaining momentum of a conflict resolution process. 
Afterward, the Arab/Muslim prioritization of collective benefit was juxtaposed against the 
Western preference for mutually beneficial solutions. Due to religious and cultural influences, 
conflict resolution in the former case is designed to benefit the collective rather than an 
individual. In some instances, settlements or resolution in Arab/Muslim society are 
asymmetrical depending on religious principles and traditions. More specifically, community 
interests and the precepts of Islam determine how conflicts are settled, as well as whether 
punishments are mandated; especially in instances were injustices violated Islamic creed or 
cultural norms. However, it is unclear how the principles of justice and mercy are balanced in 
instances of asymmetrical conflicts. In any event, Arab/Muslim scholars insist that their 
cultural approach contradicts the Western preference for “win-win” solutions. 
Then, the principle of compensation or restitution was explored. Its utility for conflict 
resolution is argued its capacity to restore honor and advance justice in the Arab/Muslim 
tradition. Both Western and Arab/Muslim traditions observe the principle of restitution, and 
both deploy associated practices, including the payment of reparations. Hence, Arab/Muslim 
and Western cultures conceptualize and practice this principle similarly. 
Finally, the flexibility of Arab/Muslim conflict resolution was noted. It was here 
demonstrated that some communities are adapting and integrating non-traditional approaches 
into their traditional resolution frameworks to create hybrid systems. Through hybridity, 
systems become more accommodative and flexible, which allows them to be utilized by any 
referent, and deployed singularly or in tandem, meeting the interests and needs of 
stakeholders. It is argued that hybrid systems demonstrate the flexibility and openness of 
Arab/Muslim conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the structures are flexible insomuch as Islam 
permits. Changes made or alternative techniques utilized cannot subjugate or infringe on 
Islamic law or traditions. By comparison, some Western scholars emphasize flexibility when 
conceptualizing conflict resolution. Most notably, Western scholars recommend conflict 
resolution programs be specifically tailored to meet the diverging needs of affected 
stakeholders, which implies flexibility and accessibility in terms of principles and practices. 
Amalgamated, the comparative analysis of principles and techniques demonstrates 
overwhelming cross-cultural convergences on the principles themselves, although there are 
some noteworthy divergences in how these principles are implemented. It is here that the 
Arab/Muslim criticisms leveled against Western practices resound; especially concerning the 
latter’s mechanistic and individualistic natures, as well as their omission of religion. For 
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example, the role of active listening or third party intervention is commonly cited 
contradictions across these cultures. In these instances, the basic principles are shared but 
standard practices sometimes diverge. Since the principles are shared, I will later argue that 
cross-cultural commonality should be further examined whereupon symmetrical and mutually 
acceptable approaches could be designed to use across cultures. The flexibility of both 
Western and Arab/Muslim practices suggest dialogue could be conducted, and that a degree of 
adaptation is possible. 
Overall, it is concluded that there are many cross-cultural similarities in terminology, 
principles and in practices, when Arab/Muslim conflict resolution approaches are compared to 
our wide Western framework. Parallels in principles comprise, but are not limited to, the 
prioritization of truth, justice, mercy, empowerment, respect and peace. Among the practices 
shared are dialogue, arbitration, reparations, arbitration, negotiation and amnesty, to name a 
few. However, we acknowledge that there are some discrepancies in the manner in which they 
are implemented across cultures. 
Despite drawing the conclusion there are many similarities across cultures, we contend 
that Western interveners/stakeholders should respect cross-cultural divergences. Respect 
means that Arab/Muslim political, cultural and religious practices be valued and 
accommodated through processes of consultation and inclusion. In cross-cultural situations, 
this requires Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution be treated as equally 
valuable and relevant. Hence, it is our recommendation that the similarities described herein 
should not be inferred, or exaggerated, but rather they should be examined on an individual 
basis and considered to demonstrate that there are more similarities in how conflict resolution 
is conceptualized and practiced than divergences. Nevertheless, through mutual consultation 
and dialogue, we believe that it is possible to preclude imposition of principles and practices 
while simultaneously empowering stakeholders. The literature examined emphasizes that 
empowerment increases popular support through meeting needs, interests and promoting 
social involvement. 
The section analyzing conflict resolution closed by denoting scholarly calls for reform 
traditional conflict resolution theory and practice in Arab/Muslim culture. Due to existing 
weaknesses, such as the absence of a conflict resolution practices that function at the higher 
level, reform is advocated. Through modifications and alterations of existing structures, it is 
thought that Arab/Muslim practices could increase their potential, while tools and practices 
are updated and/or created for managing or resolving conflict at all levels. Types of reform 
suggested include increased education among leaders of all levels and the general population, 
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proliferation of skills, and revisions of traditional practices. As part of the reformation 
process, scholars suggest that external practices could be examined, adopted and adapted to 
increase cross-cultural compatibility and eliminate the need to reform and construct 
Arab/Muslim resolution structures from the ground up. However, government and religious 
leaders’ interference, general apprehensiveness toward change, and a lack of resources, 
among other issues, stymie reformation. Overcoming these challenges, scholars argue, is 
important and necessary to improve upon the existing conflict resolution system at all levels. 
Subsequent to examining Arab/Muslim principles and tools, the last section of the chapter 
reviewed the Arab/Muslim practice of the sulh. Our analysis was designed to demonstrate 
how conflict resolution is practiced at the community level, and to reiterate specific principles 
and practices. The sulh is an ancient traditional conflict resolution technique utilized at the 
community level, and is available in two forms: public and private. The essential difference 
between the two is whether information regarding the perpetrator and deeds are disclosed. In 
either case, the sulh process begins when the jaha, an assembly of influential community 
members, is requested, or decides, to intervene to terminate and resolve a conflict. Following 
their formation, the jaha negotiates a truce, using shuttle negotiations between the conflicting 
families. Once a truce has been established, a fact-finding mission is undertaken to determine 
what occurred, and then to decide the terms of a settlement. The settlement is designed to 
compensate victims, while restoring order to the community and honor to affected 
stakeholders. 
The jaha has significant influence and can pressure referents into the process and/or 
impose resolution terms. In either case, once terms of settlement have been established, a 
public ceremony is held to signify resolution of the conflict. The ceremony is followed by a 
meal hosted by the offending family. Both the ceremony and the meal demonstrate to the 
community that the conflict has been resolved or transformed. Within this frame, sulh 
outcomes range from nonviolent coexistence to the extension of forgiveness. Overall, the sulh 
process reinforces principles outlined above, including truth, justice, mercy and honor. It 
similarly utilizes many of the same techniques including peacemaking, dialogue, arbitration, 
reparations and forgiveness, to name a few. 
Notwithstanding its advantages, the sulh has several weaknesses. Most notably, it does not 
deal with the root causes of the conflict, and thereby sometimes produces only negative peace. 
Failure to address root causes implies that conflicts could reappear and that structural issues 
remain. Additionally, the jaha has the authority to influence the process for the benefit of 
community. The social pressure applied hinges primarily on shame, whereby referents’ lack 
  
354 
 
of cooperation dishonors their family in the eyes of the community. In such instances, a 
referent may not agree to the resolution or its terms, but feels obliged to do so to preserve 
their family honor. Among other weaknesses, it was noted that a sulh process is not open to 
individuals outside the community and it does not function at the intrastate or interstate levels 
in its existing format. However, it was noted that some U.S. military commanders utilized 
similar, albeit unofficial, techniques when conflict resolution was necessary during the 
occupation of Iraq. It was equally highlighted that some Arab/Muslim scholars advocate the 
sulh be adapted for utilization at the higher levels to fill the existing practical void. Such 
alterations would require scholars and religious experts to contemplate and design a hybrid 
system that could accommodate the higher level, as well as external actors. 
Pursuant the delineation of conflict resolution as conceptualized by Arab/Muslim scholars, 
which is primarily designed to resolve conflict at the community level, and the demonstration 
that Arab/Muslim and Western traditions share many concepts, principles and practices 
(confirming Hypothesis 2), we turn our attention to investigating how conflicts are managed 
or resolved at the higher levels. In the next chapter, we comparatively analyze conflict 
resolution at the interstate level utilizing a convenience sample of laypersons’ from the United 
States and Iraq to determine convergences and divergences at the micro-level across 
respective cultures.  
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Chapter 6 Survey of Cross-Cultural Perceptions of 
Conflict Resolution: Questionnaire Design, 
Methodology and Findings 
 
Following the mapping of U.S.-Iraq conflict relations since 2003, and the exploration of 
conflict resolution in Western and Arab/Muslim culture, we hypothesize that bilateral conflict 
resolution should be explored to transform U.S.-Iraq relations. Transformation is argued 
essential for countering the probability of a continuation of violence between the United 
States and Iraq. Unfortunately, scholars hitherto have failed to address U.S.-Iraq bilateral 
conflict resolution outright, and most literature associated with Iraq emphasizes national 
reconciliation. While I believe that national reconciliation is crucial and necessary for 
stabilizing Iraq in social and political terms, the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations, I believe, are 
equally significant. In short, I hold that the United States has a moral obligation and 
geopolitical interest in establishing a nonviolent, symmetric and amicable relationship with a 
sovereign Iraq. The violent relationship between these two entities suggests that this process is 
necessary. 
To address outstanding grievance and the ruptured relationship between the U.S. and Iraq, 
and recalling the theories outlined in part two of this thesis, we argue that bilateral conflict 
resolution should be explored since scholars believe that animosity and grievances will persist 
between belligerents engaged in a conflict unless measures are taken to alter perceptions and 
behavior. In this frame, and because Western scholars frequently emphasize the importance of 
inclusion and consultation of society when theorizing about conflict resolution, we measure 
respondents’ receptiveness to, and the perceived applicability of, particular principles and 
tools outlined in our conflict resolution theoretical framework. Through survey research, it is 
possible to qualify respondent openness to principles and practices deemed applicable at the 
interstate level, and in this manner, we circumvent imposition of techniques by stakeholders 
and/or third parties. In essence, our survey empowers a group of respondents from both 
countries to articulate their perceptions of conflict resolution at the interstate level and how 
they believe it is most appropriately pursued. 
The objective of chapter six is, therefore, to qualify laypersons’ conceptualization of 
conflict resolution at the interstate level. To this end, a survey is conducted to understand how 
a small convenience sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens conceptualize resolution between two 
countries. The questionnaire asks respondents about their opinions of conflict and conflict 
resolution in general, and then examines tools and principles for promoting conflict resolution 
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between two countries as well as in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Once 
data is collected, it is analyzed and compared in two manners: across samples and vis-à-vis the 
Western and Arab/Muslim literature. The theoretical value of our survey research is twofold. 
Firstly, it allows us to make cross-cultural comparisons of laypersons versus scholars’ 
opinions when resolving conflict between two states, and layperson versus laypersons’ 
opinion across cultures. The research, therefore, increases our understanding of how conflict 
resolution between two countries is conceptualized at the micro level, while testing 
Arab/Muslim and Western theoretical assumptions outlined in part two of this research. 
Through our survey, we are able to qualify both convergences and divergences in how 
laypersons across the two samples generally conceptualize conflict resolution at the interstate 
level, and can compare those with our literature review. Secondly, our survey provides 
preliminary insight into how laypersons’ conceptualize conflict resolution in the context of 
U.S. and Iraq. More specifically, we embark on an exploratory examination of stakeholders’ 
opinion of conflict resolution in the case of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. By narrowing 
our analysis to this particular case, we are able to gauge respondents’ openness to a conflict 
resolution program in this context, and to determine which tools respondents perceive as 
acceptable. 
Our utilization of survey research at the micro level makes a theoretical contribution to 
contemporary conflict resolution discourse because it introduces laypersons’ perceptions of 
conflict and conflict resolution. Ironically, Western scholars emphasize the importance of 
inclusion and consultation of society when resolving conflict, however, scholars and 
policymakers seldom incorporate the practice. The introduction of laypersons’ opinion 
temporarily shifts discourse away from conventional generalizations (West versus 
Arab/Muslim approaches), and focuses it explicitly on our sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens. 
Consequently, we can juxtapose general scholarly understanding of conflict resolution with 
opinions expressed by our samples isolated to one instance. Since the primary concern of this 
research is on how the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations might be altered, it is logical that we 
restrict our analysis to these stakeholders. 
Combined, research findings elucidated in the present chapter test four hypotheses. Firstly, 
Hypothesis 3 states that a majority of U.S. and Iraqi respondents from our research sample 
will similarly embrace sixteen conflict resolution principles. Next, Hypothesis 4 states that a 
majority of those same respondents will support a selection of eleven tools applied at the 
interstate level. Our hypotheses are tested by providing respondents with a condensed list of 
principles and practices deemed relevant in the context of United States and Iraq relations. 
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Subsequently, Hypothesis 5 is tested. It states that following decades of deconstructive and 
violent relations between the United States and Iraq, confirmed in the first part of our thesis, 
and exemplified by the 2003 Iraq War and occupation, a majority of respondents from our 
convenience samples will agree that conflict resolution is necessary to improve contemporary 
U.S.-Iraq relations. To test this hypothesis, respondents are queried about whether or not they 
would support conflict resolution between the two countries. Finally, Hypothesis 6 suggests 
that a majority of our research participants will predominantly agree on thirteen conflict 
resolution tools to transform the quality of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Allowing 
respondents to rate the acceptability of particular tools in context directly tests the hypothesis. 
With these in mind, the chapter is designed as follows. 
We open by exploring the potential of a conciliatory move by the U.S. following the 
election of Barack Obama as U.S. President. Scholars and laypersons initially perceived his 
election as an opportunity of altering U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. More 
specifically, it was perceived that Obama would be more conciliatory when interacting with 
other countries than his predecessor. The assumption was instigated by Obama’s conciliatory 
rhetoric. Obama rhetorically made references to qualitative alterations in the manner in which 
the United States interacted with Arab/Muslim countries, however, no significant changes 
manifest during his presidency. As a consequence, the need to improve U.S.-Iraq relations by 
pursing conflict resolution at the structural and societal level continues to be relevant. 
 With this in mind, and in recognition that some steps have been implemented to improve 
U.S.-Iraq relations subsequent to the invasion and occupation, we explore techniques 
implemented as modes of advancing conflict resolution between these two countries. While 
exploring tools utilized hitherto, we explain how our questionnaire was designed. Our 
evaluation of conflict resolution practices used up to this point begins with a reference to the 
non-exhaustive list of tools outlined in Appendix one. The list of conflict resolution tools was 
extracted during the course of our research. Using the list in the Appendix, we extract from 
the literature which measures have hitherto been deployed to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq 
relations during and after the occupation. Our comparative analysis demonstrates that 
structural approaches have been prioritized, for example political and economic cooperation, 
while social-psychological aspects of conflict resolution have received a marginal degree of 
attention. Recalling theory from the previous part of our research, some scholars argue that 
conflict resolution needs to occur at the societal and structural level to root and institutionalize 
change. In this instance, it appears that more bottom-up modes should be implemented in 
tandem with the structural tools. 
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The creation of a draft questionnaire begins with a dichotomous classification of conflict 
resolution tools from Appendix 1 as either relevant or irrelevant in the case of U.S.-Iraq 
relations. Combined, thirty-seven practices extracted from Appendix 1 were deemed relevant 
in context, but for the sake of designing a questionnaire, mechanisms were further reduced to 
the eleven most recognizable and contextually relevant conflict resolution mechanisms 
according to pilot participants. Once mechanisms were condensed through piloting, the 
selected tools were combined with conflict resolution principles extracted from part two of the 
thesis to create a questionnaire. While explaining which tools were selected and which were 
not, we simultaneously outline the development of the research questionnaire, including its 
composition and piloting. 
The third section of this chapter outlines survey methodology. Here we provide an 
overview of how the questionnaire was launched and implemented. It similarly outlines 
research ethics, target populations and distribution. Then, we address crucial research 
weaknesses, including our small n-sample and the inability to have the survey translated into 
the Arabic language. Thereafter, data collection, compilation, and testing of reliability are 
explained. Following this methodological assessment, we introduce our research findings. 
When comparatively analyzing the research data, the survey is broken down into five 
segments. These include: the general conceptualization of conflict; general perception of 
conflict resolution principles; general perceptions of conflict resolution tools; perceptions of 
the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and occupation; and conflict resolution tools in the context of 
contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations, respectively. As we analyze respondents’ perceptions across 
our samples on these issues, their opinions are simultaneously compared with the literature 
review conducted in part two. Survey findings confirm that many of the cross-cultural 
compatibility articulated above in the literature review are shared by laypersons. In addition, 
our survey findings also raise several theoretical and practical issues. Most importantly, there 
are instances where scholarly conceptualizations of conflict and conflict resolution (across 
cultures) are not reflected in the opinions of our research sample. These anomalies introduce 
questions that require additional cross-cultural research. 
6.1 Potential for conflict resolution 
Anne-Marie Slaughter argued in 2008 that George W. Bush’s successor should 
acknowledge that the United States government had “made serious, even tragic, mistakes in 
the aftermath of September 11” (Slaughter, 2008). Slaughter recommends this 
acknowledgement to demonstrate U.S. political humility, self-criticism, and a desire to 
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transform its foreign policy approach, which she theorizes would demonstrate U.S. respect for 
international opinion and norms (basic human rights and international law) and augment 
declining international sentiment (Slaughter, 2008). Admission of wrongdoing and the 
qualitative transformation associated with a public admission were theorized to positively 
impact on international opinion of the United States following more than a decade of 
aggressive U.S. foreign policy perpetrated during the global war on terror. From this 
perspective, the 2009 inauguration of Barack Obama as U.S. President presented an 
opportunity for qualitative and practical alteration of U.S. foreign policy and international 
standing. 
The propensity for qualitative change in international sentiment was initially anticipated 
since Obama was rhetorically softer when articulating his foreign policy, especially regarding 
Middle East-U.S. relations, by comparison to George W. Bush (BBC News, 2009; Feste, 
2011: 2-21; Obama, 2009b). For instance, during a speech to U.S. Marines in 2009, Barack 
Obama (2009c) asserted that the United States and Iraq “can build a lasting relationship 
founded upon mutual interests and mutual respect.” A similar conciliatory reference to macro 
level relations was made during a speech to an audience in Cairo, Egypt in June 2009, when 
Obama (2009a) acknowledged that the “cycle of suspicion and discord [between 
Arab/Muslims and the United States] must end”. To circumvent the trends of discord and 
suspicion denoted, Obama emphasizes the need for “a sustained effort to listen to each other; 
to learn from each other; to respect one another; and to seek common ground” (Obama, 
2009a). These quotes make it clear that Obama recognizes the need for alteration of bilateral 
perceptions and behavior, and the creation of a symmetrical relationship with countries in the 
Middle East. Simply stated, President Obama demonstrates acute awareness of the importance 
of the cognitive and behavioral components of U.S.-Middle East bilateral relationships and 
their importance for transforming the quality of contemporary bilateral relations (Feste, 2011: 
17-22). Obama’s message seemingly acknowledges the need to resolve the long-standing 
deconstructive relationship between the United States and Arab/Muslim countries in the 
Middle East in general, and the necessity for both parties to demonstrate willingness and 
capacity to transform as a means of altering interstate perceptions and behavior. 
Arab/Muslims throughout the Middle East welcomed Obama’s message of conciliation in 
Cairo (BBC News, 2009; Feste, 2011: 13). Anticipation of change was reinforced in Jakarta, 
Indonesia in November 2010, when Obama again spoke of his determination to alter the 
manner in which his administration interacted with Arab/Muslims (Obama, 2010a). A further 
example was provided when his administration released the 2010 National Security Strategy 
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(NSS), which echoed the non-confrontational and accommodating tone. Barry Buzan (1991: 
331) defines a national security strategy as a policy “that focuses on reducing the 
vulnerabilities of the state.” Obama’s NSS objectives emphasize the importance of “soft 
power” techniques available to the United States for pursuing its national interests (Obama, 
2010b: 16)78. One soft policy tool articulated in the NSS is “Strategic Communication” 
(Obama, 2010b: 16). 
The NSS explains strategic communication in the following manner: 
Across all of our efforts, effective strategic communications are 
essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims. 
Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibility that must 
be fostered by a culture of communication throughout government. We 
must also be more effective in our deliberate communication and 
engagement and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, 
grievances, and concerns of peoples—not just elites—around the world. 
Doing so allows us to convey credible, consistent messages and to 
develop effective plans, while better understanding how our actions will 
be perceived. We must also use a broad range of methods for 
communicating with foreign publics, including new media (Obama, 
2010b: 16). 
The concept of strategic communication, as outlined in the quote, affirms the Obama 
administration recognizes: a) the importance of accommodating indigenous needs in terms of 
U.S. foreign relations; and b) the importance of transforming relations, including the need to 
adjust behavior. 
Accordingly, strategic communication is Obama’s preferred technique of institutionalizing 
the qualitative changes deemed essential to improving U.S. bilateral relations and 
international opinion of the United States (Obama, 2010b: 16). Nonetheless, embarking on 
such transformative endeavors requires popular and political support for the program, since 
approval and societal buy-in is essential to generate tangible alterations in perceptions and 
behavior, whereby bilateral transformation can be rooted and institutionalized within relevant 
structures and society (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 62; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352; Feste, 2011: 9-13; 
Lederach, 1995: 18). Advancing this depth of conflict resolution at the interstate level is, 
however, challenging. It is challenging primarily because individual leaders can advocate a 
particular policy, but they have a limited capacity to aggregate political and public support for 
                                                          
 
78 Joseph Nye (2002) speaks of “hard” and “soft power.” Hard power incorporates coercive measures, or sticks, 
used by a government to coerce or force desired change on an adversary. Comparatively, soft power employs 
persuasive methods, or carrots, to entice change rather than coerce. Generally speaking, soft power tactics offer 
long-term potential because they are slower to produce results, while hard power tactics provide short-term 
solutions with faster results (Nye, 2002). 
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that program (Feste, 2011: 9). Concerning the latter, and as outlined in the second part of our 
research, absent popular support, the probability of achieving conflict resolution is reduced. 
While its reasons cannot be qualified, Barack Obama’s conciliatory rhetoric lessened over 
time and there has been a general failure to implement the behavioral and relational changes 
articulated. In the context of U.S.-Iraq relations, the asymmetrical power balance between Iraq 
and the United States has continued throughout Obama’s presidency. For instance, U.S. 
political interests eclipsed those of Iraq on April 8, 2011 when Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates advised the GOI that U.S. troop presence would only be extended beyond December 
2011 if the GOI made a formal request and met specific U.S. conditions (Timberg, 2011). 
Although the GOI had been discussing deferment of a full U.S. military withdrawal scheduled 
for December 2011, for the purpose of continuing U.S. training of the ISF, the GOI 
simultaneously expressed its unwillingness to extend legal immunity to those same U.S. 
troops (Brennan and others, 2013: 13; Katzman, 2012: 38-39). Absent the extension of 
immunity, however, President Obama declined to grant an extension since U.S. soldiers 
would be legally accountable for their actions while deployed beyond 2011 (Brennan and 
others, 2013: 13; Katzman, 2014: 34-35). Equally influential to the decision to withdraw U.S. 
troops was Muatada al-Sadr’s threat to mobilize the Mahdi Army if the United States military 
were not removed (Katzman, 2014: 11, 34). In both cases, U.S. self-interest (notably its desire 
to circumvent soldiers’ accountability and prevent a re-emergence of the insurgency) trumped 
GOI interests (the continued training of the ISF) regardless of the implications the decision 
might have on the political and social stability of Iraq. Therefore, U.S. interests continued to 
offset those of Iraq, demonstrating the relationship between the United States and Iraq 
remained asymmetrical. 
Since there was no obvious behavioral change in U.S. foreign policy following the 
election of Barack Obama, there was a decline in the approval of Barack Obama among 
Iraqis, as qualified by a 2010 poll (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 25; Slaughter, 2008: 1-3). 
As Obama (2010b: 16) implied in his rhetoric, concrete steps are necessary to demonstrate 
that the United States government is willing to acknowledge past wrongdoing and change its 
modes of interaction with Arab/Muslims communities. His failure to reinforce initial rhetoric 
with deeds, a fundamental component of Arab/Muslim conceptualization of conflict 
resolution, and outlined above, resulted in a decline of popular support. In essence, Obama 
had been expected to improve cross-cultural relations between the U.S. and Iraq, but he failed 
to take concrete steps that would alter public opinion in Iraq or the Middle East. For this 
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reason, conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq remains necessary and relevant 
at the micro level. 
Analyzing bilateral relations through this conceptual lens, we hypothesizes that an 
adaptation of U.S. bilateral approach, in particular a reduction or avoidance of policies and 
tools that would be perceived as negative, threatening or violent by Iraqis, remains valid. 
Behavioral alterations, as Obama acknowledges, should be one component of a process of 
transforming the quality of U.S. and Iraq relations. Our recommendation for alteration in 
behavior is deduced from the expectations that such efforts would establish a congenial 
environment where relational symmetry could be established for building trust, stabilizing 
cooperation, reducing tensions and minimizing the perceived utility of violence (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 18; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359; Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 4-7). A recent 
example of bold move toward interstate conflict resolution implemented by Barack Obama is 
his December 2014 announcement that U.S. relations with Cuba would undergo alteration 
(Obama, 2014). This move modifies decades of hostility and sanctions between the two 
countries (Renwick, 2014) and appears to be supported by citizens of the United States (Latin 
America Working Group, 2012: 1). A similar approach, we hypothesize, is necessary in 
regards to U.S.-Iraq relations, and U.S.-Middle East relations, and we believe would pay 
dividends if determination and commitment were demonstrated. 
Recalling our findings from chapter 2, Iraqi animosity and distrust of the United States 
exists (section 1) and scholars suggest under comparable conditions, conflict resolution should 
be pursued (section 4) (Funk and Said, 2004: 1-24). We believe that the potential for pressing 
further toward conflict resolution exists. For instance, although Iraqi respondents expressed 
“unfavorable” opinions of the U.S. in 2008, that same research found respondents were not 
adverse to certain types of cooperation and assistance (ABC News and others, 2008: 5)79. 
However, research specifically directed at evaluating receptiveness to conflict resolution, or a 
spectrum of techniques in this particular case have not been conducted to the author’s 
knowledge. We seek to fill this theoretical void. 
As noted in chapters 3 and 4, conflict resolution is determined theoretically possible at the 
interstate level in the West, with Long and Brecke (2003: 119) suggesting events are “turning 
points in the relations of the belligerents.” Unfortunately, the authors conclude that alterations 
                                                          
 
79 Comparable findings are observable in Pakistan, a country where the United States suffers a severe and 
persistent deficit of trust and has a dismal approval rating (Pew Research Center, 2013: 12-14). Despite, 64% of 
respondents “consider[ing] the U.S. an enemy,” citizens of Pakistan remain open to cooperation according to 
their terms. For instance, Pew Research Center (2013: 14) found that 53% of respondents from Pakistan desire 
U.S. “financial and humanitarian aid in areas where extremist organizations are active” and 44% “want the U.S. 
to provide intelligence and logistical support to Pakistani troops fighting extremists.” 
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are more likely to occur if the belligerents live in close proximity (Long and Brecke, 2003: 
114). According to this finding, the great geographic proximity between Iraq and the United 
States reduces the probability of conflict resolution being pursued (Long and Brecke, 2003: 
114). However, the United States government accentuates the importance of the Middle East 
to U.S. geopolitical interest, and the United States maintains a persistent presence in the 
region, which suggests that the United States will be engaged in the region for the foreseeable 
future (Iraq Study Group, 2006: 2). We, therefore, concluded that U.S. geopolitical interests 
reduce the significance of close geographical proximity since U.S. interaction in the region is 
expected to persist. 
Upon this theoretical foundation, we examine the potentiality of cross-cultural conflict 
resolution at the interstate level in general and in context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Our micro 
level study deploys a survey to measure laypersons’ conceptualization of conflict and conflict 
resolution principles and practices. Survey design, methodology and findings are respectively 
articulated in the following sections. 
6.2 Questionnaire design and piloting 
Since Western theory and practice dominate conflict resolution in international relations, 
indigenous opinion and techniques in non-Western countries are often marginalized or 
completely subordinated (Irani, 1999: 1-5; Lederach, 1995: 16-17). As a result, imposition of 
external theory and practices at the intrastate and interstate level is common; despite the 
increased probability imposition has on a program being perceived as inappropriate or 
unacceptable by those upon whom the program is forced (Irani, 1999: 1-5). This possibility is 
especially salient in asymmetrical relations. Due to the asymmetrical tendencies of the U.S.-
Iraq relationship, we contend that policies and tools perceived as unwanted, negative, 
threatening or violent by Iraqis should be avoided because such practices undermine public 
support and the overall viability of conflict resolution (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 23-25). 
To enhance symmetry, scholars argue that stakeholders’ opinions should be qualified to 
determine the acceptability of principles and practices of conflict resolution, whereby 
individuals are empowered, their needs are met and local ownership is ensured (Funk and 
Said, 2004: 22-26; Irani, 1999: 1). 
In this spirit, our survey objectively seeks to qualify stakeholder opinion to determine 
which principles and practices of conflict resolution are deemed acceptable in the context of 
transforming interstate relations between the United States and Iraq. Insight obtained from our 
findings thereby gives respondents a voice to decide which principles and practices are 
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mutually acceptable. We believe that such consultation not only provides insight into tools, 
but illustrates a willingness to engage the other in equal partnership and to take their opinion 
into consideration, as scholars such as Funk and Said (2004: 22-26) or Hinds and Oliver 
(2009: 3-30) recommend. There is also theoretical value since our survey allows us to qualify 
laypersons’ conceptualization of conflict resolution at the interstate level, whereupon 
comparisons can be made across samples as well as with scholarly theory. 
The literature review conducted in chapters 3 through 5 traces how Western and 
Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize conflict resolution in the English language, identifying 
associated concepts, principles and tools. Several benchmarks extracted from that review are 
used to create a questionnaire qualifying if a sample of respondents from Iraq and the United 
Our questionnaire is designed to test four working hypotheses. 
Firstly, Hypothesis 3 states that a majority of U.S. and Iraqi respondents from our research 
sample will embrace a preponderance of sixteen conflict resolution principles. Similarly, 
Hypothesis 4 states that a majority of respondents from both countries will support a majority 
of eleven conflict resolution tools utilized at the interstate level in general. Our hypotheses are 
tested by providing respondents with a condensed list of principles and practices deemed 
relevant in the context of conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq, and asking 
them to rate their degree of approval or disapproval. In addition, Hypothesis 5 states that 
subsequent to decades of deconstructive relations between the United States and Iraq, 
exemplified by the 2003 Iraq War, a majority of respondents from our convenience sample 
will agree that conflict resolution is necessary to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. 
Lastly, Hypothesis 6 states that a majority of our research participants will predominantly 
agree on thirteen conflict resolution tools (truth commissions, inquiries, reparations) to 
transform the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations. Approval or disapproval of these practices is 
qualified by asking respondents to rate the acceptability of tools in context. 
To test the four inter-connected hypotheses, a preliminary questionnaire was drafted. Its 
contents were designed from principles and concepts elicited from part two, and from the non-
exhaustive list of 59 conflict resolution tools found in Appendix 1. Concerning the former, 
many concepts, principles and benchmarks were extracted from our theoretical framework of 
conflict resolution, as articulated in chapters three through five. In this manner, concepts and 
terminology can be evaluated and compared across our samples of laypersons, and between 
laypersons and scholarly theory. Concerning tools, Appendix 1 was developed during the 
course of our research by recording conflict resolution tools utilized at the interstate level as 
referenced in the literature. The list of tools was then analyzed to determine which have been 
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used in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations and which have not been used but are 
perceived valuable. Combined, our list of mechanisms, in conjunction with numerous 
benchmarks extracted from part two, serves as the foundation whereupon our questionnaire 
was designed. 
Figure 6 Evaluations of Tools in Context of U.S.-Iraq Context 
hitherto applied appropriate irrelevant 
aid/assistance 
economic cooperation 
establishing channels of 
communication 
formal agreements or 
treaties 
gestures of solidarity 
joint 
institutions/cooperation 
joint projects/ 
reconstruction 
military signaling 
official state visits 
political cooperation 
security cooperation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
selected  omitted  adjudication 
arbitration 
holding new elections 
mutual recognition 
opening borders 
peaceful partition 
legal/political reform 
release of political 
prisoners 
symbolic restoration 
vetting government 
refraining 
apologies 
international tribunals 
promoting religious and 
cultural awareness 
restitution/reparations 
third party intervention 
truth commissions 
 
archiving testimonies  
amnesty 
exchange of 
representatives 
face-to-face encounters 
films/documentaries 
good governance and 
accountability 
joint or hybrid tribunals 
joint memorials or 
ceremonies (events) 
legislative admission of 
wrongdoing 
opening archives and 
records 
peace education 
regular joint meetings  
(re)writing history 
special courts 
theatre and storytelling 
traditional methods 
travel/tourism 
workshops/dialogue 
media 
criminal trials  
reintroduced to 
measure openness 
continued security 
cooperation 
an Iraq and U.S. inquiry 
into the war 
economic cooperation 
political cooperation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
untimely 
art, dance and music 
asking for forgiveness 
awards and scholarships 
entertainment and sports 
memorials/monuments 
(structures) 
modifying educational 
curriculum 
museums 
parks 
revising text books 
 
 
Figure 6 categorizes overlapping conflict resolution tools in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. 
The left hand column contains those tools hitherto used. The next column lists those that deemed appropriate 
and are included in the research. The third column lists those identified as useful but not included in the study 
for reasons outlined below. Finally, the far right column holds those tools that were deemed irrelevant to U.S.-
Iraq relations or unattractive in this particular context.  
    
 
After extracting several important concepts (conflict, conflict resolution), theoretical 
assumptions (a conflict can be resolved, or two countries can resolve a conflict), and 
principles (truth, justice) from chapters three through five, attention turned to creating a list of 
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tools that promote conflict resolution that are viable and easily recognizable in the context of 
U.S.-Iraq relations. To this end, each tool in Appendix 1 was first analyzed by the researcher 
and organized into three broad categories depicted in Figure 6: tools “hitherto applied,” those 
deemed “appropriate” and those “irrelevant.” Once classified by the researcher into the three 
categories, and because the survey would be administered across cultures, it was essential to 
validity to select tools and concepts that were easily recognizable and were projected to share 
meaning across target populations (Johnson, 1998: 11-29). Hence, the number of tools had to 
be reduced to a manageable quantity while maintaining relevance in context and cross-cultural 
validity. To accommodate this qualitative and quantitative reduction, pilot research was 
conducted to reduce those tools deemed “appropriate” into a manageable and recognizable 
selection for our questionnaire. Further explanations for why conflict resolution tools were 
categorized in the manner expressed in the figure above, in conjunction with practices 
associated with research piloting (participant selection), are provided in the following 
subsections. 
6.2.1 Tools hitherto utilized 
Conflict resolution tools found in Appendix 1 that have been implemented hitherto in the 
context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations are listed in the left hand column of Figure 6. 
Mechanisms placed in this category were identified through a literature review and are 
accounted for as follows. Foremost, the George W. Bush administration initiated tools to 
improve the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations during the occupation. Attention was initially 
confined to the structural level through “security”, “economic” and “political cooperation,” as 
articulated in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (National Security Council, 2005). In 
2008, the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation 
between the United States and the Republic of Iraq enhanced the administration’s efforts to 
improve bilateral relations and institutionalize cooperation between the governments of Iraq 
and the United States (Brennan and others, 2013: 60-64; Katzman, 2014: 39; Strategic 
Framework Agreement, 2008). Those agreements were followed by the Security Agreement 
(in effect between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2011), which dictated complete transfer 
of sovereignty to the GOI and imposed restrictions on unilateral U.S. military operations in 
Iraq (Brennan and others, 2013: 65-66). The combination of agreements established the 
framework for bilateral relations between the U.S.-Iraq, and several of their components 
remain in effect (Katzman, 2014: 39). 
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In conjunction with the structural practices denoted, cooperation at the societal level has 
also been established, including a joint cultural and educational collaborative framework. As 
of October 2009, five Joint Coordination Committees (JCCs) had been founded for the 
purpose of enhancing bilateral cooperation between institutions in the United States and Iraq 
(Department of Defense, 2010: 39). JCC committees collaborate on: “economic and energy 
cooperation; cultural, educational, and scientific cooperation; services and information 
technology cooperation; law enforcement and judicial cooperation; and political and 
diplomatic cooperation” (Department of Defense, 2010: 39). JCC’s cooperative framework 
across these sectors, denoted by the DOD quote, includes both structural and societal level 
approaches, and is still being utilized at the time of writing (Department of State, 2014; 
Katzman, 2014: 39). While beneficial for enhancing cooperation and trust, it was denoted that 
mainly structural approaches alone are unsatisfactory for generating and rooting conflict 
transformation at the societal level (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259). Social 
participation is essential; as we demonstrated in chapter two that the quality of relations have 
impacted on society in both countries, suggesting that transformation of societal perceptions 
and behavior is similarly necessary. Moreover, it is unclear how citizens from both countries 
view the existing arrangements, since there is no indication that the publics were consulted.  
In addition to these measures, other conflict resolution tools have been implemented, as 
listed in the “hitherto applied” category of Figure 6. More specifically, acts signaling 
improved relations have occurred. Acts of signaling encompass the multiple “official state 
visits” by representatives from Iraq and the United States. For example, Vice President Joe 
Biden met with Iraq’s leaders on several occasions in 2009 and 2010 (Department of Defense, 
2009; Katzman, 2014: 39; Miles, 2010). Reversely, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki traveled to 
the United States to meet with Barack Obama in 2011 and 2013 (BBC News, 2013). 
Likewise, representatives from both countries have signaled “gestures of solidarity” and 
emphasized the need for bilateral cooperation. On the one hand, President Obama (2011) 
commented that the United States “will be proud to stand with” Iraq “as a steadfast partner.” 
On the other hand, Ayad Allawi publicly advocated an increase in U.S. assistance with Iraq’s 
national reconciliation program, suggesting, at least in certain instances, he perceives 
cooperation with the United States essential to improving social-political conditions inside 
Iraq (Fadel, 2010). In conjunction, channels of communication have been established at 
multiple levels, including the appointment of Vice President Biden as special envoy (Quinn, 
2009; Ryan, 2010). To these channels of communication, we can also re-list the regular state 
visits and the establishment of JCCs (Department of Defense, 2010), as outlined previously. 
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Next, “military signaling” occurred gradually. The U.S. first reduced troop activity in Iraq, 
handing over responsibility for security to ISF, and thereafter, U.S. troops assumed a training 
role until complete troop withdraw in 2011 (Logan, 2011). Transition of security 
responsibility was partially dictated by the 2009 Security Agreement, which limited unilateral 
U.S. military operations in Iraq unless otherwise requested by the GOI (Brennan and others, 
2013: 65-66). Although U.S. military forces were permanently removed in December 2011, a 
contingent of trainers have returned at the request of the GOI to train Iraq’s forces to fight IS. 
The expected duration of their deployment is unclear. 
Finally, Iraq and the U.S. cooperated on “reconstruction” and “joint projects” throughout 
the occupation (Bowen, 2013: 37-113). Reconstruction and joint projects are observable in 
United States activity including the allocation of financial assistance in grants and loans to 
Iraq to underwrite multiple (joint) infrastructural/reconstruction projects (Bowen, 2013: 37-
113); assistance with conducting political elections at the local and national levels (Bowen, 
2013: 105-108); and, the introduction of legal reform and legislative revision, the latter of 
which was purported to advance accountability, fairness and transparency within Iraq’s 
judicial framework (Bowen, 2013: 101-104). While the noted tools have encountered varying 
degrees of success, and are subject to criticism (outlined in 1.3.3.3), the GOI eventually 
assumed absolute control over respective projects and institutions (Bowen, 2013: 28). In 
summary, tools which prepare the way for conflict resolution which have been utilized 
hitherto include aid/assistance, economic cooperation, establishing channels of 
communication, formal agreements or treaties, gestures of solidarity, joint 
institutions/cooperation, joint projects/ reconstruction, military signaling, official state visits, 
and political and security cooperation have been utilized to alter the quality of U.S.-Iraq 
relations. It should be noted, however, that although all of these mechanisms have been 
implemented in context, several were copied into the “appropriate” category of Figure 6, to 
provide our survey participants an opportunity to rate their acceptability as practices. In this 
manner, we can gauge if our samples value these tools in general terms, an in the context of 
contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. 
6.2.2 Tools excluded in context 
The right hand column of Figure 6 contains tools deemed “irrelevant” and “untimely” in 
the context of U.S.-Iraq relations, and was categorized as such for two broad reasons. On the 
one hand, eleven mechanisms were determined nonviable because of their lack of substance 
or applicability in context. For example, peaceful partition, arbitration, holding new elections, 
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social shaming, symbolic restoration or vetting, among others, are inapplicable for resolving 
U.S.-Iraq conflict relations. While some were utilized at the intrastate level (new elections, 
social shaming, vetting), the tools are irrelevant when contemplating U.S.-Iraq relations. On 
the other hand, nine additional tools were determined untimely. Those deemed untimely 
include the arts, adapting the educational curriculum or textbooks, offering educational 
awards and scholarships, and establishing parks or memorials, all of which are deemed 
inappropriate gestures in the absence of more discernible enterprises. The latter set is, 
therefore, deemed irrelevant momentarily, but these recognized tools could be reconsidered in 
the future to pave the way for transformation following more tangible efforts being pursued. 
6.2.3 Piloting the survey 
Following the reduction of conflict resolution mechanisms identified in Appendix 1 into 
the three categories, the 37 tools listed in the “appropriate” columns of Figure 6 were reduced 
to eleven core mechanisms utilizing piloting to filter the quality and quantity. Piloting was, 
nonetheless, not only beneficial for reducing techniques to the most recognizable, it was 
equally useful for evaluating and improving our questionnaire quality in terms of 
composition, layout and wording (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266; Krosnik, 1999: 541). 
Piloting occurred in three stages between September 2010 and March 2011 in Innsbruck, 
Austria. The three phases included 10, 10, and 5 pilot participants respectively. Pilot 
participants were selected from a convenience sample that consists predominantly of U.S. 
study abroad students in Innsbruck, and expatriates living in the area, whose acquaintance 
were made through the Austro-American Society Innsbruck. Lastly, 5 personal acquaintances 
were contacted in the United States to increase the number of pilots without a university 
degree. 
One primary weakness of piloting was the inability to locate participants from Iraq. 
Despite three attempts to network through an acquaintance employed at the U.S. Embassy in 
Baghdad, the researcher was unable to pilot more than one citizen from Iraq. Consequently, 
pilot participants consist of twenty-four U.S. citizens and one citizen from Iraq. Pilot 
participants in general have diverse educational and social backgrounds. Participants included 
one degree-seeking employee at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, while U.S. pilots contain ten 
degree-seeking undergraduates, nine with Masters, and five blue-collar workers. Our pilot 
sample consists of fifteen male participants. Their age ranges are 18-25 (n = 6), 26-35 (n = 6), 
and 36-45 (n = 3). Ten females likewise participated. Their ages are 18-25 (n = 3), 26-35 (n = 
4), and 36-45 (n = 3). 
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All potential pilot respondents consented to participation after being contacted by the 
researcher. The anonymity of participants was ensured, and for the purposes of 
confidentiality, each was assigned a Pilot Number (1-25) according to their order of 
participation. Pilot surveys were administered using face-to-face interviews, face-to-face 
survey completions (n = 20) and email correspondence (n = 5). Face-to-face interviewing 
occurred at the convenience of the pilot participant, at a time and location they selected. 
Locations for interviewing included the Innsbruck university library (n = 7), in someone’s 
residence (n = 8), in a park (n = 2) or restaurant (n = 3), and online (n = 5). The average 
duration of the interviews was 60 minutes for the first ten pilots, 30 minutes for the second 
group, and 15 minutes for the third set. The five internet-based questionnaire completions 
were conducted by forwarding a draft survey to a respondent, allowing the pilot to complete 
the survey and provide additional feedback. 
The three stages of piloting complimented each other in terms of content and presentation, 
as detailed below. During the first phase, face-to-face semi-structured interviews included an 
electronic draft of the survey with 130 open questions. We also provided a printed chart of 5, 
7 and 11 point Likert Scales for rating items, such as conflict resolution principles and 
practices, should the participant request. The researcher preferred the Likert scales due to their 
ease of construction, utilization and reliability (Bertram, 2007: 7). However, we initially used 
open-ended questions to understand how pilots would respond to the questions and to obtain 
potential answers should closed questions be integrated into the survey. 
As stated, the primary objective of the first and second piloting phases was to narrow 
questions and tools to a manageable number. Survey questions during the first phase 
contained 37 potential tools for advancing conflict resolution, 16 principles and included 
questions pertaining to general perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution as extracted 
from the literature review. Pilot participants were given two opportunities to rank this list of 
tools: once in general terms at the interstate level and in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq 
relations. This two-fold approach allowed us to compare if pilot participants accepted or 
rejected certain principles in general and in the case of the U.S. and Iraq. 
During phase one face-to-face interviews, the researcher presented questions orally and 
answers were elicited. Pilots were encouraged to not only provide answers to the questions, 
but also to critique questions and provide general feedback on potential responses, question 
wording and so forth (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). As participants responded, the 
researcher took digital notes (see Appendix 6). Since the researcher read the questions from a 
computer, grammatical and lexical corrections were made in real-time for the purpose of 
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ensuring clarity. Although phase one preliminary interviews were time consuming and only 
conducted in English, their advantage is their semi-structured nature that allowed participants 
freedom of response and the opportunity to interact with the researcher (Oppenheim, 2008: 
184-185). Nonetheless, pilot responses tended to be curt, and they seldom provided in-depth 
insight into their opinions even when the researcher tried to elicit additional information. In 
most instances, it appeared that the respondents had not given much thought to conflict or 
conflict resolution prior to their agreement to participate.  
After ten individuals had been piloted, data and feedback obtained from each semi-
structured interview were comparatively analyzed and harmonized to reduce the number of 
questions and improve the draft questionnaire. More specifically, several tools were combined 
(criminal trials, hybrid tribunals) to reduce, what respondents perceived was, repetition in the 
survey. For example, respondents felt that criminal trials and tribunals could be combined, 
thereby reducing duplication. In addition, virtually all of the first ten pilots recommended the 
introduction of a permanent rating scale rather than open-ended questions, which respondents 
found time consuming and exhausting. Nonetheless, the improvements generated from the 
first pilot group increased the quality of the questionnaire’s content and design since issues 
and response categories that might have otherwise been overlooked or omitted were elicited 
(Oppenheim, 2008: 184-185). 
Subsequent to the first stage of piloting, it was also determined that open-ended questions 
should be avoided for four reasons. First, it would be challenging to code and translate 
responses (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266; Oppenheim, 2008: 101-102). Second, closed 
questions increase statistical reliability and validity, making it easier to make comparisons 
across samples (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). Third, a structured questionnaire would 
assure standardization of the survey process, guaranteeing the same questions were asked in 
the same manner from all respondents (Schaeffer and Maynard, 2001: 579). Fourth, while the 
first ten pilot participants recognized the value of open-ended questions, they overwhelmingly 
(80%, n = 8) expressed discontent with the amount of time required to complete the survey 
when expected to produce every answer. While closed questions limited the potential range of 
responses (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266; Oppenheim, 2008: 101-102), their advantages 
outweighed their disadvantages in regards to the present research. Consequently, a printed 
survey with closed questions was produced for the second phase of piloting. 
In terms of reducing the conflict resolution tools, the first ten pilots’ preference for 
techniques, in a general context, gravitated around fifteen of the thirty-seven potential 
practices incorporated into the draft survey. Among those, economic cooperation, truth 
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commissions and apologies were unanimously embraced over other tools, namely amnesty or 
peace education. It was also clear that some tools were vague and less recognized. In several 
cases, respondents had to request a definition for particular tools, such as hybrid tribunals, 
military signaling or joint commemorations. Requests for definitions prolonged the duration 
of the interview and indicated that numerous mechanisms were obscure to laypersons. 
However, these obstacles were expected, as one of the goals of piloting was to select tools that 
respondents recognized and felt were beneficial to advancing interstate conflict resolution. 
One nearly unanimous complaint expressed by pilot participants during the first phase was 
the length of the survey. This complaint was expected, since there were 37 tools that needed 
to be reduced. The theoretical and practical issues faced were how to reduce survey length to 
limit respondent fatigue (Krosnick and others, 2002: 382), while preserving research value 
and reliability. To reduce the length of the pilot survey, it was decided to temporarily remove 
the rating of principles. Likewise, as noted elsewhere, techniques were reduced to 31, because 
respondents considered six tools overlapping or redundant and were, therefore, combined. 
With the slightly condensed version of the draft survey complete with closed questions and 
scales, phase two piloting began. 
During phase two, eighty topic-related questions with Likert Scales (with “two fixed 
points”) were provided (Hinken, 1998: 109-110; Saris and Gallhofer, 2007: 118) on a printed 
questionnaire administered by the researcher. During this phase of piloting, attention remained 
largely centered on reducing the remaining 31 conflict resolution mechanisms to eleven and 
evaluating the viability of Likert scales. The ten participants were again encouraged to answer 
the question posed and provide feedback as they worked through the questionnaire. To 
improve the clarity and presentation of each survey, vocabulary and grammar mistakes 
identified during piloting were corrected between pilot participants, although no content 
changes were made. 
Combining the results from the first two pilot groups, thirty-one conflict resolution tools 
were reduced to eleven that were easily recognized by pilot participants and suggested 
beneficial for altering conflict between two countries. Table 1 indicates the number of 
acceptances and rejections each tool received during the first and second phases of piloting. 
Our findings led to the reduction of tools to eleven. Increased analysis as to why techniques 
were accepted or rejected is provided in sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4. Survey responses and 
comments acquired from the second phase of piloting are available in Appendix 7. 
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Table 1 Rating of Conflict Resolution Tools from Piloting Phases 1 and 2 
conflict resolution tools phase 1 phase 2 outcome 
 support reject support reject supported rejected 
third party intervention 10 0 10 0 ✓  
security cooperation 2 8 10 0 ✓  
political cooperation 1 9 10 0 ✓  
reparation payments 6 4 7 3 ✓  
court (or judicial) proceedings 5 5 10 0 ✓  
public apology 6 4 6 4 ✓  
economic cooperation 10 0 10 0 ✓  
truth telling/commission 7 3 8 2 ✓  
cultural exchanges/awareness 7 3 6 4 ✓  
positive media coverage 10 0 9 1 ✓  
international tribunals 6 4 5 5 ✓  
gestures of solidarity 4 6 0 10  ✗ 
official state visits 3 7 0 10  ✗ 
joint institutions/cooperation 5 5 1 9  ✗ 
military signaling 5 5 0 10  ✗ 
joint projects/ reconstruction 5 5 2 8  ✗ 
archiving testimonies 0 10 0 10  ✗ 
granting amnesty 2 8 0 10  ✗ 
exchange of representatives 3 7 0 10  ✗ 
face-to-face encounters 0 10 0 10  ✗ 
films/documentaries 0 10 0 10  ✗ 
good governance and accountability 2 8 0 10  ✗ 
joint or hybrid tribunals 1 9 0 10  ✗ 
joint memorials or ceremonies 0 10 0 10  ✗ 
peace education 0 10 1 9  ✗ 
regular joint meetings 2 8 0 10  ✗ 
(re)writing history 0 10 0 10  ✗ 
theater and storytelling 0 10 0 10  ✗ 
traditional methods 0 10 0 10  ✗ 
travel/tourism 1 9 0 10  ✗ 
legislative admission of wrongdoing 0 10 0 10  ✗ 
opening archives and records 0 10 0 10  ✗ 
showing forgiveness 3 7 added as a question in final draft 
economic assistance 10 0 merged with economic coop. 
channels of communication 10 0 merged with political cooperation 
treaties and formal agreements 8 2 merged with political cooperation 
special courts 1 9 merged with court proceedings 
workshops 5 5 
merged with cultural exchanges and 
interaction 
 
Table 1 qualifies pilot participants’ aggregated approval or disapproval of conflict resolution tools from phases 
one and two piloting. It demonstrates that the first eleven practices were widely supported, while the remainder 
was predominantly rejected. The last six tools were merged, as indicated, following phase one to reduce 
repetition within the survey. 
 
In addition to reducing the number of tools, pilot participants in the second phase also 
made recommendations to enhance the quality of the questionnaire. In terms of scales, seven 
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out of ten second phase participants preferred Likert Scales with at least 7 options, and there 
was unanimous preference for the 11-point scales when rating principles and tools. 
Respondents found, as the literature suggests, that Likert Scales were easy to use, they 
ensured parsimony, and provided sufficient flexibility in response (Hinken, 1998: 109-110; 
Saris and Gallhofer, 2007: 118). Next, participants assisted with the rewording and overall 
presentation of questions to increase flow and understandability. Recommendations were also 
made concerning grammar and lexicon. Simultaneously, respondents recommended adding 
alternating background colors on the question sets to increasing legibility. 
In terms of criticism, the most prominent complaint gravitated around survey length. Six 
out of ten participants perceived the questionnaire was “too long”, averaging 35 minutes, and 
another complained that it was “entirely too long.” However, respondents realized that the 
final survey would naturally be reduced since the primary objective of second phase was to 
aid in the reduction of mechanism included into the final draft. Equally valuable, phase two 
pilot participants suggested that brief definitions for concepts such as “conflict resolution” be 
added. They also recommended that short descriptions for mechanisms be introduced into the 
survey to ensure (cross-cultural) clarity and validity. Through the provision of definitions, 
participants felt that all respondent doubt and confusion would be significantly reduced. 
Following content adaptations made subsequent to phases one and two piloting, including 
the reduction of the number of tools and the introduction of definitions for relevant terms, five 
additional pilot probes were conducted to evaluate the final draft of the questionnaire. Pilots 
during phase three concentrated on the presentation and style of the survey. Hence, focus was 
placed entirely on the aesthetics of the survey, understandability, grammar and general 
presentation. Their survey responses are available Appendix 8. 
Overall, phase three participants expressed positive feedback on the structure and 
presentation of the questionnaire. For instance, the eleven-point rating scale were commonly 
praised and respondents enjoyed alternating between Likert Scales, finding they contained 
clear symmetrical, easy-to-use response ranges (Johnson, 1998: 17; Krosnik, 1999: 544). 
Similarly, pilot participants unanimously agreed that the definitions provided were useful, and 
only 1 of 5 pilot respondents expressed concern about the survey length (averaging 18 
minutes). However, at this stage, four out of five respondents criticized the inclusion of the 
“don’t know” response category, which no pilot participant had utilized hitherto. They 
recommended this category be eliminated. Aside from removing the “don't know” responses 
from the survey, only minor corrections were made to question wording. 
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Subsequent to making the necessary alterations after the third phase piloting, the 
questionnaire was finalized in early 2011. As a means of quality control, the researcher 
contacted the political science department of the University of New Orleans in the U.S. state 
of Louisiana to have the finalized survey reviewed by a methodology professor. A university 
representative recommended Assistant Professor Dr. Matt Jacobsmeier, who was teaching 
research methodology and political science courses at the time, be contacted. Contact with Dr. 
Jacobsmeier was made via email. The researcher had no prior affiliation with the assistant 
professor. Upon initial contact, Dr. Jacobsmeier (2011) agreed to review the questionnaire and 
draft research methodology in early February 2011. His response came on March 28, 2011, 
recommending minor structural changes to several questions and the re-introduction of the 
“don’t know” category throughout the survey (which had been removed during the third 
phase) (Jacobsmeier, 2011). 
The former suggestions were promptly addressed. By comparison, Dr. Jacobmeier’s 
(2011) latter recommendation raised a theoretical issue within survey literature, namely that 
scholars disagree over the relative utility of “don’t know” categories in surveys and its effects 
on research validity. Krosnick and others (2002: 396), for example, argue that: “Inclusion of 
no-opinion option” does “not reliably improve the quality of the data obtained.” They go on to 
criticize the inclusion of no opinion “systematically encourages low-education respondents to 
avoid the effort of deciding how to answer the question, thereby reducing the impact they 
have on survey results” (Krosnick and others, 2002: 398-399). As emphasized in the quote, 
their inclusion is hypothesized to induce respondents’ random selection of answers on topics 
they have not given much consideration (Krosnick and others, 2002: 372). Since the literature 
suggests the inclusion of the “don't know” category is problematic for the reasons stated 
above, and no pilot participants had utilized them, but rather criticized their inclusion, and 
since Likert Scales with clear neutral positions were provided, it was decided not to re-
introduce the “don’t know” categories in the final draft of the survey. 
In terms of methodology, Dr. Jacobsmeier (2011) denoted the inherent difficulties of 
acquiring a high n-value with no funding, assistance or possibility of traveling to the United 
States or Iraq. He thus suggested I attempt to solicit assistance with survey distribution. 
Simultaneously, he recommended that should both sample populations remain small, I should 
weigh my samples through purposeful (or quota) sampling whenever possible (Jacobsmeier, 
2011). Quotas are used to target respondents according to particular stratum as a means of 
increasing the representativeness of the sample (Jacobsmeier, 2011; Patton, 2002: 46; 
Schofield, 1996: 36). For instance, if female respondents outnumbered male respondents, an 
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increased number of males should be purposefully sampled to create a more representative 
sample. Quota sampling, he argued, would be one potential means of controlling for over-
representation of respondents according to gender, age or education (Jacobsmeier, 2011). 
However, as articulated later, this valuable methodological insight was difficult to implement. 
With piloting methodology delineated, our attention turns to demonstrating how piloting 
affected the contents of the final survey. The following two subsections explain why and how 
the researcher categorized tools from Appendix 1 into Figure 6, and summarizes pilot 
participants’ opinion on the tools during the first two phases of piloting. 
6.2.4 Thirty-seven potentially applicable tools 
Several criteria were used to determine which conflict resolution tools noted in the 
“appropriate” category of Figure 6 would be included in the research. Foremost, it was 
imperative to include techniques that were recognized by pilot participants. With the increased 
ease of identification it was hypothesized respondents would have a higher probability of 
possessing a basic understanding of each tool, which in turn would enable them to form an 
opinion about their relative utility for improving relations at the interstate level. Second, the 
researcher wanted to integrate tools spread across the spectrum, including structural, societal-
based, as well as restorative and retributive justice techniques. Through diversification, it 
would be possible to comparatively analyze how respondents perceived the array of tools in 
general terms and in then in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Finally, the research wanted to 
test Irani’s (1999) hypothesis about the general acceptability of certain techniques commonly 
utilized at the international level. This section outlines those tools extracted from Appendix 1, 
and deemed applicable in context. 
The tools located in the “omitted” sub-column of the “applicable” category of Figure 6 
were excluded for the following combination of reasons. First, “legislative acknowledgment” 
of wrongdoing and the “opening of archives” were excluded due to the actions of the U.S. 
Congress between 2001 and 2014. For instance, Congress has been criticized for not doing 
enough to prevent the war or to objectively investigate wrongdoing after-the-fact (Amnesty 
International, 2008; L. Fisher, 2003: 389-390). Although Amnesty International (2013: 14-18) 
has emphasized the importance of U.S. government accountability in relation to the war in 
Iraq, no discernible actions have occurred hitherto. For example, no senior ranking military or 
government representative has been held responsible for the promotion of the 2003 invasion 
or wrongdoing associated with implementation. By way of example, Paul Wolfowitz, one 
staunch advocated of the invasion and promoter of its necessity, has not been held to account 
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and instead was installed as President of the World Bank between June 2005 and June 2007 
(Cassidy, 2007). 
To its credit, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2014) publicly released a 
condemning report in December 2014, criticizing CIA detention and interrogation techniques 
deployed during as a part of the Global War on Terrorism. It is doubtful, however, that justice 
in this instance will be pursued against individuals involved with the design and 
implementation of such policies. We, therefore, deem it unlikely that the U.S. government 
will make any efforts at ensuring accountability, providing legislative acknowledgment or 
opening of agency archives in the short-term, since such tools require congressional support. 
For similar reasons, congressional (in)actions underscore the non-viability of practices such as 
“good governance and accountability” which were equally omitted for the reasons 
enumerated. Confirming our reservations, most pilot participants rejected these practices as 
displayed in Table 1. They likewise did not perceive the United States government would 
budge on such issues. 
Next, justice based tools, such as the “prosecution of criminals” or the use of “special 
courts” (retributive), and offering “amnesty” (restorative), appeared biased and impractical 
initially in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. On the one hand, the United States demand the 
immunity of its citizens at the hands of foreign governments and international institutions, and 
the Strategic Framework Agreement (2008) contains blanket immunity for U.S. citizens 
serving in Iraq80. On the other hand, it was not expected that Iraqis would (or should) offer 
amnesty to U.S. government representatives or its citizens who committed wrongdoing during 
the 2003 War and subsequent occupation, since they were reluctant to do so with criminal 
wrongdoing committed under Saddam Hussein (International Center for Transitional Justice 
and Human Rights Center, 2004: 51). Since the war was preventive, and the arguments posed 
for its necessity were erroneous (for example the possession of WMD) (Carty, 2011: 80; 
Johansen, 2004: 4; Kepel, 2004: 197-198; Lieberfeld, 2005: 3; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 
223; Roy, 2007: 13; Tripp, 2007: 273), it was deemed morally inappropriate and potentially 
offensive to refer to the granting of amnesty until the truth is told and wrongdoings are 
documented. Interestingly, we found during piloting that U.S. citizens were equally offended 
by these references. For example, 14 out of 20 pilot participants suggested that the inclusion 
of criminal trials in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations was offensive, and they argued that their 
                                                          
 
80 The U.S. government’s determination to prevent prosecution was demonstrated when it intervened to prevent 
Blackwater’s private security employees from being prosecuted in Iraq for their actions in the 2007 shooting of 
civilians in Nisoor Square (Chen, 2009; 101-106). Eventually, Blackwater employees involved in this incident 
were tried and convicted in the United States in October 2014 (Apuzzo, 2014). 
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inclusion implied that wrongdoing had been committed. It was, therefore, determined that 
reference to criminal trials would be sensitive to both sample populations, and that their 
reference risked inducing non-response by offending respondents (Tourangeau and Yan, 
2007: 860). For this reason, these were eliminated from the final draft. 
Thereafter, “traditional methods” were excised from the research for several reasons. 
Foremost, Kilcullen (2009: 169) asserts that the sulh is not open to foreigners. Next, the sulh 
is a mechanism utilized at the familial or clan levels and is inapplicable at the interstate level 
(Pely, 2009: 82-83). The final reason that traditional mechanisms were omitted was due to the 
inherent challenges of reducing complex practices, such as the sulh, to one or two sentence for 
the purposes of creating a definition or explanation for survey respondents. During piloting, 
definitions were provided orally to all respondents because none recognized traditional 
methods. Once defined, no pilot participant favored its inclusion. 
By comparison, “travel/tourism” was excluded since pilot participants unanimously 
recognized the difficulties of traveling between the United States and Iraq. Most notably, it is 
improbable that travel and tourism will take root in Iraq in the short-term until internal 
stability has been established. Travel and tourism was thereby determined premature. 
Nevertheless, the potential value of travel for enhancing mutual awareness in the future is 
recognized (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 34; Boulding, 1978: 63). Simultaneously, “face-to-
face” meetings, such as those between war veterans, and the building of “casual relationships” 
or (student) “exchange programs,” were equally excluded for corresponding reasons. 
However, we wish to highlight that independent organizations, such as “Right to Heal,” 
sponsor activities of this nature between Iraq and the United States (Brooks and Cassano, 
2013), and there is a JCC centered on cooperation in the field of education, so their value is 
recognized and some limited measures are underway, nonetheless, pilot participants 
overwhelmingly rejected these tools. 
“Peace education” (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 20-26; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 226) 
and community “workshops” (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 217; R. Fisher, 2001b: 26; Maoz, 2000: 720-
723) were difficult to dismiss since they seek to transform perspectives and to impart skills at 
the societal level. However, due to their obscure nature, their inclusion required detailed 
definitions that would have increased survey length and the probability of respondent fatigue, 
which in turn would have a negative impact on research validity and reliability (Krosnick and 
others, 2002: 382). Moreover, a clear majority of pilot participants were unaware of peace 
education, and pilot participants recommended merging workshops into cultural exchanges, 
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although we recognize that both are, in reality, stand-alone tools that generally target diverse 
groups. 
A similar obstacle was encountered with the inclusion of creating and maintaining 
“archives and testimonials.” Few participants were aware of archiving and testimonial 
collection, few pilot participants supported it, and many concluded that the processes would 
be inextricably linked to truth commissions rather than stand-alone mechanisms. 
Summarizing pilot opinion, most believed archives and testimonials are a linear product of a 
trial or truth commission. Archiving and documenting testimonials were, therefore, excluded. 
Correspondingly, “joint meetings” and the “exchanges of representatives” were unpopular 
during piloting. They were thus jettisoned in favor of re-introducing the general practices of 
“economic, political and military cooperation,” which are already in use in the case of U.S.-
Iraq relations. In short, a majority of participants perceived that the tools of joint meetings and 
exchanges fit neatly under the rubric of economic, political and military cooperation. Lastly, 
“rewriting history,” “joint commemoration or ceremonies,” “theatre,” “story telling,” “films 
and documentaries” are equally useful alternative tools for advancing conflict resolution that 
are focused at the community level. However, these were rejected since most pilot participants 
lacked a general knowledge of these practices, and those whom recognized them, prioritized 
alternative tools. One astute pilot participant suggested that the inclusion of these lesser-
known tools risked “making light” of their real potential to transformation relations (Pilot 
Number 12, 2010). Hence, due to their obscure nature, and their potential of being 
misinterpreted by those unfamiliar with their processes, these tools were excluded from the 
final survey.  
After explaining why some tools were excluded, the next subsection explains why 
individual tools were included in the final draft of the survey. 
6.2.5 Selected conflict resolution tools 
As elaborated above, numerous criteria aided in the selection of the eleven primary tools 
incorporated into the final draft of the research survey. Four our research purposes, the tools 
selected had to be applicable in the U.S.-Iraq context, easily recognizable across cultures, and 
supported by pilot participants. The present subsection details why the eleven mechanisms 
selected were deemed most applicable. We begin our analysis with the structural practices, 
including cooperation in “security,” “economic” and “political” terms. These were added 
since they are common conflict resolution practices at the interstate level. Moreover, they are 
currently in use in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. With this in mind, their inclusion in the 
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survey provides laypersons an opportunity to rate the practices in general and in context. 
Furthering this position, a clear majority of pilot participants accepted the structural practices 
in general and in context. They were easily recognizable among our pilots. 
Next, “third party intervention” was included because the U.S., NGOs and IGOs have 
been actively involved in Iraq at the intrastate and interstate levels. These actors have engaged 
with local stakeholders through strategies including brokering negotiations on contentious 
issues, assisting with national elections, hosting interstate dialogue, and have been engage 
with meeting the needs and representing interests of internally displaced persons in Iraq 
(United Nations, 2012: 4-12). The researcher wanted to qualify openness to third party 
intervention in terms of interstate conflict resolution. Furthermore, most pilot participants 
recognized that third parties frequently intervene in conflicts and determined third party 
intervention was one of the most easily recognizable and commonly utilized of the 
mechanisms included in the draft survey. 
Thereafter, justice based tools were integrated into the survey, including restorative and 
retributive techniques. The relative utility of justice mechanisms, including its retributive and 
restorative forms, is noted in the Arab/Muslim and (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 247; International 
Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 25; Özçelik, 2007: 8-10) 
Western literature (Anderlini and others, 2004: 1-2; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; Rouhana, 2004: 36). 
Nonetheless, to minimize respondent bias and the potential of non-response, we did not 
incorporate trials for criminal wrongdoing, since it was feared Iraqis would take offense. 
Likewise, and noted above (6.2.3), reference to criminal trials were eliminated due to the 
sensitive nature of the question, as many pilot participants argued the inclusion of such tools 
were accusatory and inflammatory to U.S. respondents. In short, U.S. pilot participants felt 
the reference implied that wrongdoing had been perpetrated, and no consensus could be 
reached on restructuring or rewording of the question. 
Our piloting found that a majority of respondents involved in the first two phases were 
open to “judicial proceedings” and “international tribunals” in general, and more than half 
advocated restorative tools, namely “reparations,” “truth commissions” and “apologies”. This 
combination of justice-based mechanisms were included because pilot participants recognized 
the tools, and found the techniques less offensive in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations than 
direct references to amnesties or criminal trials, which respondents perceived implied guilt. 
We also incorporated “reparations” (Brooks and Cassano, 2013) and “truth commissions” 
since international organizations (Amnesty International, 2008) and scholars (Benjamin, 
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2008: 5, 11; Galtung, 2009: 140; Gareau, 2004: 231) advocate their use81. Similarly, a 2006 
survey found that a majority of Iraqis (86.3%) embraced the idea of compensation being paid 
to those harmed by coalition forces (Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies, 2006: 19), 
a call more recently echoed by media conglomerate Aljazeera USA (Brooks and Cassano, 
2013). Similarly, truth commissions were advanced as a potential tool to advance transitional 
justice in Iraq, although no official program was implemented (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 
243-259) and Iraqis expressed limited knowledge of the mechanism (International Center for 
Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 37-56). The tools were, nonetheless, 
included to quantify respondent opinion at the interstate level. Overall, we found that pilot 
participants generally recognized reparations and truth commissions as practices, with a 
majority advocating for their utilization in general to resolve interstate conflict. 
Simultaneously, a “public apology” was incorporated, because the practice is a recognized 
conflict resolution mechanisms sometimes utilized at the higher levels. It is also associated 
with forgiveness. While most pilot participants accepted apologizing as a general practice, it 
was rejected during piloting in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Its inclusion in the survey 
was, nonetheless, purposefully retained since it allowed further qualification of laypersons’ 
opinion on the use of an apology in general and in context. 
Finally, “positive media coverage” and “raising cultural awareness” were included into the 
study because of their relevance and ease of recognition across cultures. On the one hand, 
positive media coverage was included since it is an alternative mode of targeting society at 
large and because Funk and Said (2004: 6-20) emphasis the role of the media in reinforcing 
conflict narratives in the West and Middle East conflictual relationship. Moreover, a majority 
of pilot participants endorsed the tool. On the other hand, increasing cultural awareness was 
included since Dalia Mogahed (2006: 1-2) draws attention to the fact that U.S. citizens know 
very little about Muslims, as elucidated in chapter two. Furthermore, a majority of pilot 
respondents recognized the tools and supported its inclusion since it would augment cultural 
understanding. With the piloting methodology and findings explained, attention now turns to 
articulating survey implementation and statistical evaluation of the final research 
questionnaire. 
                                                          
 
81 For a radical call for U.S. reparations, among other recommended punishments in the case of U.S. action in 
Iraq, see Corlett (2012). 
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6.3 Research methodology and ethics 
Our descriptive and normative research of personal disposition toward conflict resolution 
involving human subjects (Schwarz, 2007: 639), administered by internet to a convenience 
sample of Iraq and U.S. citizens, adheres to the ethical guidelines endorsed by the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research (2010), American Psychological Association (2010) 
and the British Psychological Society (2010). Quality control of the research process, 
including methods and means of soliciting respondents, as well as questionnaire design and 
content, was persistent from the questionnaire’s inception to the termination of data 
processing. Regardless of the phase of research, potential issues encountered or concerns 
voiced (such as cultural insensitivity) were promptly rectified to protect survey participants 
and to safeguard the quality and integrity of the study. For the purposes of accountability and 
transparency, survey protocol was designed and observed as follows. 
6.3.1 Questionnaire availability and distribution 
Due to the researcher’s location in Italy, and the lack of resources and possibility to travel, 
several techniques were attempted and/or utilized to acquire a representative sample from 
both countries. Foremost, the researcher attempted to have the questionnaire translated into 
Arabic to increase the availability of the survey to respondents from Iraq. In mid-2011, 
several attempts were made to hire Arabic-English translators working at the U.S. Embassy in 
Baghdad through the assistance of a former study colleague. Unfortunately, a pair/team of 
translators could not be assembled due to employment restrictions and translator workload, so 
the idea was abandoned. Inability to recruit Arabic speaking translators decreased the 
probability that a representative sample of citizens living in Iraq could be acquired and meant 
that respondents from Iraq would have to complete the survey in a second language. 
As an alternative means of increasing the potential pool of Iraqi respondents, it was 
decided to have the questionnaire translated into German and Italian during 2012, a method 
that would allow Iraqis residing in Italy, Germany, Austria, Belgium and/or other European 
countries to be solicited. Translation of the original English questionnaire into Italian and 
German was performed and quality controlled by three Italian native speakers with either a 
Bachelor (n = 1) or Master degree (n = 2) in English-Italian-German interpreting and 
translating from the University of Innsbruck. The translation process required several months 
to complete and was initiated by one translator who translated the original English 
questionnaire into German and Italian (Harkness and Schoua-Glasberg, 1998: 88-105). Once 
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the preliminary translations had been completed, two separate translators, one at the time, 
working in tandem with the first, controlled the original and translated versions. When 
discrepancies and errors were discovered, the translators engaged in discussions to agree on 
the most appropriate solution (Harkness and Schoua-Glasberg, 1998: 88-105; Johnson, 1998: 
19). Once the first pair of translators unanimously agreed, the same process was utilized with 
a third translator. The finished products were then quality controlled by an Italian and German 
native speaker to ensure clarity of the finished translations respectively. 
Meanwhile, attempts were made to collaborate with professionals and institutions in the 
U.S., Iraq and Europe, to broadcast the research and solicit assistance with distributing the 
questionnaires. Collaboration is a technique deemed acceptable in qualitative research 
(American Psychological Association, 2010: 6; Johnson, 1998: 13; Kelley and others, 2003: 
261-266). Unfortunately, collaboration was difficult to acquire. Between May 2, 2013 and 
October 15, 2013, the researcher solicited independent assistance with promoting the research 
via telephone or email from institutes of higher learning in Iraq (for instance, University of 
Sulaimani, University of Baghdad) (n = 4), NGOs working with Iraqis, in the Middle East, the 
United States and Europe (Caritas, Refugee International, Refugee Action, among others) (n = 
23), and independent associations (Muslim American Society, Muslim Student Association) 
(n = 10). Of the thirty-seven attempts made during this six-month period, only two institutions 
responded, both rejecting requests for assistance (see Appendix 4). Sasha Crow (2013), at 
Collateral Repair Project, provided the most detailed explanation for non-collaboration. She 
claimed that Iraqis assisted by her organization had initially expressed great enthusiasm for 
participating in academic research in the early years of the U.S. occupation, but rapidly 
became frustrated by continuous research which produced no tangible improvements to their 
individual welfare (Crow, 2013). Accordingly, Collateral Repair Project discontinued 
assisting all researchers because they found the process frustrated the individuals they were 
assisting. 
As a result of the difficulties experienced recruiting assistance, it was decided that a 
snowball and convenience sample would have to be utilized, which virtually guaranteed that a 
representative sample would not be acquired. However, in order to expedite the research, the 
researcher primarily relied on networking friends and acquaintances to solicit potential 
respondents (Singleton and Straits, 2001: 87). The latter practice yielded a measure of success 
thanks to the social networking site Facebook. Simultaneously, the survey was made 
accessible online using Google Docs survey application, whereby online users could log in at 
their convenience and complete the questionnaire in anonymity. Facebook and Google Doc as 
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research platforms proved invaluable to our study for multiple reasons including its 
affordability, in addition to its ease of accessibility and convenience to respondents, as 
outlined below. Through these technologies, respondents were solicited directly or snowballed 
indirectly by networking friends, colleagues and acquaintances (Singleton and Straits, 2001: 
87). No respondents were solicited using spamming, advertisements, repeat contact or other 
forms of electronic harassment (internet trolling) (American Psychological Association, 2010: 
5-6). 
Around the same period, there was a breakthrough following continued attempts at 
networking. Through a family acquaintance, I was able to locate invaluable assistance with 
reaching refuges from Iraq living in Italy. With the cooperation of Pietro Benedetti, an expert 
with 15 years’ experience working with refugees in Rome, Italy and founder and coordinator 
of Servizio Salute Migranti Forzati (SAMIFO), an independent NGO, he facilitated contact 
with the small quantity of refugees from Iraq he worked with in Italy. Benedetti’s assistance 
was conditioned on vetting the questionnaire and personally meeting with the researcher. 
After scrutinizing the questionnaire’s contents and cultural sensitivity, Benedetti approved the 
survey in its original format on September 10, 2013. The following day, Benedetti began 
soliciting refugees from Iraq he came into contact with at SAMIFO. At the same time, a face-
to-face meeting was scheduled, and held on September 23, 2013, whereupon his continued 
collaboration was guaranteed until late December 2013 (Benedetti, 2013). 
With the questionnaire made accessible online in the English, German and Italian 
languages, solicitation of respondents through SAMIFO and social networking commenced. 
When making initial contact with potential respondents, whether directly or indirectly, 
individuals were offered an opportunity to complete an online questionnaire and provided a 
brief description of the researcher, accompanied by a concise description of the research 
(American Psychological Association, 2010: 10). The research description identified the study 
as a comparative analysis of cross-cultural perceptions of interstate conflict resolution. 
Additionally, an estimated duration (American Psychological Association, 2010: 10) of fifteen 
minutes for completing the survey was explained. Potential respondents were also informed 
that they could freely opt for (non-) participation absent reward or penalty for their (non-) 
cooperation (American Psychological Association, 2010: 10). Those adults who expressed 
interest in participating were then provided with an electronic link and/or direct access to the 
survey. 
At this juncture it is imperative to emphasize that only partial disclosure of the research 
objective and target populations were transmitted to potential respondents (The British 
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Psychological Society, 2010: 24-25). Participants were not informed that citizens from the 
U.S. and Iraq were the target populations, nor were they informed that the research centered 
on comparatively analyzing U.S. and Iraqi perceptions. The decision to limit disclosure was 
determined necessary to minimize response bias (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). Our 
limited disclosure approach was based on the assumption that if the target populations were 
aware of which respondents were being targeted, participants might modify their responses 
due to social bias (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). In particular, it was feared that 
respondents might accept or reject conflict resolution according to preconceived notions of 
how they believed they should responded subsequent to the invasion and occupation of Iraq. 
Therefore, non-disclosure of the authentic target groups, in exchange for a generic research 
description, was deemed ethically appropriate since no harmful repercussions would come to 
respondents (The British Psychological Society, 2010: 24-25). 
Returning our attention to those who elected to participate in the survey, consenting 
respondents were required to access the Internet and connect to the questionnaire, in one of 
the three languages, using an HTTP link provided. In this manner, initial consent to 
participate occurred through a participant’s activation of the electronic survey via a web 
browser. While this practice adheres to The British Psychological Society’s (2010: 15) ethical 
practices, which assert that “anonymised-at-source [online], non-sensitive data, consent may 
be considered to have been given by the act of participation,” a request for informed consent 
was also placed at the end of the online survey, as detailed below. 
Once a (potential) respondent had launched the online questionnaire in their language 
preference, a research title and two explanatory paragraphs were visible in the upper half of 
the Internet browser window. The first paragraph reiterated pertinent information, including 
recapping the research purpose and methodology. A projection of the time required to 
complete the survey was also repeated. In addition, viewers were informed that their 
anonymity was assured since no personal contact information would be requested and Internet 
proxy (IP) addresses were not tracked or stored by the survey host (American Psychological 
Association, 2010: 7). Confidentiality was further assured since no names, dates of birth, or 
comparable personal data that could be used to identify participants was collected (American 
Psychological Association, 2010: 7). 
Rather than using sensitive personal data, participants who submitted their survey were 
automatically provided a time-date stamp by Google Docs, and this time-date stamp served as 
the respondent’s identification number during data processing. Therefore, the researcher did 
not acquire, disclose or put at risk any personal information which could be used to identify 
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participants or link them to their opinions (American Psychological Association, 2010: 7). 
Moreover, the autonomous data that was collected following the submission of a completed 
survey was saved on a secure Google Internet database. The data was protected by a 15 
character alphanumeric password and a unique six-digit secondary “security access code.” 
The security code changed each time the database was accessed, and Google Docs forwarded 
each new access code to the researcher’s personal mobile phone. 
Returning to the launched survey, in the second introductory paragraph of a launched 
online survey, respondents were informed that they could exit the survey without consequence 
at any time simply by closing the Internet browser window (American Psychological 
Association, 2010: 10). The hitherto keyed data of those “opting out” of the survey was not 
saved since the non-participant would not have activated the “submit” button located at the 
end of the questionnaire. Data that was not submitted was not stored, and thereby was not 
retrievable by the researcher, because closing the browser window prior to submission 
expunged any data that had been entered by non-respondents. Consequently, incomplete 
questionnaires could not be submitted, a technique which making it impossible to qualify how 
many respondents opened the survey, and/or partially completed it, but never submitted. 
Nonetheless, following the introductory paragraphs just detailed, the Internet survey 
presented respondents with 76 topical questions arranged in seven question sets. See 
Appendix 2 to view the questionnaire. All topical questions were provided with Likert Scales 
for responses, while classification questions generally included selection boxes and/or a text 
box respondents could use in case the answers provided were inadequate. Combined, 
questions were distributed as follows: fifty questions were related to participants’ perceptions 
of conflict and conflict resolution in general; twenty were related to conflict resolution in 
terms of U.S.-Iraq relations subsequent to the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War; and six were classification 
questions (age, gender). Questions sets were separated by introductory sentences and 
instructions. The questionnaire ended with a set of classification questions.  
The survey concluded by thanking participants for their cooperation. Contact information 
was then provided to participants so (non-) respondents could contact the researcher for 
additional information about any aspect of the research should they desire, or to make special 
requests such as purging submitted data (American Psychological Association, 2010: 10). 
Lastly, there was a “submit” button. Viewers were informed that by depressing the “submit” 
button, the act formally provided their consent to participate in the research (American 
Psychological Association, 2010: 10; Schmidt, 1997: 4). Once the submit button was 
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activated, a time-date stamp was provided and the data was transferred and saved directly onto 
a linked, secured excel file. 
In terms of ethical standards, no participants were expected to experience psychological 
harm from the survey process or research content (The British Psychological Society, 2010: 
11-12). Similarly, the issue of (cultural) sensitivity was projected to be minimal with those 
who had English as a second language (The British Psychological Society, 2010: 13). To 
circumvent cultural insensitivity, question phrasing, vocabulary and cultural nuances were 
taken into consideration when drafting and piloting the survey. The survey was also screened 
to verify its cultural sensitivity. Items identified (potentially) culturally sensitive were either 
omitted from the questionnaire or rephrased with the assistance of pilot participants. 
Moreover, Mr. Benedetti’s quality control of the survey yielded no suggestions or complaints 
regarding cultural sensitivity. Despite these practices, our study does suffer from several 
obvious weaknesses. 
6.3.2 Weaknesses of the research  
The present research suffers from apparent weaknesses, primarily due to the size and non-
representative nature of our convenience samples (Norman, 2010: 4) due to the challenges of 
reaching respondents from the U.S. and Iraq. Absent a significant degree of external 
assistance, it was impossible to acquire a representative samples from the United States or 
Iraq, and, accordingly, the survey populations were reduced to a convenience sample of 
citizens residing in their native country, or abroad, which is neither random nor representative 
(Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266; Schmidt, 1997: 2; Schofield, 1996: 29). However, use of 
convenience and snowball sampling techniques were necessary to expedite the research in 
consideration of the resources available. As a result of the sample type and size, research 
findings have to be interpreted with caution and should not be considered representative 
(Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). While efforts were made to weigh the sample, for 
instance by encouraging acquaintances to target respondents with particular demographic 
characteristics (for instance more males) (Jacobsmeier, 2011; Schofield, 1996: 36), our efforts 
failed to provide demographic representativeness. Despite the recognized problems our 
sample presents, small n samples can be found in peace and conflict resolution literature, 
whose sample sizes range from eighteen to one hundred thirty-one (Basedau and De Juan, 
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2008: 13; Halperin, 2008: 717; Maoz, 2000: 724; Mayer and Boness, 2011: 67; Ron and 
Maoz, 2013: 281)82. 
Next, because of security, financial, technological and geographic limitations, face-to-face 
contact with respondents was impossible. Inability to conduct face-to-face querying restricted 
modes of data collection and eliminated the potential of eliciting supplementary information, 
for instance through follow-up questioning (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). This practice 
restricts the range of possible questions, responses and a deeper qualification of attitudes 
(Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). Although attempts were made to conduct face-to-face 
interviews with Iraqi refugees in Italy, for example, scheduling issues and concerns for 
refugee privacy undermined the possibility. Consequently, all questionnaires completed were 
administered via the Internet and contained closed questions. 
Thereafter, the use of the Internet creates associated research weaknesses. For instance, 
the use of the social networking site Facebook and Google Docs eliminates the possibility of 
determining non-response rates. While survey researchers should qualify non-response rates 
(Singleton and Straits, 2001: 62-87), the use of these technologies makes it impossible to 
know with certainty how many people were informed of the survey, or may have launched the 
survey, and then declined to participate. The absence of non-response rates is problematic for 
accurately determining survey reliability, and for qualifying differences between those who 
responded and those who did not (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266; Singleton and Straits, 
2001: 62-87). In spite of these problems, the online survey was the most effective means of 
distributing the survey to as many potential respondents in our case and its guaranteed 
anonymity. 
Another weakness associated with the implementation of the research via the Internet is 
that it limits access since those without computers or Internet cannot participate (Schmidt, 
1997: 1-2). These limitations, however, were partially controlled since Internet access was 
granted to Iraqi refugees in Italy who consented to participate. In all instances, Pietro 
Benedetti, whom also made himself available to assist with the completion of the survey via 
computer, provided refugees access to the Internet survey if they wished to participate. In a 
private interview with Mr. Benedetti, he praised the use of technology-based surveying over 
the standard practice of paper, suggesting it was more convenient and functional for 
facilitators, researchers and respondents. We agreed, and hence, the advantages of Internet 
                                                          
 
82 In alphabetical order, Basedau and De Juan’s (2008: 13) research contains 28 cases. Eran Halperin’s (2008: 
717) is based on 30 in-depth interviews. Maoz’s (2000: 724) study consists of 131 workshop participants of two 
different nationalities. By comparison, the Mayer and Boness (2011: 67) study included 18 interviews. Finally, 
Ron and Maoz’s (2013: 281) research contains 20 interviews. 
  
391 
 
surveying outweighed its limitation of accessibility in this particular study because refugees, 
whom risk having limited access to the Internet, were provided the resources and assistance 
with utilizing this technology (Mann and Stewart, 2003: 245-246; Schmidt, 1997: 2-4)83. 
The next weakness was the potential sensitive nature of some survey questions. While 
efforts were made to eliminate sensitive questions, disclosure of personal opinions on issues 
such as U.S.-Iraq relations was potentially invasive to some respondents. The literature 
suggests that integration of sensitive questions into surveys is problematic for numerous 
reasons (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007: 860). First, sensitive questions, “tend to produce 
comparatively higher non-response rates or larger measurement error in responses than 
questions on other topics” due to their “intrusiveness” (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007: 860). In 
this instance, respondents either refuse to answer, or randomly select answers, because of the 
sensitive nature of the topic. Second, sensitive questions have an increased tendency of 
prompting socially desirable responses (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007: 860). Here, respondents 
select an answer they perceive is most acceptable by their peers. While socially desirable 
answers compromise the quality and reliability of survey research, the literature suggests that 
respondents are increasingly likely to complete a survey containing sensitive questions when 
it is self-administered and anonymity is ensured (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007: 863). In 
consideration of these findings, hosting the survey online ensured respondents’ anonymity 
while adhering to survey best practice for minimizing non-response and social bias with 
sensitive questions since the survey was self-administered. Moreover, as mentioned, only 
partial disclosure of the target populations was provided to reduce the probability of 
generating social bias answers. 
Another weakness of our study is that it is opinion based; hence its findings offer only a 
snapshot into a narrow sample’s attitudes toward a complex set of issues and circumstances 
(van Schalk and Aureli, 2000: 309). The theoretical foundation of this weakness is rooted in 
the recognition that opinions are subject to fluctuation determined by time, context, wording, 
and even the state of mind of the respondent at the time she completes the survey (Schwarz, 
2007: 644-645). In full recognition of the fluidity of opinions, we emphasize that our findings 
qualifies non-crystallized opinions of a non-representative sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens 
(the latter mainly residing in Europe). We, therefore, acknowledge that the opinions and 
                                                          
 
83 For example, online surveys are convenient to respondents since they can activate and complete a survey at 
will (Mann and Stewart, 2003: 245-246). It is also more economical than printing questionnaires and reduces the 
time dedicated to soliciting potential respondents (Mann and Stewart, 2003: 245-246; Schmidt, 1997: 1-4). 
Finally, data transfer is safer since the information is directly uploaded into a database minimizing the risk of 
transposing or other errors by the research (Mann and Stewart, 2003: 245-246). 
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values measured by the survey are subject to alteration over time should contextualized inputs 
(experience, information) change (Schwarz, 2007: 642-644; van Schalk and Aureli, 2000: 
309). 
Nevertheless, the realization that opinions are subject to modification over time is not 
problematic for several reasons. First, we maintain that our research makes valuable 
theoretical contributions to cross-cultural understanding of conflict resolution and at times 
challenges preexisting theoretical conceptualizations when comparing Arab/Muslim-Western 
understandings of conflict resolution at interstate level. Accordingly, the research is a 
theoretical milestone. Second, we recognize that fluctuation of opinion on such topics is 
natural, and conflict resolution scholars emphasizes “peacebuilding enterprises needs to be 
under constant review, to be adjustable as events and outcomes unfold, and to include as 
many constituencies as possible in the ongoing evaluation process” (Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 241). Persistent review is necessary because attitudes, the quality of the relationship and 
environmental changes are expected over time, and these inputs produce modifications of 
opinion toward conflict resolution. Hence, opinions on the necessity or effectiveness of 
conflict resolution, and its principles and practices, are subject to change, because fluctuation 
in opinion is an inevitable aspect of survey research. 
Lastly, and noted elsewhere, there was a lack of resources necessary for hiring 
professional translators to design and quality control a questionnaire in the Arabic language 
(Harkness and Schoua-Glasberg, 1998: 87-128; Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). This 
resource deficit unfortunately hindered distribution and availability of the survey to 
respondents from Iraq. The restrictions were partially circumvented by the creation of Italian 
and German versions to accommodate Iraqis residing in Europe. The Italian and German 
versions were translated, crosschecked and re-evaluated to ensure accuracy as well as to vet 
the content, style and understandability (Johnson, 1998: 12). We do, however, recognize that 
completing a questionnaire in a second language limits participation and risks 
misunderstanding or misinterpretations of the questions and thereby validity (Johnson, 1998: 
12; King and others, 2004: 193-199; Oppenheim, 2008: 184; Ryen, 2003: 429). 
Language concerns were managed in several manners. On the one hand, they were 
partially controlled in Italy since Mr. Benedetti was acquainted with the respondents and 
knew refugees’ language capabilities (English or Italian). Additionally, Mr. Benedetti 
facilitated questionnaire completion by making himself available to respondents should 
language assistance be required. On the other hand, issues of comprehensibility and validity 
were minimized by incorporating simplified question wording, providing definitions of terms, 
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and utilizing parsimonious Likert Scales (Johnson, 1998: 12). The combination increases 
cross-cultural understandability and validity. Subsequent to outlining survey methodology and 
research weaknesses, we now address how the data collected was analyzed. 
6.3.3 Data analysis 
Completed survey data were automatically coded and transferred into a Microsoft Excel 
file by Google Docs when the respondent submitted their completed questionnaire. Following 
closure of the survey, the data were then transferred into an R programming language 
(http://www.r-project.org) for analysis (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 2014), and is available as 
an Excel file called “Combined Data Set”. Subsequent to making the data uniform (spelling 
and capitalization) in terms of classification questions (such as religious affiliation), statistical 
analysis was conducted on responses. For analytical purposes, the data was processed as eight 
test sets. The sets include: S1 (Q [questions] 4-7); S2 (Q 8-15); S3 (Q 16-23); S4 (Q 24-39); 
S5 (Q 40-50); S6a (Q 51a, 52a, 53-57); S6b (Q51b, 52b); and S7 (Q 58-68). Question sets 
were established according to survey layout, content and shared Likert Scale design84. Our 
framework of questions sets was purposefully designed, with the questionnaire opening with 
general “funneling” questions to get the respondent accustomed to the survey, topic, and the 
scales (Oppenheim, 2008: 109-111). Questions then narrowed to evaluating respondents’ 
opinion of conflict resolution principles and practices, before ending with classification 
questions (Oppenheim, 2008: 109-111). 
With this in mind, question sets were designed as follows. S1 questions deal with 
religiosity and general perceptions of conflict. S2 questions further explore respondents’ 
conceptualization of conflict. The two question sets are designed to funnel the respondents’ 
attention toward conflict resolution. S3 questions center on general perceptions of conflict 
resolution. At this point, focus is predominantly on conflict resolution. S4 allows respondents 
to rank the value of sixteen principles of conflict resolution. S5 asks respondents to rank the 
eleven conflict resolution tools (listed in section 6.2.4) in general. S6a and S6b qualify 
participants’ opinion of conflict resolution in the case of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations, 
and simultaneously requests they conjecture about the perceived effects the 2003 War has had 
on societal opinion. Finally, S7 requests respondents to rank thirteen conflict resolution 
mechanisms in the context of improving contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. 
                                                          
 
84 Questions 1-3 were only available on the U.S. survey and queried whether the respondent or one of their 
family members had served in some capacity in Iraq. No respondent had served in Iraq, and due to the small 
number of respondents who had a family member serve, there was an insufficient quantity of respondents to 
make meaningful comparative analysis. 
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Once the data collected was made uniform, responses were treated as ordinal so non-
parametric tests were utilized (Gadermann and others, 2012: 2). Reliability of the data was, 
therefore, tested using three techniques: Cronbach’s alpha, Cronbach’s standard alpha and 
Guttman’s Lambda 6. Reliability is defined by Jum C. Nunnally as “the extent to which 
[measurements] are repeatable and that any random influence which tends to make 
measurements different from occasion to occasion is a source of measurement error” (Cortina, 
1993: 98). Reliability, according to the quote, thus statistically estimates the likelihood that 
responses could be reproduced if the research were conducted again. 
The reliability of our online survey data is arranged into four columns in Table 2, and is 
tested by question set. The first column identifies the test set (set). The second identifies 
Cronbach’s Alpha (raw.alpha) returns. Cronbach’s Alpha quantifies the internal consistency 
of the data, and is the most widely utilized test of internal reliability (Cortina, 1993: 98-100; 
Gadermann and others, 2012: 1-2; Revelle, 2013). According to strict research standards, a 
value of 0.7 or higher is preferred for reliability (Garson, 2009). The third column in Table 2 
shows the returns from the second reliability measurement used, Cronbach’s standardized 
alpha (std.alpha) (Mehra, 2003; Revelle, 2013). Cronbach’s standardized alpha measures 
variance and covariance of the data, with variance indicating how the data are distributed, and 
covariance the relationship between two random variables from the data. Lastly, Guttman’s 
Lambda 6 (lambda) is found in the fourth column. Guttman's Lambda 6 (G6) is suggested 
more appropriate for evaluating reliability for small research samples (Revelle, 2013). See 
Table 2 for reliability values from our data sets according to the three measures utilized. 
Table 2 Reliability by Question Set 
set raw.alpha std.alpha lambda 
S1 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6a 
S6b 
S7 
0.4428710 
0.5209050 
0.5859031 
0.8519466 
0.8513191 
0.7611463 
0.7408743 
0.9074280 
0.4507927 
0.5372211 
0.5689824 
0.8662757 
0.8511812 
0.7637947 
0.7480498 
0.9101671 
0.3957005 
0.5655851 
0.6185759 
0.9092379 
0.8673065 
0.7825412 
0.5975076 
0.9297009 
Table 2 illustrates the reliability of each question set using three measures of reliability. Returns with 
a high level of reliability are printed in bold. 
 
We can deduce several conclusions from the values in Table 2. First, S1, S2 and S3 data 
(the latter of which contains four questions) falls below the generally accepted reliability 
threshold. Our findings related to these question sets must, therefore, be interpreted with 
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caution. Nonetheless, their low level of reliability has no significant effect on our research 
since these question sets were designed as funnel questions. A similar issue that must be 
mentioned is that while S6b has a high rate of reliability using the raw and standardized 
Alpha, the question set contains only two questions, which makes its statistical reliability 
fragile, as the low lambda return indicates. Most importantly for our research, the values in 
Table 2 illustrate that question sets S4-S6a and S7 have a high level of statistical reliability. 
These high rates of reliability are crucial to our research because these question sets measure 
respondents’ perceptions of conflict resolution principles and tools in general, and in the 
context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Data extracted from these question sets test Hypotheses 3, 4 
and 6. 
After testing reliability, single item testing was performed on each question to evaluate 
differences between answers provided according to country of origin. Once again, we utilized 
three different measures to quantify differences between responses according to country of 
origin. We first used a Pearson chi-square (chi.sq) test, since it is the most common test 
utilized for comparing variables by category (Iorga and others, 2003; McDonald, 2013: 70-75, 
Newsom, 2014). Its findings are presented as p-values, which either exceed or fall below a 
given threshold to accept or reject our null hypothesis. Rejection of the null hypothesis for the 
chi-square test is set at 0.01, where if the p-value is smaller than the level of significance, the 
null hypothesis has to be rejected. Succinctly, our null hypothesis states there is no significant 
difference between U.S. and Iraqi responses in our data set when a p-value is lower than 0.01. 
When calculated values fall below the threshold of our null hypothesis, the more evidence 
there is that there is a significant difference between respondents’ answers across samples. To 
understand how to interpret p-values, see Appendix 5 that explains how to calculate p-values. 
Table 3 Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test by Set 
set country 
S1 3.587491e-01 
S2 1.685651e-02 
S3 8.480372e-01 
S4 2.377548e-02 
S5 5.810763e-03 
S6a 5.834242e-06 
S6b 1.996018e-04 
S7 2.013188e-02 
Table 3 provides the p-values of question sets following the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. 
 
Second, we measured the difference between responses of individual questions using 
Fisher’s exact test (fis). While the Fisher test likewise measures differences between response 
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categories, it calculates levels of significance according to the Likert scale ranges actually 
utilized by respondents (McDonald, 2013: 70-75). More specifically, unlike the chi-square 
that measures responses across the entire range of response possibilities, Fisher more 
accurately calculates responses according to the response categories on the Likert scale 
actually utilized by respondents (McDonald, 2013: 70-75; Newsom, 2014). The p-values from 
our chi-square and Fisher testing of individual questions are located in Tables throughout the 
next section entitled “Levels of Significance for Individual Questions.” We will briefly 
analyze the data each time respective question sets are introduced. 
Lastly, we comparatively analyzed the significance of differences between responses by 
country of origin according to question sets using a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. In order to 
perform the Wilcoxon test, we first aggregated the answers provided for each question set by 
category and country of origin. We then calculated their median values across categories. The 
Wilcoxon test was then used to estimate the difference of the set aggregates. Its p-value 
provides a simplistic comparative overview of the differences between aggregated median 
responses within a question set between our U.S. and Iraq samples. Table 3 illustrates the p-
values of the Wilcoxon test for the 8 sets of questions analyzed by country. It illustrates that 
the most significant difference across cultural responses are found in question sets S3, S5 and 
S6a. Interpreting our table, there is statistical evidence of a degree of discrepancy between 
respondents’ answers across our two samples on the S2, S4, S6b and S7 questions, as detailed 
below. Nonetheless, these aggregated differences diminish when questions are assessed 
independently (using the Pearson and Fisher), as demonstrated in the Tables of “Tests for 
Individual Questions” presented below. 
6.4 Comparative research findings 
Before examining our research findings, we must first qualify our research samples. Our 
research samples consist of a convenience sample of respondents from Iraq (n = 51) and the 
United States (n = 58) solicited through snowball and convenience sampling by networking 
friends and acquaintances (Singleton and Straits, 2001: 87). The U.S. sample is composed of 
21 males (36%) and 37 females (64%), whereas the actual U.S. population is 50.8% and 
49.2% respectively (Howden and Meyer, 2011: 2). Hence, as indicated above, our U.S. 
sample is not demographically representative of the U.S. population. 
Figure 7 U.S. Respondents’ Ethnicity and Age 
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Figure 7 illustrates the demographic distribution of U.S. respondents by ethnicity and age. 
 
Nonetheless, the ethnic composition of our U.S. sample includes 69% Caucasian (n = 40); 
10% African-American (n = 6); 7% Native American (n = 4); 4% Hispanic (n = 2); and 10% 
who classify themselves multiracial or made no distinction (n = 6). Age distribution comprises 
8 respondents between the ages of 18-25 (14%); 13 between 26 and 35 (22%); 21 between 36 
and 45 (36%); 3 between 46 and 55 (5%); 12 between 56 and 65 (21%); and one between 66 
and 75 (2%). See Figure 7 for ethnic and age distribution of the U.S. sample by percentage. 
Eleven respondents (19%) had an immediate family member serve in Iraq between 2003 and 
2011, but no respondents were military veterans or civilians who had served in Iraq between 
2003 and 2011. 
Table 4 Iraq Respondents’ Location and Gender Distribution 
 
Iraq Sample By Location and Gender 
Austria Germany Iraq Italy U.S. unknown total 
male 1 10 1 22 1 1 36 
female 0 7 3 5 0 0 15 
 1 17 4 27 1 1 51 
Table 4 illustrates the location from which our Iraq sample was reached in addition to gender distribution. 
 
Comparatively, between September 11 and December 11, 2013, Iraqi respondents were 
solicited on two fronts. On the one hand, they were petitioned online through networking on 
Facebook. This portion of the convenience sample includes citizens of Iraq living, studying 
and working in Europe (n = 18) and the United States (n = 1) who were solicited through 
Facebook and networking acquaintances. Additionally, 4 citizens living in Iraq were 
snowballed using a contact at the U.S. Embassy and one respondent did not specify his 
location. On the other hand, Mr. Benedetti facilitated 27 Iraqi refugees residing in Italy to 
complete the online questionnaire. Five refugees in Italy refused to participate equaling an 
84% response rate from our group of refugees residing in Italy. Combined, the convenience 
sample of Iraq citizens contains 51 adults. 
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Figure 8 Iraq Respondents’ Ethnicity and Age 
  
 
Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of our Iraq sample by ethnicity and age. 
 
As a result of the inclusion of refugees from Iraq residing in Italy, our sample contains 
twice as many male respondents (70.5 %, n = 36) as female (29.5 %, n = 15). For a 
distribution of the Iraq sample by gender and current residence, see Table 4. Nevertheless, the 
ethnic distribution of the sample is as follows: 51% are Arab (n = 26); 45% are Kurd (n = 23); 
2% are Assyrian (n = 1); and 2% claim no affiliation (n = 1). Kurds, which accounts for 15-
20% of Iraq’s overall population, are, therefore, over-represented because they account for 20 
of the 27 refugee participants (74%) from Italy, while Arabs, which account for 75%-80% of 
Iraq’s population, are under-represented (World Factbook, 2014). In terms of age, the sample 
of respondents from Iraq includes: 21% from the ages of 18-25 (n = 11); 63% from 26-35 (n = 
32); 14% from 36-45 (n = 7); and 2% from 46-55 (n = 1). See Figure 8 for ethnic and age 
distribution of the sample from Iraq by percentage. 
Next, the religious affiliation of respondents from both countries is distributed as follows. 
On the one hand, U.S. respondents are predominantly (64%) Christian (n = 37); 26% claim no 
affiliation (n = 15); 5% claimed amalgamate or mixed (n = 3); followed by 2% Jewish (n = 1); 
and 3% other (n = 2). In terms of religiosity (Q4), U.S. respondents (n = 26) are polarized 
with 45% agreeing that “religion is a very important influencer in my everyday life” while 
47% disagree (n = 27). On the other hand, 39% of participants from Iraq affiliate themselves 
with Shi‘a Islam (n = 20); 19% with Sunni Islam (n = 10); 18% with Sufi Islam (n = 9); 6% 
with Christianity (n = 3); and 18% claim no religious affiliation (n = 9). Compared to Iraq’s 
demographics, Shi‘a (60-65%) and Sunni (32-37%) are under-represented in our survey 
while Christian (0.8%) and Sufi are over-represented (World Factbook, 2014). Albeit, fifty-
nine percent of the Iraq sample (n = 29) agrees that religion is an important influence in their 
daily life while thirty-five percent disagree (n = 19). See Figure 9 for religious affiliation of 
both the U.S. and Iraq convenience samples by percentage. 
Figure 9 Respondents' Religious Affiliation 
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Figure 9 illustrates the religious affiliation of research participants from the United States and Iraq. 
 
Finally, both populations were asked to indicate their highest completed level of 
education. Among our U.S. sample, 14% have a high school degree (n = 8); 9% have an 
associate’s degree (n = 1); 34% of have a Bachelor degree (n = 19); 33% have a Master (n = 
19); 9% have a doctorate (n = 1); and 2% are a Doctor of Medicine (n = 1). By comparison, 
our Iraq sample consists of 27% who completed middle school (n = 14); 31% have a high 
school diploma (n = 16); 4% a technical degree (n = 2); 12% a Bachelor (n = 6); 20% have a 
Master (n = 10); and 6% a doctorate (n = 3). Overall, both samples have a high rate of 
complete education. 
With the demographic nature of our U.S. and Iraq survey samples clarified, we now 
comparatively analyze how these samples conceptualize conflict in general, conflict resolution 
principles, general perceptions of eleven tools of conflict resolution, perceptions of the 
societal effects of the 2003 Iraq War, and, thereafter, how respondents conceptualized thirteen 
conflict resolution principles in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. The graphed 
comparative analysis of responses to all of the questions from our survey is available in 
Appendix 3. Appendix 3 is arranged according to question sets and question numbers. 
6.4.1 General conceptualizations of conflict 
Our first comparative analysis explores cross-cultural conceptualizations of conflict 
according to our sample populations (S1, S2). It should be recalled that S1 and S2 question 
sets have a low rate of internal reliability, but our findings are, nonetheless, presented for the 
purpose of discussion. Table 5 shows the p-values of our chi-square and Fisher tests which 
measures the level of significance between country of origin for individual questions in sets 
S1 and S2. Our null hypothesis threshold was set at p < 0.01. 
Table 5 indicates high levels of significant between answers provided for three questions 
in question set one across both the chi-square and Fisher tests, most notably questions 4, 5 and 
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7 according to the chi-square. In question Set 2, questions 9, 12 and 14 have the greatest 
degree of difference across our samples according to our chi-square and Fisher tests. It should 
be recalled that Pearson chi-square and Fisher exact test measure levels of significance 
differently, with the former calculating for the entire range of possible responses while the 
latter calculates according to the response ranges utilized. Attention now turns to analyzing 
responses. 
Questions in set 1 are funneling questions designed to initiate contemplation on conflict, 
whereupon focus can be narrowed to conflict resolution. Question set one qualifies 
respondents’ general conceptualization of conflict. Our analysis begins by examining the 
importance of resolving a conflict. The first question concerning conflict asked respondents to 
rate the importance of resolving a dispute with a friend. A majority of respondents from our 
samples, that is 84% of the U.S. sample (n = 49) and 75% of those from Iraq (n = 38), claims 
that resolving a conflict with their close friend was important (Q5). Question number five was 
designed to evaluate respondents’ general prioritization of resolving conflict by rooting it in 
common phenomenon. Next, we measured respondent optimism toward conflict resolution. 
Research findings demonstrate that a slight majority (64%) of U.S. respondents (n = 37) 
believes that conflictual relationships can be resolved (Q6). By comparison, 61% of 
respondents from Iraq (n = 31) agree that conflict relationships can be resolved, while 24 % 
disagree (n = 12). Sixteen percent are undecided (n = 8). Similarly, when queried if all 
conflict should be resolved (Q7), 78% of those from the Iraq sample (n = 40) and 72% of U.S. 
respondents (n = 42) affirm that they should. In the three cases, a majority of our respondents 
value conflict resolution in their personal life, perceives that conflict can be resolved and 
asserts that they should. 
Table 5 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S1, S2) 
set item chi.sq fis 
S1 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
Q7 
8.193967e-02 
6.439935e-01 
1.456061e-01 
4.124852e-01 
8.266618e-02 
6.746553e-01 
1.533878e-01 
4.220188e-01 
S2 
Q8 
Q9 
Q10 
Q11 
Q12 
Q13 
Q14 
Q15 
2.676891e-01 
2.235904e-03 
 
6.348014e-02 
7.266076e-04 
1.620392e-02 
2.419261e-07 
2.336015e-01 
2.662088e-01 
6.562777e-04 
3.441517e-04 
4.881398e-02 
2.411068e-04 
1.250876e-02 
6.838325e-09 
2.143087e-01 
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Table 5 shows the p-values of the chi-square and Fisher tests on individual questions from question 
sets S1 and S2. 
 
The next measured perception relates to whether conflict is perceived as a systemic 
phenomenon. Recalling the hypothesis that Western scholars view conflict as an 
incompatibility or struggle strictly limited to those individuals or groups directly involved, a 
conceptualization argued to contradict Arab/Muslim understanding of conflict as a systemic 
phenomenon which affects the community at large (Irani, 1999: 1-4, 14-17), the survey sought 
to qualify popular opinion on whether laypersons perceive conflicts have systemic effects 
(Q8). Contradicting the hypothesis that Westerners do not see conflict as systemic, an 
overwhelming majority of our U.S. sample (91%, n = 53) and a clear majority from Iraq 
(78%, n = 40) perceive a conflict affects more than those immediately involved. In this sense, 
conflict is viewed by both samples as having a systemic effect. Therefore, our finding contests 
Irani’s (1999) assertion that Westerns do not view conflict as systemic. Nevertheless, due to 
the low level of reliability, our findings should be interpreted with great caution. 
Another theory tested in the S2 question set is whether conflict is perceived to have a 
positive dimension. It was noted in the second part of this research that Arab/Muslim scholars 
criticize that Westerner scholars perceive conflict has a positive dimension (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 
18-19; Irani, 1999: 1-4). Contrary, Arab/Muslim scholars claim that individuals in the Middle 
East are hesitant to associate conflict with positive attributes (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18; Irani, 
1999: 3; Irani and Funk, 2000: 6-8). Our research (Q9) supports Arab/Muslim theory. 88% of 
U.S. respondents (n = 51) perceive a conflict can produce positive benefits compared to only 
51% of respondents from Iraq (n = 26). The data supports the theory that Westerners perceive 
conflict can produce positive benefits, while it qualifies a polarization of our Iraq sample on 
the issue. 
The next theory tested was the perceived normality of conflict (Q10). According to the 
literature, both Arab/Muslim (Abu-Nimer, 2001: 616) and Western scholarship (Bercovitch 
and others, 2009: 3; Boulding, 1978: 132; Lederach, 1995: 9; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 1, 
3; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7) perceive conflict as natural. Most respondents from our 
samples identify conflict as natural, with an overwhelming 95% of U.S. respondents (n = 55) 
agreeing versus 76% of those from Iraq (n = 39). Hence a clear majority from both sample 
groups believes conflicts are natural phenomenon. Afterward, Q14 asked respondents if 
conflicts could be nonviolent. An overwhelming ninety-eight percent of U.S. respondents 
suggest conflicts can be nonviolent (n = 57), compared to forty-nine percent of those from the 
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Iraq sample (n = 25). Consequently, a plurality of U.S. respondents perceives conflicts can be 
nonviolent, while our Iraq sample is polarized on the issue. 
Thereafter, we tested the perceived inevitability of conflict (Q11). A slight majority of all 
respondents, 60% of U.S. (n = 35) versus 61% Iraq (n = 31), agrees that conflict cannot be 
prevented. By comparison, when questioned if conflicts should be avoided (Q12), only 47% 
of U.S. respondents (n = 27) believe avoidance is important compared to a clear majority from 
the Iraq sample (82%, n = 42) that shares this sentiment. Finally, when making comparisons 
between conflict at the upper and lower levels (Q15), only 37% of our sample from Iraq (n = 
19) agree with the statement “a conflict between two people has the same characteristics as a 
conflict between two states.” Comparatively, U.S. respondents (47%) are slightly more likely 
to believe that the two levels of conflict share characteristics (n = 34). Combined, most 
respondents believe that conflicts should be prevented and a majority of the Iraq sample 
believes it is crucial to avoid conflict. Less than half of both samples believe conflict at the 
individual and international level share characteristics. 
 
 
 
6.4.2 General perception of conflict resolution and principles 
The present section analyzes how respondents perceive conflict resolution (S3) and 
associated principles (S4) for resolving a conflict in general. Table 6 reports the p-values of 
the chi-square and Fisher tests by country for questions in S3. The table illustrates that 
questions 18, 21 and 23 have the highest levels of significance between countries with both 
the chi-square and Fisher test. It should be recalled that the internal reliability of question set 
three was low (see section 6.3.3). Our data is, nevertheless, presented for the benefit of 
comparative discourse, although we believe that findings associated with the question set 
should be interpreted with caution. 
Table 6 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S3) 
set item chi.sq fis 
S3 
Q16 
Q17 
Q18 
Q19 
Q20 
Q21 
Q22 
4.273100e-02 
1.266111e-01 
8.147106e-02  
2.904845e-03 
1.795339e-01 
4.712892e-02 
5.875506e-02 
3.189397e-02 
1.221079e-01 
6.806479e-02 
1.280497e-03 
1.367299e-01 
3.577881e-02 
4.461478e-02 
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Q23 1.125655e-01 1.081381e-01 
Table 6 contains the p-values of the Pearson chi-square and Fisher test by country. 
 
S3 questions funnel our respondents’ attention from conceptualizing conflict resolution in 
general toward questions related to conflict resolution at the interstate level. Overall, our 
findings indicate that conflict resolution is a practice that respondents perceive important. In 
terms of which conflict relations should be resolved, a majority of U.S. (90%, n = 52) and Iraq 
(71%) respondents (n = 36) disagrees that only violent relationships must be resolved (Q18). 
Contrary, 78% of U.S. (n = 45) and 59% of our Iraq sample (n = 30) express that even 
nonviolent conflict relations must be resolved (Q19). While conflict resolution is widely 
embraced for resolving conflicts, both samples measure their expectations when 
conceptualizing the process. A slight majority of U.S. respondents from our sample (64%, n = 
37) perceives that all conflicts are resolvable (Q16) by comparison to 49% of those in the Iraq 
sample (n = 30). Here, it is possible to see less optimism among our Iraq sample, which Irani 
(1999: 1-10) suggests is common among Arab/Muslims. Correspondingly, 71% of U.S. 
respondents (n = 41) perceive that nonviolent coexistence is the most probable outcome than 
peace when resolving violent conflict relations (Q20). This is slightly more than the 61% from 
our Iraq sample (n = 31) who express the equivalent opinion. Hence, a clear majority from 
both samples expresses that nonviolent coexistence is more probable than positive peace when 
resolving conflict. 
Table 7 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S4) 
set item chi.sq fis 
 
S4 
Q24 
Q25 
Q26 
Q27 
Q28 
Q29 
Q30 
Q31 
Q32 
Q33 
Q34 
Q35 
Q36 
Q37 
Q38 
Q39 
1.853580e-01 
 
 
 
 
 
6.397891e-03 
 
 
4.405605e-01 
 
 
 
 
 
2.046814e-01 
1.456862e-01 
6.460608e-01 
1.702114e-01 
2.610094e-01 
6.771486e-02 
2.307894e-01 
3.931907e-03 
8.799321e-02 
7.202310e-02 
4.147962e-01 
9.477902e-02 
6.269683e-02 
1.811886e-01 
4.821093e-01 
1.793575e-04 
2.120113e-01 
Table 7 depicts the p-values of the chi-square and Fisher tests for S4 question set, which measures 
respondent opinion of sixteen conflict resolution principles. 
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Next, we explored conflict resolution at the intrastate level. Data illustrates that an 
overwhelming number of respondents from both countries optimistically state that two 
countries involved in war can improve their relationship (Q22). However, there is a sizable 
discrepancy when comparing responses across cultures. 91% of U.S. participants (n = 53) feel 
two countries can resolve their conflictual relationship, compared to 75% of those from Iraq 
(n = 38). In short, our U.S. sample is more optimistic about conflict being resolved at the 
interstate level than our Iraq sample, although a clear majority of the latter perceives 
resolution is possible. The last question in S3 classifies respondents’ perception of 
reconciliation (Q23). It demonstrates that U.S. respondents (47%, n = 27) are less likely to 
perceive reconciled relations as peaceful relations, compared to their counterparts from the 
Iraq sample (65%, n = 33). Stated differently, our Iraq sample is more inclined to believe that 
reconciliation and peaceful relations are synonymous, while a clear majority from our U.S. 
sample disagrees. 
Prior to evaluating respondents’ rating of sixteen principles (question set S4) when 
resolving a conflict between two countries, we refer to our p-values. Table 7 depicts the levels 
of significance between our U.S. and Iraq samples. It is possible to see there is a significant 
difference between our sample groups pertaining to question 30 using the chi-square. 
To begin our analysis, we recall that scholars assert that Arab/Muslim societies preference 
the principle of religion as a component of conflict resolution while many Western scholars 
minimizes it (Gulam, 2003: 5-6; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human 
Rights Center, 2004: 1-26; Irani, 1999: 7-10). As expected, when conceptualizing conflict 
resolution in general (Q17), a majority of U.S. (57%) respondents (n = 33) rejects the 
influence of religion. Comparatively, the Iraq sample is polarized with 51% of respondents (n 
= 26) stating that religious values should not guide conflict resolution. Similarly, when rating 
religious values as a principle of conflict resolution (Q39), a minority of U.S. respondents 
(43%) supports its influence (n = 25). Contrary, 38% of our U.S. sample (n = 22) opposes the 
principle of religion in conflict resolution and 19% are undecided (n = 11). By comparison, 
65% of respondents from Iraq believe that religion is a fundamental principle of conflict 
resolution (n = 33), with 23% opposed (n = 12) and 12% undecided (n = 6). These findings 
demonstrate that our Iraq sample is more inclined to support the principle of religion in 
conflict resolution, while the U.S. sample rejects it as Irani (1999: 7-10) surmises. 
The second principle qualified is forgiveness. The principle of forgiveness was tested due 
to the dissension it produces in Western literature, and in order to introduce laypersons’ 
opinion into the discourse. Recalling the critiques proffered by Western scholars, forgiveness 
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is suggested to be a religiously laden concept (Bar-On, 2005: 6-7) that invokes a sense of 
idealism (Rosoux, 2009: 559) and/or a “forgive and forget” attitude (Bloomfield, 2006: 23-25; 
Rothfield, 2008: 559). By comparison, our U.S. sample does not appear to be adverse to 
forgiveness at the interstate level contrary to the theory offered by Bloomfield (2006: 20-24) 
and others (Dwyer, 1999; Lerche, 2000; Rothfield, 2008: 15-16). Instead, a majority of 
respondents from the U.S. (72%, n = 42) agrees that showing forgiveness is essential to 
resolving a conflict (Q21). Their endorsement suggests that some Western scholars, namely 
Bloomfield (2006: 23-25), may be misrepresenting laypersons’ receptiveness to forgiveness 
and thereby may be devaluing the principle’s relative utility. Our U.S. sample, therefore, 
advocates forgiveness as a principle and practice of conflict resolution similar to Western 
scholars, including John Paul Lederach (1995: 21) and others (Avruch, 2010: 40; Gopin, 
2001: 87; Parent, 2012: 30-37; Wohl and Branscombe, 2009: 193-194; Worthington, 2006: 7-
9). 
By comparison, eighty percent of the Iraq sample (n = 41) supports forgiveness. The 
prioritization of forgiveness among our Iraq sample confirms Arab/Muslim scholars’ theory 
that forgiveness is an essential component of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim context 
(Abu-Nimer, 2000: 227-233, 248; Ashki, 2006: 23; Soliman, 2009). Affirming our collective 
findings denoted hitherto, when forgiveness is rated as a principle of conflict resolution 
(Q38), 81% of U.S. participants (n = 47) advocate its use. Comparatively, an overwhelming 
majority (98%) of respondents from Iraq (n = 50) embraces the principle. Combined, a clear 
majority of our US and Iraq samples embraces forgiveness as a component of conflict 
resolution. 
The next principle analyzed was honor (Q24). As noted in chapter five, section two, 
Arab/Muslim societies place a significant amount of weight on individual and family honor 
since it impacts individual and collective identity and social status (Gellman and Vuinovich, 
2008: 136-138; Irani, 1999: 2; Pely, 2009: 83-87). It was simultaneously conjectured that 
while honor is not directly referenced in Western literature, it is implied in principles and 
practices such as regard. Nonetheless, according to our survey findings, honor is an esteemed 
principle in terms of conflict resolution across cultures. Combined, 84% of participants from 
the U.S. (n = 49) and 88% from Iraq (n = 45) favor the principle. Interestingly, nearly thirty-
eight percent of U.S. respondents (n = 22) give honor the highest ranking on the Likert scale 
versus twenty-three percent of those from Iraq (n = 12). Overall both samples largely support 
its application. 
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Dignity (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136-138; Irani, 1999: 1-10; Pely, 2009: 83-87) 
and respect (Irani, 1999: 1-10) are also venerated principles in Arab/Muslim conflict 
resolution literature, and were likewise included in the survey. Our findings indicate that 90% 
of participants from Iraq (n = 46) and 86% of U.S. respondents (n = 50) agree that dignity 
(Q25) is a valuable principle, with response distribution of the Iraq sample (39%, n = 20) 
weighing more favorably than the U.S. (29%, n = 17) in absolute terms. Concerning the 
principle of respect (Q26), majorities from both sample populations agree that respect is 
crucial to conflict resolution. An overwhelming 98% of U.S. (n = 57) and 100% of the Iraq 
sample (n = 51) positively rate the principle, with more than fifty percent from each sample 
group qualifying respect as absolutely imperative. Thus, both samples overwhelmingly 
support respect and dignity as principles of conflict resolution. 
Afterward, we explored the principles of satisfaction of interests and needs of stakeholders 
as advocated by Western scholars (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Botes, 2003; Briggs, 2003: 287-
306; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 176; Reimann, 2004: 11). It should be recalled that 
Arab/Muslim scholars express diverse views toward satisfaction of interests, because they 
must be considered in relation to Islamic teachings and norms. On the one hand, a clear 
majority of respondents from our U.S. (78%, n = 45) and Iraq samples (86%, n = 44) asserts 
that satisfaction of the “interests” of those involved in a conflict is indispensable for resolution 
(Q27). On the other hand, 92% of respondents from Iraq (n = 49) prioritize satisfaction of 
stakeholders’ “needs” versus 84% of U.S. participants (n = 47) (Q28). Hence clear majorities 
across both sample populations support the satisfaction of stakeholders’ interests and needs 
when resolving a conflict, with our Iraq sample expressing more support than our U.S. 
sample. 
Then, Arab/Muslim (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 234; Ashki, 2006: 24-25; Bekdash, 2009; Foster, 
2007: 70; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 1-26) 
and Western (Anderlini and others, 2004: 1-2; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; Rouhana, 2004: 36) 
scholars prioritize the principle of justice. Unsurprisingly, a clear majority from both samples 
favors the principle of justice in conflict resolution (Q35). There are, however, noticeable 
discrepancies across cultures. Foremost, 88% of U.S respondents (n = 51) favor the pursuit of 
justice compared to a plurality (96%) of those from our Iraq sample (n = 49). There is also a 
marked distribution difference, with forty-five percent of those from Iraq (n = 23) making 
justice an absolute priority versus twenty-seven percent among respondents from the United 
States (n = 16). Amalgamated, our data illustrates that our Iraq sample is more inclined to 
embrace justice than our U.S. sample. 
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Subsequently, perceptions of truth as a principle were qualified (Q36). Truth, or the 
establishment of an objective, detailed account of what has occurred in the past, is 
hypothesized as essential to conflict resolution according to Arab/Muslim (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 
252; Ashki, 2006: 15; Bekdash, 2009; Said and Funk, 2001) and Western scholars (Adelman, 
2005: 287-307; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 29; Kelman, 2004: 122-124; Lederach, 1997; 
Rosoux, 2009: 550). Our data confirms this. A plurality of respondents from Iraq (96%, n = 
49) prioritizes the principle. By comparison, a clear majority of U.S. respondents (88%, n = 
51) equally favors the inclusion of the principle of truth. Both samples, therefore, embrace 
truth as a principle, while our Iraq sample expresses an increased degree of support. 
Similarly, we measured respondent perceptions of accountability when resolving conflict. 
We found overwhelming majorities across cultures advocate accountability as a principle 
(Q37). 95% of participants from the U.S. (n = 55) and 96% from Iraq (n = 49) favor 
accountability. However, our Iraq sample ranks accountability higher than their U.S. 
counterparts, with forty-three percent of respondents from Iraq (n = 22) ranking accountability 
as an absolute priority versus thirty-two percent of respondents from the U.S. sample (n = 19). 
Nevertheless, a clear plurality of respondents from both samples embraces accountability in 
conflict resolution. 
The next principle considered was the protection of individual rights, which Abu-Nimer 
(2000) suggests is essential to Arab/Muslim conceptualizations and practices of conflict 
resolution. Our data demonstrates that absolute majorities from both countries positively rate 
the protection of individual rights (Q29). 95% of participants from the U.S. (n = 55) and 
100% from Iraq (n = 51) claim that the protection of stakeholders’ individual rights should be 
prioritized when resolving conflict. Hence, the principle of protecting individual rights is 
likewise shared across cultures. 
The most noteworthy difference in perceptions of principles qualified between our U.S. 
and Iraq samples revolves around the importance of compensation extended to those who 
have suffered during a conflict (Q30). Although compensation or restitution is a recognized 
principle and practice of conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236; 
Bekdash, 2009) and the Western theory and practice (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 30; 
Goschler, 2007; Kriesberg, 2004: 100; Rosoux, 2009: 546), there is a noteworthy cross-
cultural discrepancy between how our respondents rate restitution. Although a plurality (94%) 
of participants from Iraq (n = 48) supports the payment of reparations, only 67% of U.S. 
respondents (n = 39) express the same opinion. U.S. respondents are not only less supportive 
of the tool, 22% reject the principle (n = 13) compared to two participants from our Iraq 
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sample (4%). Thus, although a majority from both samples approves the principle of 
restitution, our Iraq sample is more inclined to embrace the principle and practice compared to 
our U.S. sample. 
Then empowerment was evaluated. Empowerment is a principle embraced by 
Arab/Muslim (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 237-239) and Western (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 21; 
Reimann, 2004: 11) scholars, and support for it was measured using multiple scenarios. First, 
respondents were asked whether the opinion of those involved in a conflict should be 
consulted when constructing conflict resolution between two countries (Q31). A plurality of 
participants from Iraq (98%, n = 50) agrees that getting the opinion of those involved is 
crucial when resolving conflict. Comparatively, 86% of U.S. respondents (n = 50) share this 
sentiment. Next, respondents were queried about the importance of listening to the other 
(Q32). Once again, a plurality from both samples agrees on the importance of listening with 
97% of U.S. (n = 56) and 96% of our Iraq sample (n = 49) expressing support. 
Linked to the above, respondents were then asked if practices and techniques acceptable to 
affected stakeholders should be incorporated into conflict resolution (Q34). As outlined 
elsewhere, consultations to identify methodology in conflict resolution are advocated by 
Western scholars, including Stover and others (2005: 834-836). Our data show a majority of 
U.S. participants (93%, n = 54) agrees conflict resolution practices should be acceptable to 
affected stakeholders. By comparison, 86% of respondents from Iraq (n = 44) believe 
practices should be mutually acceptable. Our latter finding supports International Center for 
Transitional Justice’s (2008) hypothesis that found Iraqis advocated individual empowerment 
through “inclusiveness” and “comprehensive consultation” when designing conflict resolution 
strategies. Accordingly, we found that our samples think citizens should be consulted on 
conflict resolution, they felt that listening to the other was important and that practices utilized 
to resolve a conflict should be mutually acceptable. 
Table 8 Respondents’ Support for Principles in General 
S4 principle U.S. sample Iraq sample 
Q24 honor 84% ✓ 88% ✓ 
Q25 dignity 86% ✓ 90% ✓ 
Q26 respect 98% ✓ 100% ✓ 
Q27 satisfaction of interests 78% ✓ 86% ✓ 
Q28 satisfaction of the needs 84% ✓ 92% ✓ 
Q29 protection of individual rights 95% ✓ 100% ✓ 
Q30 appropriate compensation 67% ✓ 94% ✓ 
Q31 consultation (getting opinions) 86% ✓ 98% ✓ 
Q32 listening to the “other” 97% ✓ 96% ✓ 
Q33 mutual benefit 88% ✓ 82% ✓ 
Q34 acceptable practices 93% ✓ 86% ✓ 
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Q35 justice 88% ✓ 96% ✓ 
Q36 truth 88% ✓ 96% ✓ 
Q37 accountability 95% ✓ 96% ✓ 
Q38 forgiveness 81% ✓ 98% ✓ 
Q39 religion 43% ✗ 65% ✓ 
Table 8 provides the percentage of respondents from our survey who supported conflict resolution principles in 
general. Check marks indicate that a majority of respondents in the sample supported the principle in question. 
 
Lastly, we explored the principle of mutual benefit. Although Arab/Muslim culture is 
suggested to minimize the importance of mutual benefit vis-à-vis their prioritization of 
collective interests during the resolution of a conflict (Irani, 1999: 2-10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 
20; Said and Funk, 2001), we measured respondent openness to mutual benefit (Q33). Our 
data illustrate that 88% of U.S. (n = 51) and 82% of respondents from Iraq (n = 42) perceive 
mutual benefit as an essential principle of conflict resolution at the interstate level. Thus, both 
our samples advocate mutually beneficial resolutions when resolving conflict between two 
countries. 
Combined, our survey of principles demonstrates that most respondents in the U.S. and 
Iraq samples esteem similar principles. Only the principle of religion is rejected by a majority 
of U.S. respondents. See Table 8 for a summary of our research findings according to the 
percentage of support each population expressed for conflict resolution principles. Our 
findings confirm Hypothesis 3, demonstrating that a majority of U.S. and Iraqi respondents 
from our research sample similarly embraces sixteen conflict resolution principles. 
6.4.3 General perception of tools 
 The questionnaire then asked respondents to rank the usefulness of eleven conflict 
resolution tools for resolving conflict between two countries. To enhance survey validity 
across samples, brief descriptions of each tool were provided to ensure clarity. Table 9 depicts 
the p-values of the chi-square and Fisher tests that measure level of significance by country of 
origin. It illustrates that many questions failed to meet our null hypothesis when using the chi-
square, although the Fisher exact test (fis) was able to confirm our null hypothesis for all 
questions. The table likewise indicates that there are quantifiable levels of significance across 
our samples, namely for question 45. 
Table 9 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S5)     
set item chi.sq fis 
S5 
Q40 
Q41 
Q42 
 
 
 
2.799935e-01 
8.301667e-02 
9.760462e-01 
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Q43 
Q44 
Q45 
Q46 
Q47 
Q48 
Q49 
Q50 
1.732218e-03 
1.528302e-02 
 
 
5.131155e-01 
 
8.064941e-01 
 
6.040850e-04 
5.732632e-03 
3.667446e-02 
1.700800e-01 
6.090232e-01 
5.948527e-01 
8.569325e-01 
1.234266e-01 
Table 9 shows the p-values of individual questions in set S5, which measures respondent openness to 
eleven conflict resolution mechanisms. 
 
Our survey finds that structural practices for interstate conflict resolution are 
overwhelmingly supported by both samples. In particular, a plurality of respondents supports 
political cooperation (Q42), defined as government representatives from two adversarial 
countries agreeing to work together, for example by holding joint meetings to resolve issues. 
More specifically, 96% from the Iraq sample (n = 49) and 93% of those from the U.S. (n = 54) 
rate political cooperation positively. Among those, 48% from the U.S. rank political 
cooperation in the two highest categories (n = 28), which is comparable to 49% of those from 
Iraq (n = 25). Similarly, 84% of U.S. respondents (n = 49) and 88% of those from Iraq (n = 
45) espouse economic cooperation (Q46), defined as two adversarial countries agreeing to 
work together to improve economic relations and increase dependency. Finally, security 
cooperation (Q41), defined as two adversarial countries working together to increase mutual 
security, is favored by an absolute majority of respondents from the Iraq sample (96%, n = 49) 
compared to 86% of those from the United States (n = 50). While 19% of U.S. respondents 
rank security cooperation at the highest level, only 10% from the Iraq sample rate it at the 
maxim. In conclusion, clear majorities from both samples support economic, political and 
security cooperation, which are structural-based techniques for advancing conflict resolution 
between two countries. 
The next tools analyzed are associated with justice, and included both retributive and 
restorative mechanisms. Concerning the former, ninety-four percent of respondents from the 
Iraq sample (n = 48) support retributive justice through court (or judicial) proceedings, 
defined as the prosecution of criminal wrongdoing according to state or international law 
(Q44). U.S. counterparts, however, express less support compared to those from Iraq, 
although seventy-eight percent (n = 45) supported judicial proceedings at the interstate level. 
In distributive terms, 53% of those from Iraq (n = 27) rank judicial proceedings in the two 
highest categories on the scale while only 21% of U.S. respondents (n = 12) do the same. 
Concerning the later, restorative justice mechanisms score comparatively well across 
techniques and study samples. For instance, 90% of respondents from Iraq (n = 46) and 76% 
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of those from the United States (n = 44) advocate truth telling (Q47), defined as a process 
where individuals who have committed wrongdoing are asked to tell the truth before a 
committee in exchange for amnesty or reduced sentencing. Hence, our Iraq sample is more 
inclined to embrace truth telling compared to the U.S. sample although a clear majority of the 
latter supports both techniques. 
Similarly, 90% of respondents from Iraq (n = 46) embrace a public apology (Q45), where 
one or more representatives publicly apologize for wrongs committed against another group. 
By comparison, 66% of the U.S. sample (n = 38) expresses the same opinion. Next, reparation 
payments (Q43), demarcated as one country paying compensation to citizens of another for 
wrongdoings committed, are supported by 88% of participants from Iraq (n = 45) and 67% of 
those from the U.S. (n = 39). Of those, 47% of respondents from Iraq (n = 24) rank 
reparations with the highest two ratings. Only 17% of U.S. respondents (n = 10) do the same. 
That a majority of the sample from Iraq expresses support for reparations was expected since 
restitution was embraced in the context of transitional justice in Iraq (International Center for 
Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 19; Stover and others, 2005: 854). 
Combined, both samples approve public apology and reparations; but by comparison, our Iraq 
sample expresses greater support for restitution and an apology than their U.S. counterparts. 
Thereafter, third party intervention (Q40), identified as representatives from another 
country or organization assisting countries to improve their relations, was evaluated. Our data 
illustrates that third party intervention likewise receives widespread support. 84% of 
respondents from Iraq (n = 43) support third party involvement compared to 78% of those 
from the United States sample (n = 45). While our finding suggests cross-cultural 
receptiveness to third party intervention at the international level, it was beyond the scope of 
the research to analyze how third party intervention is conceptualized. 
Then we explored empowerment. Unsurprisingly, pluralities from both samples agree that 
stakeholders should be empowered, or permitted to decide on how conflict resolution is 
pursued (Q50). In fact, 90% of the U.S. (n = 52) and 86% of the Iraq samples (n = 44) favors 
empowerment for guiding conflict resolution practices. Our finding reinforces scholars’ 
emphasis on particular principles, including inclusiveness and consultation, when designing 
and implementing conflict resolution (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-30). 
Finally, the questionnaire asked participants to rank tools purported to increase bilateral 
(cross-cultural) awareness. These were represented first by cultural exchanges, defined the act 
of facilitating work, study or travel to another country for a period of time to increase mutual 
knowledge of other cultures (Q48). Ninety-six percent of respondents from the Iraq sample (n 
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= 49) support cultural exchanges versus eighty-three percent of those from the United States 
(n = 48). Correspondingly, respondents were queried about positive media coverage, defined 
as the dissemination of positive news, reports and documentaries about an adversary to 
enhance public awareness (Q49). Once again, clear majorities from the U.S. (86%, n = 50) 
and Iraq samples (88%, n = 45) embrace positive media coverage in general. Accordingly, 
both sample groups support cultural exchanges and positive media coverage as tools of 
enhancing cultural awareness and transforming conflict at the interstate level. 
Amalgamated, the eleven mechanisms presented in our survey are broadly supported by 
both samples. Within this frame, the Iraq sample is more inclined to support the eleven tools 
tested at the interstate level than our sample of respondents from the United States. In 
particular, U.S. participants are, at minimum, ten percentage points less likely to advocate 
cultural exchanges, reparations, apology, court proceedings, truth commissions and security 
cooperation compared to their counterparts from Iraq. Table 10 summarizes the percentage of 
respondents who supported each tool by country of origin. The research findings extracted 
from this section confirm Hypotheses 4. More specifically, a clear majority of U.S. and Iraqi 
respondents from our research sample embraces (similar) conflict resolution tools at the 
interstate level in general. 
Table 10 Respondents’ Support for Tools in General  
S5 tools in general U.S. sample Iraq sample 
Q40 third party intervention 78% ✓ 84% ✓ 
Q41 security cooperation 86% ✓ 96% ✓ 
Q42 political cooperation 93% ✓ 96% ✓ 
Q43 reparation payments 67% ✓ 88% ✓ 
Q44 court proceedings 78% ✓ 94% ✓ 
Q45 public apology 66% ✓ 90% ✓ 
Q46 economic cooperation 84% ✓ 88% ✓ 
 Q47 truth telling 76% ✓ 90% ✓ 
Q48 cultural exchanges 83% ✓ 96% ✓ 
Q49 positive media coverage 86% ✓ 88% ✓ 
Q50 empowerment 90% ✓ 86% ✓ 
Table 10 summarizes the percentage of respondents from our survey who supported conflict resolution tools in 
general. Check marks indicate that a majority of respondents in a given sample supported the tool in question. 
 
Following our general analysis of conflict and conflict resolution, our survey refocused 
attention onto contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. The next section measures laypersons’ 
opinion concerning the effects of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. 
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6.4.4 Perceptions of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War 
Question set S6 qualifies respondent perception of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and 
occupation. Table 11 provides the p-values of the Pearson chi-square and Fisher tests of 
question sets S6a and S6b. The table illustrates levels of significance across populations (Q54, 
56) with both tests on questions 51a, 52a, 52b and 56. In both cases, there are also 
divergences in how respondents utilized the Likert Scale to answer the question as indicated 
by our Fisher p-values. The graphed responses are available in Appendix 3. 
Table 11 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S6a, b) 
set item chi.sq fis 
S6a 
Q51a 
Q52a 
Q53 
Q54 
Q55 
Q56 
Q57 
4.807480e-08 
9.855349e-05 
1.773895e-01 
7.182300e-01 
1.438633e-01 
7.060544e-03 
4.497644e-01 
1.860677e-09 
1.994498e-05 
1.558847e-01 
7.196149e-01 
1.375660e-01 
5.240604e-03 
4.263657e-01 
S6b 
Q51b 
Q52b 
1.250968e-01 
3.423902e-02 
9.985587e-02 
2.414743e-02 
Table 11 shows the p-values of chi-square and Fisher testing on question sets S6a and S6b. 
 
Questions regarding perceptions of the conflict began by querying respondents on the 
perceived impact of the 2003 war on public opinion. When asked if the war affected U.S. 
citizens’ opinion of Iraqis (Q51a), 84% of U.S. citizens (n = 49) agree it has, with 60% (n = 
35) stating that it “definitely” affects U.S. opinions of Iraqis. By contrast, only 47% of 
respondents from Iraq (n = 24) perceive the war affected U.S. citizens’ opinion of Iraqis, and 
only six percent perceive this is “definitely” the case (n = 3). Our data illustrates that our Iraq 
population is less likely to believe that the war had an impact on U.S. perceptions of Iraqis, 
while the U.S. respondents perceived otherwise. 
Figure 10 Perceptions of Effects of 2003 War on Iraqis 
 
Figure 10 depicts respondents’ answer to the question: “Do you think that the 2003-2011 invasion and 
occupation of Iraq affected Iraqis’ opinion of U.S. citizens?” A clear majority of U.S. citizens 
perceives events influence opinion, while a slight majority from our Iraq sample shares this sentiment. 
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When asked to qualify the affects the war had on U.S. citizens’ perception of Iraqis 
(Q51b), 64% of U.S. participants (n = 36) say the event had a negative impact on U.S. opinion 
of Iraqis while 41% of the Iraq sample (n = 21) agree with the assertion. The undecided rates 
from both countries range from particularly high (17% from the U.S., n = 10), to extremely 
high (35% from Iraq, n = 18). The high rate of undecided is thought a result of respondents 
having not given much consideration to how the war has impacted popular opinion of the 
“other”. 
Figure 11 Effects of the 2003 War on Iraqis 
 
Figure 11 depicts respondents’ answer to the question: “How would you rate the affect this event had 
on Iraqi opinion of U.S. citizens?” The graph illustrates that most U.S. respondents perceive the affects 
as negative while less respondents from Iraq expressed corresponding sentiment. 
 
Approaching the question from the reverse angle, respondents were asked if they felt that 
the war affected Iraqi opinion of U.S. citizens (Q52a). Ninety-three percent of U.S. 
respondents (n = 54) agree that the war and occupation has affected Iraqi perceptions of U.S. 
citizens. Seventy-one percent state this is a definite fact (n = 41). By comparison, fifty-five 
percent of from the Iraq sample (n = 28) perceive the war and occupation affect Iraqi 
perceptions of U.S. citizens. Of those, thirty-five percent (n = 18) express that Iraqi opinion of 
the U.S. was “definitely” affected. See Figure 10 for the distribution of responses by country 
of origin. 
When asked to qualify the affect the 2003 invasion has had on Iraqi opinion of U.S. 
citizens (Q52b), 72% of participants in the U.S. sample (n = 42) and 45% in the sample from 
Iraq (n = 23) say the invasion had a negative impact on Iraqi opinion of U.S. citizens. See 
Figure 11 for the distribution of responses. Thus, a majority of U.S. respondents perceives that 
the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War has had a negative effect on popular opinion in both countries. 
Comparatively, our Iraq sample is less likely to perceive that the war affected opinion of U.S. 
or Iraqi citizens. The notably high rates of negative perceptions registered here support our 
findings in chapter 2, emphasizing the need for conflict resolution to be pursued between the 
two countries. The remaining questions contained in S6a (Q53-57) are outlined in the next 
subsection as they concern conflict resolution tools in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. 
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6.4.5 Tools in context of U.S.-Iraq relations 
Building upon the theory that conflict resolution should be pursued between the United 
States and Iraq following the analysis conducted in the first part of our research, we queried 
respondents about the necessity of conflict resolution and their receptiveness to such a 
program subsequent to the 2003 War and occupation. Our analysis begins by qualifying 
general openness to the program before transitioning to respondents’ rating of tools for 
achieving this purpose. Here we test Hypothesis 5, which states that subsequent to decades of 
deconstructive and violent relations between the United States and Iraq, exemplified by the 
2003 Iraq War, a majority of respondents from our convenience sample will agree that 
conflict resolution is necessary to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations, is tested. When 
questioned if respondents believe that the Iraq and U.S. governments should reconcile their 
relationship (Q53), 79% of U.S. (n = 46) and 63% of those from the Iraq sample (n = 32) 
agree conflict resolution is necessary. Hence, a clear majority of respondents from both 
samples advocates conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq. Our finding 
confirms Hypothesis five. 
Subsequently, the questionnaire qualifies laypersons’ openness to particular tools in the 
context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Table 12 shows the p-values from the chi-square 
and Fisher test for the last question set (S7). It illustrates that the highest levels of significance 
between study populations concern questions 59, 60, 63, 66 and 68 using our chi-square. With 
divergences in responses in mind, our survey produced the following results. According to our 
Fisher, there are notable differences in the way that respondents on questions 60, 62, 63, 67 
and 68 utilized the Likert scales. 
Table 12 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S7)  
set item chi.sq fis 
S7 
Q58 
Q59 
Q60 
Q61 
Q62 
Q63 
Q64 
Q65 
Q66 
Q67 
Q68 
 
2.986714e-02 
1.618971e-03 
1.102052e-01 
3.949311e-02 
3.279916e-03 
3.538400e-01 
2.747491e-01 
6.673873e-01 
 
2.123496e-06 
2.614458e-01 
2.043799e-02 
5.898965e-04 
1.086794e-01 
4.009818e-02 
1.998474e-03 
3.341372e-01 
2.991858e-01 
7.249286e-01 
9.158203e-01 
1.483074e-07 
Table 12 illustrates the p-values of the chi-square and Fisher tests of question set S7, which include 
eleven conflict resolution mechanisms evaluated in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. 
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When asked if U.S. politicians should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when 
drafting U.S.-Iraq policy (Q57), 83% of U.S. (n = 48) and 76% of respondents from Iraq (n = 
39) agree such consultation should take place. More specifically, 35% of our Iraq sample (n = 
18) express that politicians should “definitely” take opinions into consideration when drafting 
U.S. policy, compared to 52% of U.S. respondents (n = 30) holding the same opinion. 
Respondent sentiment reiterates one of the lessons learned from U.S. government analysis of 
occupied Iraq is that the host population should be engaged to determine their needs and 
desires (Bowen, 2013: xii). It was also noted in part two that scholars emphasize that such 
inquiries would augment popular support. 
Next, focus was placed on structural tools used to advance conflict resolution in context. 
We found that pluralities support continued economic cooperation between the United States 
and Iraq (Q64). 86% of our Iraq (n = 44) and 81% of our U.S. sample (n = 47) advocate the 
tool. Support for economic cooperation was expected since majorities in Iraq had previously 
stated that the U.S. should provide financial resources to reconstruct Iraq in the aftermath of 
the 2003 war (ABC News and others, 2008: 38; Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic 
Studies, 2006: 19). Similarly, increased political cooperation (Q67) is advocated by a clear 
majority of citizens from Iraq (84%, n = 43) and the U.S. (88%, n = 51). Hence, clear 
majorities from our samples embrace economic and political cooperation between the United 
States and Iraq as tools of altering their relationship. 
In addition, respondents widely support security cooperation (Q61). Seventy-two percent 
of U.S. respondents (n = 42) support security cooperation in context, which is slightly less 
than our Iraq sample (84%, n = 43). While a clear majority of U.S. respondents advocates 
security cooperation, the tool is less appealing by comparison to our Iraq sample. Support 
among the Iraq sample was expected as ABC News and others (2008: 5) found that seventy-
six percent of respondents from Iraq thought that the United States should train and equip the 
ISF. Moreover, a majority of Iraqi respondents had expressed interest in United States 
assisting Iraq with national security against neighboring countries such as Turkey and Iran 
(ABC News and others, 2008: 5). 
The survey then measured respondents’ receptiveness to retributive justice mechanisms in 
context. Seventy-eight percent of respondents from Iraq (n = 40) support an international 
tribunal (Q56) to investigate wrongdoing committed during the 2003 War in Iraq. Of those, 
37% of participants from Iraq (n = 19) “definitely” support an international tribunal compared 
to 41% (n = 21) who claim they would “probably” support such an inquiry. A total of 20% of 
the Iraq sample is undecided about the utility of an international tribunal. By comparison, 
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sixty-nine percent of all U.S. respondents (n = 40) support an international tribunal in context. 
Thirty-eight percent (n = 22) of our U.S. sample proclaims they would “definitely” support 
such a tribunal and thirty-one percent (n = 18) claim they would “probably” support the 
practice. Nevertheless, twenty-four percent of U.S. respondents (n = 14) reject tribunals in 
context compared to only two percent of those from Iraq (n = 1). Amalgamated, a clear 
majority from our samples supports an international tribunal as a means of transforming U.S.-
Iraq relations, however our U.S. sample is less likely to support the practice and nearly one-
quarter reject the tool in context. 
When asked to rate the viability of an international tribunal in the context of U.S.-Iraq 
relations on a Likert Scale (Q59), 92% of participants from Iraq (n = 47) support its use to 
investigate wrongdoing. Support among our respondents from Iraq was expected as the 
International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center (2004: 25-26) found 
that Iraqis embraced the pursuit of retributive justice as a transitional justice mechanism on 
the condition that any “punishment matched the offense and the crimes and those who 
committed them would be publicly exposed.” By way of contrast, 67% of those from the U.S. 
(n = 39) positively rate an international tribunal in context. Thus, there is noticeably more 
support for an international tribunal among our sample from Iraq than the United States, and 
the U.S. sample is relatively consistent in their acceptance or rejection of international tribunal 
across two questions (Q56 and Q59). 
Similarly, respondents were queried about government inquiries into the 2003 War. 
Inquiries were incorporated to determine the potential value of the mechanism by comparison 
to other forms of determining the truth (such as trials or truth commissions). On the one hand, 
a U.S. government inquiry into the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War (Q55) is supported by 62% of U.S. 
respondents (n = 36) compared to 49% from our Iraq sample (n = 25). A surprising forty 
percent of those U.S. respondents (n = 23) “definitely” support a U.S. government inquiry 
compared to eighteen percent of those from Iraq (n = 9). Although our figures indicate that a 
majority of U.S. respondents supports a U.S. government inquiry, the Iraq sample is generally 
polarized on the issue. Demonstrating a high degree of uncertainty, twenty-five percent of our 
Iraq sample (n = 13) is undecided on the utility of a government inquiry. While the survey 
unfortunately could not qualify the reasoning behind their indecision or reluctance, we 
hypothesize that our Iraq sample distrusts the U.S. government would objectively conduct an 
inquiry. 
Reversely, respondents were asked if they would support a Government of Iraq inquiry 
into the 2003 war (Q62). In this instance, our U.S. participants (66%, n = 38) express slightly 
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less support for an Iraq inquiry into the war versus 78% of participants from Iraq (n = 40). 
Together, our data indicate that clear majorities from both populations support the use of an 
Iraqi inquiry, but our Iraq population expresses more support. It can also be surmised that our 
Iraq sample has more faith in a GOI inquiry than one conducted by the United States 
government. 
Afterwards, attention turned to qualifying support for restorative justice mechanisms in 
context. The data shows there are some discrepancies across our population samples. Firstly, a 
plurality (96%, n = 49) of participants from Iraq supports a truth commission (Q63) compared 
to 69% of U.S. respondents (n = 40). The nearly unanimous support expressed by the Iraq 
sample dwarfs that expressed by the U.S. sample. An analogous discrepancy is found in the 
appropriateness of a U.S. apology for its actions in Iraq (Q60). Ninety percent of those in our 
Iraq sample (n = 46) favor the use of an apology compared to only fifty percent of U.S. 
respondents (n = 29). Consequently, a clear majority of respondents from Iraq supports an 
apology while the U.S. sample is polarized on the mechanism in context. Lastly, nearly twice 
as many respondents from Iraq (96%, n = 49) favor the payment of reparations by the U.S. 
(Q68), compared to 53% of their U.S. counterparts (n = 31). It should be recalled that U.S. 
participants gave the three tools marginally positive rating in general terms (section 6.4.3). 
Hence, clear majorities from our Iraq sample support the three restorative justice tools in 
context, while U.S. respondents clearly embrace a truth commission, but support is (nearly) 
polarized on reparations and apology. 
Table 13 Respondents’ Support for Tools in Context 
 S6a*, 7 Tools in context U.S. sample Iraq sample 
Q55* a U.S. inquiry 62% ✓ 49% ✗ 
Q57* consultation with Iraqis 83% ✓ 76% ✓ 
Q58 cultural exchanges 81% ✓ 96% ✓ 
Q59 international tribunal 67% ✓ 92% ✓ 
Q60 a U.S. apology 50% ✗ 90% ✓ 
Q61 security cooperation 72% ✓ 84% ✓ 
Q62 an Iraq inquiry 66% ✓ 78% ✓ 
Q63 truth commission 69% ✓ 96% ✓ 
Q64 economic cooperation 81% ✓ 86% ✓ 
Q65 third party intervention 69% ✓ 69% ✓ 
Q66 positive media coverage 81% ✓ 84% ✓ 
Q67 political cooperation 88% ✓ 84% ✓ 
Q68 reparations 53% ✓ 96% ✓ 
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Table 13 provides the percentage of respondents from our survey who supported conflict resolution tools in the 
context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Check marks indicate that a majority of respondents in a given 
sample supported the tool in question. The * indicates questions in question set 6a. 
 
The next mechanism examined was third party intervention. Two questions were asked 
concerning third party intervention. Firstly, when queried if respondents would support 
conflict resolution if a third party proposed it (Q54), 69% from the U.S. (n = 40) and 57% 
from Iraq (n = 29) assert that they would. Among those, twenty-four percent of U.S. 
participants (n = 14) say they would “definitely” support conflict resolution if a third party 
proposed it versus eighteen percent of those from Iraq (n = 9). However, 14% of U.S. (n = 8) 
and 16% of respondents from Iraq (n = 8) state that they would not support conflict resolution 
if proposed by a third party. Nonetheless, a majority of respondents from both countries 
would support conflict resolution if proposed by a third party. Secondly, respondents were 
asked to rate third party intervention as a tool in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq 
relations (Q65). A slight majority from our Iraq (69%, n = 35) and the U.S. samples (69%, n = 
40) rate third party involvement positively. Hence, both sample populations similarly embrace 
the mechanism in context. 
Finally, tools for advancing cultural awareness were integrated into the survey to measure 
respondent rating of their utility for altering U.S.-Iraq relations. On the one hand, clear 
majorities advocate positive media coverage (Q66). Eighty-four percent of the Iraq sample (n 
= 43), and eighty-one percent of U.S. participants (n = 47), perceive positive media coverage 
as beneficial for transforming U.S.-Iraq relations. Thirty-three percent of U.S. respondents (n 
= 19) give positive media coverage the highest priority versus 19% of those from Iraq (n = 
10). On the other hand, clear majorities express interest in cultural exchanges (Q58). An 
overwhelming 96% of participants from Iraq (n = 49) approve cultural exchanges compared to 
81% of those from the U.S. (n = 47). Both positive media coverage and cultural exchanges are 
supported by our U.S. and Iraq samples. 
Combining our survey findings from this question set demonstrates that both samples 
approve a plurality of the conflict resolution tools introduced in this section in the context of 
contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. See Table 13 for a summary of the percentage of 
respondents who supported conflict resolution practices to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq 
relations. Our Iraq sample only rejected a U.S. government inquiry, while our U.S. samples 
rejected a U.S. apology and narrowly approved the U.S. payment of reparations. In 9 of 13 
instances, the sample from Iraq views the listed conflict resolution mechanisms more 
favorably in context than their U.S. counterparts. Accordingly, Hypothesis 6 is confirmed as a 
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majority of our research participants agrees on thirteen conflict resolution factors to transform 
the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The present chapter outlines methodology and findings of our questionnaire that 
comparatively analyzes perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution in general terms, as 
well as in the context of United States and Iraq relation across a convenience sample of U.S. 
and Iraq respondents. The overall objective of the survey was to qualify convergences and 
divergences in conceptualizations of conflict and conflict resolution across our samples by 
eliciting and quantifying respondents’ opinion of related concepts, principles and factors. Our 
survey is a theoretical milestone since it comparatively analyzes micro level 
conceptualizations of conflict resolution across U.S. and Iraq samples, and between scholarly 
perceptions articulated in part two of the present thesis with that of laypersons. 
Simultaneously, the survey measures respondent receptiveness to a hypothetical conflict 
resolution program between the United States and Iraq, and laypersons’ receptiveness to 
thirteen factors in that context. Four interrelated Hypotheses were tested and confirmed 
throughout our examination of the survey data. 
Chapter 6 opened by reiterating the need for conflict resolution in the context of U.S.-Iraq 
relations. While scholars and citizens alike initially expressed optimism at the potential for 
change in U.S. foreign policy approach toward the Middle East following the election of 
Barack Obama, positive sentiment gradually waned. Although Obama’s rhetoric was 
conciliatory in nature, and emphasized the need for improved relations across these cultures, 
his administration failed to make meaningful policy adjustments to lend credence to rhetoric. 
Confirming the trend, Iraq experienced a temporary rise in popular opinion of Obama, which 
later declined. Alteration in popular sentiment is proposed to be a result of there being no 
increased or tangible efforts to reconcile U.S.-Iraq relations or alter public opinion. With 
sentiment remaining predominantly negative, we determined that conflict resolution is still 
necessary and relevant in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations, as animosity and grievance still 
exist. 
Upon the theory that conflict resolution is necessary in this context, we produced a survey 
to measure how laypersons from the United States and Iraq conceptualize conflict and conflict 
resolution. The survey was designed around our analysis of conflict resolution in part two of 
our research and Appendix 1. Concerning the former, many concepts, principles and tools 
were extracted from our theoretical framework of conflict resolution as articulated in the 
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literature review of Western and Arab/Muslim scholars in chapters three through five. These 
included concepts and terminology that could be evaluated and compared between our 
samples of laypersons, and across our samples and scholarly theory. Concerning the latter, 
Appendix 1, a non-exhaustive list of tools, was developed during the course of our research 
by recording conflict resolution tools utilized at the interstate level as referenced in the 
literature. This framework was used to determine which mechanisms have been implemented 
in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations, which are not viable, and which are 
considered viable. 
Succinctly, referencing the non-exhaustive list of conflict resolution tools outlined in 
Appendix 1, the research categorized the mechanisms according to those “hitherto applied,” 
“relevant” or “irrelevant” in context. Those applied included mainly structural techniques, for 
instance, political and security cooperation. Tools deemed irrelevant included practices 
including partition or holding new elections, practices that are irrelevant in context, in 
addition to techniques, such as forgiveness or modifying textbooks, which are determined 
untimely. Following this preliminary analysis, mechanisms determined relevant totaled 37, 
which included several structural practices from the “hitherto applied”, namely political, and 
economic and security cooperation, which were transposed to evaluate their acceptability 
among our samples. Due to their large quantity, the thirty-seven “relevant” tools had to be 
further reduced through two phases of piloting. Subsequent to pilot work, the list of relevant 
tools was condensed to eleven of the most recognizable and relevant conflict resolution 
mechanisms for resolving interstate conflict. 
The second section of chapter six provided detailed explanations as to why conflict 
resolution tools were inserted or eliminated from the final draft of the survey. Reasons for 
pilot rejection of tools include their obscure nature, their perceived inappropriateness absent 
implementation of other techniques, or the belief that respondents would misperceive the 
practice. Concerning the latter, for example, it was feared that respondents might mistake 
techniques, such as theatre or storytelling, for entertainment rather than recognizing their 
relative utility for resolving and transforming conflictual relationships. In this manner, eleven 
mechanisms were overwhelmingly selected by pilot participants as applicable and easily 
recognizable, and were, therefore, incorporated into the final draft of the questionnaire. 
While explaining how relevant principles and mechanisms were determined, the chapter 
outlined the development and design of the questionnaire. Our overview includes a brief 
history of questionnaire construction, composition and piloting. Although piloting occurred 
over three stages and was limited to 25 participants, who were predominantly U.S. citizens, 
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the process proved invaluable. The first two phases (20 respondents total) aided in the 
reduction of tools which advance conflict resolution, and assisted with improving 
questionnaire layout and presentation. Phase one of piloting consisted of ten respondents who 
were asked open questions and a response elicited. Notes were taken, and the data and 
feedback collected aided in the reduction of the length of the survey and to the establishment 
of a written questionnaire with closed questions. The decision to shift from an open-question 
interview to a written survey was recommended to expedite the survey process, reduce 
respondent fatigue and ensure comparability across research samples. Once corrections 
acquired from phase one was made, and a written survey was produced, phase two was 
implemented. 
Phase two likewise consisted of ten pilot participants. During phase two, the survey was 
presented in printed format by the research and consisted of 80 questions. Again, respondents 
were asked to provide answers to questions as well as provide general feedback on language, 
presentation and design. Once complete, data from phases one and two were analyzed and the 
most popular mechanisms were selected for inclusion in the final survey. When a survey had 
been designed around the eleven most relevant and recognizable conflict resolution factors, 
the final draft of the survey was presented to five additional pilot participants who completed 
the survey. The last five participants’ primary contribution to the survey was their critique of 
questionnaire language, format and design. 
Subsequent to piloting, the survey was forwarded to an assistant professor of politics and 
methodology that provided additional feedback. Among minor recommended changes to the 
wording of some questions, the assistant professor warned the researcher of the challenges of 
administering the survey and acquiring a representative sample from both target population 
groups. He recommended that if assistance with distribution could not be solicited, that the 
research sample be weighed to improve representativeness. Additionally, he recommended 
that the “don’t know” categories be re-introduced into the survey. This latter suggestion was 
not adopted, however, for several reasons, including pilot participants’ criticism of its 
inclusion, and survey literature suggesting that “don’t know” categories increase the 
likelihood of respondents not giving much consideration to the questions asked. 
Once the survey had been controlled and finalized, the researcher sought to make it 
available and promote it with U.S. and Iraq citizens. On the one hand, attempts were made to 
recruit Arab translators through a contact at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. However, a team of 
translators could not be hired due to work restrictions and/or time restraint issues. As an 
alternative, the survey was translated into German and Italian to accommodate Iraqis living 
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abroad. These translations aided in the availability of the survey. On the other hand, assistance 
with promoting the research was solicited, namely from NGOs and universities, was not 
forthcoming. It was denoted that most individuals and organizations solicited were not 
supportive, although the prominent exception was Pietro Benedetti at Servizio Salute Migranti 
Forzati, who was essential to the advancement of our research in terms of reaching 
respondents from Iraq. Nonetheless, absent large-scale assistance, and subsequent to the 
inability to recruit Arab translators and target Arabic speaking Iraqis, it was decided to jettison 
hopes of acquiring a representative sample from either the U.S. or Iraq population. To 
compensate, snowball and convenience sampling became the primary recruiting methods, and 
to enhance availability, whereby the survey was launched online in three languages to 
augment accessibility and convenience to potential respondents from each sample. 
Subsequent to outlining questionnaire construction and distribution, we explained several 
research weaknesses. Among its weaknesses, our survey sample is small and unrepresentative 
due to the inability to recruit assistance or travel to the United States or Iraq. For this reason, 
we caution that our research findings not be used to make generalizations about opinion held 
by U.S. or Iraq citizens, but rather our research provides insight into the opinions of our 
sample groups. In addition, due to the use of Internet technologies, it is impossible to 
determine the non-participation rate or provide insight into why potential respondents chose 
not to participate. Due to these weaknesses, and others, we again emphasize that research 
findings are not representative of the populations in general. 
However, despite its weaknesses, we contend that our research findings are valuable for 
understanding how conflict resolution is conceptualized by laypersons across U.S. and Iraq 
culture at the micro level. To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study of micro 
level opinion in this context. Consequently, we believe that our survey research offers an 
alternative approach to analyzing conflict resolution theory and practices across cultures, 
which is typically generalized at the macro level. It thereby offers a fresh perspective into 
cross-cultural conflict resolution discourse. Moreover, due to its unique approach, our survey 
findings both confirm and contradict theories extracted from our literature review of 
Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations as articulated by scholars. 
We, therefore, believe that the utilization of survey research at the micro level, despite its 
unrepresentative nature, makes a theoretical contribution to contemporary discourse because it 
introduces laypersons’ perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution into scholarly discourse 
while empowering relevant stakeholders. Our selected methodology, therefore, shifts 
discourse away from conventional scholarly generalizations at the macro level (West versus 
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Arab/Muslim approaches), and refocuses it on the opinions of our samples of U.S. and Iraq 
citizens. In this manner, general scholarly understanding of conflict resolution of macro level 
approaches is juxtaposed with the opinion of affected laypersons at the micro level. Another 
notable advantage of our approach is that members of the affected societies were given an 
opportunity to express their opinions on conflict, conflict resolution and principles and factors 
associated with its processes. In essence, respondents could express their opinion on 
theoretical and practical aspects of conflict resolution between two countries in general, and in 
the case of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. 
Thereafter, we outlined data collection, compilation and analysis. Simultaneously, 
methodology was explained, including how the survey was broadcast and administered online 
and how respondents were recruited. On the one hand, Iraq refugees, or immigrants living in 
Europe, were solicited. On the other hand, personal acquaintances and Facebook respondents 
were networked to acquire both U.S. and Iraq respondents online. The latter method increased 
availability, and convenience, although Internet surveys are considered potentially restrictive 
in nature, since not everyone has access to a computer. However, in the case of Iraq refugees 
or immigrants living in Italy, refugees were provided with Internet access and assistance, if 
necessary, to complete the survey. Hence, we managed to reach some respondents who would 
have otherwise not have been able to participate. 
Following elucidation of survey implementation and availability, we explained how the 
collected data was analyzed. Subsequent to making the data uniform, for instance spelling, we 
explained how reliability and levels of significance were tested utilizing three separate 
measures respectively. Concerning reliability, our analysis found that question sets 1-3, which 
are our funnel questions concerning general perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution, are 
statistically unreliable. Nevertheless, the data was introduced for the sake of discussion. 
Alternatively, the remaining question sets essential to testing our four working hypothesis 
have a high rate of reliability across the three measures used. Albeit, we also explained that 
due to the small size and non-representative nature of our sample, it was only possible to 
analyze the date descriptively, and we again emphasized that generalizations of our findings 
should proceed with caution as our findings represent our samples and not populations. 
Thereafter, comparative findings extracted from our survey were examined in the last 
section of the chapter. Our questionnaire contains seven topical question sets. The first two 
question sets deal with how our sample conceptualizes conflict and conflict resolution. 
Through questioning, we find similarities and differences across cultures (or our samples) 
concerning how conflict is conceptualized. For instance, we find that most respondents from 
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our U.S. and Iraq samples agree that conflicts are normal, and that a majority of respondents 
from our samples perceives conflict resolution as important in their daily lives. Similarly, a 
slight majority of respondents agrees that conflict cannot be prevented, although a slight 
majority of respondents from both samples believes that conflictual relationships can be 
resolved, and most believe that conflicts should be resolved. Finally, there was consensus 
across cultures that there is a difference between conflict resolution between two individuals 
and conflict resolution between two states. However, these findings had a low degree of 
reliability. 
Nevertheless, there were equally noteworthy differences in how our samples conceptualize 
conflict. Foremost, an overwhelming percentage of U.S. respondents say conflicts can be 
nonviolent, compared to less than half of those from the Iraq sample. In this frame, our U.S. 
sample perceives conflict could manifest nonviolently while our Iraq sample disagree. This 
finding reinforces Arab/Muslim theory outlined in chapter five, although the reliability of 
these question sets is low. In addition, when questioned if conflicts should be avoided, slightly 
less than half of all U.S. respondents believe avoidance is necessary compared to a clear 
majority from the Iraq sample. Unfortunately our survey does not permit an opportunity to ask 
follow-up questions to determine why these differences exist. Nonetheless, these question sets 
are designed to funnel our respondents’ attention to conflict resolution, and despite their low 
reliability, we qualify many similarities and some divergences in how conflict is 
conceptualized across our research samples by comparison to our literature review of cultural 
approaches. 
In short, our research findings pertaining to conflict both challenge and confirm scholarly 
conceptualizations outlined in the second part of our research. However, we recommend that 
more thorough and representative research be conducted to verify our findings. We make this 
recommendation because our data generates some interesting findings but is unreliable. On 
the one hand, we found an overwhelming majority of our sample from the U.S., and a clear 
majority from the Iraq, perceives a conflict affects more than those immediately involved. 
Respondent opinions on this topic contradicts the Arab/Muslim hypothesis that Westerners do 
not see conflict as systemic, and indicates that laypersons in our U.S. sample appreciates the 
systemic nature of conflict and its effects. On the other hand, our research finds that a clear 
majority of the U.S. sample perceives a conflict can produce positive benefits compared to 
only about half of those from Iraq. In this instance, our data confirms the Arab/Muslim theory 
that Westerners perceive conflicts is generally perceived as having a positive dimension. 
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However, the polarization of our Iraq sample on this issue suggests further research is 
necessary to better qualify how Iraqis conceptualize conflict. 
Subsequent question sets examined respondents’ perceptions of conflict resolution. 
Through our questionnaire, we found that a majority of U.S. and Iraq respondents believes 
that all conflicts should be resolved. Interestingly, only a slight majority of U.S. respondents 
perceives that all conflicts are resolvable compared to a polarized Iraq sample. Here, it is 
possible to observe limited optimism among our Iraq sample, which confirms scholars’ 
hypothesis that Arab/Muslims generally perceive conflict is challenging to resolve. 
Nonetheless, both samples measure their expectations when conceptualizing the relative 
capacity of conflict resolution. Similarly, slight majorities from our U.S. and Iraq samples 
perceive that nonviolent coexistence is the most probable outcome than peace when resolving 
violent conflict relations. Despite their limited expectation concerning probable outcomes, an 
overwhelming number of respondents from both samples optimistically state that two 
countries involved in war can improve their relationship following conflict. This finding 
suggests that both samples believe conflicts can be resolved, although they limit their 
expectations. Lastly, when classifying reconciliation, we found that U.S. respondents are less 
likely to perceive reconciled relations is synonymous to peaceful relations, compared to their 
counterparts from Iraq, who are more inclined to believe that reconciliation and peaceful 
relations are synonymous. 
Attention then turned to qualifying respondent perceptions of conflict resolution 
principles. Among the principles analyzed, we included: honor; dignity; respect; satisfaction 
of interests; satisfaction of the needs; protection of individual rights; appropriate 
compensation; consultation; listening to the “other”; mutual benefit; acceptable practices; 
justice; truth; accountability; forgiveness; and religion. Most of the principles examined are 
referenced by Arab/Muslim scholars, and emphasized or implied in the Western literature, as 
analyzed elsewhere. Our survey indicates that clear majorities of laypersons from both 
samples embrace 15 of the 16 principles analyzed. Amalgamated, a minimum of sixty-five 
percent of respondents from our samples support a majority of the principles introduced 
including justice, truth and honor. The single exception was the rejection of religion by our 
U.S. sample. This finding supports Arab/Muslim theory that Westerners reject religion as a 
principle of conflict resolution. However, some Western scholars advocate religion be 
incorporated, so the principle remains theoretically applicable. Nevertheless, our data 
evaluating laypersons’ opinions towards principles confirms Hypothesis 3, which projected 
  
427 
 
that respondents across cultures would similarly embrace sixteen principles of conflict 
resolution. In this case, our U.S. and Iraq samples embraced fifteen of sixteen principles. 
Our attention then turned to testing whether tools were equally embraced. To test 
Hypothesis 4, we qualified perceptions of eleven conflict resolution tools in general. The tools 
selected were extracted from Appendix 1, as outlined in section two of this chapter. The tools 
included are: third party intervention; security cooperation; political cooperation; reparation 
payments; court proceedings; public apology; economic cooperation; truth telling; cultural 
exchanges; positive media coverage; and empowerment. Our data confirms a majority of 
laypersons’ from both samples embraces a majority of the conflict resolution tools introduced. 
More precisely, over 65% of all U.S. respondents support each tool, compared to over 80% of 
our Iraq sample. Our data, therefore, confirms Hypotheses 4, which suggests that modes of 
conflict resolution would be shared across our sample populations. 
Subsequently, our survey qualified perceptions of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War among our 
samples. We found that most respondents from Iraq did not perceive that the war affected 
U.S. or Iraqi opinion of the other. By comparison, a majority of U.S. respondents perceives 
that the invasion had a negative effect on both the U.S. and Iraqi opinion of the other. 
Thereafter, respondents were asked whether they believe that conflict resolution is necessary 
between the United States and Iraq following the 2003 invasion and occupation. In response 
to this question, more than half of respondents from both sample groups believe that conflict 
resolution should be pursued between the two countries. This data confirms Hypothesis 5, 
which states a majority of respondents would agree that conflict resolution between the 
United States and Iraq is necessary to transform the quality of the relationship. 
Finally, we asked respondents to rate thirteen tools for promoting conflict resolution in the 
context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Among those selected were: a U.S. inquiry into 
the war; consultation with Iraqis; cultural exchanges; an international tribunal; a U.S. apology; 
security cooperation; an Iraq inquiry; truth commission; economic cooperation; third party 
intervention; positive media coverage; political cooperation; and reparations. Of those thirteen 
introduced, each sample reject one method. U.S. respondents do not support an apology, and 
respondents from Iraq do not endorse a U.S. government inquiry into the war. Our U.S. 
sample was also nearly polarized on the issue of payment of reparations, which was supported 
by slightly more than half of participants (53%). Aside from these instances, a minimum of 
65% of U.S. respondents supported each of the remaining twelve tools, compared to at least 
75% of respondents from Iraq who supported the remaining twelve. 
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Consequently, our data confirms that our U.S. and Iraq samples largely approve the use of 
eleven of thirteen tools presented in the context of improving contemporary U.S.-Iraq 
relations. Our research findings, therefore, confirm Hypothesis 6, which states that a majority 
of respondents will support the use of a majority of thirteen conflict resolution techniques to 
transform the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations. Combined, our survey demonstrates that both 
samples predominantly embrace nearly the same conflict resolution principles and practices in 
general, and the same conflict resolution mechanism in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. 
With this knowledge in mind, we present several recommendations concerning future cross-
cultural studies of conflict resolution between Arab/Muslim and Western culture in theory and 
practice, as well as summarize the findings of this research, in the next chapter. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The present research accomplished several objectives. First, it qualified the existence of a 
protracted conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq, a relationship that 
needs to be transformed to minimize the potential for future conflict. Second, it juxtaposed 
Western and Arab/Muslim scholarly conceptualizations of conflict and conflict resolution, 
written in the English language, to qualify similarities and divergences of lexicon, principles 
and practices. Lastly, it examined laypersons’ general conceptualizations of conflict resolution 
between two countries and in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations among a convenience sample 
of U.S. and Iraq citizens. The survey allowed us to comparatively analyze responses provided 
by our samples, and to juxtapose their opinions against scholarly theory. Amalgamated, we 
proved the existence of a protracted conflictual relationship, and demonstrated a high degree 
of cross-cultural similarity between conceptualizations of conflict resolution across the 
literature analyzed and our research samples. While reviewing our research findings in this 
section, we will revisit the six hypotheses that guided the present research, and introduce 
existing research gaps and policy recommendations deduced from this study. 
U.S.-Iraq (conflict) relations matured following the withdrawal of Britain’s influence from 
the Middle East in the mid-1900s. At this point, the United States and the Soviet Union 
became increasingly involved in the Middle East, with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
engaging regional leaders to selfishly augment the hegemons’ relative influence. As part of its 
strategy, the United States utilized enticements, and sometimes violence, to coerce Iraq’s 
leaders to conform to policies the U.S. determined favorable to its regional interests, which, 
among others, were designed to undermine the regional influence of the Soviet Union, and to 
secure the flow of Middle East petroleum onto the international market. From its utilization of 
covert operations supporting Kurd rebels in Iraq, to offsetting Iraq-Soviet relations by 
courting and assisting Iran, the United States regularly implemented policies which 
counteracted Iraq’s leaders when they acted contrary to the desired objectives of the standing 
U.S. administration. The U.S. government deployed analogous policies throughout the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s, generally perceiving Iraq as a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. 
Subsequent to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran in September 1980, the Ronald Reagan 
administration officially adopted a neutral position. Unofficially, however, the U.S. 
administration provided military and intelligence support to warring Iraq throughout the 
1980s. Nonetheless, it was later disclosed that the Reagan administration was simultaneously 
aiding Iran as part of a clandestine negotiated arrangement to have U.S. hostages in Lebanon 
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released from captivity. U.S. duplicitous behavior, once disclosed, exacerbated preexisting 
regional distrust of the U.S. government, especially in Iraq. The act confirmed Saddam 
Hussein’s suspicions that the United State government could not be trusted, and led credence 
to the perception that the single U.S. policy objective was to undermine Iraq. Nonetheless, 
once U.S. covert support for Iran had been publicized, the Reagan administration supported 
only Iraq for the remainder of the Iran-Iraq War. Although trust between the Iraq and the 
United States had been severely compromised, Saddam Hussein continued to accept 
assistance from the U.S. to augment his military capacity vis-à-vis Iran. 
Following the termination of the Iran-Iraq War in late 1988, Iraq emerged as a frail 
military power in the Middle East. Frailty of the country was a result of tremendous economic 
debt accumulated during the Iran-Iraq War, most of which was bankrolled by Iraq’s regional 
neighbors. Equally problematic, Iraq’s infrastructure had been damage or deteriorated. At this 
time, the price of petroleum on the international market declined, which strangled Iraq’s 
economic revenue. Saddam Hussein’s hopelessly negotiated assistance from his neighboring 
lenders, yet they were uncooperative and would not implement measures to ease Iraq’s 
economic burden. Frustrated, Saddam Hussein harshened his rhetoric, trying to coerce 
concessions. Meanwhile, the George H.W. Bush administration attempted to improve U.S.-
Iraq relations at this time, even securing U.S. economic assistance to aid Iraq’s recovery, but 
the degree of assistance procured was insufficient. 
As frustration turned to determination and desperation, Iraq’s President, Saddam Hussein, 
invaded neighboring Kuwait in 1990. It is argued that Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait was a form 
of punishment, which allowed Iraq to absorb the emirate’s natural resources as a means of 
loosening Iraq’s debt burden. Following the annexation, the Bush administration scuttled 
efforts to maintain amicable relations, and Iraq was again viewed as a threat to U.S. 
geopolitical interests. In short, the eight years of cooperation between these two countries 
during the Iran-Iraq War was reversed, and a conflictual relationship between the United 
States and Iraq reemerged. After diplomatic measures failed to compel Saddam Hussein to 
withdraw its military forces from Kuwait, the 1991 Persian Gulf War was launched under the 
auspice of the United Nations. Subsequent to the U.S.-led coalition’s decisive defeat of Iraq’s 
military, a ceasefire agreement was brokered. 
The ceasefire agreement, however, did not end violence, because it contained (violent) 
provisions, namely economic sanctions, whereby the United States and other countries were 
able to continue to perpetrate physical and structural violence against Iraq as components of a 
broad containment policy. Combined, the containment of Iraq endured between 1991 and 
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2003. The strategy included international weapons inspections, economic sanctioning, 
military strikes and assistance to political opponents. While the policies were designed to 
weaken Saddam Hussein’s grip on power, and curtail Iraq’s military capability, they likewise 
produced a humanitarian crisis. Among the devastating humanitarian consequences 
manufactured by sanctioning, Iraqis endured shortages of medical supplies and food. These 
circumstances were exacerbated by regular aerial bombardments from coalition military 
operations and high rates of unemployment. Those acts of physical and structural violence 
negatively impacted on popular opinion, producing acute animosity and grievances among 
Iraq’s society toward the United States and the international community for imposing 
sanctions and containment. 
Although the population endured hardship resulting from the containment policy 
throughout the 1990s, Saddam Hussein remained firmly in control. He expelled international 
weapons inspectors, promoted black market trading, and generally scoffed at the United 
Nations and the United States. Hussein's ability to retain authority, in turn, frustrated some 
U.S. politicians who insisted direct military intervention was necessary to remove him from 
power. The persistent impulse to depose Iraq’s leader by military force was bolstered within 
the U.S. government by the September 11, 2001 attacks. Subsequently, tensions between Iraq 
and the United States escalated since some administration officials, with the assistance of the 
Department of Defense, manufactured a case for war. Founded upon false accusations and 
exaggerated threat assessments, the U.S. public generally accepted the administration’s 
assertion that intervention was necessary. By comparison, most of the international 
community rejected and condemned a possible invasion. Absent international support, 
nevertheless, determined to implement regime change, an ad hoc coalition led by the United 
States was formed. The invasion to depose Saddam Hussein was perpetrated in April 2003. 
The 2003 U.S.-Iraq War escalated and protracted the deconstructive relationship between 
the two countries. The operation ushered in eight years of U.S.-led occupation, bolstered by 
the sustained deployment of physical and structural violence between these two entities. 
Physical violence during this period, for instance, is observable in the use of the military to 
overthrow Hussein, and its deployment to combat the insurgency against coalition forces and 
sectarian violence the occupation inevitably produced. Structural violence was deployed in the 
imposition of U.S. political objectives designed to refashion Iraq’s political and social 
structures between 2003 and 2011. The combination created an insurgency to hasten the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces, while fracturing Iraq’s society. The latter produced internal ethnic 
and sectarian conflict at the political and social levels on an unprecedented scale in Iraq’s 
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history. Prevalent insecurity was compounded by U.S. inaction, one the one hand, (for 
example, its failure to provide security or basic services), and its actions, one the other hand 
(imposition of social and political benchmarks during the occupation). 
As a consequence of more than two decades of violent interaction, articulated in our 
conflict mapping, we demonstrated how the protracted conflictual relationship between the 
United States and Iraq has negatively influenced societal perceptions. The societal impact was 
qualified through the referencing of public opinion polling collected by various research 
groups, media corporations and scholars. In short, the sustained deconstructive relationship 
between the United States and Iraq produced distrust and grievances within both societies, and 
at the macro level. One the one hand, in Iraq and the Middle East, frustration and outrage at 
the United States has persisted since the 1990s sanction of Iraq. This sentiment was 
exacerbated by the 2003 occupation, manifesting in popular espousal, at the micro and macro 
levels, of violence against occupying U.S. military forces. Tenacious negative sentiment was 
manufactured by a combination of factors, including preexisting animosity, abhorrence of the 
occupation and the (asymmetrical) physical and structural violence perpetrated by the United 
States, to name a few. On the other hand, we illustrated how popular U.S. negative sentiment 
toward Iraq has been acute since the 1990s, and persists at the time of writing. Combined, the 
historical analysis and conflict mapping provided, supported by polling data, proves the 
protracted violent conflict between the United States and Iraq has produced a negative social 
impact, including animosity and grievances, findings which prove Hypothesis 1 of our 
research. 
With the conflict relationship qualified, we turned our attention to how the quality of 
protracted, deconstructive relationships between referents can be altered. According to 
scholars, alteration is necessary because, in instances of long-term and/or socially rooted 
deconstructive interaction, especially at the intrastate and interstate levels, these types of 
relationships are subject to conflict continuation or escalation since the effects of conflict 
become embedded within social, cultural and political structures. To reverse these trends, 
scholars advocate conflict resolution be pursued. The applicability of this recommendation is 
obvious in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations, with some scholars hypothesizing that as long as the 
U.S. is perceived as predominantly responsible for the religious, political and social problems 
experienced in the Middle East, and the malefactor or initiator of the social and political 
turmoil experienced in the region, the potential for violent conflict between the U.S. and 
Arab/Muslim countries remains. From the reverse angle, politicians and the public in the U.S. 
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continue to feel that they have interests in the Middle East, which must be secured and 
protected. 
Transferring these macro level assumptions to the micro level, we argue that the end of 
combat operations, and the removal of military forces from Iraq constitute the most 
appropriate time when conflict resolution between these two countries can be pursued. To this 
end, some efforts have been made to repair U.S.-Iraq relations hitherto. However, measures 
implemented thus far have been mainly structural in nature, which scholars argue are 
insufficient for generating transformation of the conflictive relationship between Iraq and the 
United States at the societal level. Succinctly, structural techniques are useful, but inadequate 
for addressing conflict structures, and thereby are unlikely to produce long-term constructive 
relations that target and become rooted in society. While structural measures implemented 
have, among other things, reduced direct physical violence, conflict is not synonymous with 
armed confrontation, violence or war. Consequently, we believe both governments need to 
appreciate that the conflict relationship between the two countries is deeper than the 2003 war 
and occupation, as it has impacted on society. In short, the deconstructive relationship is 
rooted in historical experience, reinforced by sustained structural and physical violence, which 
acutely impact cognitive, effective and behavioral aspects of individuals and collectives 
exposed. 
Since bilateral negative sentiment between Iraq and U.S. societies is high, it is suggested a 
process of conflict resolution aimed at altering social perceptions and behavior is warranted. 
However, avocation of conflict resolution is problematic, because the 2003 U.S. invasion of 
Iraq amplified scholarly critique of conflict resolution as a practice. By way of summary, 
three prominent critiques examined insinuate conflict resolution: is impotent for resolving 
conflict; its practices are implemented in an uncritical, unbalanced and unjust manner; and it 
is inapplicable or inappropriate across cultures because its theories and practices are 
predominantly perceived as Western in style and approach. However, since many scholars 
continue to believe that conflict resolution is viable at the intrastate and interstate levels, in 
spite of its faults, we believe the process should be pursued. This verdict marginalizes the first 
critique. 
To address the latter two critiques, our research transitioned to comparatively analyzing 
conflict resolution as a theory and practice across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures in the 
English language. Comparisons were designed to qualify similarities and differences between 
lexicon, theory and practices across cultures. To this end, our research made cross-cultural 
comparisons in two manners: across scholarship, and across a sample of laypersons. Through 
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this combination of approaches, we are able to determine a high degree of cross-cultural 
compatibility, which contradicts the assumption that conflict and conflict resolution, when 
conceptualized and practiced at the interstate level, are predominantly divergent. Addressing 
the latter two critiques, we test cross-cultural compatibility between Arab/Muslim and 
Western approaches between two countries, while giving a sample of laypersons’ the 
opportunity to provide insight into how they conceptualize lexicon, principles and practices. 
The latter is relevant for empowering individuals and allowing them to express how they 
believe conflict resolution should be pursued. 
The methodology we utilized for comparing Western and Arab/Muslim approaches to 
conflict resolution diverges from comparable research conducted hitherto in two important 
respects. First, we utilized a broad Western framework of conflict resolution whereupon 
lexicon, principles and practices could be extracted and compared across Western and 
Arab/Muslim cultures. More precisely, our theoretical framework contains elements from all 
three Western peacebuilding approaches: conflict management, conflict resolution and 
conflict transformation. Operationalizing this broad framework fills a conspicuous research 
gap, since Arab/Muslim scholars conduct most comparative analysis in this instance, and 
generally, albeit inappropriately, reduce Western principles and practices to the structural 
approach alone. 
 The aforementioned narrow Arab/Muslim comparisons with Western approaches have, as 
a result of their limited framework, suffers from one striking theoretical contradiction. While 
isolating the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches during their analysis, 
those same appraisals emphasize two recognized theories largely rooted in those same 
Western approaches. More specifically, Arab/Muslim comparative literature accuses most 
Western scholars of believing that conflicts can produce positive benefits and for believing 
that all conflicts can be resolved. Despite accurately referencing these two theories associated 
with conflict resolution and/or conflict transformation theory, Arab/Muslim scholars fail to 
further acknowledge, let alone evaluate, other salient theoretical and practical contributions 
these approaches offer. Namely, scholars do not make references to conflict resolution being 
implemented at the societal level, as embraced by both the social-psychological and spiritual 
approaches, nor do they allude to religious influence found in the spiritual approach. 
Nevertheless, based on their narrow and unrepresentative comparisons, these scholars go on to 
criticize Western approaches for, among other reasons, failing to accommodate society and 
religion. Trapped in their narrow theoretical framework, it is concluded that Western and 
Arab/Muslim approaches are largely incompatible and function at cross-purposes. However, 
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by incorporating theory associated with the spiritual and social-psychological approaches into 
the comparative discourse, our comparative analysis is better able to represent Western 
theory, and consequently, whereby we are able to qualify increasing degrees of theoretical and 
practical convergences across Western and Arab/Muslim scholarly conceptualizations of 
conflict resolution in theory and practice. 
The second manner in which our comparative approach differs from its predecessors is 
that we incorporate micro level input into comparative conflict resolution discourse by 
querying two convenience samples of laypersons. Surveying allows us to qualify perceptions 
of conflict and conflict resolution at the interstate level. Scholars and policymakers alike have 
generally overlooked quantitative research of this nature despite Western scholarships’ 
reference to the importance of inclusion and consultation of society when contemplating 
conflict resolution. Through the evaluation of laypersons’ opinion, we obtain insight into how 
a sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens conceptualize conflict resolution between two countries in 
general, and in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. 
After collecting our survey data, we descriptively analyze it to compare perceptions of 
lexicon, principles and practices, as extracted from Arab/Muslim and Western literature, at 
two levels. On the one hand, we make comparisons across our U.S. and Iraq convenience 
samples. Through our comparisons, we are able to qualify numerous similarities and some 
differences in conceptualizations among immediate stakeholders in the case of U.S.-Iraq 
relations. Once again, our methodological approach addresses the aforementioned critiques of 
cross-cultural applicability and representativeness. On the other hand, we are able to juxtapose 
laypersons’ opinion with scholarly theory. Succinctly, the combined approach permits us to 
qualify theoretical convergence and divergence across our samples, and between our samples 
and scholars. 
The present comparison of conceptualizations of conflict resolution was structured around 
a framework of lexicon, principles and tools extracted from an assortment of Western scholars 
adhering to diverse approaches. Using this framework, our comparative analysis determines 
that there are striking theoretical and practical convergences between Arab/Muslim and 
Western conceptualizations when incorporating the Western spiritual, social-psychological, 
and structural approaches. Most importantly, similarities include shared lexicon and numerous 
principles. Likewise, both cultural approaches share many tools in general, although there are 
some discrepancies as to how these tools are applied. The high degree of commonality 
qualified in our study is only possible because we include the Western social-psychological 
and spiritual approaches, which more directly correspond to Arab/Muslim conceptualizations 
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of conflict resolution than the Western structural approach. In the following paragraphs, we 
will review our research findings, referencing both our literature review and survey samples. 
Our comparative analysis of lexicon began by examining the term conflict as utilized by 
scholars. Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize conflict as a systemic, deconstructive, normal 
phenomenon, which can only be managed. Since conflicts are perceived to have a 
deconstructive and systemic nature, Arab/Muslim scholars suggest conflicts be terminated or 
transformed at the community level to prevent a continuation or escalation. Summarily, 
excluding the Arab/Muslim predominant belief that conflicts are always deconstructive, the 
manner in which Arab/Muslim scholars articulate conflict corresponds to the theories found in 
the Western literature we analyzed. Hence, we found that Western scholars are more apt to 
categorize conflict as constructive, although there are exceptions to this rule. 
As part of our comparisons of how conflict is conceptualized across these cultures, we 
reviewed three commonly referenced divergences that Arab/Muslim critiques often level 
against Western theory. Among the criticisms, is the argument that Western scholars 
frequently perceive conflicts: can have a positive dimension; are limited to those directly 
involved; and can be resolved. Our analysis of these judgments demonstrates that while many 
Western scholars ascribe to them as accused, not all Western scholars and/or Arab/Muslim 
scholars uniformly accept these precepts. First, we conclude that while Western scholars do 
generally perceive conflict can contain positive attributes, both Western and Arab/Muslim 
scholars conceptualize violent conflict as deconstructive and requiring management or 
transformation. Second, Western scholars are accused of viewing and approaching conflict as 
if it were limited directly to those immediately engaged. While there are some examples of 
Western scholars perceiving a conflict is limited to those directly involved, and implementing 
resolution accordingly, scholars adhering to the conflict resolution or conflict transformation 
see thing differently. Those who adhere to the latter schools of thought argue that conflict 
produces systemic effects, and at the interstate and international levels, that societies need to 
be involved in conflict resolution since they likewise have been affected. Finally, 
Arab/Muslim comparisons usually assume that Western scholars perceive that conflicts can be 
resolved. However, not all Western scholars perceive conflicts are resolvable, since some 
recognize that conflicts can become intractable, and, thereby, not subject to resolution. 
Accordingly, when the complex and wide range of Western approaches are included into our 
comparison, it is possible to see that there is an array of theory and practices available 
exceeding that articulated by scholars who preference a structural approach. 
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Transferring our attention to how laypersons in our sample perceive conflict, we identify 
many cross-cultural similarities. Among those, we notice that most respondents from our U.S. 
and Iraq samples agree that conflicts are normal and have systemic effects. Concurrently, a 
majority of respondents from both samples agree that conflict cannot be prevented; although 
most respondents likewise believe that conflictual relationships can and should be resolved. 
Equally relevant, there was consensus across our sample groups that there is a difference 
between conflict resolution between two individuals and conflict resolution between two 
states. This differentiation is fundament, and suggests that both groups recognize that conflict 
resolution practices are subject to variation between the lower at the higher levels. We deduce 
that the conceptualization of conflict is, therefore, largely comparable across our samples. 
When comparing laypersons’ conceptualization of conflict with those presented in the 
literature review, our survey both challenges and confirms important scholarly theory across 
cultures. It confirms preexisting theory on three points. First, an overwhelming percentage of 
U.S. respondents say conflicts can be nonviolent compared to less than half of those from our 
Iraq sample. This theory is one of the few cross-cultural divergences qualified across our 
samples when conflict is conceptualized, and confirms the U.S. participants differentiate 
between constructive and deconstructive conflicts, whereas respondents in our Iraq sample 
view conflict as predominantly deconstructive. Second, our research shows that a clear 
majority of respondents from our U.S. sample perceives a conflict can produce positive 
benefits compared to only about half of those from Iraq. In this instance, another difference is 
qualified across our samples, with our U.S. sample perceiving potential positive outcomes can 
manifest from conflict, while our Iraq sample is more pessimistic. This finding equally 
reinforces Arab/Muslim generalizations about how Westerners conceptualize conflict. Finally, 
when questioned if conflicts should be avoided, nearly half of all U.S. respondents believe 
avoidance is necessary compared to a clear majority from our Iraq sample. Once again, the 
sample from Iraq view conflict negatively, perceiving it should be avoided, while the U.S. 
sample is divided on the issue. These findings reinforce Arab/Muslim criticism of Western 
theory, but once again, it should be reiterated that there are exceptions among scholars and 
laypersons across both cultures. It should also be reiterated that our sample was small, and 
statistical reliability concerning the question set associated with conflict was low. 
By comparison, our survey also contradicts some preexisting Arab/Muslim theories 
concerning conflict. For instance, our data challenges the hypothesis that Westerners do not 
perceive conflict as systemic. In fact, an overwhelming majority of our U.S. sample, and a 
clear majority from the Iraq sample, perceives conflict affects more than those immediately 
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involved. Our sample of U.S. respondents, thereby, challenges Arab/Muslim assumptions, 
because they appear to view conflict as systemic in nature. Equally relevant, we found that a 
majority of respondents from our Iraq and the U.S. samples believe that social inclusion is 
important when resolving conflict. However, since our survey data measuring perceptions of 
conflict have a low rate of statistical reliability, once again, we recommend a larger, 
representative research sample be conducted to better qualify laypersons’ conceptualization of 
conflict. A large, representative sample would provide more definitive qualifications 
concerning cross-cultural convergences and divergences on the topic more accurately. 
Following our analysis of conflict, attention turned to articulating and comparing 
conceptualizations of conflict resolution across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures, once 
again utilizing a literature review and our samples of laypersons. While there is unanimous 
cross-cultural recognition of the importance of resolving conflict among scholarship and the 
samples we analyzed, there are equally some theoretical and practical discrepancies identified. 
Beginning with convergence, the scholarly work analyzed share general lexicon, and refer to 
concepts such as conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, 
reconciliation and peace in somewhat comparable manners. Additionally, numerous concepts, 
including cognitive transformation, are also referenced in the literature. For example, Abu-
Nimer’s framework illustrates the process as the 3H’s, where the head, hands and heart of 
those involved in a conflict are transformed. The 3H triangle corresponds to the Western 
conceptualization of cognitive transformation that contains a cognitive, behavioral and 
emotive aspect. By focusing transformation on the three primary aspects listed, both cultural 
approaches theorize that conflicts can be resolved and relationships altered to degrees that 
range from nonviolent coexistence to positive peace. 
There are, nevertheless, fundamental cross-cultural divergences that must equally be 
acknowledged. By way of summary, conflict resolution according to Arab/Muslim theory is 
rooted in Islamic tradition and decrees. It occurs at the community level and is designed to 
manage a conflict, or transform relations, for the benefit of the community, while restoring 
honor to those involved and correcting injustices. The practice is driven by numerous 
principles, including truth, justice and mercy, and its implementation cannot oppose the 
precepts of Islamic teachings. Religious input is, therefore, essential to the management or 
resolution of a conflict in the Arab/Muslim tradition. When injustices are present, Islamic law 
and tradition dictate they are corrected, and this precept often weakens the neutrality of a third 
party, as well as the potential to achieve mutually beneficial solutions, two practices that are 
frequently prioritized by Western approaches. 
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Because implementation is usually applied at the familial or community level in 
Arab/Muslim tradition, conflict resolution at the individual, intrastate and interstate levels are 
relegated or nonexistent. Within the existing Arab/Muslim framework, resolving conflict 
between individuals is accommodated at the group level, while alternatively there are no 
traditional techniques for resolving conflict at the higher levels. Despite these particularities, 
Arab/Muslim scholars insist that the same principles and practices embraced at the 
community level are applicable at the higher levels. 
By contrast, conflict resolution in the West is applicable at multiple levels: individual, 
group, intrastate, interstate, or in combination. According to our wide Western framework, 
conflicts can be managed, resolved or transformed, at all levels, according to conflict nuances. 
For example, the needs and interests of the stakeholders engaged must determine how 
resolution should be approached, and to what degree it can ultimately be achieved. Thus, the 
level at which resolution is theorized and applied varies across Western and Arab/Muslim 
culture. Conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim communities is generally approached at the 
family or community level, while the Western theorizes and implements conflict resolution at 
the individual, group, intrastate and interstate levels. 
The absence of indigenous approaches for resolving conflict at the higher levels in 
Arab/Muslim traditions, offset by Western tendencies to prioritize their theories and 
techniques, have resulted in Western principles and practices frequently being imposed onto 
Arab/Muslim communities. Imposition is naturally problematic, foremost, because it is 
violent, but it is uniformly problematical since Arab/Muslim scholars insist that foreign 
principles and techniques are not always accepted or wanted by Arab/Muslims exposed. 
Concurrently, imposition of foreign practices marginalizes indigenous concepts and 
techniques, thereby muting local customs and tools that might otherwise have an increased 
probability of being accepted by stakeholders. Both imposition and the marginalization of 
indigenous practices undermine the potential for resolving conflict within and across 
Arab/Muslim cultures and, therefore, should be avoided at all cost. As we have illustrated, and 
will detail below, there are sufficient parallels in principles and practices across cultures that 
we believe could be exploited to create mutually acceptable approaches. 
However, before exploring these similarities, we wish to continue examining divergences. 
Another cultural difference in approaches extracted from the literature is the Arab/Muslim 
prioritization of Islam/religion when conceptualizing conflict resolution. Although, our 
research interest concentrated on resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels, 
Arab/Muslim direct reference to Islam/religion when conceptualizing conflict resolution, 
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which they assert is applicable at all levels, contradicts most Western approaches. There is, 
nevertheless, some room for maneuvering when the spiritual approach is considered. The 
spiritual approach, after all, accommodates practices such as forgiveness, which the structural 
approach condemns. 
There were also additional divergences found across these two cultures. They include, for 
example, the characteristics and role of a mediator or third party. In the Arab/Muslim 
tradition, elders and respected men, whom are not expected to have specialized knowledge or 
skill set, in terms of conflict resolution, manage conflicts within the community. These inside-
partial mediators function to terminate or resolve a conflict for the benefit of the community, 
while Islamic and traditional norms guide their activity. According to the Western approach, 
partial, knowledgeable and experienced experts in the field are preferences to implement 
conflict resolution. At the same time, the Western program is largely secular, and most 
scholars recommend that neutral third parties facilitate the process while immediate 
stakeholders maintain ownership of the program. But these cultural arrangements are broad 
stereotypes, and, as was demonstrated, there are scholars who are outliers from both the 
Arab/Muslim and Western mainstream. For instance, there are Western scholars who 
incorporate religious principles in to their theories, or advocate for third parties who have the 
capacity to nudge and coerce belligerents into conflict resolution. In short, in many instances, 
these Western scholars prescribe to the social-psychological or spiritual approach. Similarly, 
in the Arab/Muslim context, some scholars believe that community leaders should possess 
skills sets and be trained in conflict resolution, and even call expansion and reform of local 
traditions and practices. 
With these issues in mind, we paid special attention to the two dominant Arab/Muslim 
critiques leveled against Western practices during our comparison of scholarly 
conceptualizations: the alleged absence of religion and the lack of a societal approach. 
Through our analysis of the scholarly literature, we demonstrated that religion and society are 
accommodated by the spiritual approach, and, to some degree, by the social-psychological. 
Concerning religion, some Western scholars minimize, even criticize, religious input in 
conflict resolution at the higher levels. However, the Western spiritual approach is religiously 
influenced and accommodates religion as a component. More precisely, the conflict 
transformation framework accommodates fundamental religious precepts, namely forgiveness 
and healing. As a consequence, the spiritual approach contains components of religion, which 
emulates the Arab/Muslim prioritization of Islamic principles, by comparison to other 
Western approaches, especially the structural approach. 
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Concerning societal incorporation, Arab/Muslim scholars criticize Western approaches for 
concentrating their efforts at the individual and/or structural levels. According to this critique, 
Western practices lack a systemic approach that targets the group or society, which are 
alternatively prioritized in Arab/Muslim culture. Contrary to this assumption, we illustrated 
that the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches both recognize that conflict 
affects society and, therefore, needs to be resolved or transformed at the collective level. In 
particular, the conflict transformation approach is tailored to addressing the interests and 
needs of society. Therefore, when Arab/Muslim conceptualizations are compared with a broad 
Western conflict resolution framework, religion and society are better accommodated, most 
notably by conflict transformation/spiritual approach spearheaded by John Paul Lederach. By 
way of summary, although there are some cross-cultural divergences concerning how conflict 
resolution is conceptualized in the scholarly literature, most of the lexicon and theory we 
analyzed confirms that Arab/Muslim and Western traditions share an increased degree of 
parallels than has been acknowledged by previous comparisons. 
Reinforcing this conclusion, cross-cultural similarities are equally observable when we 
examine laypersons’ understanding of conflict resolution using our samples. Although our 
question set pertaining to conceptualizations of conflict resolution in general suffers from low 
levels of reliability, and, consequently, should be retested, our data suggests there are multiple 
parallels across our samples. Among them, we discovered a majority from our U.S. and Iraq 
samples believes that all conflicts should be resolved. Another notable parallel is that both 
samples perceive a process of conflict resolution has limited capability at the interstate level. 
More precisely, slight majorities from both samples believe that nonviolent coexistence is the 
most probable outcome than positive peace. Despite the limited projected outcome, an 
overwhelming number of respondents from both samples optimistically proclaim that two 
countries involved in war can, and should, improve their deconstructive relationship. Hence, 
most of our respondents value, and endorse, conflict resolution, but measure their 
expectations pertaining to the projected degree to which a conflict at this level will be 
resolved. We deduce that our respondents believe that conflict management or resolution is 
the most probable outcome at the interstate level, and that few perceive conflict 
transformation, namely the development of positive peace, is likely. Once again, there are 
more similarities than differences in the way that our samples perceive conflict resolution. 
Following our comparative review of terminology and concepts associated with conflict 
resolution, we dedicated our attention to qualifying and comparing numerous interconnected 
principles and tools advanced across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures. Maintaining our 
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comparative methodology, we utilized a literature review and the questionnaire to make 
theoretical comparisons. During our cross-cultural comparative analysis of the literature, we 
introduced and examined principles including: peacemaking and negotiations; truth; justice; 
arbitration; amnesty and forgiveness; empowerment and consultation; dialogue; third party 
intervention; deeds; collectively beneficial solutions; compensation/restitution; balance; and 
flexibility. Additional principles mentioned by Arab/Muslim scholars, and (in)directly 
denoted in the Western literature that were considered include: honor, dignity, respect, 
individual rights, accountability, forgiveness and religion. Arab/Muslim scholars embrace 
those outline, and further hypothesize they are applicable at all levels of conflict resolution in 
the Arab/Muslim tradition. By comparison, Western scholars either directly, or indirectly, 
make a similar assertion in most instances. 
Thus, our comparison of the literature found that most principles just listed are shared 
across cultures, yet there are some incongruities. The most noteworthy exceptions are two 
fundamental principles prioritized in Arab/Muslim traditions, namely religion and 
forgiveness. As mentioned previously, these are subject to criticism by some Western scholars 
when applied at the intrastate and interstate levels. Hence, the tendency for some Western 
scholars to minimize the importance of “religion” and criticize the inclusion of “forgiveness” 
in conflict resolution, once again stands as important divergences across these cultures. 
Nevertheless, we again refer back to the spiritual approach, since it better accommodates both 
religion and forgiveness at all levels of application. Accordingly, we determine that Western 
and Arab/Muslim scholars largely embrace most principles evaluated, with the Western 
spiritual approach repeatedly minimizing or eliminating cross-cultural discontinuity when it is 
factored into the Western comparative framework.  
From this point, we conduct a preliminary evaluation to determine the applicability of 
conflict resolution principles in the Arab/Muslim context at the higher levels, since there are 
no practices or theories directly associated with intrastate or interstate conflict resolution. We 
double-check applicability by briefly examining three cases of transitional justice/national 
reconciliation programs implemented in predominantly Arab/Muslim countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa. In particular, we examined the programs administered in Morocco, 
Algeria and Iraq. Our review was designed to test whether some principles and practices 
predominantly applied at the community level are applicable at the higher levels. Our brief 
analysis demonstrates that Arab/Muslim principles and practices utilized at the community 
level seem to transfer to the intrastate level, as Arab/Muslim scholars hypothesize. Most 
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prominently, we found that the populations in the three case studies analyzed prioritized truth, 
justice, restitution, mercy and a balancing of those mechanisms. 
With the Arab/Muslim theory of transferability validated, analysis reverts to micro level 
comparisons appropriating our survey samples. Among laypersons, we tested the relevance of 
a selection of principles extracted from the literature review. We found that among sixteen 
principles evaluated, including: honor; dignity; respect; satisfaction of interests; satisfaction of 
the needs; protection of individual rights; appropriate compensation; consultation; listening to 
the “other”; mutual benefit; acceptable practices; justice; truth; accountability; forgiveness; 
and religion, only the principle of religion was rejected by our U.S. sample when 
conceptualizing conflict resolution between two countries. Nonetheless, while our sample of 
U.S. laypersons rejected religion as a principle of conflict resolution at the interstate level, a 
clear majority of those same respondents endorsed forgiveness as a principle. Nevertheless, 
our convenience sample of laypersons from the U.S. and Iraq embraces a plurality of the 
sixteen principles reviewed, which corresponds to our conclusion that Arab/Muslim and 
Western scholarly theory share many principles. 
Subsequent to determining there are notable cross-cultural parallels in conflict resolution 
principles as articulated in the literature and expressed by our convenience samples, we 
measured cross-cultural comparability concerning conflict resolution tools across these 
entities. During our literature review, we comparatively analyzed mechanisms including: 
negotiations, dialogue and consultation, third-party intervention, education and empowerment. 
We likewise measured retributive mechanisms, for example, vetting, arbitration and trials, and 
restorative techniques, including truth seeking, amnesty, and restitution, to name a few. The 
literature analyzed demonstrates that the practices themselves are generally acceptable at the 
community, intrastate and interstate levels across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures. 
Nevertheless, there are some noticeable variations in how certain tools are implemented in a 
given culture. To summarize, most tools evaluated are shared, but consideration should be 
given when implementing practices to ensure cultural interests and needs are accommodated. 
We recommend consultation, careful selection and perhaps modifications of the practices 
deployed to ensure interests and needs are met. 
Similar conclusions are drawn when we examine our samples of laypersons. When 
evaluating the acceptability of some conflict resolution mechanisms at the interstate level 
among our samples, we concentrated on: government inquiries, consultation of the population, 
cultural exchanges, international tribunals, apology, security cooperation, truth commissions, 
economic cooperation, third party intervention, positive media coverage, political cooperation 
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and reparations. The mixture of mechanisms allows us to test various approaches. Overall, we 
find that a clear majority of respondents from our U.S. and Iraq samples support a plurality of 
the practices examined in general, and again for resolving the conflict relationship between 
the United States and Iraq. Among the collection of mechanisms, the only tool rejected by our 
U.S. sample, in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations, is an apology, while the U.S. sample is 
polarized on the use of reparations to advance conflict resolution between the United States 
and Iraq. By comparison, our Iraq sample only rejects a U.S. government inquiry. 
Nevertheless, since our survey qualifies laypersons’ opinion of the applicability of 
mechanisms at the interstate level in a general sense, and in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations, we 
can deduce that respondents are not rejecting the mechanisms, but rather their use in the 
context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. More specifically, our U.S. sample espouses 
reparations and apology in general to resolve conflict between two countries, and only 
perceives a U.S. apology to Iraq is inappropriate. Likewise, our Iraq sample supports an Iraq 
government inquiry into the 2003 War, but rejects a U.S. inquiry. This finding suggests that it 
is not the mechanism being rejected but rather the U.S. utilization of the mechanism. 
Therefore, all of the mechanisms analyzed in our survey research for resolving conflicts at the 
interstate level in general are perceived as accepted across our convenience samples. Once 
more, a clear majority of the practices for resolving conflict are embraced across 
Arab/Muslim and Western culture according to our literature review and survey research. 
Our combination of literature review and survey research, therefore, suggests there is a 
higher degree of cross-cultural compatibility across Western and Arab/Muslim scholarship, 
when conceptualizing conflict resolution, namely at the intrastate and interstate levels, than 
generally acknowledged in the literature. Our testing of numerous working hypotheses proves 
this theory. Revisiting our hypotheses, hypothesis two projected that Western and 
Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution, as articulated by scholars in the 
respective literature, would generally converge when a broad understanding of conflict 
resolution is applied. We found that lexicon, principles and practices do largely converge 
when a wide Western framework is utilized. As a consequence, we conclude that 
Arab/Muslim scholars’ previous narrow comparisons have marginalized some Western 
approaches, since we qualify an increased degree of convergences from the literature when 
the social-psychological and spiritual approaches are factored into the comparative equation. 
Correspondingly, at the micro level, we equally qualified a high degree of cross-cultural 
agreement when conflict resolution is considered at the interstate level among our group of 
laypersons. Our questionnaire proves this through the measuring of four additional 
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hypotheses. In particular, we found that a majority of respondents from our U.S. and Iraq 
convenience samples embrace sixteen conflict resolution principles (Hypothesis 3), while a 
majority embraces thirteen tools for resolving conflict, at the interstate level, in general terms 
(Hypothesis 4). Our research focus then shifted to the perceived necessity of pursuing conflict 
resolution to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. In this case, a majority of respondents 
from our samples agree that conflict resolution between the two countries is necessary 
(Hypothesis 5). Afterward, and building upon our findings from Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4, we 
evaluate which mechanisms our survey respondents support in the context of improving U.S.-
Iraq relations. As expected, a majority of thirteen conflict resolution techniques were 
approved by a majority of our respondents as a means of altering the quality of U.S.-Iraq 
relations (Hypothesis 6). Hence, our comparative research, consisting of a literature review 
and a questionnaire targeting a sample of laypersons, demonstrates there are many parallels in 
how conflict and conflict resolution are conceptualized across cultures and entities, and 
ubiquitous accord in the principles and tools deemed viable for transforming conflict between 
two countries. 
Our combined findings, contradict the common Arab/Muslim assessment that Western 
conflict resolution theory and practice is incompatible and unacceptable. Contradicting the 
critiques frequently leveled, we determine that “Western” practices are not “at cross-
purposes” or “unacceptable” to all Arab/Muslims scholars or laypersons. While the existing 
Arab/Muslim critique might be applicable when contemplating conflict resolution at the 
community level with the Western structural approach, our literature review and questionnaire 
indicates that perceptions of conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels are more 
comparability across cultures than usually accredited. We are able to qualify a higher degree 
of similarities because Arab/Muslim scholars hitherto have failed to holistically analyze 
Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution, and rather limit their comparisons to 
Arab/Muslim community approaches with the Western structural approach. This practice 
crudely reduces three Western approaches to one, which in turn, overstates cross-cultural 
convergences. 
We have demonstrated that, on the one hand, there are three Western approaches to 
conflict resolution which must be considered when comparatively analyzing. In this frame, it 
was demonstrated that the social-psychological and spiritual approaches are more comparable 
with Arab/Muslim principles and practices. On the other hand, Arab/Muslim scholars 
frequently compare different levels, since the Arab/Muslim approach is predominantly 
practiced at the community level, with the Western structural approach, which is 
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predominantly practiced at the higher level. However, our use of samples and concentration of 
questioning focused at resolving conflict between two countries shows that the Iraq sample 
not only recognize there are differences between how conflicts at the lower and higher levels 
can be dealt with, but it equally indicates that they share similar understandings of conflict 
and conflict resolution with our U.S. respondents when contemplating conflict at the higher 
levels. This latter finding suggests that Arab/Muslim critiques should be reconsidered as we 
find significantly higher degree of compatibility at the higher levels than they acknowledge.  
We wish to be, nonetheless, cautious in our assertions. Although our literature review and 
survey research qualifies an increased degree of cross-cultural compatibility between Western 
and Arab/Muslim theory and practice, we do not wish to over-exaggerate commonalities 
deduced subsequent to a literature review of a limited number of Arab/Muslim resources in 
the English language, or through a small, non-representative sample of survey respondents. 
Contrary, we will later recommend that further research be conducted to better qualify 
similarities and divergences. At this juncture, we simply wish to emphasize that the gradation 
of cross-cultural similarities qualified in this research is higher than generally acknowledged 
by Arab/Muslim scholars’ hitherto. In this frame, the degree of criticism and outright rejection 
of Western theory, principles and practices by Arab/Muslim scholars, we believe, is inflated 
when conceptualizations of conflict resolution are compared at the higher levels, and all 
Western approaches are considered. Thus, we hypothesize that Arab/Muslim scholars 
inappropriately reduce Western theory to the structural approach, and thereby misrepresent 
the degree of potential compatibility when comparing cross-cultural approaches at the 
intrastate or interstate levels. 
That said, we equally and emphatically state that this research should not be interpreted as 
suggesting that Western conflict resolution standards and practices should be prioritized or 
imposed. Contrary, we renounce such activities in theory and practice. Rather than promoting 
Western standards, we wish to demonstrate that the potential for traversing cross-cultural 
divergences across Arab/Muslim and Western cultures is greater than previously articulated. 
Hence, this research and its associated findings are not designed to thrust Western theory and 
practices to the forefront of conflict resolution discourse, or marginalize alternative 
approaches by emphasizing cross-cultural commonalities and acceptance among Arab/Muslim 
scholars and/or laypersons. Instead, we simply want to expose the increased potential for 
bridging cultural approaches at the intrastate and interstate levels and to encourage discourse 
and research to determine asymmetrical, mutually acceptable approaches for resolving 
conflict between these two cultures. 
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The high potential of bridging cross-cultural differences in the case of Arab/Muslim and 
Western traditions, we believe, is evidenced in the qualified sharing of general principles and 
tools across scholarly literature and our research samples. In practical terms, virtually all of 
the principles and tools we analyzed are shared, while there are some cross-cultural 
discrepancies in how certain tools are implemented. Because principles and practices 
fundamentally correspond in theory, we believe that establishing methodological convergence 
across cultures can be facilitated if emphasis is placed on respective commonalities rather than 
divergences, the latter of which has been the standard in previous comparative analyses. For 
instance, we believe that Western rejection of the principle of religion, a fundamental 
divergence according to Arab/Muslim scholars, could be tempered by diminishing direct 
reference to religious dogma and faith, and instead concentrating on associated, fundamental 
and cross-culturally acceptable faith-based principles, including forgiveness, justice, and truth. 
In this instance, direct reference to religion could be modulated while, while Islamic values 
are respected and maintained. Succinctly, it is our belief that accentuating jointly embraced 
principles, and the inherent flexibility in the conflict resolution approaches in both cultures, is 
a more effective strategy for discovering mutually acceptable cross-cultural techniques, than 
over-emphasizing incompatibilities and cultural divergences. While the latter naturally must 
be contemplated and accommodated, they seem a counterproductive manner in which to begin 
cross-cultural discourse on how conflict across these cultures can be resolved. 
When examining discourse on potential tools and principles for designing mutually 
acceptable approaches, Lederach’s elicitive style is pertinent because it aims to monopolize 
upon local customs, values and norms. Moreover, the elicitive approach seeks to discover or 
create relevant and mutually acceptable techniques that accommodate cross-cultural needs and 
desires, while advancing constructive relationships. In pursuit of acceptable practices, we 
recommend further comparative (survey) research, theoretical debate, and dialogue, to more 
deeply probe and qualify cross-cultural conceptualizations. Through these processes, it will be 
possible to increasingly identify similarities and differences between Arab/Muslim and 
Western conflict resolution conceptualizations and practices at the higher level. 
Therefore, we recommend that more thorough research be conducted to better qualify how 
scholars and laypersons conceptualize conflict resolution across Arab/Muslim and Western 
cultures, and by default, to (re-) evaluate the degree of cross-cultural compatibility qualified 
by our research and that produced by its predecessors’. Ideally, we encourage collaborative 
qualitative and quantitative research between Arab/Muslim and Western scholars, to both 
deepen and broaden our findings. Cross-cultural collaboration would fill two theoretical 
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weaknesses found in the present research. First, collaboration would allow scholarly and 
religious literature in the Arabic language, to be incorporated into the comparative analysis. 
This practice would enhance theoretical understanding of Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of 
conflict resolution in their native tongue. In this manner, the Arab/Muslim conflict resolution 
framework could be more appropriately and holistically represented. Second, cross-cultural 
collaboration would allow survey research to be conducted in Arabic and/or other relevant 
languages, eliminating the necessity to survey in a second language. Incorporation of 
alternative languages would simultaneously foster acquisition of representative research 
samples at the micro and/or macro levels. It is, therefore, our recommendation that 
collaborative, supplementary research be conducted to enhance our understanding of conflict 
resolution as articulated by scholars, in addition to querying representative samples of 
laypersons (at the micro and/or macro levels), to acquire more insight into how U.S./Western 
and Iraq/Arab/Muslim scholars and laypersons conceptualize conflict resolution at the 
intrastate and interstate levels. From large-scale, collaborative research, a more precise 
framework of convergences and divergences could be constructed at the macro and/or micro 
levels. 
This research recommendation affords us the opportunity to close the present research by 
revisiting the driving force of our thesis, namely resolving the protracted conflictual 
relationship between the United States and Iraq. Our research demonstrated that this conflict, 
which has affected both societies, is rooted in policy and identity. For this reason, we believe 
that conflict resolution should be pursued between the two countries at the societal level. Our 
survey research qualifies general support for a conflict resolution program across our U.S. and 
Iraq convenience samples. It equally qualifies a high degree of support for the same principles 
and tools in this context. 
While some efforts have been made to transform relations following the 2003 War and 
occupation, there are three fundamental problems with the program implemented hitherto. 
First, attention has been limited primarily to transforming relationships at the structural level. 
Unfortunately, such efforts have marginalized principles such as truth seeking or justice as 
advocated across cultures by our literature review and our sample of laypersons. Moreover, 
the approach implemented hitherto has not placed focus on transforming bilateral societal 
perceptions and relationships. The second problem is that societal consultation has not taken 
place, so the tools implemented thus far are valuable for improving structural relations, but we 
believe that focus should be shifted onto societal perceptions, needs and desires. Third, a 
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serious pursuit of conflict resolution in this case will require U.S. policy change, since U.S. 
foreign policy is a harbinger of conflict resolution as articulated in the body of the thesis. 
Consequently, we believe that more needs to be done to minimize or eliminate existing 
animosity and grievances accumulated at the societal level following the protracted conflict 
relations between the United States and Iraq. Our cross-cultural analysis of scholarly 
literature, buttressed by our micro level survey research, indicates that conflict resolution is 
necessary and possible. Optimistically, this thesis simultaneously suggests that there are many 
shared conflict resolution principles and tools across U.S. and Iraq culture, and we believe 
these similarities should be further explored and implemented.  
The timing of this call appears to be appropriate. Some of Bar-Siman-Tov’s prerequisites 
for conflict resolution have been met in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations. Foremost, the conflict 
has been terminated. In fact, several years have passed since the end of occupation, which 
scholars suggest allows opinions of the “other” to soften. Second, some joint structures have 
been designed and are operating, such as the JCCs. Many of these target the structural level, 
but some are implemented at the societal level. These could be vital foundations upon which 
further structures could be established and institutionalized. Third, there seems to be some 
popular support for the program. Our convenience samples are open to conflict resolution in 
this instance, although we recommend a representative sample be surveyed to verify our 
findings. 
Concerning the other remaining prerequisites, more research would have to be conducted 
to qualify which prerequisites both societies believe are important, and evaluate if they have 
or have not been achieved. Among them, the contemporary climate or environment might be 
appropriate, but would have to be confirmed. One obvious challenge to the environment is the 
operation of Islamic State in Iraq, and internal sectarian-political divisions, which may make 
the environment uncongenial. More specifically, improved bilateral relations with the United 
States may not be a priority of Iraqis at the moment. Accordingly, it might be more 
appropriate to postpone consideration for exploring conflict resolution until the threat from IS 
has been eliminated, and Iraq manages to stabilize politically and socially. While unfortunate, 
an additional waiting period would allow more time for positions to soften, and more time for 
continued structural cooperation whereby amity can be deepened. 
Similarly, the prerequisite of leaders/facilitators, we believe, was ideal early in Barack 
Obama’s presidency, and we perceived he had the essential qualities to advance conflict 
resolution. However, the window of opportunity is rapidly closing. A new U.S. administration 
is scheduled to be elected in 2016, which suggests that the current administration does not 
  
451 
 
have ample time to explore and institutionalize a campaign. At the time of writing, it is 
unclear who will succeed the current administration, and, therefore, it is impossible to predict 
how Iraqis will perceive them. Consequently, evaluations of the leadership in both Iraq and 
the United States will have to occur to determine if they are perceived as acceptable and 
legitimate for advancing conflict resolution, in both Iraq and the United States. Naturally, this 
means that we have to see who is elected U.S. president. 
With several prerequisites addressed, we offer two recommendations associated with the 
quality of U.S.-Iraq relations. First, we endorse comprehensive, representative research in the 
United States and Iraq to further qualify openness to such a program, and to increase our 
understanding of associated principles and practices each society deems appropriate for 
bilateral conflict resolution. The value of such research would not only inform bilateral U.S.-
Iraq relations, but would likewise provide substantial theoretical and practical insight into 
macro level cross-cultural conceptualizations of conflict resolution at the interstate level. Such 
research, ideally, might serve as a framework for establishing and enhancing symmetrical 
relationship between the United States and Iraq. Failure to consult and meet the needs of 
affected stakeholders, as emphasized in our literature review and our case studies, is expected 
to compromise the effectiveness of any program due to its inability to garner popular support 
and participation, or meet collective needs. 
Second, we recommend the United States articulate and pursue a foreign policy congenial 
to resolving conflict with Iraq at the structural and societal level. One fundamental component 
of any resolution program must be behavioral change on the part of the United States. 
Behavioral change is mandatory to reverse years of distrust, and because actions are an 
esteemed principle in Arab/Muslim culture. As Barack Obama experienced, conciliatory 
rhetoric alone is insufficient for changing perceptions in the Middle East, let alone for 
generating trust and improving relations. Contrary, deeds must accentuate and reinforce 
rhetoric if conflict resolution and/or cognitive transformation are going to occur. Therefore, 
we believe the U.S. government should undertake an objective review of U.S. geopolitical 
policies and aspirations in the Middle East, and establish a non-violent foreign policy 
influenced by a knowledge of, and serious consideration for, domestic and foreign public 
opinion, as a means of advancing conflict resolution. 
Locating a nonviolent foreign policy will require symmetrical dialogue and compromise 
on both sides. Establishing relational symmetry, and finding mutually acceptable compromise, 
necessitates respecting diverse goals, priorities and opinions, and designing foreign relations 
and policy around such nuances, even when they contrast or are at cross-purposes with those 
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of the United States or Iraq government. To make the necessary changes and compromises, 
the United States government needs to appreciate the systemic and complex nature of 
relationships, and responding in accordance. The United States will be required to engage Iraq 
and the Middle East on multiple fronts simultaneously, because singular, or focused policy 
changes are unlikely to produce results. It will equally have to engage other countries as 
equals, whereby they are given an opportunity to express their interests and needs. These 
conditions necessitate that the United States government alter its perceptions, become more 
flexible and accommodative in its policies and approach, and concentrate on long-term U.S. 
objectives rather than pursuing immediate, self-gratifying dividends that produce frustration 
and grievance among inhabitants of the Middle East. 
In our opinion, Barack Obama’s conciliatory movement toward Cuba was notably a 
symmetrical and bold policy change, breaking a long-standing cycle of enmity by thinking 
outside the box and acting accordingly. Considering the United States has isolated and 
sanctioned Cuba for fifty years, we think that Obama’s actions in this instance represents a 
prime example of how conflict resolution with Iraq could be approached. More specifically, 
Obama’s policy reversal with Cuba was “novel” and “irrevocable”, borrowing Long and 
Brecke’s terminology. It appears that he is committed to improving relations, and is following 
up his initial move toward Cuba with corresponding, reinforcing maneuvers. Such activity is 
necessary to sustain the momentum, change opinions and build trust over time. We, therefore, 
recommend a similar approach in U.S.-Iraq relations, which might pay significant dividends 
over the long-term. Since many of the prerequisites denoted in the literature have been met, 
bold and novel actions by a respected leader could instigate a program that alters the quality 
of U.S.-Iraq relations, not just at the structural level, but also at the societal level in both 
countries.  
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Appendix 1: Tools of Conflict Resolution 
 
During the course of our research, conflict resolution tools were extracted from the 
literature. The techniques contained herein, while not exhaustive and difficult to categorize 
due to their comparable and overlapping nature, have been implemented at the intrastate and 
interstate. For simplicity’s sake, these tools are listed alphabetically. Citations in the present 
appendix are available in the “Sources” section above. 
 
adjudication Adjudication is a judicial process presided over by a judge/decision-
maker who offers a verdict that can be legally enforced (Fry, 2000: 
336). West’s Encyclopedia of American Law (1998) claims that all 
parties involved are permitted to submit evidence and present their 
arguments. “Its objective is to reach a reasonable settlement of the 
controversy at hand. A decision is rendered by an impartial, passive 
fact finder, usually a judge, jury, or administrative tribunal” (West’s 
Encyclopedia of American Law, 1998). Once the case has been 
presented and a decision issued, the litigants are expected to abide by 
the ruling. 
aid/assistance 
 
Former adversaries can offer assistance to a former belligerent as a 
means of demonstrating their desire to cultivate a new relationship 
(Kriesberg, 2004: 100). Assistance can be extended in multiple 
forms, including financial (loans or grants), expertise (including 
institution building), humanitarian or otherwise (Wilmer, 1998: 7). 
For example, the United States has assisted Iraq, offering loans, 
expertise and humanitarian assistance during and after the 
occupation. 
amnesty 
 
Judicial amnesty can be granted to perpetrators of wrongdoing under 
certain conditions as a means of conflict resolution (Gibson, 2002: 
540; Long and Brecke, 2003: 71-72). Some scholars advocate their 
utility claiming amnesties are sometimes necessary to advance 
transformation despite its apparent contradictions with the provision 
of justice (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 5-44). Amnesties are 
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especially pertinent in instances where prosecution is not possible or 
desired especially when the depth and breadth of actors involved and 
wrongdoing perpetrated is immense in scale (Gibson, 2002: 540-
544).  
The degree of amnesty extended to perpetrators can vary. It can 
range from full, near total or partial amnesty and can be introduced at 
any stage of the conflict resolution process (Long and Brecke, 2003: 
71). Nevertheless, the literature recommends balancing the provision 
of justice with the granting of amnesty since individuals affected by 
violence often demand that justice be served (Anderlini and others, 
2004: 1; Skaar, 2013: 83-85). Through a balancing of these 
principles, a wider range of needs can be met while avoiding the 
extreme perceptions that justice is either being disproportionately 
applied or impunity is prevailing. Albeit, Long and Brecke (2003: 
71-72) optimistically assert, “people appear able to tolerate a 
substantial amount of injustice wrought by amnesty in the name of 
social peace.” This quote suggests that society will accept injustice 
when it is perceived to advance peace. 
apologies 
 
Through the extension of an apology, wrongdoing is acknowledged 
and the confession serves as a step toward altering previous behavior 
and admitting its unacceptability (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 29; 
Rouhana, 2004: 34). Shriver (1995: 138) suggests that, “As a 
political people, we would be better served by politicians who 
confessed our collective sins once in a while, even when our sins are 
enmeshed in the sins of others.” Hence, Shriver believes that 
politicians do not use apologies frequently enough.  
Apologies can be official or unofficial, and extended by high-ranking 
public officials or proffered at lower levels (R. Fisher, 2001b: 27). 
Although sincerity is subject to interpretation, if properly timed and 
convincingly enacted, an apology is thought a very useful tool (Ross, 
2004: 206). President Bill Clinton’s expression of regret to Uganda 
for the slave trade is one example of a high-ranking U.S. official 
(nearly) apologizing (Avruch, 2010: 41; Gibney and Roxstrom, 2001: 
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913). At the individual level, a former U.S. Marine apologized for his 
actions and those of his comrades who served at Guantánamo Bay 
detention facility (BBC News, 2010a). This apology was passed on 
directly to two former British nationals who had been held captive 
and later released from the facility (BBC News, 2010a). Not all 
scholars endorse the use of apologies as a way of reconciling. 
Galtung (2001: 7-8) is critical of apology since it neither deals with 
the origins of the conflict nor offers more than words to those who 
have suffered. 
arbitration 
 
Some countries have used arbitration to solve ongoing disputes. In 
arbitration, litigants present their case to a third party, or an 
arbitrator, who does not have the power to enforce its decision (Fry, 
2000: 336; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 277). Thus litigants agree 
to voluntarily abide by the decision passed down (Fry, 2000: 336; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 277). Honduras and El Salvador 
turned to the International Court of Justice in 1987 to arbitrate a 
border dispute whose verdict was passed down in 1992 (Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 109). 
archiving 
testimonies and 
wrongdoing 
 
Archiving the wrongs committed is an intrinsic aspect of conflict 
resolution for two reasons. First, it gives voice to those which 
otherwise may have been silenced. Second, it provides a personal and 
historical account of the past (Opgenhaffen and Freeman, 2005: 2-3; 
Urschel, 2005). Stated differently, suffering is provided an outlet and 
the truth is recounted when victims’ experiences are documented and 
preserved (Opgenhaffen and Freeman, 2005: 2-3). Morocco, for 
example, established a database containing the testimony of 
thousands of victims of the “years of lead” as part of its national 
reconciliation campaign (Opgenhaffen and Freeman, 2005: 2-3). 
art, dance and music 
 
The arts can be used in multiple ways to transform relationships, 
whether through increased cultural understanding or expression of 
feelings (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 34; C. Cohen, 2004: 3-53; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 347-351). The expressiveness of the 
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arts is thought constructive and therapeutic (Urschel, 2005). Art, as 
conflict resolution, can be promoted through individual or joint 
exhibitions or projects (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33-34). Urschel 
(2005), for instance, denotes the Samputu-Ingeli Dance Troupe in 
Rwanda that contained dancers from the three main ethnic groups of 
Rwanda (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa). This team traveled the country 
performing together as a means of building cooperation following 
genocide (Urschel, 2005). The arts have likewise been utilized in 
other post-conflict settings including Timor-Leste, Morocco, Peru 
(Sarkin, 2008: 25) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Zelizer, 2003: 62-75). 
asking for 
forgiveness 
 
An acknowledgment of wrongdoing and/or a request for forgiveness 
for wrongdoing can be made as a means of advancing conflict 
resolution (Hermann, 2004: 45-46; Lederach, 1997). Similar to an 
apology, the request is perceived to demonstrate regret while 
simultaneously admitting that wrongs were committed (Hermann, 
2004: 45-46). Nevertheless, whether or not forgiveness is granted 
rests entirely on those who have been wronged (Bar-On, 2004: 247-
248). It was demonstrated in the body of our thesis that forgiveness is 
perceived as a mode of empowerment in Arab/Muslim culture.  
awards, scholarships 
and educational 
exchanges 
 
Financial assistance through awards and scholarships can be offered 
to students to promote and assist student exchanges, through 
internships, awards or research scholarships that promote exchanges 
and institutionalizes cooperation (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 34; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 98). The implementation of these tools not only 
ensures a regular exchange of individuals and ideas and increases 
cross-cultural awareness and interaction, but also acts as a symbolic 
gesture of cooperation and invitation to the “other” (Kriesberg, 2004: 
98, 104). For example, joint summer camps that bringing diverse 
groups together could be established to promote awareness and 
interaction across groups (Urschel, 2005). In such camps, a safe and 
controlled environment congenial to advancing education, awareness, 
interaction and entertainment can be established (Urschel, 2005). 
Such programs are suggested to overwrite preconceived 
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misconceptions and stereotypes of the “other” through regular and 
prolonged cooperative interaction that proliferates trust and mutual 
understanding (Urschel, 2005). However, in the case of Northern 
Ireland, this type of “contact work had little impact” on changing 
mutual attitudes or increasing understanding between Protestants and 
Catholics (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 28). 
ceremonies and 
rituals 
 
Various cultures have unique means of dealing with social issues, 
expressing grief or triumph, and these activities can be incorporated 
into conflict resolution (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 75; Galtung, 
2001: 3-4). Conducting such rituals and ceremonies are proposed 
useful for rooting transformation in a target community and aiding in 
the process of restoration or healing of society through the 
experience itself and by giving the community a stake in what occurs 
(Long and Brecke, 2003: 57). Long and Brecke (2003: 57) provide 
the example of traditional healing techniques utilized by local leaders 
in rural communities in Mozambique to purify and appease past 
transgressions. 
criminal trials Criminal trials are retributive justice techniques designed to punish 
wrongdoers for the crimes they committed (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 
2004: 30; Worthington, 2006: 248). Through the prosecution of 
criminals, a measure of faith in the system of justice is restored to 
individuals and communities who have suffered as a result of 
wrongdoing (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 30; Worthington, 2006: 
248). Scholars counsel retributive justice be implemented while 
adhering to principles including transparency, proportionality and 
balance (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1062-1065; Stover and 
others, 2005: 836-856). Argentina used public trials in 1985-1986 for 
crimes committed during the “Dirty War” by Argentina’s military 
and police (Long and Brecke, 2003: 45). 
economic 
cooperation 
Linking countries or communities together economically has proven 
a very popular and effective means of uniting former adversaries 
throughout history (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 25). As economic 
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inter-dependence develops, the likelihood of conflict is projected to 
recede since war thereafter would be economically deconstructive 
(Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 25). Europe was economically united 
following the termination of World War II as a means of unifying 
former enemies and this arrangement transmogrified into the 
institution of the European Union (Buzan and others, 1998: 54-64). 
entertainment and 
sports 
 
Various types of entertainment and sports can be utilized to bring 
former conflicting parties together (Dae-seok, 2002: 107-113; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 351-356). From music concerts to 
scrimmage sports competitions, these events provide an opportunity 
for illustrating the possibility of interaction in an atmosphere 
controlled by sportsmanship, rules and a common interest 
(Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 351-356). North and South Korea 
have played soccer matches against one another on several occasions, 
respectively altering venues in the capital cities of Pyongyang and 
Seoul (Dae-seok, 2002: 107-113). 
establishing 
channels of 
communication 
The creation of a formal channel where (former) belligerents 
maintain immediate contact ensures that upper-level communication 
is always possible and readily available (Donohue, 2009: 447-448; 
Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 37-38; Rosoux, 2009: 544). Its 
potential usefulness is obvious in critical situations where the ability 
to communicate in real-time reduces the probability of one or both 
belligerents misinterpreting the actions of the other, which reduces 
the likelihood a misinterpretation leads to an inappropriate rise in 
tension or escalation of violence (Saunders, 2009: 386-388). For 
example, direct phone communication between the United States and 
the Soviet Union was established during the Cold War to 
demonstrate a commitment to dialogue and to provide a vital 
connection between the two countries during times of tension 
(Saunders, 2009: 386-388). 
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exchange of 
representatives 
(structural level) 
Former belligerents can exchange representatives from countless 
institutions, including political, military, education, culture or 
religion, as a way of promoting dialogue, understanding, interaction 
and confidence through organized and sustained interaction (Rosoux, 
2009: 546-548). These exchanges also permit adversaries to share 
expertise, assist one another, or collaborate to solve common 
problems (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 37-38; Rosoux, 2009: 544). 
Over time, understanding, respect and cooperation are fostered as 
these exchanges endure and are institutionalized (Rosoux, 2009: 546-
548). Germany and France have regularly exchanged representatives 
across diverse fields, including politics, economics and education 
since the 1963 signing of the Élysée Treaty (Goethe Institut, 2009). 
face-to-face 
encounters of 
civilians/veterans 
 
Face-to-face encounters of former belligerents can occur through the 
initiative of one member who decides to make contact, or can be 
facilitated by third parties (Ropers, 2003: 5). These encounters 
generally occur many years subsequent to the end of a conflict 
(Ropers, 2003: 5). Their overall purpose is to promote dialogue and 
understanding among participants at a non-official level (Ropers, 
2003: 5). For instance, some U.S. military veterans who served in 
Vietnam later re-visited the country to encounter their former 
adversaries as an act of healing (Calloway, 1996: 124). 
films and 
documentaries 
 
Films have the potential to document or educate and are useful for 
advancing conflict resolution and transformation (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 31). They likewise increase the opportunity for 
reaching a wider audience, through screening for audiences in 
established cinemas or the use of traveling cinemas. For instance, 
Cynthia Connop (2007) produced a documentary called “Bloodlines” 
which traces the meeting of a descendant of a Nazi leader with a 
descendant of a Holocaust survivor. Similarly, Beth Davenport and 
Elizabeth Mandel directed “Pushing the Elephant,” a story of Rose 
Mapendo and her family’s experience in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo in the 1990s (Independent Television Service, 2011). In 
Iraq, USIP circulated a film produced by York Zimmerman and Peter 
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Ackerman titled “Confronting The Truth: Truth Commissions and 
Societies in Transition” as a means of promoting popular awareness 
of truth commissions (Sterling, 2009). The latter film was designed 
to educate viewers about the value and functionality of truth 
commissions with the hope of encouraging popular support for a 
similar program in Iraq as part of a national reconciliation program 
(Sterling, 2009). 
formal agreements 
or treaties 
Formal agreements or peace treaties are structural tools that formally 
signal the end of hostilities and extend recognition to the “other” by 
default (Long and Brecke, 2003: 89). Treaties or agreements likewise 
formally and publicly illustrate a change in the status quo 
relationship is desired and/or underway (Long and Brecke, 2003: 89). 
Among such treaties, one could include weapons reduction treaties, 
treaties of recognition, and so forth (Rosoux, 2009: 544). Such 
formal agreements are common between states, for example the 
peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979 (Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 89). 
gestures of solidarity 
 
There are instances where former conflicting parties make public 
gestures, for example, through the expression of shared grief with the 
“other” to advance conflict resolution (Dynkin, 2010). Such gestures 
demonstrate mutual support, solidarity and sympathy. Russia’s 
designation of April 12, 2010 as a national day of mourning 
following the death of Poland’s President and other representatives in 
a plane crash in Russia on April 10, 2010 serves as an example 
(Dynkin, 2010). This action was well received by the Polish 
community and immediately followed Russia’s acknowledgment of 
atrocities in a joint commemoration of the 1940 massacre of 22,000 
Polish troops in Katyn (BBC News, 2010b; Gentle, 2010; New 
Poland Express, 2010: 1-2). 
good governance 
and accountability 
Accountability and good governance, especially in the case of 
transitional justice, are necessary following conflict to demonstrate a 
government’s commitment to transformation through measures such 
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as abandoning previous policies of marginalization or repressive 
behavior (Bächler, 2004: 2-18; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 131-
132). Other demonstrations of good governance or accountability 
include the re-institution of democratic instruments, the reinstatement 
of a state constitution if it had been suspended under dictatorship or 
military coup, the restructuring or reformation of organizations or 
structures to ensure representativeness, justice and equality 
(Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 131-132). Such undertakings 
illustrate a government’s commitment to effect change and thereby 
elevates popular trust in the new governing institutions and their 
representatives (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 131-132). 
Accountability and good governance measures were used in both 
Eritrea and Ethiopia (Bächler, 2004: 8). 
holding (new) 
elections 
Conducting elections following intrastate conflict allows political 
representatives to illustrate their willingness to submit to the will of 
constituents (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 24), and are thereby 
catalysts for advancing transitional justice in post-conflict settings 
(Sarkin, 2008: 17). Holding new elections permits constituents a 
voice in two manners. First, they can choose representatives, and 
second, they can decide which topics are of politically, economically 
and socially relevant by voting accordingly (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 
2004: 24). Elections were effectively used in Angola in 1991 and 
Mozambique in 1992 following intrastate conflict (López-Pintor, 
1997: 43). 
international 
tribunals 
 
International tribunals are distributive justice mechanisms where 
high-ranking security officials or politicians are brought to trial for 
human rights violations committed under their direction (Kriesberg, 
2004: 99; Méndez, 2001: 25). High-level prosecutions are thought to 
reinforce internationally accepted standards and practices, for 
example international human rights law, and to deter future events 
(Kaminski and others, 2006: 295-296; Kriesberg, 2004: 99; Méndez, 
2001: 25-26). Nevertheless, international tribunals are not without 
their critics. According to Minow, tribunals do not reconcile victims 
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with perpetrators but provide punishment (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 
68). Consequently, the process is sometimes deemed 
counterproductive for restoring relationships (Brants and Klep, 2013: 
40; Méndez, 2001: 27-28). Equally these institutions favor Western 
theory and practices when implementing justice, thereby 
marginalizing indigenous alternatives (Sharp, 2013: 161-165). The 
trial of Slobodan Milosevic for his responsibility for crimes against 
humanity at the Hague, Netherlands is one example of an 
international tribunal (Malek, 2005; Worthington, 2006: 265). 
joint institutions Joint institutions are designed to increase and institutionalize regular, 
bilateral interaction at the social and structural levels (Bar-Siman-
Tov, 2004: 66; Horstkotte, 2009; Rosoux, 2009: 544). These can be 
implemented at the structural and societal levels (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
2004: 66; Horstkotte, 2009; Rosoux, 2009: 544). Their aim is to 
enhance interdependence, cooperation and provide a forum for 
exchanging and discussing ideas (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66; Rosoux, 
2009: 544). Ideally, their construction and utilization will 
institutionalize cooperation and erode negative perceptions and 
distrust (Boulding, 1978: 50; Worthington, 2006: 266). The German-
Poland Institute, for example, promotes literature from Poland in the 
German language as an instrument of increasing German 
understanding and appreciation of culture in Poland (Horstkotte, 
2009). 
joint memorial or 
ceremonies 
 
Former adversaries can jointly commemorate a given day or action as 
a means of illustrating cooperation (Liebes and Katz, 1996: 235-
257). In general, both groups can mourn or celebrate in unison, 
expressing a common perception of a given event (Liebes and Katz, 
1996: 235-257). History is replete with joint commemorations that 
had a positive impact on the trajectory of post-war relationships. For 
instance, German chancellor Willie Brandt’s attendance of the 1970 
Memorial Day celebration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising became a 
landmark event when Brandt fell to his knees during the ceremony 
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(Long and Brecke, 2003: 98).  
Not all scholars agree that commemoration ceremonies are beneficial 
for conflict resolution. Marcus Hawel (2007), for example, argues 
that reification is counterproductive because these practices “do not 
contain true history and do not penetrate into consciousness, but 
contribute to forgetting and neglect.” Hence, Hawel perceives such 
events as constructed realities that diminish historical occurrences. 
This, he argues, is because the ceremony occurs in political, social 
and economic isolation, and thereby is limited in scope and capacity 
(Hawel, 2007). 
joint or hybrid 
tribunals 
Joint tribunals consist of international and domestic judges who 
jointly conduct hearings and render verdicts (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 
2004: 17-18). The combination of internal and external legal 
representatives is hypothesized to enhance the legitimacy and 
fairness of the trials, as well as ensure the observation of both 
domestic and international legal norms (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 
17-18). They are also hypothesized capable of “build[ing] the 
institutional capacity of local judiciaries and thereby strengthen the 
rule of law” (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 17-18). It is likewise 
suggested that the practice promotes the perception of impartiality, 
though it is doubtful that impartiality can be guaranteed in every 
instance (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 17-18). Joint tribunals were 
utilized in several countries including Sierra Leone, Iraq, and East 
Timor subsequent to intrastate conflict (Gloppen, 2005: 25). 
joint  
(reconstruction) 
projects  
In the aftermath of violence, establishing joint projects to reconstruct 
what has been devastated by violence is a way of signaling an end to 
hostilities and a commitment to a constructive future (Bar-Siman-
Tov, 2004: 68; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33; Rosoux, 2009: 546). 
By establishing working relationships, on reconstruction or other 
projects, the short-term goal of institutionalizing positive interaction 
is developed while the long-term objective of ameliorating mutual 
trust is fostered (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33; Galtung, 2001: 16; 
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Rosoux, 2009: 546). While lives and communities are rebuilt, and 
cooperation and assistance rendered, perceptions of the “other” are 
challenged through the experience of working together to achieve 
common objectives (Rosoux, 2009: 546). 
legislative admission 
of wrongdoing 
The act of legislatively confessing to wrongdoing signals a change in 
the way that a country’s government views past actions, notably by 
accepting responsibility for wrongdoing whereupon conflict 
resolution can advance (Ropers, 2003: 3). In 2010, Serbia’s 
parliament passed a resolution that acknowledged the 1995 
Srebrenica massacre (BBC News, 2010c). While the resolution failed 
to recognize the atrocity as genocide, the action was an extraordinary 
step toward acknowledging Serbia’s military forces had perpetrated a 
massacre (BBC News, 2010c). 
media  
 
The importance of the media (newspaper, radio, television, and 
internet) in modern society is recognizable, with these tools being 
capable of informing and mobilizing the masses to violence (such as 
in Rwanda) or peace (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 32; Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 68; Price and others, 2009: 1-20; Ramsbotham and 
others, 2011: 285; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 227). Media’s versatility 
and popularity suggest it is a valuable tool for promoting conflict 
resolution (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 285). Properly timed, 
adapted and conveyed messages (symbolic, visual and audio), for 
instance, are capable of raising awareness, altering perceptions and 
advancing constructive relationships and behavior (Liebes and Katz, 
1996: 235-257). The media was used to broadcast and promote truth 
and reconciliation in South Africa (Verdoolaege, 2005: 190-196). 
memorials and 
monuments 
 
Monuments serve as a reminder of the past, and a place where 
patrons can visit to come to terms with historical events through 
emotions such as grieving (Gloppen, 2005: 38; Marschall, 2004: 78-
80; Stover and others, 2005: 853). Scholars likewise argue that 
“recognition and acknowledgement” are intrinsic to individual and 
collective transformation, although the theory is subject to debate in 
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the literature (Marschall, 2004: 79-82). Accordingly, monument and 
memorials can symbolize the events for which they were constructed. 
The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, Germany, 
is a monument that honors the victims of the Holocaust and stands as 
a reminder to the world of the atrocities committed by Nazi German 
forces during World War II (Public Broadcast Service, 2005). 
military signaling This broad category of techniques include activity that illustrates a 
military threat has been reduced or is nonexistent (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 16). Signals include the demobilization of the armed 
forces, weapons reduction, the abandonment or withdrawal of the 
military from contentious area or the creation of buffer zones (Bar-
Tal and Bennink, 2004: 16; Rosoux, 2009: 544). Such signaling 
reduces the perceived threat to an adversary and demonstrates the 
political will to develop peaceful coexistence, which can lead to 
increased cooperation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 77). Disarmament and 
demobilization of forces was one component of post-conflict 
transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was a process designed to 
reduce mutual threat (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 500). 
modifying the 
educational 
curriculum 
 
Students can be conditioned or taught to hold specific deconstructive 
beliefs because of a given education curriculum (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
2004: 75; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26-28; Jackson, 2009: 183; Stover 
and others, 2005: 853). Hence, education can purposefully be 
deployed to reinforce national myths, beliefs and stereotypes, which 
increases the probability of a continuation of deconstructive thoughts 
and behavior (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26-27; Keranen, 2014: 130-
132). For example, violence committed by the in-group may be 
excluded from the curriculum while the wrongdoing of an “enemy” 
emphasized (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26). For these reasons, 
adaptations of education curriculum should be objectively evaluated 
and altered to undermine conflict continuation (Hinds and Oliver, 
2009: 26-28). Similarly, Worthington (2006: 266) recommends 
including educational courses on peacemakers as heroes, rather than  
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the tendency to elevate war heroes. 
museums 
 
Museums can be dedicated to peace (Marschall, 2004: 78; 
Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 347-348; Stover and others, 2005: 
853). In such facilities, patrons can learn about peace events, 
peacemakers and so forth. Peace museums are thereby viable 
substitutes to the glorification of violence (Ramsbotham and others, 
2011: 348). Japan’s Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museums, for 
example, raises awareness of the U.S.’s use of the atomic bomb 
against Japan and the destructiveness of nuclear weapons (Mehdi, 
2005: 116). 
mutual recognition Since conflict often results in the denial of the “other’s” existence or 
humanity, reversing these tendencies are invaluable tools for 
improving relationships (Kelman, 2004: 122). Mutual acknowledge 
is, therefore, considered an intrinsic step in (re-) humanizing a former 
enemy (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 19; Hermann, 2004: 46; 
Kelman, 2004: 122; Kriesberg, 2004: 103). Recognition includes acts 
of accommodating the “other’s” pain and their right to exist 
(Kriesberg, 2004: 103). Recognition can be expressed in numerous 
ways, such as through a leader’s speech, via a state visit or a piece of 
legislation (Kriesberg, 2004: 103). Germany and Czech Republic, for 
example, mutually codified their acknowledgment of wrongdoing 
during and after World War II in the 1997 Czech German 
Declaration on Mutual Relations and Their Future Development 
(Rosoux, 2009: 546). This document addressed outstanding mutual 
concerns and grievances, and extended mutual apologies for wrongs 
perpetrated (Rosoux, 2009: 546). 
official (state) visits Official visits are salient political statement of acknowledgment of 
the other and they demonstrate a willingness to engage in dialogue at 
the structural level (Liebes and Katz, 1996: 235-257; Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 89-90). For instance, Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel in 
1997 not only legitimized Israel in the eyes of Egypt’s leader, albeit 
by default, it likewise illustrated Sadat’s political commitment to 
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improved relations (Liebes and Katz, 1996: 235-257; Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 89-90). That the political maneuver was out of step 
with regional public sentiment is demonstrated by the controversy 
that Sadat’s visit sparked in Egypt and throughout the Middle East 
(Long and Brecke, 2003: 89-90). The event was, nonetheless, a 
landmark visit that advanced conflict resolution. 
opening archives 
and records 
 
As part of restoring trust through the promotion of truth, opening 
classified government archives is one practice a government can 
implement to demonstrate their commitment to truth and/or justice 
(Rosoux, 2009: 554). The value of revealing classified information 
that would otherwise have remained beyond public view precipitates 
the emergence of truth and allows issues to be discussed and 
processed publicly (Rosoux, 2009: 554). Opening archives and 
records likewise signals a commitment to transparency and can build 
public confidence (Rosoux, 2009: 554). Scholars recommended 
archives be opened in eastern Europe subsequent to the demise of the 
communist bloc as a means of coming to terms with events that 
occurred under communism (Gábor Tóth, 2010: 2, 23-24). 
opening borders Opening borders or frontiers to allow the free movement of 
individuals is another mode of extending acknowledgment, 
increasing cooperation (economic, security, political), raising cultural 
awareness and advancing conflict transformation (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 16). By allowing individuals to reciprocally move 
across borders, individuals are afforded an opportunity to travel, visit 
relatives, or interact with the “other,” whereby confidence can be 
constructed (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 16). North and South Korea 
have opened their borders to allow families to unite. 
parks 
 
In some instances, territory has been set aside geographically to serve 
as a reminder of conflict, or as a location of physical or emotional 
restoration (Stover and others, 2005: 853; van Amerom and Büscher, 
2005: 1-24). Such places can take the form of a public park, national 
wildlife refuge or sanctuaries (Fischer, 2007: 195; van Amerom and 
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Büscher, 2005: 7-8). In some instances, disputed territory has been 
converted into neutral or shared property, for instance as a national 
park (Fischer, 2007: 195; van Amerom and Büscher, 2005: 7-8). This 
practice, for example, was utilized to end a border dispute between 
Ecuador and Peru in 1998 (Fischer, 2007: 195; van Amerom and 
Büscher, 2005: 7-8) and between Africa and Botswana in May 2000 
(van Amerom and Büscher, 2005: 7-8). 
peace education Peace education is a peacebuilding practice designed to stimulate 
non-violence through the establishment of a curriculum of peace. A 
peace curriculum imparts values and conflict resolution techniques, 
which ideally promotes a culture of peace (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; 
Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31; Danesh, 2006: 55-78; Hinds and 
Oliver, 2009; Jackson, 2009: 183; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 
226; Stover and others, 2005: 853). Peace education can be included 
into a standard educational curriculum and can target students of all 
ages (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31; Hinds and Oliver, 2009; 
Jackson, 2009: 183; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 226; Stover and 
others, 2005: 853). By way of example, UNICEF implemented peace 
education in Lebanon and Rwanda’s standard educational framework 
(Maynard, 1997: 215). 
peaceful partition Partition or demarcation of territory is an option for improving 
conflict relations centered on territorial disputes (Matejova, 2014: 
60-76; Tir, 2005: 713). Partitions can be approved as a means of 
avoiding or resolving violent conflict, and is thereby a means of 
addressing ethnic differences, or a desire for economic, political or 
ethnic autonomy (Tir, 2005: 714-715). However, partition does not 
guarantee long-term stability as conflict over territory or other issues 
could re-surface (Tir, 2005: 721). Among numerous examples, 
former Czechoslovakia’s peacefully division into Czech Republic 
and Slovakia in 1992 under mutually acceptable terms serves as an 
example (Matejova, 2014: 60; Tir, 2005: 713, 738-739). 
political cooperation States and communities can cooperate politically, whereby bonds are 
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created and trust built (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5; Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 15). Structural cooperation can include regular 
meetings between heads of state or other representatives, political 
assistance, dialogue and a number of other cooperative measures 
(Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15). These 
acts increase structural ties, promote political collaboration and 
simultaneously build trust at the structural level (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
2004: 5; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15). The Strategic Framework 
Agreement (2008) between the United States and Iraq includes 
political cooperation as a component. 
promoting religious 
and cultural 
awareness 
 
Promoting cultural and religious awareness between parties at the 
structural and grassroots levels is a broad technique helpful for 
bridging gaps and countering misconceptions (Lederach, 1995: 12). 
General awareness can be raised through education, public seminars 
and other outlets, providing individuals an opportunity to experience 
and understand the “other” (Lederach, 1995: 12). Numerous 
mechanisms can be used to promote awareness, from the arts and 
media to educational exchange programs. 
reform of legal and 
political systems 
Legal and political reform is essential to institutionalizing conflict 
resolution for multiple reasons (Adelman, 2005: 302; Bloomfield, 
2006: 9; Crocker, 2003: 53). On the one hand, reform can be used to 
extend legal protection to minority groups previously denied such 
safeguards (Kriesberg, 2004: 105). In other cases, legal reform might 
include the writing, or the re-institution, of preexisting legislation 
(Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 143). On the other hand, manifestations 
could include the reduction of executive power, or the introduction of 
power sharing arrangements within a governing framework 
(Kriesberg, 2004: 104-105; Rouhana, 2004: 39). Ultimately, reform 
should: ensure the rights of all stakeholders; hold political leadership 
accountable; empower the marginalized; and alleviate excessive 
abuse of power (Kriesberg, 2004: 104-105). Morocco undertook 
modest legal reforms to re-brand itself (Slyomovics, 2001: 18). 
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refraining 
 
The act of halting or refusing to continue certain acts or rituals is a 
means of demonstrating a willingness to transform relations. For 
instance, Shriver (1995: 5) informs his readers that Ulysses S. Grant 
halted Union soldiers from commencing with their celebratory gun 
salute following the end of the U.S. Civil War. Grant asked union 
soldiers to refrain from this common ritual out of respect to their 
southern comrades who, following the war, were once again 
considered members of the United States of America (Shriver, 1995: 
5). It is challenging to identify unless on is familiar with the culture 
and norms of a given society. 
regular (joint) 
meetings 
Political leaders and other state representatives (or institutions) can 
establish regular meetings with counterparts to discuss topics, resolve 
issues, hold workshops, or even exchange information (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 32-33). Through institutionalized regularity, these 
groups or institutions have the opportunity to work together on a 
wide range of issues for an extended period of time (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 32-33). Interaction allows for the exchange of ideas, 
encourages the formation of working partnerships, and serves to 
demonstration that regular, positive interaction among the parties is 
not only possible, but can be mutually beneficial (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 32-33). Germany and France, for instance, held joint 
cabinet meetings as a manner of promoting reconciliation (Gardner 
Feldman, 2008: 15). 
releasing 
(political/war) 
prisoners 
The liberation of political prisoners is another measure of indicating 
a government’s willingness to reverse its former policies and/or 
demonstrate a disposition toward transitional justice and/or 
reconciliation (Long and Brecke, 2003: 40). Releasing political 
prisoners signifies the importance of the “other” by allowing their 
reintegration into politics and society (Long and Brecke, 2003: 40). 
Simultaneously, the act demonstrates that these individuals (and their 
supporters) are no longer viewed as an existential threat (Long and 
Brecke, 2003: 40). Under French pressure, for example, the 
government of Chad released political prisoners in 1971 to promote 
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national reconciliation in the aftermath of decades of civil strife 
(Long and Brecke, 2003: 40). The act can likewise occur between 
countries when prisoners of war are released or exchanged 
(Kriesberg, 2004: 82). Prisoner release was utilized by Britain as a 
conflict resolution tool in Ireland during “The Troubles” (Lundy and 
McGovern, 2001: 29). 
restitution/ 
reparations 
 
Reparations or compensation can be paid to victims on multiple 
levels and are hypothesized to restore “the identity and good name of 
the victim” (Long and Brecke, 2003: 69). A government can pay 
restitution to its citizens, or to those of another country, for wrongs 
committed (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 30; Goschler, 2007; 
Kriesberg, 2004: 100; Rosoux, 2009: 546). Reparations need not 
come simply in the form of financial payment (Gloppen, 2005: 38; 
Stover and others, 2005: 853). Rather, they can take the form of 
improved education, access to health services or even physical or 
psychological rehabilitation (Gloppen, 2005: 38). 
However, the literature identifies many disadvantages with the 
payment of restitution. Foremost, reparations raise complex 
questions such as “who should pay what to whom under which 
conditions” (Lerche, 2000). Next, reparations may not be acceptable 
in certain contexts (Galtung, 2001: 6-7). More specifically, victims 
may deem reparations inappropriate (an unacceptable form of 
punishment) or the act may be interpreted as insincere or a means of 
purchasing forgiveness (Galtung, 2001: 6-7). Thus, Galtung (2001: 
6-7) asserts that victims must want reparations and “the act must 
convey the correct symbolic message.” Germany paid reparations to 
Israel for confiscating Jewish property in the 1930s and 1940s and 
for the suffering caused by the Holocaust (Goschler, 2007). 
reviewing and/or 
rewriting text books 
 
To prove an objective education to students, textbooks can be 
reviewed or rewritten, removing potential content that promotes 
imbalanced historical accounts or glorifies the in-group vis-à-vis the 
out-group (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26-27; Stover and others, 2005: 
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853). Such revisions performed singularly or jointly, can undermine 
preexisting stereotypes and national myths that may attribute to 
conflict continuation (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26-27). Germany, 
France and Poland worked together after World War II to produce 
school textbooks that balanced what students were taught about in-
group and out-group history and culture (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 1-
19; Höpken, 2004). 
re-writing history 
 
There is more than one version of history as Mona Sue Weissmark 
found when she brought adult children of Holocaust survivors and 
Nazi soldiers together (Worthington, 2006: 259-260). According to 
Weissmark, both victims and perpetrators construct their own 
versions of history often creating conflicting accounts (Worthington, 
2006: 259-260). Accordingly, scholars advocate writing a common 
history to facilitate conflict resolution by minimizing or eliminating 
the proliferation of two competing versions of history (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 31; Jackson, 2009: 183). Through collective effort, 
referents can determine and produce a common history that 
represents a unified view of the past (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31; 
Jackson, 2009: 183). The German-Czech Historians Commission 
(Deutsch-Tschechische Historiker-kommission) is one example of 
bilateral coordination for rewriting history (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 
9). 
security cooperation Former conflicting parties can partner in the pursuit of mutual 
security interests (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5). Ideally, over time, this 
type of cooperation will increase mutual trust and cooperation 
between former belligerents (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5). Security 
cooperation was a cornerstone of post-World War II European 
cooperation as European states worked together under the auspice of 
NATO against the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Bloc 
(Wallensteen, 2007: 255). 
special courts Special courts can be temporarily established for the purposes of 
providing justice within a given time and context (Schabas, 2004: 3-
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 5; Triponel, 2007: 296-315). Ideally, these special courts will 
combine existing traditional justice and restorative justice systems to 
provide a holistic approach between retributive and restorative 
techniques (Triponel, 2007: 296-315). One example of a special 
court was established in Sierra Leone in 2002 (Schabas, 2004: 4-5; 
Triponel, 2007: 297). Its legal jurisdiction was restricted by design 
and limited in size and scope, which meant that it could only 
prosecute a limited number of defendants (Triponel, 2007: 296-315). 
symbolic restoration 
 
Gloppen (2005: 38) identifies “symbolic restoration” as one means of 
transforming relationships. These include gestures which range from 
changing street names to reinstating or recognizing suppressed 
languages or formerly prohibited cultural practices (Alcock, 2001: 1-
5). Symbolic restoration was implemented in South Tirol in 1946 
following the De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement, which reversed the 
suppression of the German language and culture in South Tirol 
(Alcock, 2001: 4-5). 
theatre and 
storytelling 
 
Rustom Bharucha (2001: 3763-3773) argues that theatre and 
storytelling are empowering practices. Theatre or storytelling, like 
films and other expressions of art, is suggested to provide a safe 
forum for dealing with post-conflict issues and sometimes affords the 
viewers and/or participants the opportunity to confront the past and 
express their feelings about what has occurred (Bharucha, 2001: 
3763-3773; C. Cohen, 2004: 1-53; Galtung, 2001: 3-4; Ramsbotham 
and others, 2011: 349-351). In certain cases, participants are 
permitted to take control and perhaps even hypothetically alter 
outcomes by adapting a story or play to produce a more positive 
outcome (Bharucha, 2001: 3763-3773). Theatre has been used as a 
conflict resolution tool in countries including South Africa, India and 
the United States (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 351). 
third party 
intervention 
(NGOs/IGOs/ etc.) 
Third parties often become involved in conflicts that do not involve 
them, or may not pertain to them, for the sake of promoting peace 
and stability (R. Fisher, 2001a: 4-23). For instance, a neighboring 
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country may decide to work with two belligerents to bring about an 
end to hostilities. Equally probable, a regional body (for instance the 
European Union) or an international body (the United Nations) may 
become engaged as a third party (R. Fisher, 2001a: 4-23). In general 
terms, third party involvement can be useful for encouraging 
referents to pursue conflict resolution by providing political 
assistance or incentives and/or by providing a venue or mediating 
body which permits dialogue to begin (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 
33; R. Fisher, 2001a: 4-23). 
Third parties can become involved in conflict resolution at many 
levels (grassroots, structural) and can provide innumerable resources 
(Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33; R. Fisher, 2001a: 4). For instance, 
they can broker peace arrangements, oversee their implementation 
and monitor reconciliation projects and their progression (R. Fisher, 
2001a: 4). Third parties can likewise provide necessary resources and 
expertise to assist referents, and can thereby increase the probability 
that resolution is achieved (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33; R. 
Fisher, 2001a: 15). Numerous third parties, including NGOs and 
IGOs, became involved in Iraq during the occupation, trying to 
advance national reconciliation (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1034, 
1061; Stover and others, 2005: 841). 
traditional methods / 
practices 
 
Traditional methods are indigenous conflict resolution practices that 
have a long and respected traditional history within a given 
community (Gloppen, 2005: 38; Sarkin, 2008: 23). These processes 
are familiar to the community, have the potential to increase the 
“cohesiveness” of community members, and their utilization can 
encourage popular participation and increase program legitimacy 
(Sarkin, 2008: 23). In this manner, any outcome achieved through the 
utilization of traditional techniques is more likely to be endorsed by 
the general public. Sarkin (2008: 23) suggests these practices can use 
retributive or restorative justice, and hence could include concessions 
such as an apology, reparations, or other tools according to 
community norms and tradition (Kriesberg, 2004: 100-103). 
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Rwanda used the gacaca, which means grass(roots) (Buckeye, 2010: 
46) or people’s trial, to supplement modern judicial practices 
following the April 1994 genocide (Gloppen, 2005: 25; Sarkin, 2008: 
24; Sharp, 2013: 166). However, the international community 
expressed outrage at their use claiming that it was insufficient for 
providing justice in light of the atrocities committed (Gloppen, 2005: 
25; Sarkin, 2008: 24; Sharp, 2013: 166-167). Nevertheless, scholars 
argue that traditional practices, if accepted by the affected 
community at large, offer viable tools of restoring society and acting 
as a point from which relationships can be re-structured 
(Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 257). 
travel and tourism 
 
Tourism allows individuals to confront, experience and celebrate 
diversity, and has the potential to alter perspectives (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 34; Boulding, 1978: 63). Since diverse individuals 
meet and interact, previously held (mis-) conceptions can be 
challenged and adapted from first-hand experience (Bar-Tal and 
Bennink, 2004: 34; Lederach, 1995: 12). Travel and tourism also 
establish an economic connection between formerly conflicting 
parties, creating economic interdependence (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 
2004: 34). The United Kingdom and Argentina lifted a travel ban to 
the Falkland/Malvinas Island in 1999 as an expression of 
reconciliation following military conflict over the Island in early 
1982 (Long and Brecke, 2003: 102-103). 
truth commissions 
 
A substantial amount of ink has been spilled on truth commissions as 
a transitional mechanism in post-conflict settings (Brahm, 2004; 
Chapman, 2007: 52; Hayner, 1994; Sarkin, 2008: 19-20). Chapman 
(2007: 52) defines a truth commission as “temporary, usually official 
bodies, vested with the responsibility to investigate the causes and 
sources of the violence and human rights abuses.” Goschler (2007) 
goes on to emphasize these temporary investigative bodies, “ a s a 
rule, […] serve as an alternative to the criminal persecution of former 
perpetrators.” Hence, truth commissions commonly adopt a median 
approach between broad amnesty and retributive justice (Brants and 
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Klep, 2013: 38; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 252-253; Schabas, 
2004: 8). 
Gibson (2006: 428) summarizes that a truth commission aids in the 
societal re-conceptualization of a conflict through the use of “strict 
condemnation of all who violate universal human rights standards 
but without extensive prosecution.” In short, wrongdoing is 
condemned but not necessarily punished harshly. Similarly, Michael 
Humphrey (2005: 203-220) and Randall Coyne (2005: 19) suggest 
that truth commissions refocus public attention and energy away 
from retribution and onto reconciliation. Long and Brecke (2003: 
68), nonetheless, emphasize the paradoxical implications of truth 
telling, particularly its value for promoting truth and forgiveness vis-
á-vis its potential for creating further caveats among adversaries and 
thereby prolonging or re-activating conflict. 
The objectives of a truth commission include exploring the past, 
documenting human rights abuses and (sometimes) punishing those 
determined responsible (Avruch, 2010: 34; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 
2004: 29; Brahm, 2007: 10-25; Chapman, 2007: 51-69). However, 
the depth of their mandate varies (Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Skaar, 
2013: 76). Upon completion, a truth commission’s findings and/or 
recommendations are released to the government or public (Brahm, 
2007: 22-25). While processes diverge, Everett Worthington (2006: 
265) summarizes the processes of the TRC in South Africa in three 
phases: victims told their story, amnesty hearings were held, and 
reparations were distributed. 
vetting government 
 
Confidence may be restored in governing institutions and leadership 
if vetting, also referred to as lustration, occurs to remove former 
elites responsible for wrongdoing from office and limiting their 
eligibility for holding office in future (Gloppen, 2005: 25-26). 
Vetting, as utilized here, includes judicial reviews of political leaders 
and their temporary or permanent removal from office for wrongful 
activity including corruption or advancement of violence (Gloppen, 
2005: 25-26). Following their removal from office, criminal trials 
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may be pursued to ensure accountability and justice (Gloppen, 2005: 
25-26). Vetting occurred in Greece (1975) and Argentina (1983) as 
part of transitional justice programs (Goschler, 2007). 
workshops, dialogue 
and training 
programs 
 
Some scholars view workshops, dialogue projects and training 
programs as modes of establishing contact and raising mutual 
awareness in a controlled environment (R. Fisher, 2001b: 29; 
Lederach, 1995: 48-62; Maoz, 2000: 721-726; Ropers, 2003: 2-12). 
Morton Deutsch (2005: 18) summarizes “training programs seek to 
instill the attitudes, knowledge, and skills which are conducive to 
effective, cooperative problem solving and to discourage the attitudes 
and habitual responses which give rise to win–lose struggles.” These 
events can be prescriptive, where knowledge and skills are imparted, 
or through an elicitive approach, where participants actively 
participate and contribute to the process (Lederach, 1995). 
These mechanisms usually unite representatives from the various 
sides in an official or non-official capacity for dialogue, discussion, 
confidence building or skills training (Ropers, 2003: 1). One problem 
with workshops is their targeting of high- and mid-level public 
officials and marginalization of society (Galtung, 2001: 17). 
However, they have been utilized at the grassroots level as a means 
of coping with individual and collective trauma (Bharucha, 2001: 
3763-3773; Montville, 1999). Another problem is that the process 
tends to be prolonged and time-consuming, therefore, it “does not 
provide quick solutions” (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 79). These 
techniques have been used in the Palestine-Israel context, for 
example (Lumsden, 1996: 36-66). 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire/Log Book 
 
This survey explores how people perceive popular methods of improving international relationships following a military conflict between two states. Your 
participation in this study is very important for making cultural comparisons. The questions below will ask for your opinion on certain terms, values and concepts 
of conflict resolution. You will also be asked to rate various social and political methods or practices often used for improving relationships between two states 
following a conflict. Your responses are completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 20 minutes to complete. Please answer all of the questions. 
Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!  
 
 
1. 
As a U.S. citizen, did you work or serve in Iraq at any time between April 2003 and December 2011?  (U.S. 
Respondents ONLY) 
Yes     1     (Answer only the “a” questions in 
this section) 
 
 No   0     (Answer only the “b” questions in this 
section) 
 
 
2a. 
Which type of employer did you work/serve for in 
Iraq? 
 
2b. 
If you have not personally worked/served in Iraq, 
did one of your immediate family members (a 
parent, a child, or a sister or brother) work in Iraq (in 
the military or as a civilian) between April 2003 and 
December 2011? 
 
 
the U.S. military 
 
 
 1 
 
the U.S. diplomatic service   2   
Yes    1   
 
 
No  0   
 
 
         Go to 
question 4. 
a private U.S. company  3  
an international organization  4  
as an independent or freelancer 
 
other (specify)       
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
3a. 
For about how many months in total were you in 
Iraq? 
 
3b. 
For about how many months did your family 
member work in Iraq? 
 
1-3 months  1   1-3 months  1  
4-8 months  2   4-8 months  2  
9-12 months  3  9-12 months  3  
13-16 months  4  13-16 months  4  
17 months or more  5  17 months or more  
 
5  
 
(BEGIN QUESTIONS FOR IRAQ AND U.S. RESPONDENTS) 
 
The next set of questions asks for your general opinion. Please carefully read the questions and mark the answer that best 
expresses how you feel about the issue. 
 
  
Do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? 
 
A
lw
ay
s 
D
isag
ree 
M
o
stly
 
d
isag
ree 
S
o
m
etim
es 
D
isag
ree 
N
eith
er 
A
g
ree n
o
r 
D
isag
ree 
S
o
m
etim
es 
A
g
ree 
M
o
stly
 
A
g
ree 
A
lw
ay
s 
A
g
ree 
 
4 
 
Religion is a very important influencer 
in my everyday life 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5 
 
I find it very important to improve my 
relations with a close friend after a 
conflict  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 All conflicts can be resolved 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 All conflicts should be resolved 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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The following questions concern your view of conflict. Please read the questions carefully and answer whether you believe the statement to be false, mostly false, 
undecided, mostly true or true. 
 
  
When thinking about conflict, do you 
believe…? 
 
A
lw
ay
s 
F
alse 
M
o
stly
 
F
alse 
S
o
m
etim
es 
F
alse 
U
n
su
re 
S
o
m
etim
es 
T
ru
e 
M
o
stly
 
T
ru
e 
A
lw
ay
s 
T
ru
e 
8 
Conflicts only affect those individuals 
directly involved 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 
Conflicts can produce positive 
benefits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 Conflicts between people are normal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 Conflict cannot be prevented 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 Conflicts should be avoided  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 Conflicts are always violent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 Conflicts can be nonviolent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 
A conflict between two people has 
the same characteristics as a conflict 
between two countries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
For the purposes of this survey, conflict resolution is broadly defined as an action taken to end a conflict and improve the relationship between former adversaries. 
Please read the following statements and mark the most appropriate answer according to your opinion of reconciliation. 
 
Using the scale, please indicate how important or unimportant you believe the following methods are for resolving a conflict in general. “0” indicates that they are 
“unimportant” for resolving conflict, “5” indicates a “neutral” effect and “10” indicates they are “very important.” 
  
When thinking about conflict resolution, do you 
believe…? 
 
A
lw
ay
s 
F
alse 
M
o
stly
 
F
alse 
S
o
m
etim
es 
F
alse 
U
n
su
re 
S
o
m
etim
es  
T
ru
e 
    M
o
stly
 
     T
ru
e 
   A
lw
ay
s 
      T
ru
e 
16 All conflict relationships can be resolved 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17 
Religious values must guide conflict 
resolution 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 Only violent relationships must be resolved 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19 
Nonviolent conflict relationships must be 
resolved  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 
Nonviolent coexistence is more probable than 
peace when resolving violent relations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21 
Showing forgiveness is essential to resolve 
conflict 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22 
Two countries involved in war can improve 
their relationship 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23 
Reconciled relationships are synonymous with 
peaceful relationships  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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In general, how would you rate the following 
principles for reconciling relations after a 
conflict…? 
 
                  
Unimportant 
0 
N
eu
tral   5
 
 
5
 
 
 
         Very important  
      10 
24 honor 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
25 dignity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
26 respect 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
27 satisfaction of interests of those involved 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
28 satisfaction of the needs of those involved 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
29 
protection of individual rights of those 
involved 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
30 
appropriate compensation given to those who 
suffered 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
31 getting the opinions of those involved 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
32 listening to the “other”/adversary 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
33 mutual benefit to those involved 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
34 
the use of practices acceptable to those 
involved 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
35 justice 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
36 truth 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
37 accountability 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
38 forgiveness 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
39 religion 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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The next section deals with resolving conflict between two countries. Using the scale, please indicate how useful or un-useful you believe the following methods 
are for improving relations following a conflict between two countries “0” indicates that they are “very un-useful” for improving relations, “5” indicates a 
“neutral” effect and “10” indicates they are “very useful.” Brief definitions of each method are provided. 
 
 
How would you rate the following mechamisms…? 
Very un-useful 
0 
 
5 
                      Very useful     
              10 
40 Third party intervention (another country or 
organization steps in to help two states find ways to 
improve relations between the two countries) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
41 Security cooperation (two states agree to work together 
to increase their security) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
42 Political cooperation (two states agree to work together 
politically, for example by holding joint political 
meetings to discuss issues important to both states) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
43 Reparation payments (state A pays compensation to 
citizens of state B who have been wrongfully harmed or 
injured as a result of state A’s previous action) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
44 Court (or judicial) proceedings (criminal wrongdoing is 
prosecuted according to state or international law and 
punishment is passed down if guilt is determined) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
45 Public apology (One or more representatives publicly 
apologize for wrongs committed against another group) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
46 Economic cooperation (two states agree to work 
together economically as a way to improve relations and 
increase economic dependency on one another) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
47 Truth telling (a process where individuals who have 
committed wrongdoing are asked to tell the truth [admit 
wrongdoing] before a committee in exchange for 
amnesty or reduced sentences) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
48 Cultural exchanges (provides an opportunity for 
individuals to work, study or travel to another country for 
a period of time to learn about other cultures) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
49 Positive media coverage of the other state (more 
positive news, reports and documentaries should be 
given on a country to increase public awareness) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
50 Empowerment (allowing the people involved to decide 
on how reconciliation is pursued) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
In the last part of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to Iraq-U.S. relations. The first set of questions asks about the effects of the war and occupation. The next  
questions ask for your opinion about how conflict resolution between the U.S. and Iraq could hypothetically be pursued. Carefully read and answer each question. 
 
  
Definitely 
not 
Probably 
not 
Unsure Probably 
yes 
Definitely 
yes 
51a 
 
Do you believe that the 2003-2011, 
invasion and occupation of Iraq affected 
U.S. citizens’ opinion of Iraqis? 
1 2 3 4 5 
51b 
How would you rate the affect this event 
had on U.S. citizens’ opinion of Iraqis…? 
Negative                                       Neutral                                      Positive 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
52a 
Do you think that the 2003-2011 invasion 
and occupation of Iraq affected Iraqis’ 
opinion of U.S. citizens? 
1 2 3 4 5 
52b 
How would you rate the affect this event 
had on Iraqi opinion of U.S. citizens? 
Negative                                       Neutral                                      Positive 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Definitely 
not 
Probably 
not 
Unsure Probably 
Yes 
Definitely 
yes 
53 
Do you think that it is necessary for the Iraq 
and U.S. Governments to reconcile their 
relations following the 2003 war? 
1 2 3 4 5 
54 
Would you support reconciliation between 
the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it? 
1 2 3 4 5 
55 
Would you support a U.S. government 
inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? 
1 2 3 4 5 
56 
Would you support an international tribunal 
to investigate wrongdoing during the 2003 
war in Iraq? 
1 2 3 4 5 
57 
Do you think that U.S. politicians should 
take Iraqi public opinion into consideration 
when drafting U.S.-Iraq policy? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
Still thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations, please rate the following methods according to how acceptable you think they are for improving this relationship. On the 
scale, “0” means that you find the item “completely unacceptable,” “5” that you are “neutral” and “10” that you find it “absolutely acceptable” in context. 
 
 Rate the following mechanisms according to your 
opinion of their acceptability for improving U.S.-
Iraq relations… 
Completely 
unacceptable 
“0” 
N
eu
tral 
Absolutely   
acceptable 
“10” 
58 … cultural exchanges to increase understanding 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
59 … an international tribunal to investigate wrongdoing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
60 … a U.S. apology for its actions in Iraq 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
61 … continued security cooperation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
62 …  an Iraq inquiry into the war 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
63 … use of truth commissions to disclose wrongdoing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
64 … continued economic cooperation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
65 … third party intervention 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
66 … positive media coverage of the other country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
67 … increased political cooperation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
68 … payment of reparations by the U.S. to Iraq 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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(DEMOGRAPHICS) 
 
In this final section you are asked to provide some personal information. The answers that you provide to the following questions will help the 
researcher to classify the data and make statistical comparisons.  
 69.     What is your gender?        
            1  Male      0  Female         
 70.     With which race do you identify? 
            U.S. Respondents: 
  African American             Native American            Hispanic/Latino             
   Caucasian            None           Other, please specify:         
            Iraq Respondents: 
               Arab             Kurdish               Turkoman              Yazidis              Assyrian          
              Chaldeans          None         Other, please specify:        
 
 71.     How old are you? 
           15-25     26-35     36-45     46-55     56-65     66-75     76 or older 
 72.     How many children do you have? 
             0       1        2        3       4        5       6 or more 
 73.    What is your highest level of completed education? 
                       Middle School         High School         Associates Degree        Bachelor           
                       Master           Ph.D.    
 74.    Which religion do you identify with? 
                       None         Shi’a Islam         Sufi Islam         Sunni Islam         Christianity          Judaism            
 
                      Other, please specify:       
 
75. Nationality  (IRAQ ONLY) 
 
76. Questionnaire Language (IRAQ ONLY – Not a question) 
         English (1)      German (2)       Italian (3) 
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Appendix 3: Bar Graphs of Responses 
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Appendix 4: Contact Log 
 
date institution Mode of contact time response 
May 2, 
2013 
Iraq University 
Sulaimani, Kirkuk 
Main Road 
Sulaimani, Iraq 
info@auis.edu.iq 11:15 
no 
response 
May 2, 
2013 
University of 
Baghdad 
http://www.en.uobaghdad.edu.iq/ contactus.aspx 11:20 
no 
response 
May 2, 
2013 
University of Al-
Qadisiyah, Iraq 
info@qadissuni.edu.iq 11:25 
no 
response 
May 2, 
2013, 
Salahaddin 
University College 
of Postgraduate 
Studies | Zanko 
Street | Erbil | 
Kurdistan Region | 
Iraq 
http://www.suh-edu.com/ 11:30 
no 
response 
May 12, 
2013 
Iraqi American 
Society for Peace, 
Phoenix 
tpaetschow@iaspf.org 16.52 
no 
response 
May 12, 
2013 
Iraqi American 
Association, 
Pomona, CA 
admin@iraqiamerican.org 16.55 
no 
response 
May 12, 
2013 
Iraqi American 
Council, 
Annandale, VA 
IRAQ@AL-IRAQ.ORG 16.56 
no 
response 
May 12, 
Iraqi American 
Association of 
North Texas, 13524 
Quarry Trace, 
Euless, TX. 76040 
info@iaant.org 16.58 
no 
response 
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June 8, 
2013 
Islamic Society of 
North America 
(ISNA) 6500 
Greenville Avenue, 
Dallas, TX 75206 
Plainfield, Indiana 
46168 
19.00 
no 
response 
May 27, 
2013 
International 
Rescue 
Committee 122 
East 42nd 
Street, New York, 
NY 10168 USA 
+1 212 551 3000 9: 45 
no 
response 
May 27, 
2013 
Refugees 
International (RI), 
2001 S Street 
NW, Suite 700, 
Washington, DC 
20009, 
ri@refugeesinternational.org 
Phone: 202.828.0110, Fax: 202.828.0819 
9:55 
no 
response 
May 26, 
2013 
Collateral Repair 
project 
http://www.collateralrepairproject.org 
/#!__contactus 
10:19 
Sasha 
Crow 
responded 
on May 27, 
5:20 
August 
18, 2013 
Iraqi Network for 
Social Media 
Iraqi.network.4.social.media@gmail.com 8:48 
no 
response 
August 
20, 
2013 
Refugee Action 
(UK) 
refugeeactioninfo@refugee-action.co.uk 12:10 
August 20 
declining 
any offer 
of 
assistance 
August 
20, 2013 
Refugee Council 
(UK) 
020 7346 6700 12:20 
no 
response 
Sept. 4, 
2013 
Caritas (Italy) immigrazione@caritasitaliana.it 13:58 
no 
response 
Sept. 4, 
2013 
Associazione delle 
ONG Italiane 
ong@ong.it 13:35 
no 
response 
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Sept. 4, 
2013 
International 
Organization for 
Migration 
OIM Ufficio di 
coordinamento per 
il Mediterraneo 
iomrome@iom.int 14:00 
no 
response 
Sept. 4, 
2013 
Il Quartier Generale 
dell'OIM è in 
Svizzera , in Route 
des Morillons, 
17 CH-1211 
Ginevra 19 
info@iom.int 14:01 
no 
response 
Sept. 4, 
2013 
centro ambrosiano 
di dialogo con le 
religioni 
cadr@cadr.it 14:03 
no 
response 
Sept. 4, 
2013 
Caritas der Diözese 
Innsbruck 
Heiliggeiststraße 
16, 6020 Innsbruck 
Tel.: (0512) 72 70-0 Fax: (0512) 72 70-5 14:15 
left 
message- 
no 
response 
Sept. 4, 
2013 
Islamisches 
Zentrum Tirol 
Innsbruck 
Wilten 
Andreas-Hofer-
Straße 17a 
Moussa_shawki@hotmail.com 14:30 
no 
response 
Sept. 4, 
2013 
International Center 
for Muslim and 
Non-Muslim 
Understanding, 
Australia 
 
http://www.unisa.edu.au/Research/International-
Centre-for-Muslim-and-non-Muslim-
Understanding/Contact-us/ 
14:14 
no 
response 
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Sept. 4, 
2013 
IslamiCity www.islamicity.com/support/#All-other 14:21 
no 
response 
Sept. 4, 
2013 
Deutscher 
Caritasverband 
e.V., Referat 
Migration und 
Integration, 
Karlstraße 40, 
79104 Freiburg 
Roberto.Alborino@caritas.de 
Telefon: 0761/200-375  
14:40 
no 
response 
by phone 
or email 
Sept. 14, 
2013 
Islamic Society of 
North America, 
P.O. Box 38 
Plainfield, IN 
46168 
http://www.isna.net/contact.html 11:05 
no 
response 
Sept. 14, 
2013 
Muslim American 
Society 
1010 W 105th 
Street 
Overland Park, KS 
66212 
Phone:  913-888-
5555 
Info@MuslimAmericanSociety.org 11:06 
no 
response 
Sept. 14, 
2013 
American Society 
for the 
Advancement of 
Muslims, 
475 Riverside Drive 
Suite 248 
New York, NY 
10115 
Phone: 212-870-2552 
Fax: 212-870-2540 
11:17 
no 
response to 
phone call 
Oct. 11, Muslim Student http://msanational.org/contact/ 18:22 
no 
response 
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2013 Association 
Oct. 11, 
2013 
Northern Virginia 
Community College 
Karla Vasconez, international student advisor 
mailto:kvasconez@nvcc.edu 
18:56 
no 
response 
Oct. 15, 
2013 
International 
Catholic Migration 
secretariat.be@icmc.net648 11:05 
no 
response 
Oct. 15, 
2013 
Caritas Belgium, 
Brussels, 
www.caritas-int.be 11:12 
no 
response 
Oct. 15, 
2013 
Dutch Refugee 
Council 
info@vluchtelingenwerk.nl 11:17 
no 
response 
Oct. 15, 
2013 
Danish Immigration 
Service 
study@us.dk 11:24 
no 
response 
Oct. 15, 
2013 
Refugio info@refugio-muenchen.de 12.15 
no 
response 
Oct. 15, 
2013 
Caritas DE info@caritas.de 12.18 
no 
response 
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Appendix 5: How to Interpret p-values 
 
This provides basic instructions for understanding and interpreting the p-values provided by our R 
software package. This process is relevant for all of our p-values, regardless if they were generated 
from the Wilcoxon Rank Sum, Chi Square or the Fisher Exact Test. Recall that the lower the number, 
the more confident we are that there are differences between response categories being compared. The 
p-value, however, does not indicate what the difference is or how it manifests. 
 
Example 1. 
For our first illustration, we use the p-value from the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test of Question Set 1 
from Table 3, on page 562. 
– Our p-values returned from the R software package are presented with a whole number. 
This value needs to be converted to its decimal form to test the null hypothesis. Our 
value for this example is: 3.587491e-01 
– First we separate the p-value into its two parts. Since we are not statisticians, we can 
likewise reduce the size of the value for our research purposes. When we reduce the p-
value into its two parts, we get: 3.58 (7491) e-01 
• 3.58 = is our value with a whole number, and e-01 is our negative exponent, or 
(10 -¹). The latter is necessary to convert the value to its decimal form. 
– Calculate: 3.58 × 10 -¹ = 0.358 
– Compare: 0.358 > 0.01 (threshold of null hypothesis) 
– Conclude: The p-value indicates that we are confident there is only slight difference 
between U.S. and Iraq respondents’ answers to the combination of questions included 
in Question Set 1. 
Example 2 
This time we refer to the p-value generated from our Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test of Question Set 6b 
from Table 3, on page 562. 
– Value with a whole number: 1.996018e-04 
– Separate and calculate: 1.99 … e-04 (10-4) = 0.000199 
– Compare: 0.000199 < 0.01 (threshold of null hypothesis) 
– Conclude: We are confident that there is a difference in how the compared samples 
answered the questions in this set. 
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Appendix 6: Combined Pilot 1-10 
Pilot Questions                Pilot Number 1  Date:  Sept. 13, 2010 
Location: Researcher's flat 
I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and 
countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think 
about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel 
free to ask questions at any time. 
1. What is your nationality?  USA 
2. Gender:   male       
3. Age:    22 
4. Level of education:  high school 
5. Ethnicity: white 
6. Religion: Christian  
7. Is it important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend?   Most of the time 
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday 
 life?      Very important with good friends. Not so much with others. 
9. Are conflicts normal?    I suppose. 
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent?  Maybe. Complicated. 
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive?  Both, depends of the goals.      
 Sometime need to fight for what you want. 
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Both.       
           Like I said. 
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved?    Are there solutions? Most of the time I think so. 
14. Should a conflict be solved?   Yes, it possible. 
15. Can a conflict be prevented?    In many cases, I think so. Have to work at it. 
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits?    Sure. Positive and negative. 
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states?     
           Sort of. They are fighting for something they want...usually someone wins. 
18. Do you think that it is possible for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Yes. 
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? It is probably best. 
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20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? Maybe. I guess. 
21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? (requests a   
 definition) No, not very likely. 
When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think 
the following methods are for improving relations? 
22. showing forgiveness     not between states 
23. economic aid/assistance     very 
24. economic cooperation     important 
25. establishing channels of communication    yes, talking is important 
26. formal agreements or treaties   yeah, normal 
27. gestures of solidarity    (request definition)  not really   
28. joint institutions/cooperation   (request definition)  maybe, but not really 
29. joint projects/ reconstruction     not useful 
30. military signaling     not really 
31. official state visits     no 
32. political cooperation     yes 
33. security cooperation      okay 
34. apologies       no 
35. international tribunals        yes 
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness   sometimes 
37. restitution/reparations     maybe 
38. third party intervention    maybe 
39. truth commissions   (request definition) no 
40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no 
41. granting amnesty  no, counterproductive 
42. exchange of representatives   no 
43. face-to-face encounters    useless 
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44. films/documentaries     a waste  
45. good governance and accountability   inside a country, not between 
46. joint or hybrid tribunals       (request definition)   no 
47. joint memorials or ceremonies     definitely not  
48. legislative admission of wrongdoing    definitely not  
49. opening archives and records    (request definition) useless 
50. peace education   (request definition)  no, not for interstate 
51. regular joint meetings   maybe 
52. (re)writing history  (request definition) no 
53. special courts    no 
54. theater and storytelling   of course not  
55. traditional methods    (request definition) no 
56. travel/tourism     good for economy and awareness 
57. workshops/dialogue     (request definition) maybe 
58. positive media coverage   might help 
59. criminal trials  in some cases could be important   (NOTE: recommends a likert scale for 
 section) 
How important do you think these are to conflict resolution? 
60. Honor     perhaps 
61. dignity   sure 
62. respect   very 
63. satisfaction of interests   when possible 
64. satisfaction of the needs    when possible 
65. mutual benefit      yes, it would help 
66. justice       important 
67. truth      important 
68. accountability    important     (NOTE: likert scale) 
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Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer 
the following questions. 
69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? Maybe, but 
I am not sure 
70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens?   No 
71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed?  --- 
72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens?   I don't think so. 
73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed?  ----- 
74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you?    Not at all 
75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government?   Pretty important 
76. … are to Iraqi citizens?    Under occupation, important 
77. … are to the U.S. Government?   very—why else are we there 
78. … are to U.S. citizens?    Not at all 
79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states?  Would be nice, but 
 unrealistic 
80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations?   Of course 
81. Do you think that it is necessary for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations?     Yes 
82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence?  maybe 
83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence?      I think it is. 
Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving 
U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?  
84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing?     Maybe 
85. maintaining economic relations?   Not really  
86. maintaining political relations?  yes 
87. establishing channels of communication   yes 
88. formal agreements or treaties   No, it's just paper. 
89. gestures of solidarity   no 
90. joint institutions/cooperation   no 
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91. joint projects/ reconstruction    maybe, who pays? Not the US 
92. military signaling   no 
93. official state visits    maybe-but that is just meetings, not change much 
94. political cooperation    yes 
95. security cooperation     yes 
96. apologies      no 
97. showing forgiveness      no 
98. international tribunals       No, but many states would want this. 
99. promote religious and cultural awareness     maybe would be useful 
100. restitution/reparations  Guess Iraq would want, not sure I would want to pay. 
101. third party intervention     maybe 
102. truth commissions     might be useful 
103. archiving testimonies    no 
104. granting amnesty   no, seems unfair 
105. exchange of representatives      no 
106. face-to-face encounters    no, useless 
107. films/documentaries    useless 
108. good governance and accountability    useless 
109. joint or hybrid tribunals    no, but others might want 
110. joint memorials or ceremonies     no thanks 
111. legislative admission of wrongdoing   no, congress agreed to go there 
112. opening archives and records    can't image that happening 
113. peace education      no 
114. regular joint meetings     no 
115. (re)writing history     to say what, no 
116. special courts      no, too many references to courts (wants to know if I think wrongdoing was 
 committed, the question seems biased) 
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117. theater and storytelling     no 
118. traditional methods    no 
119. travel/tourism      no 
120. workshops/dialogue     no 
121. positive media coverage      sure 
122. criminal trials     no, there it is again   (LIKERT) 
123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration 
 when drafting its Middle East policy? They probably should, but the government doesn't ask 
 me. So no. 
124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Sure, definitely not war 
125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not at all 
126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration?  yes 
127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations?   In an ideal world--definitely 
128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War?  Should help 
129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.?  I don't know, maybe 
130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?  No, what would 
 they  determine...what would it matter. It is done. 
131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? No, they were involved. 
Notes: consider giving selection of answers to reduce time needed to complete. 
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Pilot Questions                Pilot Number 2  Date:  Sept. 16, 2010 
Location: Researcher's flat 
I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and 
countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think 
about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel 
free to ask questions at any time. 
1. What is your nationality?  USA 
2. Gender:   female       
3. Age:    20 
4. Level of education:  high school 
5. Ethnicity: white 
6. Religion: Catholic  
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend?   yes 
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday 
 life?      It is. We should be kind to others. 
9. Are conflicts normal?    Yes, unfortunately. 
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent?  No, I fight with my sister but we aren't violent.. 
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive?  It is both. Depends on 
 perspective. 
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative 
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved?    If you work at it, yes.. 
14. Should a conflict be solved?   Yes. 
15. Can a conflict be prevented?    Probably, if you try. 
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits?    Yes. Compromise. 
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states?    Yes 
 and no. Broadly sense they share similarities...disagree, want something, sometimes are violent. 
18. Do you think that it is possible for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Of course. 
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence?   Yes. 
20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution?    I suppose it might help. 
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21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation?   maybe. 
When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the 
following methods are for improving relations? 
22. showing forgiveness     kind of important 
23. economic aid/assistance     important 
24. economic cooperation     important 
25. establishing channels of communication    very important 
26. formal agreements or treaties   important 
27. gestures of solidarity    (request definition) maybe, not sure 
28. joint institutions/cooperation   (request definition)  perhaps 
29. joint projects/ reconstruction   sometimes important 
30. military signaling      (request definition) yes 
31. official state visits    maybe 
32. political cooperation     yes 
33. security cooperation      maybe 
34. apologies      maybe, but is it real 
35. international tribunals        maybe 
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness   yes—could be 
37. restitution/reparations    sometimes 
38. third party intervention    maybe 
39. truth commissions   maybe 
40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no 
41. granting amnesty  could be, but not sure...make others angry 
42. exchange of representatives   maybe 
43. face-to-face encounters    not a priority 
44. films/documentaries     not a priority  
45. good governance and accountability   maybe 
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46. joint or hybrid tribunals       (request definition)   perhaps 
47. joint memorials or ceremonies     not a priority  
48. legislative admission of wrongdoing    no  
49. opening archives and records    (request definition) no 
50. peace education   (request definition)  not a priority 
51. regular joint meetings   not sure, maybe 
52. (re)writing history  (request definition) not the most important 
53. special courts    could be 
54. theater and storytelling   (request definition) not a priority 
55. traditional methods    (request definition) not a priority 
56. travel/tourism     not a priority 
57. workshops/dialogue     (request definition) could be useful 
58. positive media coverage   this might be useful 
59. criminal trials  may be needed  (NOTE: recommends scale and definitions) 
How important do you think these are to conflict resolution? 
60. honor     very 
61. dignity   very 
62. respect   very 
63. satisfaction of interests   very 
64. satisfaction of the needs    very 
65. mutual benefit      very 
66. justice       if possible 
67. truth     important 
68. accountability    important when possible     (NOTE: recommends a rating scale) 
Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer 
the following questions. 
69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? Yes 
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70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens?   No 
71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed?  --- 
72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens?   No. 
73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed?  ----- 
74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you?    Kind of important, we are at war 
75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government?   Very important 
76. . … are to Iraqi citizens?    Very important 
77. . … are to the U.S. Government?   Very. Sadly, not sure reason is positive. Oil. 
78. . … are to U.S. citizens?    Probably not important 
79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states?  Yes 
80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations?   Yes, definitely 
81. Do you think that it is necessary for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations?  Yes 
82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence?  Yes 
83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence?  Yes 
Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving 
U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?  
84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing?    sure 
85. maintaining economic relations?   yes 
86. maintaining political relations?  yes 
87. establishing channels of communication   yes, helps to talk 
88. formal agreements or treaties   maybe 
89. gestures of solidarity   no 
90. joint institutions/cooperation   maybe 
91. joint projects/ reconstruction    probably, but not sure 
92. military signaling   maybe 
93. official state visits    sure 
94. political cooperation    yes 
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95. security cooperation     yes 
96. apologies      maybe 
97. showing forgiveness      maybe but that is a long way off 
98. international tribunals       maybe 
99. promote religious and cultural awareness     sure 
100. restitution/reparations  maybe 
101. third party intervention     maybe 
102. truth commissions     maybe 
103. archiving testimonies    no 
104. granting amnesty   no 
105. exchange of representatives      no 
106. face-to-face encounters    no 
107. films/documentaries    no-entertainment 
108. good governance and accountability    not in this case 
109. joint or hybrid tribunals    no 
110. joint memorials or ceremonies     no 
111. legislative admission of wrongdoing   no 
112. opening archives and records    not useful 
113. peace education      don't think so, but maybe in the future 
114. regular joint meetings     no 
115. (re)writing history     no 
116. special courts      no 
117. theater and storytelling     no 
118. traditional methods    no, don't know enough about it 
119. travel/tourism      no 
120. workshops/dialogue     no 
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121. positive media coverage      yes 
122. criminal trials     maybe     (recommends a scale so pilot can rank, too many methods.) 
123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration 
 when drafting its Middle East policy? Yes 
124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Yes 
125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not very. We could 
 live together without forgiving. Idealistic. 
126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration?  The 
 government should consider public opinion...guess polling does influence some. 
127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations?   That would be great. But also the 
 government can't always ask the people everything. It's difficult. 
128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War?  Yes, we should contribute. 
129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.?  Of course not! 
130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?  Maybe, but it 
 doesn't change anything. 
131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? Yes. It should be looked 
 into. 
Notes: Pilot emphasizes there are too many methods. Suggests that by eliminating less-recognizable 
methods, the length of the survey would be reduced as well. Open questions drags the survey process 
out too long.  
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Pilot Questions                Pilot Number:  3  Date:  Sept. 16, 2010 
Location: UIBK library 
I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and 
countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think 
about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel 
free to ask questions at any time. 
1. What is your nationality?  USA 
2. Gender:   female       
3. Age:    24 
4. Level of education:  high school 
5. Ethnicity: white 
6. Religion: Protestant  
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend?   yes 
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday 
 life?      Important 
9. Are conflicts normal?    Yes. 
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent?  No, not always. 
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive?  Negative I think. 
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative 
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved?    No, probably not. 
14. Should a conflict be solved?   When possible. 
15. Can a conflict be prevented?    Sometimes yes. 
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits?    Maybe, but not often. 
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states?    In 
 some respects...two parties are at odds and looking out for their interests. 
18. Do you think that it is possible for two states to resolve a conflict after violence?   Yes 
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence?   Yes. 
20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution?    Maybe, but it can cause problems too. 
21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation?   perhaps 
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When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the 
following methods are for improving relations? 
22. showing forgiveness     not so much – anyway, how would it work? 
23. economic aid/assistance     somewhat important 
24. economic cooperation     somewhat important 
25. establishing channels of communication    sure important 
26. formal agreements or treaties   can be, but can be broken too 
27. gestures of solidarity    (request definition)   no, just a show 
28. joint institutions/cooperation   (request definition)  no, not really 
29. joint projects/ reconstruction  could be useful, but not most important 
30. military signaling      (request definition) no 
31. official state visits    no 
32. political cooperation     maybe 
33. security cooperation      no 
34. apologies      maybe 
35. international tribunals        sometimes 
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness   maybe 
37. restitution/reparations    maybe 
38. third party intervention    sometimes 
39. truth commissions   (request definition)  not so much 
40. archiving testimonies (request definition) not at all 
41. granting amnesty  no 
42. exchange of representatives   not important 
43. face-to-face encounters    not important 
44. films/documentaries     not important  
45. good governance and accountability   no 
46. joint or hybrid tribunals       (request definition)   no 
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47. joint memorials or ceremonies     (request definition) not at all important 
48. legislative admission of wrongdoing    no  
49. opening archives and records    (request definition) no 
50. peace education   (request definition)  no 
51. regular joint meetings   no 
52. (re)writing history  (request definition) no 
53. special courts    no 
54. theater and storytelling   (request definition)   no, is this a method? 
55. traditional methods    (request definition)     no, too complicated 
56. travel/tourism     no 
57. workshops/dialogue     (request definition) maybe 
58. positive media coverage   sure 
59. criminal trials  no  (NOTE: requests a scale, definitions, less methods) 
How important do you think these are to conflict resolution? 
60. honor    not so important 
61. dignity   important 
62. respect   important 
63. satisfaction of interests   if you can  
64. satisfaction of the needs    if possible 
65. mutual benefit      whenever possible 
66. justice       important 
67. truth     sort of important 
68. accountability    if you can      (NOTE: recommends a rating scale with positive and negative 
 range) 
Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer 
the following questions. 
69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? Yes 
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70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens?   Not personally 
71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed?  --- 
72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens?   Sort of. 
73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed?  I feel sorry for them. 
74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you?    Not at all. 
75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government?   Really 
76. . … are to Iraqi citizens?    Maybe 
77. . … are to the U.S. Government?   Important, they went to war. 
78. . … are to U.S. citizens?    Not important. 
79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states?  I wish. 
80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations?   Yes 
81. Do you think that it is necessary for the Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations?  Yes 
82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence?  Yes 
83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence?  Yes 
Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving 
U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?  
84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing?    maybe 
85. maintaining economic relations?   yes 
86. maintaining political relations?  yes 
87. establishing channels of communication   yes 
88. formal agreements or treaties   no 
89. gestures of solidarity   no 
90. joint institutions/cooperation   maybe 
91. joint projects/ reconstruction    yes 
92. military signaling   no 
93. official state visits    no 
94. political cooperation    yes 
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95. security cooperation     no 
96. apologies      no 
97. showing forgiveness      no 
98. international tribunals       maybe 
99. promote religious and cultural awareness    no 
100. restitution/reparations  maybe not  
101. third party intervention     maybe 
102. truth commissions     perhaps 
103. archiving testimonies    not at all 
104. granting amnesty   no at all 
105. exchange of representatives      no 
106. face-to-face encounters    no 
107. films/documentaries    no 
108. good governance and accountability    no 
109. joint or hybrid tribunals    no 
110. joint memorials or ceremonies     no 
111. legislative admission of wrongdoing   no 
112. opening archives and records    no 
113. peace education      no 
114. regular joint meetings     no 
115. (re)writing history     no 
116. special courts      no   (politely suggests questions of this nature might cause US respondents to 
 stop) 
117. theater and storytelling     no 
118. traditional methods    no 
119. travel/tourism      no 
120. workshops/dialogue     no 
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121. positive media coverage     maybe 
122. criminal trials        no  (complains about length, wants a scale-warns about offending US with 
 certain methods that implies wrongdoing) 
123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration 
 when drafting its Middle East policy? To some degree 
124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Sure 
125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not at all. 
126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration?  Yes. 
127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations?   Not really feasible. 
128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War?  Maybe. 
129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.?  Why? No. 
130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?  Maybe. 
131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? Yes. 
Notes: lots of methods, many of which are not very well known. Requests a reduction in these. 
Providing a scales is recommended to make survey taking faster. 
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Pilot Questions                Pilot Number:  4  Date:  Sept. 20, 2010 
Location: Researcher's flat 
I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and 
countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think 
about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel 
free to ask questions at any time. 
1. What is your nationality?  USA 
2. Gender:   male       
3. Age:    31 
4. Level of education:  high school 
5. Ethnicity: white 
6. Religion: none   
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend?   sometimes 
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday 
 life?      Not so important, they are strangers. 
9. Are conflicts normal?    I suppose so, 
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent?  No. 
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive?  Either, depends on the type. 
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative 
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved?    No.  
14. Should a conflict be solved?   Sure, if that is a possibility. 
15. Can a conflict be prevented?    On occasion. I suppose. 
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits?    Sure. Change. An oppressed group 
 could win control or get what they want. 
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? 
 Vaguely yes...they share characteristics such as opposition, needs, etc., but its more complex 
 between states. More people involved. 
18. Do you think that it is possible for two states to resolve a conflict after violence?   Yes 
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence?   Yes. Whenever possible. 
20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution?    No. 
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21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation?  doubtful 
When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the 
following methods are for improving relations? 
22. showing forgiveness     not at all 
23. economic aid/assistance     could be important 
24. economic cooperation     could be important, sort of like the earlier question  
25. establishing channels of communication    important 
26. formal agreements or treaties   maybe 
27. gestures of solidarity    (request definition)   no, waste of time 
28. joint institutions/cooperation   (request definition)  no 
29. joint projects/ reconstruction  no 
30. military signaling      (request definition) only in war 
31. official state visits    no 
32. political cooperation     no 
33. security cooperation      no 
34. apologies      no 
35. international tribunals        no 
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness   no 
37. restitution/reparations    no 
38. third party intervention    yes – happens all the time 
39. truth commissions   (request definition)  no 
40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no, what a joke 
41. granting amnesty  no – might make others angry 
42. exchange of representatives   no 
43. face-to-face encounters    no 
44. films/documentaries    no 
45. good governance and accountability   no 
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46. joint or hybrid tribunals       (request definition)   no 
47. joint memorials or ceremonies     (request definition) no 
48. legislative admission of wrongdoing    no  
49. opening archives and records    (request definition) no 
50. peace education   (request definition)  no 
51. regular joint meetings   no 
52. (re)writing history  (request definition) no 
53. special courts    (request definition) no 
54. theater and storytelling   (request definition)   no 
55. traditional methods    (request definition)     no 
56. travel/tourism     no 
57. workshops/dialogue     (request definition) no 
58. positive media coverage   maybe 
59. criminal trials  no  (NOTE: too many complicated ideas) 
How important do you think these are to conflict resolution? 
60. honor    sort of 
61. dignity   a bit 
62. respect   a bit 
63. satisfaction of interests   important 
64. satisfaction of the needs    important 
65. mutual benefit      ideally should be a goal 
66. justice       probably 
67. truth     probably 
68. accountability    linked with justice      (NOTE: wants a scale) 
Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer 
the following questions. 
69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it?  Maybe 
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70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens?   No, don't know anyone 
 there 
71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed?  --- 
72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens?   no 
73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed?  --- 
74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you?    Kind of important, we are at war 
75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government?   Very - 
 occupation 
76. . … are to Iraqi citizens?    Very - occupation 
77. . … are to the U.S. Government?   Very – at war 
78. . … are to U.S. citizens?    Not so much. 
79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states?  Not really. Too many 
 people. 
80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations?   Sure, why not? 
81. Do you think that it is necessary for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations?  Yes 
82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence?  Ideally yes. 
83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence?  Sure 
Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving 
U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?  
84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing?    no 
85. maintaining economic relations?   maybe 
86. maintaining political relations?  maybe 
87. establishing channels of communication   maybe 
88. formal agreements or treaties   maybe 
89. gestures of solidarity   no 
90. joint institutions/cooperation   no 
91. joint projects/ reconstruction    maybe 
92. military signaling   no 
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93. official state visits    no 
94. political cooperation    maybe 
95. security cooperation     maybe, the region is important to the U.S. 
96. apologies      no 
97. showing forgiveness      no 
98. international tribunals       no 
99. promote religious and cultural awareness    no 
100. restitution/reparations     no, we are reconstructing the country 
101. third party intervention     not really 
102. truth commissions     no 
103. archiving testimonies    no, not very helpful 
104. granting amnesty   no 
105. exchange of representatives      no, not helpful 
106. face-to-face encounters    no 
107. films/documentaries    no 
108. good governance and accountability    no 
109. joint or hybrid tribunals    no  (assumes wrongdoing, wont win US friends with line of 
 questioning) 
110. joint memorials or ceremonies     no 
111. legislative admission of wrongdoing   no 
112. opening archives and records    no 
113. peace education      no 
114. regular joint meetings     no 
115. (re)writing history     no 
116. special courts      no 
117. theater and storytelling     no 
118. traditional methods    no 
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119. travel/tourism      no 
120. workshops/dialogue     no 
121. positive media coverage     maybe 
122. criminal trials    no     (recommends deleting some of the references to trials, adding a scale, too 
 long) 
123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration 
 when drafting its Middle East policy?  No 
124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Of course. 
125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not important. 
126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration?  Yes. 
127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations?   No. Impossible. 
128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War?  No. 
129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.?  No. 
130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?  No. 
131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? No. 
Notes: too long, lots of methods. Thinks scales would be more useful as opposed to open questions. 
Insistent that reference to trials could be misunderstood as implying wrongdoing had been committed 
by the US. 
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Pilot Questions                Pilot Number:  5  Date:  Sept. 30, 2010 
Location: Researcher's flat 
I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and 
countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think 
about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel 
free to ask questions at any time. 
1. What is your nationality?  USA 
2. Gender:   male       
3. Age:    44 
4. Level of education:  bachelor 
5. Ethnicity: white 
6. Religion: Christian    
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend?   yes 
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday 
 life?      Not important 
9. Are conflicts normal?    Of course. 
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent?  No, they can be nonviolent. 
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive?  Both possible. 
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? 
 Negative. It injures people and destroys things. 
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved?    No. Some not. Parties may not want to.  
14. Should a conflict be solved?   Of course it should. 
15. Can a conflict be prevented?    I don't think that all can. Some. If you can see things moving in 
 that direction. Maybe it can be headed off.. 
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits?    Yes.. An argument with my wife 
 produced a positive outcome...personal. 
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? Yes 
 and no. Same basic interaction, but the magnitude is bigger with states.. 
18. Do you think that it is possible for two states to resolve a conflict after violence?   Yes. 
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence?   When that is an option.. 
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20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution?    Sometimes. Depends on the conflict 
 and parties. 
21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation?  (request 
 definition) Not very likely. People get angry and hurt. 
When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the 
following methods are for improving relations? 
22. showing forgiveness     not important 
23. economic aid/assistance    sometimes important 
24. economic cooperation     sometimes important  
25. establishing channels of communication    important 
26. formal agreements or treaties   sometimes important 
27. gestures of solidarity    (request definition)   no importance at all 
28. joint institutions/cooperation   (request definition)  could be important 
29. joint projects/ reconstruction  could be important - constructive 
30. military signaling      (request definition) perhaps, shows a change  
31. official state visits    maybe 
32. political cooperation     maybe 
33. security cooperation      maybe 
34. apologies      could be, but they are only words 
35. international tribunals        no, punishing more people might prolong 
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness   might be if the conflict is based on these issues 
37. restitution/reparations    no, punishment 
38. third party intervention   Maybe, happens often between states 
39. truth commissions   (request definition)  maybe 
40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no – not sure this meets immediate needs 
41. granting amnesty  no – it's the same problem as trials 
42. exchange of representatives   no 
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43. face-to-face encounters    (request definition)    no- that would take time and would need to 
 include lots of people.  
44. films/documentaries    no 
45. good governance and accountability   no 
46. joint or hybrid tribunals       (request definition)   no 
47. joint memorials or ceremonies     (request definition) no – you see this sometimes-like 
 Germany attending D-day ceremonies in France. 
48. legislative admission of wrongdoing    (request definition)    no  
49. opening archives and records    (request definition)    no 
50. peace education   (request definition)  Not really, takes a long time and lots of people. 
51. regular joint meetings   (request definition) no 
52. (re)writing history  (request definition) no 
53. special courts    (request definition) no 
54. theater and storytelling   (request definition)   No, definitely not. Entertainment. 
55. traditional methods    (request definition)     No, complicates an already complicated situation. 
56. travel/tourism     No, most people wouldn't travel to their rival's country anyway. 
57. workshops/dialogue    (request definition) No. Again need too many people and too much time. 
58. positive media coverage   It would help, but in the U.S., its more about advertising. 
59. criminal trials  No, punishment wont be accepted by everyone.  (NOTE: too many items, need 
 definitions) 
How important do you think these are to conflict resolution? 
60. honor    somewhat 
61. dignity   somewhat 
62. respect   important 
63. satisfaction of interests   very important, but sometimes idealistic. 
64. satisfaction of the needs   very important, also idealistic. 
65. mutual benefit      important, idealistic 
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66. justice       important 
67. truth     Important, but what is truth? No doubt both sides in WWII held different truths about 
 the what happened and why. 
68. accountability    Important, but you need the truth. 
Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer 
the following questions. 
69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it?  I think 
 so. Something needs to be done. 
70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens?   Not really. 
71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed?  Seem a bit 
 aggressive. 
72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens?   No 
73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed?  --- 
74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you?    Not so important. 
75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government?   Very important 
–  whether they want it or not. We are there at war. 
76. . … are to Iraqi citizens?    Very – the U.S. is everywhere they look. 
77. . … are to the U.S. Government?   Must be important, they have sent troops. 
78. . … are to U.S. citizens?    Not important at all. Iraq is a long way off. 
79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states?  Maybe. But how much 
 do I know and how would I share this opinion with government? 
80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations?   Of course. 
 Shouldn't keep fighting. But don't have to be best friends. 
81. Do you think that it is necessary for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations?  Yes 
82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence?  To stop the conflict, yes. To be best of 
 friends--rarely. 
83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence?  Yes, I think so. 
Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving 
U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?  
84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing?    no 
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85. maintaining economic relations?   Maybe. Guess we need the oil. 
86. maintaining political relations?  Why not. 
87. establishing channels of communication   yes, but related to above 
88. formal agreements or treaties   no 
89. gestures of solidarity   no – in my opinion 
90. joint institutions/cooperation   maybe 
91. joint projects/ reconstruction    maybe 
92. military signaling   no 
93. official state visits    no – not so important 
94. political cooperation    maybe 
95. security cooperation     maybe 
96. apologies      no 
97. showing forgiveness      no – with people, not with states 
98. international tribunals       no 
99. promote religious and cultural awareness    no – long-term maybe 
100. restitution/reparations     no, we are spending billions at the moment 
101. third party intervention     no 
102. truth commissions     from Iraq's standpoint, yes 
103. archiving testimonies    waste of time 
104. granting amnesty    a sore spot- no 
105. exchange of representatives      no, sounds like item earlier (political cooperation) 
106. face-to-face encounters    no 
107. films/documentaries    no, no, no 
108. good governance and accountability    not really-matters more internally than between 
109. joint or hybrid tribunals    no  
110. joint memorials or ceremonies     not at all 
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111. legislative admission of wrongdoing   no 
112. opening archives and records    waste 
113. peace education      no 
114. regular joint meetings     no – again like above 
115. (re)writing history     no 
116. special courts      no – warns to be careful of adding such questions, the survey appears biased 
117. theater and storytelling     no 
118. traditional methods    no 
119. travel/tourism      no 
120. workshops/dialogue     no 
121. positive media coverage     Perhaps, both sides might benefit 
122. criminal trials    no     (NOTE: wants a scale, too many items, methods are similar) 
123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration 
 when drafting its Middle East policy?  Maybe, but what about my opinion? I should be 
 prioritized. Same in Iraq—do you think Iraq's government should phone me up to make its 
 decisions? 
124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Absolutely. 
125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not even a little. 
126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration?  Yes. Why 
 not. I could set the rules and say when and when not. 
127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations?   In a perfect world, yes. 
128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War?  No. We're spending a lot as it is. 
129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.?  No. They didn't start the war. 
130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?  No. What would it 
 determine? 
131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war?  Maybe. We should know 
 more. 
Notes: too long, lots of methods, lots of repeat. Recommends scales, removing open questions, 
condensing the survey. 
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Pilot Questions                Pilot Number:  6  Date:  Sept. 30, 2010 
Location: Researcher's flat 
I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and 
countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think 
about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel 
free to ask questions at any time. 
1. What is your nationality?  USA 
2. Gender:   male       
3. Age:    32 
4. Level of education:  bachelor 
5. Ethnicity: white 
6. Religion:   Christian    
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend?   yes 
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday 
 life?      Not at all. I should respect, but not be friendly with people I don't know. 
9. Are conflicts normal?    Yes. 
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent?  No. 
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive?  Either. Both exist. 
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? 
 Negative. Causes problems, destroys things. People suffer. 
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved?    No. Idealistic.  
14. Should a conflict be solved?   Whenever there is that possibility, yes. 
15. Can a conflict be prevented?    Sometimes. Depends on issues and those involved. 
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits?    Sure. Student protests in the 1970s. 
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? In 
 some cases, yes. People are involved, disputing something, causing problems. 
18. Do you think that it is possible for two states to resolve a conflict after violence?   Yes. 
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence?   Whenever possible. 
20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution?    My personal opinion, no. Causes 
 enough problems. 
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21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation?  Unlikely. 
 Takes lots of time and work. 
When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the 
following methods are for improving relations? 
22. showing forgiveness     not at all 
23. economic aid/assistance    somewhat 
24. economic cooperation     somewhat 
25. establishing channels of communication    somewhat 
26. formal agreements or treaties   unlikely – these are subject to being broken 
27. gestures of solidarity    (request definition)   unimportant 
28. joint institutions/cooperation   (request definition) somewhat, but no 
29. joint projects/ reconstruction  somewhat, but no 
30. military signaling      (request definition) unimportant  
31. official state visits    doubtful 
32. political cooperation     somewhat-thought we had that earlier 
33. security cooperation      sometimes, in some cases 
34. apologies      no 
35. international tribunals        maybe 
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness   perhaps  
37. restitution/reparations    one side might want that, but the other side not 
38. third party intervention   sometimes  
39. truth commissions   (request definition)  maybe 
40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no, don't think so 
41. granting amnesty  no – linked to trials 
42. exchange of representatives   no - repeat 
43. face-to-face encounters    (request definition) no – everyone can't meet, you already asked if the 
 politicians should meet 
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44. films/documentaries    not at all – few people would probably find it entertaining or interesting. 
45. good governance and accountability   not really 
46. joint or hybrid tribunals       (request definition)   no - punishment 
47. joint memorials or ceremonies     (request definition) no – usually officials meeting, so same as 
 above 
48. legislative admission of wrongdoing    (request definition)     no  
49. opening archives and records    (request definition)      no 
50. peace education   (request definition)    no 
51. regular joint meetings   (request definition)     no – lots of government interaction (repeat idea) 
52. (re)writing history  (request definition)   no 
53. special courts    (request definition)    no 
54. theater and storytelling   (request definition)   no. 
55. traditional methods    (request definition)     no. 
56. travel/tourism     No. Who would visit their enemy? 
57. workshops/dialogue   (request definition)  No.  Usually officials go to these. 
58. positive media coverage   Maybe. 
59. criminal trials  No, punishment wont be accepted by everyone.  (NOTE: reduce and consolidate 
 items. Do this by taking out the least recognizable items and stop the repetition.) 
How important do you think these are to conflict resolution? 
60. honor    sometimes 
61. dignity   sometimes  
62. respect   sure, important 
63. satisfaction of interests   important, everyone is happy. 
64. satisfaction of the needs   important, still everyone happy. 
65. mutual benefit      important, everyone is happy. 
66. justice       important 
67. truth     Important, people often want to know what happened. 
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68. accountability    important 
Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer 
the following questions. 
69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it?  Yes 
70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens?   No. 
71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed?  ---- 
72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens?   No, I don't think. 
73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed?  --- 
74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you?    Not a priority. 
75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government?   Very important. 
 Here we are. 
76. . … are to Iraqi citizens?    Very – the military is breaking down their doors and patrolling 
 streets. 
77. . … are to the U.S. Government?   Important, they've committed to the Iraq war. 
78. . … are to U.S. citizens?    Not important. Unless they know someone in Iraq, then maybe. 
79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states?  Would be nice. 
80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations?   Yes. Without 
 doubt. 
81. Do you think that it is necessary for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations?  Yes 
82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence?  Maybe, depends on the states and their 
 problems, desire. 
83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence?  Sure, anything is possible. 
Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving 
U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?  
84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing?    no 
85. maintaining economic relations?   yes 
86. maintaining political relations?  yes 
87. establishing channels of communication   yes, repeat 
88. formal agreements or treaties   yes, but linked to cooperation...the rules of that cooperation 
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89. gestures of solidarity   no  
90. joint institutions/cooperation   perhaps 
91. joint projects/ reconstruction    yes, we are doing it anyway 
92. military signaling   no 
93. official state visits    not really  
94. political cooperation    sure - repeat 
95. security cooperation     maybe 
96. apologies      no 
97. showing forgiveness      No, how would that function? 
98. international tribunals       maybe, for the sake of Iraq 
99. promote religious and cultural awareness    might be useful  
100. restitution/reparations     maybe, for the sake of Iraq 
101. third party intervention     yes, it happens, sometimes works 
102. truth commissions     maybe 
103. archiving testimonies    no 
104. granting amnesty   No, don't U.S. troops already have amnesty? 
105. exchange of representatives      Yes, but a repeat. 
106. face-to-face encounters    no 
107. films/documentaries    no 
108. good governance and accountability    no 
109. joint or hybrid tribunals   maybe, trials has been said 
110. joint memorials or ceremonies     no 
111. legislative admission of wrongdoing   no 
112. opening archives and records    no 
113. peace education      not so important in my opinion 
114. regular joint meetings     no – you have said that 
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115. (re)writing history     no 
116. special courts      no - repeat 
117. theater and storytelling     no – sort of like films 
118. traditional methods    no 
119. travel/tourism      no 
120. workshops/dialogue     no 
121. positive media coverage     Sure. I can see FOX news doing that. (laugh) 
122. criminal trials    maybe-repeat     (NOTE: too many repeating ideas, too long) 
123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration 
 when drafting its Middle East policy?  They would not doubt appreciate that. 
124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Yes. 
125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not important. 
126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration?  Yes. 
127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations?   As much as possible. People should 
 have a say. 
128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War?  No. 
129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.?  No. No one should pay. 
130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?  No.  
131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war?  Yes, it would have a better 
 chance of determining facts than an Iraqi...due to proximity. 
Notes: too long. Reduce size by eliminating unknown methods and create one category for those that 
seemingly repeat. Wants scales not open questions. 
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Pilot Questions                Pilot Number:  7  Date:  Oct. 2, 2010 
Location: Respondent's apartment 
I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and 
countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think 
about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel 
free to ask questions at any time. 
1. What is your nationality?  USA 
2. Gender:   female 
3. Age:    19 
4. Level of education:  high school 
5. Ethnicity: white 
6. Religion: Catholic  
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend?   yes 
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday 
 life?      Yes, I think so. I try to treat others nicely. 
9. Are conflicts normal?    Yes. A sad reality. 
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent?  No. Of course not. 
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive?  Both. Depends on how it is 
 expressed. 
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? 
 Negative. It huts people. 
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved?    Maybe. It would be nice.  
14. Should a conflict be solved?   Yes. It should not be let to continue. 
15. Can a conflict be prevented?    In some instances. If you can see it forming. 
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits?    I guess so. 
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? I 
 suppose they are similar. 
18. Do you think that it is possible for two states to resolve a conflict after violence?   Yes. 
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence?   Yes 
20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution?    I think so. 
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21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation?  Ideally it 
 should. But that is not always possible. 
When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the 
following methods are for improving relations? 
22. showing forgiveness     maybe a little 
23. economic aid/assistance    a bit 
24. economic cooperation     a bit 
25. establishing channels of communication    important 
26. formal agreements or treaties   maybe  
27. gestures of solidarity    (request definition)   maybe  
28. joint institutions/cooperation   (request definition)   important 
29. joint projects/ reconstruction  might be important 
30. military signaling      (request definition)  important if a military conflict 
31. official state visits    maybe  
32. political cooperation     somewhat  
33. security cooperation      could be 
34. apologies      sometimes  
35. international tribunals        somewhat  
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness   in some instances  
37. restitution/reparations    sometimes, in certain cases – human rights violation or abuse 
38. third party intervention   it is commonly used 
39. truth commissions   (request definition)  sometimes  
40. archiving testimonies (request definition)  no value 
41. granting amnesty   perhaps, but could easily cause more problems 
42. exchange of representatives  (request definition) somewhat  
43. face-to-face encounters    (request definition) not so important 
44. films/documentaries    not so important 
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45. good governance and accountability   sometimes  
46. joint or hybrid tribunals       (request definition)   no 
47. joint memorials or ceremonies     (request definition)     no 
48. legislative admission of wrongdoing    (request definition)     no  
49. opening archives and records    (request definition)      no 
50. peace education   (request definition)    no 
51. regular joint meetings   (request definition)     no 
52. (re)writing history  (request definition)   no 
53. special courts    (request definition)    no 
54. theater and storytelling   (request definition)   No. Is this really used? 
55. traditional methods    (request definition)   no 
56. travel/tourism     no 
57. workshops/dialogue   (request definition)  perhaps 
58. positive media coverage   may be useful  
59. criminal trials  in some instances.  (NOTE: too long, some ideas repeat, ranking scale) 
How important do you think these are to conflict resolution? 
60. honor       important 
61. dignity     important  
62. respect      important 
63. satisfaction of interests     very important 
64. satisfaction of the needs   Very important, reduces reasons for dispute. 
65. mutual benefit      Important, whenever this is possible. 
66. justice       important 
67. truth       important 
68. accountability        important 
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Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer 
the following questions. 
69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it?   I would. 
70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens?   No. Not that I am 
 aware. 
71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed?  ---- 
72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens?   No, not at all. 
73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed?  --- 
74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you?    Honestly, not much. Embarrassing when I say 
 that out loud. 
75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government?   I am sure 
 important. 
76. . … are to Iraqi citizens?   With the U.S. there, important. Otherwise, I don't think so much. 
77. . … are to the U.S. Government?   Clearly important. We are there fighting a war. 
78. . … are to U.S. citizens?      Not important. 
79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states?    Yes. I mean I wish. 
80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations?   I do think this. 
81. Do you think that it is necessary for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations?   Absolutely 
82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence?  Maybe, depends on the states and their 
 problems, desire. 
83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence?  Yes, if they work at it and want 
 it. 
Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving 
U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?  
84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing?       maybe  
85. maintaining economic relations?        I think so. 
86. maintaining political relations?      I think so. 
87. establishing channels of communication       Yes, that is like political relations. 
88. formal agreements or treaties     sure 
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89. gestures of solidarity       not really   
90. joint institutions/cooperation      I think so. 
91. joint projects/ reconstruction       yes 
92. military signaling        maybe important 
93. official state visits          not a priority 
94. political cooperation          perhaps – I thought you said that earlier 
95. security cooperation       maybe 
96. apologies        maybe  
97. showing forgiveness       maybe  
98. international tribunals         maybe 
99. promote religious and cultural awareness      maybe   
100. restitution/reparations     I might. 
101. third party intervention      Perhaps I would. 
102. truth commissions       perhaps 
103. archiving testimonies    I do not see the value. 
104. granting amnesty        no 
105. exchange of representatives      that is cooperation, so maybe  
106. face-to-face encounters         I wouldn't, but those people should decide 
107. films/documentaries         No. No clear value to me. 
108. good governance and accountability         no 
109. joint or hybrid tribunals        Maybe. I thought you mentioned trials? 
110. joint memorials or ceremonies        no 
111. legislative admission of wrongdoing       no  (denotes assumes wrongdoing) 
112. opening archives and records          No. I sadly don't see its value. 
113. peace education        Nice idea, but no. 
114. regular joint meetings        perhaps – but haven't you have said that 
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115. (re)writing history         no 
116. special courts          no – I thought you also mentioned that (suggests this line of questioning 
 risks offending) 
117. theater and storytelling          no 
118. traditional methods      no 
119. travel/tourism      no 
120. workshops/dialogue       no 
121. positive media coverage     I think I would support this. 
122. criminal trials    maybe (repeat)    (NOTE: repeating ideas) 
123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration 
 when drafting its Middle East policy?  Sure, but how? Who will keep track and ask questions? 
124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq?    Yes. 
125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict?   At this level, I 
 suppose not important. 
126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration?    Yes. 
127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations?   Whenever possible people should be 
 heard. 
128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War?  Maybe. 
129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.?     Of course not. 
130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?    I don't think so..  
131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war?  Yes. More facts should be 
 made available. 
Notes: pilot sees repeat, length, and open questions a problem. Recommended rewording of some 
questions. Definitions of terms or practices requested. Do away with open-ended questions as this 
would speed up the process of completing. 
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Pilot Questions                Pilot Number:  8  Date:  Oct. 2, 2010 
Location:  UIBK library 
I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and 
countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think 
about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel 
free to ask questions at any time. 
1. What is your nationality?  USA 
2. Gender:   female 
3. Age:    26 
4. Level of education:  high school 
5. Ethnicity:    white 
6. Religion:   Christian    
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend?     It is. 
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday 
 life?      Somewhat important. This is not always possible. Can't please everyone. 
9. Are conflicts normal?      Yes 
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent?        No. A disagreement is a conflict. 
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive?    It can be either. It can  
          benefit or not. Help or hurt. 
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive?  
 Violence is never good...in my opinion. 
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved?    Probably. If people want to take the time.  
14. Should a conflict be solved?     I think it should. 
15. Can a conflict be prevented?       Sometimes, but not always. 
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits?      Sure. We can learn from them. 
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states?    In 
 some ways they are. Disagreement, violence, people...scale is different though. 
18. Do you think that it is possible for two states to resolve a conflict after violence?     Yes. 
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence?       Yes, I think it is more productive. 
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20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution?  When this is important to those 
 involved. 
21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation?   Honestly, 
 probably unlikely. Tensions are still likely. 
When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the 
following methods are for improving relations? 
22. showing forgiveness     could be 
23. economic aid/assistance        sure-  it is a way of showing you want to help 
24. economic cooperation        sure 
25. establishing channels of communication       talking is positive 
26. formal agreements or treaties      sometimes, when they are agreed  
27. gestures of solidarity    (request definition)   not really important 
28. joint institutions/cooperation   (request definition)    important 
29. joint projects/ reconstruction    in some instances, but like assistance said earlier 
30. military signaling      (request definition)   maybe reduces threat 
31. official state visits      not so much  
32. political cooperation        sometime, if possible 
33. security cooperation        sometimes, if possible 
34. apologies      maybe, but might not be accepted anyway, sounds good in principle 
35. international tribunals        sometimes might be useful   
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness      if this is an issue, maybe   
37. restitution/reparations       sometimes 
38. third party intervention     could be -  depends on parties involved 
39. truth commissions     (request definition)  maybe  
40. archiving testimonies      (request definition)  I don't think this is important 
41. granting amnesty     not so important 
42. exchange of representatives      (request definition) somewhat  
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43. face-to-face encounters      (request definition) not so important 
44. films/documentaries       unimportant 
45. good governance and accountability         no  
46. joint or hybrid tribunals     (request definition)   no 
47. joint memorials or ceremonies       (request definition)     no 
48. legislative admission of wrongdoing      (request definition)     no  
49. opening archives and records      (request definition)      no 
50. peace education     (request definition)    no 
51. regular joint meetings    (request definition)     no 
52. (re)writing history     (request definition)   no 
53. special courts      (request definition)    no 
54. theater and storytelling        (request definition)   No. Is this really used? 
55. traditional methods       (request definition)   no 
56. travel/tourism       no 
57. workshops/dialogue           (request definition)  perhaps 
58. positive media coverage      may be useful  
59. criminal trials     in some instances       ( NOTE: lengthy, repetitive, reduce size, definitions) 
How important do you think these are to conflict resolution? 
60. honor       important 
61. dignity     important  
62. respect      important 
63. satisfaction of interests     important 
64. satisfaction of the needs      important, 
65. mutual benefit      important 
66. justice       important 
67. truth       important 
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68. accountability        important 
Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer 
the following questions. 
69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it?   Yes 
70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens?   No. Not personally. 
71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed?  ---- 
72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens?   No. 
73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed?  --- 
74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you?    Not at all. 
75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government?   Very important. 
 The U.S. is a powerful and influential country. Look what we are doing. (Iraq) 
76. . … are to Iraqi citizens?  Somewhat. We have invaded. 
77. . … are to the U.S. Government?     Very important. We are at war. 
78. . … are to U.S. citizens?      Not really important. People are busy with their daily lives. Iraq is 
 distant to most of us. 
79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states?    Why not? 
80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations?   Sure. 
81. Do you think that it is necessary for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations?   I do. 
82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence?  If they wish for it and commit, yes. 
83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence?  Yes. Same as the states. 
Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving 
U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?  
84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing?       might  
85. maintaining economic relations?        maybe  
86. maintaining political relations?         maybe. 
87. establishing channels of communication         maybe  
88. formal agreements or treaties       maybe 
89. gestures of solidarity         I don't see it as so important  
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90. joint institutions/cooperation         maybe, we will see in the future 
91. joint projects/ reconstruction        we are doing reconstruction at the moment 
92. military signaling          for me, its unimportant 
93. official state visits         unimportant 
94. political cooperation          maybe  
95. security cooperation         maybe  (repeat?) 
96. apologies        perhaps 
97. showing forgiveness          not sure it works here  
98. international tribunals           maybe, complicated 
99. promote religious and cultural awareness         that might be useful   
100. restitution/reparations        not completely convinced 
101. third party intervention        maybe. 
102. truth commissions       maybe  
103. archiving testimonies      no 
104. granting amnesty        no 
105. exchange of representatives        maybe  
106. face-to-face encounters        no, only helps those involved 
107. films/documentaries           no 
108. good governance and accountability         no 
109. joint or hybrid tribunals         maybe 
110. joint memorials or ceremonies           no value 
111. legislative admission of wrongdoing       no 
112. opening archives and records       no 
113. peace education        don't think so 
114. regular joint meetings        maybe 
115. (re)writing history         not valuable in my opinion 
  
593 
 
116. special courts            maybe (does not like what this implies, repeat) 
117. theater and storytelling          not valuable 
118. traditional methods         No.  It sounds good, but just something else to disagree about. 
119. travel/tourism       no 
120. workshops/dialogue        no 
121. positive media coverage     useful 
122. criminal trials    maybe    (repeat)    (NOTE: recommends reducing linking items) 
123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration 
 when drafting its Middle East policy?    maybe  
124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq?    I would. 
125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict?   Probably not too 
 much. 
126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration?     Yes. 
127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations?     Ideally, yes. 
128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War?        perhaps 
129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.?     No. They have done nothing wrong. 
130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?    maybe  
131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war?  I would. Accountability. 
Notes: too long, repeats, definitions. Eliminate open questions for likert scales. 
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Pilot Questions                Pilot Number:  9  Date:  Oct. 2, 2010 
Location:  UIBK library 
I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and 
countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think 
about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel 
free to ask questions at any time. 
1. What is your nationality?  USA 
2. Gender:      male 
3. Age:      27 
4. Level of education:  high school 
5. Ethnicity:    white 
6. Religion:       none    
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend?     Most of the time. 
 Depends on how close we really are and what happened. 
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday 
 life?      Not so much. I don't know them, they don't know me. 
9. Are conflicts normal?     yes 
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent?      no 
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive?    Both. Sometimes it hurts, 
 sometimes it helps. My parents and I don't always agree, but it is not necessarily bad that we 
 don't. 
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive?  
 Negative in the sense that it hurts people. 
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved?     No. Unrealistic.   
14. Should a conflict be solved?       Whenever this can be done. 
15. Can a conflict be prevented?     In some instances. 
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits?      Sometimes. I've got what I wanted 
 sometimes. 
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states?   They 
 share thing...differences, people, and wants. 
18. Do you think that it is possible for two states to resolve a conflict after violence?      Yes. 
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19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence?      Yes,. 
20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution?     Not so important whether values are 
 religious or not. Even atheists have values. 
21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation?   Not so 
 much. 
When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the 
following methods are for improving relations? 
22. showing forgiveness     not 
23. economic aid/assistance        sort of 
24. economic cooperation          sort of 
25. establishing channels of communication       talking is positive 
26. formal agreements or treaties      maybe   
27. gestures of solidarity    (request definition)     no 
28. joint institutions/cooperation   (request definition)   no 
29. joint projects/ reconstruction      no  
30. military signaling      (request definition)     no 
31. official state visits         not really   
32. political cooperation         maybe  
33. security cooperation           maybe  
34. apologies        doubtful 
35. international tribunals         doubtful 
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness      no  
37. restitution/reparations         No. one side will want, the other side not. 
38. third party intervention         maybe  
39. truth commissions     (request definition)     maybe  
40. archiving testimonies      (request definition)     no 
41. granting amnesty        no 
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42. exchange of representatives    (request definition)     no 
43. face-to-face encounters     (request definition)     no 
44. films/documentaries        definitely not 
45. good governance and accountability      doubtful 
46. joint or hybrid tribunals   (request definition)    no 
47. joint memorials or ceremonies    (request definition)    definitely not 
48. legislative admission of wrongdoing     (request definition)      no  
49. opening archives and records      (request definition)   definitely not 
50. peace education   (request definition)      not really  
51. regular joint meetings    (request definition)     no   (repeat idea) 
52. (re)writing history     (request definition)      no 
53. special courts      (request definition)    no 
54. theater and storytelling        (request definition)    no 
55. traditional methods       (request definition)    no 
56. travel/tourism       no 
57. workshops/dialogue           (request definition)    no 
58. positive media coverage      maybe   
59. criminal trials     no       ( NOTE: suggests there are too many unknown methods and some of 
 those are repeated in the survey (e.g. trials or exchanges). Suggests tables so respondents can 
 rank.) 
How important do you think these are to conflict resolution? 
60. honor       not  important 
61. dignity    a little  
62. respect        important 
63. satisfaction of interests        if you can 
64. satisfaction of the needs      if possible 
65. mutual benefit      if possible 
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66. justice      when possible  
67. truth       when possible 
68. accountability       same (when possible) 
Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer 
the following questions. 
69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it?   maybe  
70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens?     no 
71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed?  ---- 
72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens?     no 
73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed?  --- 
74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you?    Not important 
75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government?   Important. We 
 are intervening there. 
76. . … are to Iraqi citizens?    Not so much. 
77. . … are to the U.S. Government?      Important. Oil. 
78. . … are to U.S. citizens?      Not  important. Too far away. 
79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states?    Maybe. But how? 
80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations?   Yes 
81. Do you think that it is necessary for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations?   They 
 should.. 
82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence?      A slight possibility. 
83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence?     probably 
Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving 
U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?  
84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing?       no  
85. maintaining economic relations?       I might. 
86. maintaining political relations?         I might.. 
87. establishing channels of communication         perhaps 
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88. formal agreements or treaties       doesn't help much 
89. gestures of solidarity      no 
90. joint institutions/cooperation         might be helpful 
91. joint projects/ reconstruction        aren't we reconstructing, so yes 
92. military signaling          no 
93. official state visits         no 
94. political cooperation          maybe  
95. security cooperation        it is in our interest-Middle East 
96. apologies         no 
97. showing forgiveness        no 
98. international tribunals          no 
99. promote religious and cultural awareness        no 
100. restitution/reparations        no 
101. third party intervention        a remote possibility 
102. truth commissions       remote  
103. archiving testimonies         no 
104. granting amnesty        no 
105. exchange of representatives        no 
106. face-to-face encounters        no, only helps those involved 
107. films/documentaries           no 
108. good governance and accountability         no 
109. joint or hybrid tribunals         no 
110. joint memorials or ceremonies         no 
111. legislative admission of wrongdoing         no – they put us here 
112. opening archives and records         no 
113. peace education        no – don't understand idea  
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114. regular joint meetings          no 
115. (re)writing history           no 
116. special courts        no (repeat, not overjoyed by reference) 
117. theater and storytelling           no 
118. traditional methods         no 
119. travel/tourism         no 
120. workshops/dialogue           no 
121. positive media coverage      maybe  
122. criminal trials    no   (repeat)    (NOTE: repeats, long) 
123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration 
           when drafting its Middle East policy?    no  
124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq?    Yes. No war. 
125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict?   Not at all. 
126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration?     Yes. 
127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations?     Sounds good. 
128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War?        No, we have been doing that. 
129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.?       No. Why? 
130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?    no 
131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war?     Maybe. 
Notes: Survey too long and repeats, need many definitions. Likes idea of providing scales rather than 
open-ended questions. 
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Pilot Questions                Pilot Number:  10  Date:  Oct. 3, 2010 
Location:  UIBK library 
I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between 
people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a 
few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes 
your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time. 
1. What is your nationality?  USA 
2. Gender:    male 
3. Age:      21 
4. Level of education:  high school 
5. Ethnicity:    white 
6. Religion:   none    
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend?     Yes 
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your 
everyday  life?      Not at all. I don't interact with them. 
9. Are conflicts normal?       yes 
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent?     No. An argument is a conflict but not 
violent. 
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive?   Either. Depends on 
how it is  expressed. 
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive?  
 Negative. Destructive. 
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved?     No. Impossible to solve all problems.   
14. Should a conflict be solved?     Yes. I can see benefits from this. 
15. Can a conflict be prevented?     Sometimes, yes. 
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits?     Anything is possible. 
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two 
states?   No.  Different magnitude. 
18. Do you think that it is possible for two states to resolve a conflict after violence?     
Yes 
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence?    Yes 
20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution?     No. Definitely not. 
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21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation?   
Not very  likely. 
When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you 
think the following methods are for improving relations? 
22. showing forgiveness     not 
23. economic aid/assistance        sort of 
24. economic cooperation          sort of 
25. establishing channels of communication       talking is positive 
26. formal agreements or treaties      maybe   
27. gestures of solidarity    (request definition)    no 
28. joint institutions/cooperation   (request definition)   maybe  
29. joint projects/ reconstruction      perhaps  
30. military signaling      (request definition)     maybe 
31. official state visits        no 
32. political cooperation         maybe  
33. security cooperation           perhaps 
34. apologies         perhaps 
35. international tribunals         no 
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness      no  
37. restitution/reparations      no 
38. third party intervention         no 
39. truth commissions     (request definition)  no  
40. archiving testimonies      (request definition)     no 
41. granting amnesty        no 
42. exchange of representatives    (request definition)     no 
43. face-to-face encounters     (request definition)     no 
44. films/documentaries        definitely not 
45. good governance and accountability      no 
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46. joint or hybrid tribunals   (request definition)    no 
47. joint memorials or ceremonies   (request definition)    no 
48. legislative admission of wrongdoing  (request definition)    no  
49. opening archives and records      (request definition)   no 
50. peace education   (request definition)   no 
51. regular joint meetings    (request definition)    no  
52. (re)writing history     (request definition)   no 
53. special courts    (request definition)   no 
54. theater and storytelling    (request definition)    no 
55. traditional methods    (request definition)    no 
56. travel/tourism         no 
57. workshops/dialogue           (request definition)    no 
58. positive media coverage      perhaps   
59. criminal trials     no        ( NOTE: very long, mix ideas to reduce 
size) 
How important do you think these are to conflict resolution? 
60. honor       not very important 
61. respect       maybe  important 
62. satisfaction of interests    important 
63. satisfaction of the needs      important 
64. mutual benefit      important 
65. justice      sometimes important  
66. truth       if it can be revealed 
67. accountability       same (when possible) 
Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please 
answer the following questions. 
68. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it?   
maybe  
69. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens?     no 
  
603 
 
70. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed?       ---- 
71. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens?       Not 
important. 
72. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed?      --- 
73. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you?    Not at all 
74. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government?   
Important. We  are intervening there. Must mean it is 
important. 
75. . … are to Iraqi citizens?    No 
76. . … are to the U.S. Government?      Important. Middle East. Political and economic 
interests. 
77. . … are to U.S. citizens?      No 
78. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states?    Yes, it 
should. 
79. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations?     Yes 
80. Do you think that it is necessary for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations?     
Yes 
81. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence?      maybe 
82. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence?      maybe  
Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for 
improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?  
83. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing?         no  
84. maintaining economic relations?      yes 
85. maintaining political relations?      yes 
86. establishing channels of communication       yes 
87. formal agreements or treaties       no 
88. gestures of solidarity      no 
89. joint institutions/cooperation        no 
90. joint projects/ reconstruction      no 
91. military signaling          no 
92. official state visits          no 
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93. political cooperation          no 
94. security cooperation       maybe  
95. apologies           no 
96. showing forgiveness          no 
97. international tribunals           no 
98. promote religious and cultural awareness           no 
99. restitution/reparations           no, reconstruction is enough 
100. third party intervention         no 
101. truth commissions        no  
102. archiving testimonies           no 
103. granting amnesty          no 
104. exchange of representatives          no 
105. face-to-face encounters           no 
106. films/documentaries           no 
107. good governance and accountability          no 
108. joint or hybrid tribunals       no 
109. joint memorials or ceremonies         no 
110. legislative admission of wrongdoing           no 
111. opening archives and records           no 
112. peace education          no  
113. regular joint meetings           no 
114. (re)writing history         no 
115. special courts       no 
116. theater and storytelling           no 
117. traditional methods         no 
118. travel/tourism         no 
119. workshops/dialogue           no 
120. positive media coverage        perhaps 
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121. criminal trials       no                 (NOTE: too much information, shorten) 
122. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into 
consideration  when drafting its Middle East policy?    
Ideally, yes. They might appreciate that.  
123. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq?      Yes. 
124. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict?     Not 
important. 
125. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration?     
Naturally.. 
126. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations?   Whenever possible. People 
should have  a say. 
127. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War?       No. 
128. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.?       No. 
129. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?    No. 
130. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war?     Maybe. 
Notes: respondent believes there are too many unrecognizable methods, which slows down 
survey process for questions to be asked. Recommends reducing number of items and the 
survey by eliminating these obscure items, consolidated methods to avoid repeat of basic 
ideas, provide scales rather than open-ended questions. 
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Appendix 7: Combined Pilot 11-20 
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Appendix 8: Combined Pilot 21-25 
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